VAN MOOK v. ASTRUE, No. 2:2010cv00876 - Document 9 (W.D. Pa. 2011)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER denying 5 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 7 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. See Memorandum Judgment Order for further details. Signed by Judge Gustave Diamond on 8/31/11. (gpr)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
VAN MOOK v. ASTRUE Doc. 9 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA ALEXANDER VAN MOOK, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 10-876 MICHAEL J. ASTRUE , COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER AND NOW, this 311t- day of August, 2011, upon due consideration of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to plaintiff's request for review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ( "Commissioner" ) denying plaintiff's application for supplemental security income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act ("Act"), IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Document No. 7) be, and the same hereby is, granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Document No.5) be, and the same hereby is, denied. As the factfinder, an Administrative Law Judge (IIALJ") has an obligation to weigh all of the facts and evidence of record and may reject or discount reasons for doing so. 'A072 Cir. 1999) . any evidence if Plummer v. Apfel, the ALJ explains 186 F.3d 422, 429 the (3d Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by (Rev. 8/82) Dockets.Justia.com substantial findings, evidence, even differently. 2001). if it a reviewing would Fargnoli v. have court decided Massanari, is bound the factual 247 F.3d 34, by 38 those inquiry (3d Cir. These well-established principles preclude a reversal or remand of the ALJ' s decision here because the record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ' s findings and conclusions. Plaintiff protectively filed his application for 88I on June 5, 2006, alleging a disability onset date of February 19, 1990, due to autism, stress and depression. denied initially. Plaintiff's application was At plaintiff's request, an ALJ held a hearing on April 3, 2008, at which plaintiff, represented by counsel, and plaintiff's mother appeared and testified. On April 11, 2008, the ALJ issued a decision finding plaintiff not disabled. On May 12, 2010, the Appeals Council denied review making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff was 24 years old at the time of the ALJ's decision and is classified as a younger individual under the regulations. 20 C.F.R. §416.963{c). C.F.R. §416.964{b) (4). Plaintiff has a high school education. 20 He has no past relevant work experience and he has not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since the date his application was filed. After testimony reviewing from plaintif f' s plaintiff and a medical records vocational and expert, hearing the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The ALJ found that although the medical evidence establishes ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 2 _ that plaintiff suffers from the severe impairment of autism, he does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the criteria of any impairment listed at Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P. The ALJ also found that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform work at all exertional levels but with certain non-exertional restrictions limiting effects of his impairment. 1 resulting from the Relying on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, such as hand packer, vehicle washer and assembler. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The Act defines "disabilityll as the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a) (3) (A). The impairment or impairments must be so severe that the claimant "is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy II 42 U.S.C. §1382c (a) (3) (B) . 1 Specifically, the ALJ found that plaintiff "is limited to the performance of simple, repetitive tasks that do not require dealing with the general public or maintaining close interaction with coworkers. In addition, the ALJ found that plaintiff "should not be required to perform mathematical tasks without a calculator." (R. 13). II II!\l;.A072 (Rev. 8/82) 3 The Commissioner has promulgated regulations incorporating a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is under a disability.2 20 C.F.R. §416.920; Newell v. Commissioner of Social Security, 347 F.3d 541, 545 (3d Cir. 2003). If the claimant is found disabled or not disabled at any step, the claim need not be reviewed further. Id.; see Barnhart v. Thomas, 124 S.Ct. 376 (2003). Here, plaintiff essentially raises ALJ's finding of not disabled: finding that specifically, plaintiff depression, functioning; and, medical two challenges to the (1) the ALJ erred at step 2 by not has additional anxiety and severe borderline impairments, intellectual (2) the ALJ erred at step 5 in evaluating the evidence by accepting the opinion of a non-examining agency physician over that of the consultative examiner and by misinterpreting other medical evidence. satisfied that all of the ALJ's Upon review, the court is findings are supported by substantial evidence. I!!lt,Aon (Rev. 8/82) 2 The ALJ must determine in sequence: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity: (2) if not, whether he has a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether his impairment meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 i (4) if not, whether the claimant's