NEILL v. ASTRUE, No. 2:2010cv01687 - Document 12 (W.D. Pa. 2012)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 8 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 10 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 3/26/12. (gpr)
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NEILL v. ASTRUE Doc. 12 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA PATRICIA A. NEILL, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 10-1687 MICHAEL J. AS TRUE , COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER AND NOW, this of the parties' ~~ of March, 2012, upon due consideration cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ( "Commissioner" ) denying plaintiff's application for supplemental security income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act ("Act"), IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 10) be, and the same hereby is, granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Document No.8) be, and the same hereby is, denied. As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") has an obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and may rej ect or discount reasons for doing so. any evidence if Plummer v. Apfel, the ALJ explains 186 F.3d 422, 429 the (3d 'Il>.AOn (Rev. 8/82) Cir. 1999). Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by Dockets.Justia.com substantial findings, evidence, even differently. 2001). if it a reviewing would Fargnoli v. have court is the decided Massanari, bound factual 247 F. 3d 34, by 38 those inquiry (3d Cir. These well-established principles preclude a reversal or remand of the ALJ I substantial S decision here because the record contains evidence to the support ALJ I s findings and conclusions. Plaintiff protectively filed her application for 88I on March 31, 2008, alleging a disability onset date of January 15, 2008, due to "unstable, uncontrolled anger" and depression. application was denied initially. Plaintiff's At plaintiff's request, an ALJ held a hearing on June 24, 2009, at which plaintiff, represented by counsel, On July 30, appeared and testified. issued a decision finding plaintiff not disabled. 2009, the ALJ On November 29, 2010, the Appeals Council denied review making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff was 39 years old at the time of the ALJ's decision and is classified as a younger person under the regulations. C.F.R. §416.963(c). Plaintiff has a high school 20 equivalency education and has past relevant work experience as a cashier, dishwasher and deli worker, but she has not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date. After testimony reviewing from plaintiff's plaintiff and a medical records vocational and expert, hearing the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The ALJ found that although the medical evidence establishes ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 2 that plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments of depression and anxiety, those impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or equal the criteria of any impairment listed at Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P. The ALJ also found that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to engage in work at any exertional level but with certain non-exertional restrictions accounting limitations arising from her mental impairments. 1 for the Relying on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that although plaintiff cannot perform her past relevant work, she retains the residual functional capacity to perform jobs significant numbers in the national economy, cleaner, laundry worker and hand packager. existing in such as hospital Accordingly, the ALJ determined that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The Act defines IIdisabilityll as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § l382c (a) (3) (A). The impairment or impairments must be so severe that the claimant lIis not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind 1 Specifically, the ALJ found that plaintiff has the following non-exertional limitations: she is limited to performing simple, routine repeti ti ve tasks; she must perform work in a low- stress environment defined as one involving no high-volume or high-speed production quotas, or complex decisionmaking; and she can have only occasional interaction with the public, coworkers or supervisors. (R. 50). '%AO 72 (Rev. 8/82) - 3 of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy .... " 42 U.S.C. §1382c (a) (3) (B) . The Commissioner has promulgated regulations incorporating a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is under a disability.2 20 C.F.R. §416.920; Newell v. Commissioner of Social Security, 347 F.3d 541, 545 (3d Cir. 2003). If the claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step, the claim need not be reviewed further. Id.; see Barnhart v. Thomas, 124 S.Ct. 376 (2003). Here, plaintiff challenges the ALJ's findings at step 3 and step 5. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that the ALJ: (1 ) improperly evaluated the medical evidence by failing to accord controlling weight to the opinion of her treating physician; and, (2) improperly evaluated plaintiff's subj ecti ve complaints of pain and limitations by finding them to be not fully credible. Upon review, the court is satisfied that all of the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence. First, the court is satisfied that the ALJ's step 3 finding is supported by substantial evidence. '!!!