ZELENKA v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, No. 2:2011cv01442 - Document 10 (W.D. Pa. 2013)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 6 plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 8 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 3/11/13. (kw)
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ZELENKA v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY Doc. 10 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA MELISSA ZELENKA, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 11-1442 CAROLYN W. COLVIN,l COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER AND NOW, this of the parties' ~f March, 2013, upon due consideration cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for supplemental security income ("SS1") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No.8) be, and the same hereby is, granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 6) be, and the same hereby is, denied. As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and may rej ect or discount reasons for doing so. Cir. 1999). '!i:l.AOn (Rev. 8/82) any evidence if Plummer v. Apfel, the ALJ explains the 186 F.3d 422, (3d 429 Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by lCarolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 14, 2013. Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) I Carolyn W. Colvin is substituted for Michael J. Astrue as the defendant in this case. Dockets.Justia.com substantial findings, evidence, even differently. 2001). if it a reviewing would Fargnoli v. Moreover, it is have court bound the decided Massanari, well is factual 247 F. 3d 34, settled determined merely by the presence of that by 38 disability impairments, those inquiry (3d Cir. is not but by the effect that those impairments have upon an individual's ability to perform substantial gainful activity. 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991). These Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d well-established principles preclude a reversal or remand of the ALJ's decision here because the record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ' s findings and conclusions. Plaintiff filed her application for SSI on January 14, 2009, alleging disability beginning on February 1, 2007, due to bipolar disorder, depression, drug problems, blood clots in her lungs and a hernia. request, an ALJ held a hearing on June 24, 2010. 2010, At plaintiff's Plaintiff's application was denied. On September 15, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff is not disabled. The Appeals Council denied plaintif f' s request for review on September 15, 2011, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. The instant action followed. Plaintiff, who has a ninth-grade education, was 28 years old when the ALJ issued his decision and is classified as a younger individual under the regulations. 20 C.F.R. §416.963(c). Plaintiff has past relevant work experience as an assembler and a dishwasher, but she has not engaged in substantial activity at any time since filing her application. f!l.AOn (Rev. 8/82) - 2 gainful After reviewing plaintiff's medical records and hearing testimony from plaintiff and a vocational expert at the hearing, the ALJ concluded meaning of the Act. that plaintiff is not disabled within the Although the medical evidence established that plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments of bipolar disorder, schizoaffective disorder and a history of polysubstance abuse, those impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or equal the criteria of any of the listed impairments set forth in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Regulation No.4 ("Appendix 1") . The ALJ found that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform work at all exertional levels, restricted by certain non-exertional limitations. but she is In that regard, plaintiff is limited to performing simple, repetitive tasks in a low stress work environment that does not require interaction with the general public (collectively, the "RFC Finding"). As a result of these limitations, the ALJ determined that plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work. based upon the vocational expert's testimony, However, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff's age, educational background, work experience and residual functional capacity enable her to perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, such as a machine presser, laundry worker or sorter. Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The Act defines "disability" as the inability to engage in ~A072 (Rev. 8182) - 3 substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental impairment that can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a) (3) (A). The impairment or impairments must be so severe that the claimant "is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a) (3) (B). " The Commissioner has promulgated regulations that incorporate a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. The ALJ must determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether she has a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether her impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in Appendix Ii (4) if not, whether the claimant's impairment prevents her from performing her past relevant work; and (5) if so, whether the claimant can perform any other work that exists in the national economy, in light of her age, residual functional capacity.2 education, work experience and 20 C.F.R. §416.920(a) (4). If the claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary. Id. In this case, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step 5 2 Res idual functional capacity is defined as that which an individual still is able to do despite the limitations caused by her impairments. 