impairment prevents him from performing his past-relevant work: and (5) if so, whether the claimant can perform any other work which exists in the national economy, in light of his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §416.920. See also Newell, 347 F.3d at 545-46. In addition, when there is evidence of a mental impairment that allegedly prevents a claimant from working, the Commissioner must follow the procedure for evaluating mental impairments set forth in the regulations. Plummer, 186 F.2d at 432; 20 C.F.R. §416.920a. 4 Plaintiff first challenges the ALJ's step 2 finding that autism is plaintiff's sole severe impairment. that the ALJ erred by not finding that Plaintiff contends plaintiff's diagnosed conditions of depressive disorder, anxiety disorder and borderline intellectual functioning also are severe impairments. At step two, the ALJ must determine whether a claimant's impairments are severe as defined by the Act. 20 C.F.R. §416.920. "[An] impairment or combination of impairments is not severe if it does not significantly limit your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." inquiry is a 20 C.F.R. §416.920(a). de minimus screening device and, The step two if the evidence presents more than a slight abnormality, the step two requirement of severity is met and the sequential evaluation process should continue. Newell, 347 F.3d at 546. The plaintiff bears the burden at step 2 of establishing that an impairment is severe. See, McCrea v. Commissioner of Social Security, 370 F.3d 357, 360 (3 rd Cir. 2004). Moreover, it is well settled that disability is not determined merely by the presence of a diagnosed impairment, but by the effect that the impairment has upon the individual's ability to perform substantial gainful activity. Thus, Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991). plaintiff's burden was to show that his additional diagnosed impairments resulted in more than a de minimus effect on his ability to perform basic work functions. meet this burden here as to either his Plaintiff failed to depressive/anxiety disorders or his borderline intellectual functioning. ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) 5 Although \\[r)easonable doubts on severity are to be resolved in favor of the claimant, II Newell, 347 F. 3d at 547, there is little doubt that plaintiff's depression and anxiety have no more than a de minimus effect on plaintiff's ability to perform basic work activities and, Although both Dr. Dalton, the therefore, Nadulek, state agency are not severe impairments. the consultative examiner, psychologist, depressive disorder and anxiety disorder noted (R. and Dr. diagnoses 307 i of 319 & 321), neither indicated that either of those disorders have any effect on plaintiff's ability to perform basic work activities. Nor does the record support such a finding. The ALJ noted that plaintiff is not receiving any mental health treatment and that he does not take any medications for depression or anxiety. (R. 14). Moreover, the neuropsychological report from Dr. Petrick dated January 9, 2007, indicates that while plaintiff's history is "significant ll for symptoms of depression,3 those issues primarily were "related to family issues which are now resolved." Dr. Petrick symptoms." plaintiff further (R. 333). with noted that plaintiff (R. 332). "denies any current In fact, Dr. Petrick did not even diagnose either a depressive disorder or an anxiety disorder. Treatment notes from Dr. Antonio Hardan indicate that plaintiff was treated for depression around the age of 15 but by February 29, 2000, there had been "some overall improvement in his symptoms. (R. 213-230). Plaintiff did not return to Dr. Hardan until July of 2005, at which time Dr. Hardan noted "no pervasive symptoms of depression." (R. 231). II "AO 72 (Rev. 8/82) - 6 Likewise, although Dr. Petrick listed a diagnosis of borderline intellectual functioning (R. 338), he did not suggest any limitations on plaintiff's ability to perform basic work activities arising from that impairment, at least not beyond those which also arise from plaintiff's autism, which were accounted for by the ALJ in his residual functional capacity finding. The ALJ noted that plaintiff graduated from high school with a 3.0 grade point average with special education assistance and that he thereafter attended a technical school to study commercial art. 11). (R. The court is satisfied that the ALJ's residual functional capacity finding accounted for all of the limitations in plaintiff's ability to perform basic work activities whether those limitations arose from autism or from borderline intellectual functioning, or both. It also is important to stress that the ALJ did not deny plaintiff's claim for benefits at step 2. Instead, he considered the impact of all of plaintiff's impairments, both severe and not severe, on plaintiff's residual functional plaintiff not disabled at step 5. capacity and found Accordingly, the ALJ's step 2 finding not only is supported by substantial evidence, but also had no effect on the ultimate determination of not disabled. Cf., McCrea v. Commissioner of Social Security, 370 F.3d 357, 360-61 (3 rd Cir. 2004) (the Commissioner's determination to deny an applicant's request for benefits at step 2 "should be reviewed with close scrutiny" because step 2 "is to be rarely utilized as a basis for the denial of benefits".) ~A072 (Rev, 8/82) - 7 Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ's evaluation of the medical evidence. the primarily, he contends that the ALJ improperly accepted opinion