>.Aon (Rev. 8/82) At step 3, the ALJ must 2 The ALJ must determine in sequence: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether she has a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether her impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) if not, whether the claimant's impairment prevents her from performing her past-relevant work; and (5) if so, whether the claimant can perform any other work which exists in the national economy, in light of her age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §416.920. See also Newell, 347 F.3d at 545-46. In addition, when there is evidence of a mental impairment that allegedly prevents a claimant from working, the Commissioner must follow the procedure for evaluating mental impairments set forth in the regulations. Plummer, 186 F.2d at 432; 20 C.F.R. §416.920a. - 4 determine whether equivalent to, the one of claimant's the impairment listed matches, is Burnett impairments. or v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000). adult, The listings describe impairments that prevent an regardless of age, education, performing any gainful activity. (3d Cir. 2000); 20 C.F.R. or work experience, from Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 85 §416.920(d). II If the impairment is equivalent to a listed impairment then [the claimant] disabled and no further analysis is necessary. is per se Burnett, 220 F. 3d II at 119. Here, as required, impairments (Listings that 12.04 the ALJ identified the relevant listed compare and with plaintiff's and 12.06) mental adequately impairments explained why plaintiff's impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or equal the severity of those listed impairments. Burnett, 220 F.3d at 120, n.2. mild restrictions difficult difficult in of In particular, the ALJ found only activities maintaining of social daily living; functioning; moderate moderate in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace; and no episodes of decompensation. that his (R. 49-53); see (R. 50). The ALJ explained finding is consistent with that of the state agency reviewing physician, Dr. Rattan, and with the overall evidence. (R. 207). Because the Listings require marked restrictions or difficulties in at least two of those areas, and there is no evidence that the "C" criteria are satisfied, the ALJ found that plaintiff does not meet or equal any of the listed impairments. <!i!.A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 5 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step 3 by improperly rejecting the opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Rock, who indicated on a medical assessment form that plaintiff has marked restrictions of activities of daily living; marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; marked difficul ties in maintaining concentration, persistence decompensation. or pace; (R. 225). and repeated episodes of She contends that the ALJ improperly relied upon the opinion of the state agency reviewing physician, who is "not as qualified" as her own treating physician, whose opinion should have been accorded controlling weight. The court finds medical evidence. no error in the ALJ's evaluation of the Under the Social Security Regulations and the law of this circuit, opinions of treating physicians are entitled to substantial, and at times even controlling, weight. §416. 927 (d) (2) i Fargnoli, 247 F. 3d at 33. Where 20 C.F.R. a treating physician's opinion on the nature and severity of an impairment is well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record, it will be given controlling weight. Id. When a treating source's opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, it is to be evaluated and weighed under the same standards applied to all other medical opinions, taking into account numerous factors, including the opinion's supportability, consistency and specialization. Here, the ALJ adhered 20 C.F.R. §416.927(d). to evaluating the medical evidence. the standards in The ALJ expressly addressed Dr. ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) foregoing - 6 Rock's opinion in his decision and thoroughly explained why he did not give that particular, opinion the ALJ controlling noted that weight. Dr. (R. Rock's 53-54). opinion is consistent with the overall evidence or his own findings. 53). In not (R. In particular, the ALJ pointed out that Dr. Rock's progress notes consistently indicated that plaintiff was stable and making progress towards medications. her goals and was benefitting from her In fact, on the same day that Dr. Rock checked boxes indicating that plaintiff is per se disabled under Listings 12.04 and 12.06, his own progress notes indicated that she was stable, making progress towards her goals, had no signs or symptoms of depression and/or anxiety consistent with more limitations and had only "some" depression. than moderate (R.54). The court is satisfied that the ALJ's decision not to give controlling weight to substantial evidence. opinion from a Dr. Rock's opinion is supported by First, although the ALJ is to consider an medical source as to whether a claimant's impairment meets a listing, SSR 96 5p, the final responsibility for that issue §416.927(e} (2), is reserved for the Commissioner, i C.F.R. and the opinion of any medical source on that issue is not entitled to any special significance. §416. 927 (e) (3) 20 20 C.F.R. see SSR 96-5p. In addition, as explained by the ALJ, Dr. Rock/s conclusion that plaintiff has marked restrictions in any of the requisite functional areas necessary to satisfy the B criteria of Listings 12.04 and 12.06 is inconsistent with the other evidence of record ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 7 as outlined by the ALJ in his decision, including Dr. Rock's own progress notes as well as the findings of the state agency reviewing physician, Dr. Rattan. Plaintiff's contention that the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Rock's assessment in favor of the opinion of the state agency reviewing physician is unpersuasive. Pursuant to the Regulations, state agency medical consultants are "highly qualified physicians who are evaluation." also experts in Social 20 C.F.R. §416.927(f) (2) (i). Security disability Accordingly, while not bound by findings made by reviewing physicians, the ALJ is to consider those findings as opinion evidence, and is to evaluate them under evidence. the same standards as all 20 C.F.R. §416.927(f) (2) (ii) i other medical SSR 96-6p. opinion The ALJ did so here and determined that Dr. Rattan's conclusions were entitled to greater weight than Dr. Rock's because they are more consistent with the overall evidence. The court is satisfied that the ALJ's step 3 analysis is supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred in evaluating the medical evidence at step 5 in assessing plaintiff's residual functional capacity. 