20 C.F.R. §416.945(a) (1); 247 F.3d at 40. In assessing a claimant's residual functional capacity, the ALJ is required to consider her ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory and other requirements of work. 20 C.F.R. §416.945(a) (4). 'll.hAon (Rev. 8/82) - 4 of the sequential evaluation process because: (1) he gave inadequate weight to the opinion of a consultative psychologist who examined heri (2) he placed too much weight on the opinion of a non-examining state agency psychologist who reviewed plaintiff's records; that (3) he improperly substituted his own lay opinion for of medical experts when he made observations plaintiff's demeanor at the administrative hearing; Finding does not match the concerning (4) his RFC RFC contained in the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert; and (5) the hypothetical question was otherwise inadequate. The court finds that each of these arguments lack merit. Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ gave inadequate weight to the opinion of Dr. Linda Rockey, who performed psychological consultative examination of plaintiff. a one-time According to the regulations, the ALJ will give an opinion the weight he deems appropriate based on such factors as whether the physician treated or examined the claimant, whether the opinion is supported by medical signs and laboratory findings and whether the opinion is consistent with the record as a whole. See 20 C.F.R. §§416.927(c) (1)-(4). In light of these factors, the ALJ properly determined Rockey's weight. Dr. that Dr. opinion should be little (R. 15). Rockey concluded that plaintiff would have difficulty interacting with others at work, complex work tasks, comprehending and completing adapting to changes, meeting deadlines and maintaining consistent employment on a daily basis. 'li>.AOn (Rev. 8182) given - 5 (R. 442). The ALJ concluded that Dr. Rockey's assessment was entitled to little appeared weight plaintiff's because subjective it to complaints, be based which the primarily ALJ found on not entirely credible,3 and because her assessment was not supported by other evidence of record. (R. In that regard, 15). the ALJ discussed records from Dr. Urrea and Dr. Gupta, two of plaintiff's treatment providers, which restrictive assessment. did not support Dr. Rockey's After reviewing the record, the court finds no error in the ALJ's consideration and weighing of Dr. Rockey's opinion, and further notes that despite giving Dr. Rockey's opinion little weight, the ALJ nevertheless incorporated some of her assessment into the RFC Finding by limiting plaintiff to simple, repetitive tasks in a low stress work environment and no interaction with the public. The court similarly finds no error in the ALJ's consideration of, and reliance upon, the assessment of Dr. Kerry Brace, a nonexamining state agency psychologist who reviewed plaintiff's records and completed a residual functional capacity assessment of plaintiff's ability to perform various mental work-related tasks. (R. 446-49). Dr. Brace determined that plaintiff was not significantly limited in her ability to understand, remember and 3 Plaintiff complains that it was inappropriate for the ALJ to reject Dr. Rockey's opinion because it was based on plaintiff's subjective complaints to the doctor. To be clear, the ALJ concluded Dr. Rockey's opinion was entitled to little weight because it was based on plaintiff's subjective complaints, which the ALJ found to be lacking credibility, and because Dr. Rockey's opinion was inconsistent with the other record evidence. (R. 15). Thus, the ALJ did not simply reject Dr. Rockey's opinion because it was based on plaintiff's representations to her; rather, it was one of the factors which the ALJ took into account when considering and weighing Dr. Rockey's assessment. "Aon (Rev. 8182) - 6 carry out short and simple instructions, limited in her instructions. ability (R. to 446). do Dr. so with but she was markedly respect to detailed Brace also found plaintiff was markedly limited in her ability to interact appropriately with the general public. great weight, (R. 447). (R. 16), The ALJ gave Dr. Brace's assessment and relied upon it to fashion the RFC Finding which limited plaintiff to simple, repetitive tasks in a low stress work environment that does not involve interaction with the general public. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly gave great weight to Dr. Brace's opinion, in part because the opinion was outdated by the time the ALJ conducted the Contrary to plaintiff's position, administrative hearing. the regulations specify that state agency psychological consultants, such as Dr. Brace, "are highly qualified . . . psychologists. . who are also experts in Social Security disability evaluation. Therefore, administrative law judges must consider findings and other opinions of State agency medical and psychological consultants as opinion evidence, except for the ultimate determination about whether [a claimant is] disabled." Consistent with 20 C.F.R. §416.927 (e) (2) (i). the regulations, the Third Circuit has recognized that the opinions of state agency consultants merit significant consideration. Security, 667 F.3d 356 In Chandler v. Commissioner of Social (3d Cir. 2011), the Third Circuit determined the ALJ in that case properly relied on the state agency medical consultant IS RFC assessment ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 7 in support of his decision to deny the claimant's application for benefits, noting that the ALJ did not merely rubber stamp the medical consultant's RFC determination, but rather considered the evidence as a whole. Id. at 361-62. Likewise, here, the ALJ was entitled to rely on, and accord great weight to, Dr. Brace's mental RFC assessment of plaintiff. As in Chandler, the ALJ did not simply rubber stamp Dr. Brace's opinion, but rather found the opinion to be consistent with the totality of the evidence and incorporated it into the RFC Finding. Moreover, to the extent plaintiff suggests that the lapse of time between Dr. Brace's assessment in April 2009 