of the state agency reviewing psychologist, Dr. Dalton, who concluded that plaintiff "is able to meet the basic mental demands of competitive work on a sustained basis," (R. 315), over the opinion of a consultative examiner, Dr. Nadulek, who opined that plaintiff "should be able to engage in some parttime gainful employment 307) (emphasis added). with structured help." (R. Upon review, the court is satisfied that the ALJ's evaluation of the medical evidence is supported by substantial evidence. Under the regulations, an ALJ is to evaluate every medical opinion received, regardless of its source, and is required to consider numerous factors in deciding the weight to which each opinion is entitled, including, inter alia, the examining and treatment relationship, the specialization of the medical source, the opinion's supportability and consistency and any other factors tending to support §416.927(d). treating, or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. Importantly, the opinion of any physician, whether examining or reviewing, on the issue of what an individual's residual functional capacity is or on the ultimate determination of significance. 20 C.F.R. §416.927(e) Here, the disability ALJ never adhered to j the is entitled to special SSR 96 5p. foregoing standards in evaluating the medical evidence and the court finds no error in the ALJ's conclusions. In particular, ~A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 8 the ALJ expressly considered Dr. Nadulek' s opinion suggesting that plaintif f is limited to part-time work and adequately explained why he did not give it great weight, specifically noting that Dr. Nadulek offered no explanation as to why he believed that plaintiff could only perform work on a part-time basis. (R.14). The court has reviewed Dr. Nadulek's report, along with the other medical evidence, and is satisfied that the ALJ's evaluation is supported by substantial evidence. Dr. Nadulek's opinion that plaintiff is limited to part-time work not only is not explained in his report but also is inconsistent with both his own objective findings and the findings of Dr. Dalton and Dr. Petrick. Plaintiff's contention that the ALJ erred in accepting the opinion of Dr. Dalton, a non-examining reviewer, over that of Dr. Nadulek, who examined plaintiff, is unpersuasive. Initially, the court notes that while plaintiff suggests that the ALJ "chose" Dr. Dalton's opinion over that of Dr. Nadulek, a review of the ALJ's decision shows that the ALJ expressly accorded greater weight "to the evaluation of Dr. Petrick," another consultative examiner, than he did to Dr. Nadulek's, "performed a more thorough evaluation utilizing a objective testing instruments." substantial weight for the reason that Dr. Petrick to Dr. (R. 14). Dalton's number of The ALJ in turn gave opinion, which was more (R.14).4 consistent with Dr. Petrick's. 4 The court finds unpersuasive plaintiff's argument that the ALJ "misinterpreted" Dr. Petrick's opinion. Although plaintiff suggests that the ALJ interpreted Dr. Petrick's opinion to be that plaintiff is presently employable, such an opinion would be on an ~A072 (Rev. 8182) - 9 Moreover, to the extent Dr. Dalton's evaluation was given more weight than Dr. Nadulek's, the ALJ did not err in doing so. Pursuant to the Regulations, state agency medical consultants are "highly qualified physicians ... who are also experts in Social Security disability evaluation." Accordingly, physicians, while not the ALJ is bound 20 C.F.R. by findings to consider those §416.927(f) (2) (i). made by findings reviewing as opinion evidence, and is to evaluate them under the same standards as all other medical opinion evidence. 96-6p. Here, 20 C.F.R. §416.927(f) (2) (ii) i SSR the ALJ determined that Dr. Dalton's conclusions, supported by Dr. Petrick, were entitled to substantial weight and the court finds no error in the ALJ's decision to give less weight to Dr. Nadulek's unsupported opinion that plaintiff can perform only part-time work. SSR 96-2Pi 20 C.F.R. §416.927(d). In sum, the ALJ did a thorough job in addressing the relevant medical evidence and explaining why he gave more weight to the opinions of Dr. Petrick and Dr. Dalton. assessment unexplained substantial medical weight. was evidence findings, in the and is record, Because Dr. Nadulek's inconsistent including with the other objective his opinion was not entitled to significant The court is satisfied that the ALJ's evaluation of the medical evidence is supported by substantial evidence. issue reserved to the Commissioner and would not be entitled to any more significance than Dr. Nadulek's opinion that plaintiff is limited to part-time work. The court is satisfied that the ALJ properly evaluated Dr. Petrick's opinion as to plaintiff's functional limitations and merely used it as support for the ALJ's residual functional capacity finding. 'IloA072 (Rev 8182) - 10 After carefully and methodically considering all medical evidence of record and plaintiff's testimony, of the the ALJ determined that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The ALJ's findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and are not otherwise erroneous. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed. ~~ Gustave Diamond United States District Judge cc: Susan Paczak, Esq. Abes Baumann 810 Penn Avenue Fifth Floor Pittsburgh, PA 15222-3614 Christy Wiegand Assistant U.S. Attorney U.S. Post Office & Courthouse 700 Grant Street, Suite 4000 Pittsburgh, PA 15219 'lli>.A072 (Rev. 8/82) - 11
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