3 Specifically, plaintiff alleges that the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Rock's opinion that plaintiff has a poor 3 At step 5, the ALJ must show that there are other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant can perform consistent with her medical impairments, age, education, past work experience and residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §416.920(g). Residual functional capacity is that which an individual still is able to do despite the limitations caused by her impairments. 20 C.F.R. §416.945(a) i Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 40. Ill1>.A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 8 ability to relate to co-workers, deal with the public, with supervisors setting. and deal with work stress that the ALJ's in a interac~ usual work (R. 222). However it I is clear residual functionall capacity finding did in fact give credence to Dr. Rock's opinion as to plaintiff's ability to make occupational adjustments! regarding stress and interaction with others, as the ALJ limite plaintiff ter alia, to, a low stress environment with onl occasional interaction with the public, co-workers or supervisors. (R. 50). In assessing plaintiff's residual functional capacity finding, the court is satisfied that the ALJ properly evaluated the medical evidence and accommodated those limitations supported by the overall evidence. Plaintiff also has challenged the ALJ's credibility finding. Allegations of pain and other subjective supported by objective medical evidence, symptoms 20 C.F.R. must be §416.929(c), and an ALJ may reject a claimant's subjective testimony if he does not find it credible so long as he explains why he is rejecting the testimony. Schaudeck v. Commissioner of Social Security, 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999) i see also SSR 96-7p. Here, reasonably the ALJ could be found that expected while to plaintiff's cause impairments plaintiff's alleged symptoms, her statements regarding the intensity, persistence and limiting effects arising from those symptoms are inconsistent with the medical evidence and with her daily activi ties. Additionally, the medical record, 'Aon (Rev. 8/82) - 9 as well as (R. 51). plaintiff's own statements, indicated improvement in her symptoms when she was on medication, and §416.929(c) (3) (iv) authorizes an ALJ to the effectiveness of medication in determining the persistence and Accordingly, limiting effects of a claimant's conside~ intensity,! symptoms. the ALJ concluded that the clinical and objectivel findings are inconsistent with an individual experiencing total I debilitating symptomatology. In assessing (R. 51). credibility subjective complaints, the ALJ considered plaintiff's but also considered those complaints in light of the medical evidence and all of the other evidence of record. 20 C.F.R. §416.929(c) SSR i 96-7p. The ALJ adhered to the appropriate standards set forth in the regulations and SSR 96 -7p and adequately explained the reasons for his credibility finding, which is supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, while it is true, as plaintiff now asserts, sporadic and transitory activities cannot be used to that show an ability to engage in substantial gainful activity, see 247 F.3d at 40, n.5, the ALJ did not do so here. determining plaintiff's residual functional Instead, capacity, in the ALJ properly considered plaintiff's allegations in light of her activities of daily living but also in light of the medical evidence, findings which revealed the absence of clinical and objective supporting debilitating symptoms. plaintiff's (R. allegations of totally 51). It also is important to note that while the ALJ did not find plaintiff's subjective complaints entirely credible, the ALJ did ~A072 (Rev, 8/82) - 10 accommodate plaintiff's allegations as to the limitations arising from her impairment to the extent her allegations are supported by the medical and other evidence. Only to the extent that plaintiff's allegations are not so supported did the ALJ find them to be not credible. The court is satisfied that the ALJ's evaluation of plaintiff's credibility is supported by substantial evidence. Finally, rej ecting the the court finds vocational that expert's the ALJ response did to a not err in hypothetical posited by plaintiff's attorney suggesting an individual who would be off task as a result of crying spells occurring approximately every other day at unpredictab thirty minutes. (R. 40). times and would last for about The vocational expert testified that such an individual would not be capable of sustaining substantial gainful activity. A hypothetical to the vocational expert must reflect only those impairments and limitations supported Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1984). limitation advanced by plaintiff is by the record, The additional supported neither by the objective medical evidence nor by plaintiff's daily activities. Accordingly, the vocational expert's hypothetical properly was disregarded. F.3d SOl, 506 (3d Cir. 2004) response to plaintiff's See Jones v. Barnhart, 364 (ALJ has authority to disregard vocational expert's response to hypothetical inconsistent with evidence) . 'll>.A072 (Rev, 8182) 11 After carefully and methodically considering medical evidence of record and plaintiff s I all testimony I of the the ALJl determined that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. substantial The ALJ s findings and conclusions are supported bYi 1 evidence and are not otherwise erroneous. AccordinglYI the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed. ~~ Gustave Diamond United States District Judge cc: Terry K. Wheeler Esq. 56 Clinton Street Greenville PA 16125 t l Paul Kovac Assistant U.S. Attorney U.S. Post Office & Courthouse 700 Grant Street Suite 4000 Pittsburgh PA 15219 l l "'<hA072 (Rev, 8/82) - 12
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