and the administrative hearing in June 2010, made it inappropriate for the ALJ to rely on Dr. Brace's opinion, that argument in Chandler, the Third Circuit rejected stating that \\ [t] he Social Security regulations impose no limit on how much time may pass between a report and the ALJ's decision in reliance on it. 361. II 667 F. 3d at It is for the ALJ to determine whether subsequent medical evidence impacts the earlier findings, id., citing SSR 96-6p, and after considering all of the evidence, the ALJ did not so conclude in this case. Plaintiff is also incorrect that the ALJ improperly made observations concerning plaintiff's demeanor at the administrative hearing and then relied upon his own lay opinion to deny benefits. As plaintiff suggests, the Third Circuit has had held that an ALJ may not experts. substitute his own lay for that of medical In Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 318 (3d Cir. 2000), ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) opinion - 8 our appellate court stated, "[a]lthough an ALJ may consider his own claimant observations of the and this second-guess the ALJ's credibility judgments, Court cannot they alone do not carry the day and override the medical opinion of a treating physician that is supported by the record." In this case / however / opinion evidence based the ALJ did not disregard medical solely on his own observations and impressions of plaintiff / s demeanor at the administrative hearing. Rather, the ALJ discussed and relied upon medical evidence from Dr. Urrea and Dr. Gupta and from Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic to conclude that plaintiff did not suffer disabling mental impairments and, in connection with that analysis, he so noted that plaintiff did not appear either hyperactive or noticeably depressed at the administrative hearing. (R. 16). As the ALJ/s opinion makes clear, he first and foremost relied upon the medical evidence of record, plaintiff/s but also noted that his own impression of demeanor at the hearing further supported the conclusion that she did not suffer disabling mental impairments. The ALJ/s analysis and reference to plaintiff/s demeanor at the hearing was proper. See Garcia v. Commissioner Security, 94 Fed. Appx. 935/ 940 41 (3d Cir. 2004) substantial evidence supported the ALJ/s of Social (holding that reference to the claimant's demeanor at the administrative hearing, where the ALJ also considered reports of examining physicians that did not match the claimant's subjective complaints of disabling limitations). Plaintiff's final arguments concern the ALJ's RFC Finding and 'lll!.A072 (Rev. 8182) - 9 hypothetical contends question that the to' the ALJ's RFC vocational Finding did expert. not Plaintiff match the RFC contained in the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert, and the hypothetical question is otherwise inadequate because it did not include limitations found by Dr. Rockey. Plaintiff is incorrect on both accounts. At the administrative hearing, the ALJ asked the vocational expert a hypothetical question that limited plaintiff to jobs involving simple, repetitive tasks that did not require working with the public. (R. 53). The ALJ's RFC Finding set forth in his decision limited plaintiff to simple, repetitive tasks performed in a low stress work environment that did not involve interaction with the general public. ALJ's hypothetical (R. 13). question to Plaintiff complains that the the vocational expert at the hearing did not reference a low stress work environment, which the ALJ later included in the RFC Finding, thus there is no expert testimony to address whether jobs exist for someone like plaintiff who cannot handle work stress. Contrary to plaintiff's position, the ALJ's hypothetical question to the vocational expert adequately conveyed plaintiff's limitations, including her need to work in a low stress environment, even though he did not specifically include the words "low stress" in his hypothetical. In Menkes v. Astrue, 262 Fed. Appx. the 410, 412 (3d Cir. 2008), Third Circuit held that "performing a 'simple routine task' typically involves low stress level work that does not require ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 10 maintaining sustained concentration." limiting Accordingly, plaintiff to the ALJ's simple, hypothetical repetitive tasks question sufficiently covered her need to work in a low stress environment. Plaintiff's final argument is that the ALJ's hypothetical question to the vocational expert did not account for all of the limitations caused by her impairments, including those identified by Dr. Rockey. reflect all An ALJ's hypothetical to a vocational expert must of the claimant's impairments supported by the medical evidence. 1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987). and limitations Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d Here, the ALJ's hypothetical incorporated all of plaintiff's functional limitations that the evidence of record supported, including all of the factors that were the basis of the RFC Finding. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in relying on the vocational expert's testimony to conclude that plaintiff can perform work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy In conclusion, after carefully and methodically considering all of the medical evidence of record, the ALJ determined that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. ALJ's findings and conclusions are supported evidence and are not otherwise erroneous. by substantial Therefore, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed. ~~ . Gustave Diamond United States District Judge 'Ill.A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 11 The cc: Karl E. Osterhout, Esq. 521 Cedar Way Suite 200 Oakmont, PA 15139 Christy Wiegand Assistant u.S. Attorney 700 Grant Street Suite 4000 Pittsburgh, PA 15219 '1&AO 72 (Rev. 8/82) - 12
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