VAILLANCOURT v. ASTRUE, No. 2:2010cv00347 - Document 13 (W.D. Pa. 2010)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER denying 9 Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 11 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Gary L. Lancaster on 12/29/10. (map)

Download PDF

VAILLANCOURT v. ASTRUE Doc. 13 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA GLENDA VAILLANCOURT, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL 1. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil Action No. 10-347 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Plaintiff, Glenda Vaillancourt, commenced the instant action on March 16,2010, pursuant to 42 U.S.c. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his claims for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") and Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §401 et seq, §1381 et seq. Plaintiff filed an application for SSI and DIB on June 19,2007, alleging that she was disabled since January 1,2003, due to degenerative disc disease and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. (R. at 126-132, 152). Her application was initially denied, and Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") (R. at 58-59). A hearing was held on April 3, 2009, and following this hearing, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled at any time through the date of the decision, and therefore was not eligible for SSI or DIB benefits (R. at 10-18). Plaintiffs request for review by the Appeals Council was denied (R. at 1-3), rendering the Commissioner's decision final under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The instant action challenges the ALJ's decision. Presently pending before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment. Upon analysis and consideration of each submission, and as set forth herein, the decision of the 1 Dockets.Justia.com Administrative Law Judge is affirmed and Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied. I. Standard of Review When reviewing a decision denying DIB and SSI, the district court's role is limited to determining whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the ALJ's findings of fact. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is defined as "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate." Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900,901 (3d Cir. 1995)(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971 ». Additionally, if the ALl's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson, 402 U.S. at 390. A district court cannot conduct a de novo review ofthe Commissioner's decision nor re-weigh evidence of record. Palmer v. Apfel, 995 F.Supp. 549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1998). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, however, the district court must review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. §706. To be eligible for social security benefits under the Act, a claimant must demonstrate that he cannot engage in substantial gainful activity because ofa medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U .S.C. §423(d)( 1)(A); Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581,583 (3d Cir. 1986). The ALJ must utilize a five-step sequential analysis when evaluating the disability status of each claimant. 20 C.F.R. §404 .1520. The ALJ must determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment or a combination of impairments that is severe; (3) whether the medical evidence of the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals the criteria listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404 2 subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) whether the claimant's impairments prevent him from performing his past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant is incapable ofperforming his past relevant work, whether he can perform any other work which exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4). Ifthe claimant is determined to be unable to resume previous employment, the burden shifts to the Commissioner (Step 5) to prove that, given plaintiffs's mental or physical limitations, age, education, and work experience, he or she is able to perform substantial gainful activity in jobs available in the national economy. Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26, 28 (3d Cir. 1986). II. Discussion In support of the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly found Plaintiff s statements as to the intensity of her back, shoulder and knee pain less than fully credible. In the ALJ's decision, it was determined that Plaintiff was not disabled at the fifth step of the sequential evaluation process. (R. at 12-17). The ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, status post hemilaminectomy, status post right knee arthroplasty, status post right shoulder surgery, hyperlipidemia, diabetes mellitus, acid reflux, celiac disease, greater trochanter bursitis, cervicothoracic myalgia and depression, which were deemed to be severe impairments under 20 C.F.R. §404.152l et seq. (R. at 11). The ALJ determined that these impairments did not meet or medically equal the listed impairments found in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., Appx. 1. (R. at 12). The ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to return to her past relevant work, however, she would have the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F .R. 404. 1567(b) except that she must be able to alternate between sitting for 45 minutes and standing for 15 minutes every hour, she must be able to stretch and move about 2-3 minutes each hour, she is limited to 3 simple, routine, repetitive work not performed in a fast paced environment, she must work in a relatively low stress environment with relatively few changes, she must avoid even moderate exposure to dust, fumes, gases, hor and cold temperature extremes, and extreme dampness and humidity, and she cannot perform right arm lifting. (R. at 12). The ALJ concluded that jobs falling within the confines ofPlaintifrs residual functional capacity existed in significant numbers in the local and national economy and she was therefore not disabled under the Act. (R. at 16-17). According to the regulations, there is a two-step process an ALJ must follow in evaluating a claimant's subjective complaints. First, the ALJ must determine whether there is an underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the individual's pain or other symptoms. See SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2. If such an impairment exists, then the ALJ must determine the extent to which the claimant's allegations are credible by evaluating "the intensity and persistence ofthe pain or symptom, and the extent to which it affects the [claimant's] ability to work .." Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the ALJ should consider the objective medical evidence as well as other factors such as the claimant's own statements, the claimant's daily activities, the treatment and medication the claimant has received, any statements by treating and examining physicians or psychologists, and any other relevant evidence in the case record. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c); SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 at *2. In this regard, there must be objective evidence of some condition that could reasonably produce the alleged pain or symptoms but there need not be objective evidence ofthe actual pain or symptoms. See Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1067 (3d Cir. 1993); Green v. Schweiker, 749 F.2d 1066, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984). "An ALl must give serious consideration to a claimant's subjective complaints ofpain, even where those complaints are not supported by objective 4 medical evidence." Mason, 994 F .2d at 1067 (citing Ferguson v. Schweiker, 765 F .2d 31,37 (3d Cir. 1985)). Further, "[w]here medical evidence does support a claimant's complaints of pain, the complaints should then be given 'great weight' and may not be disregarded unless there exists contrary medical evidence." Mason, 994 F.2d at 1067; see also Carter v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 834 F.2d 62,65 (3d Cir. 1987); Ferguson, 765 F.2d at 37. Finally, the ALJ as the finder of fact can reject, partially or fully, subjective complaints ifhe finds them not credible based on other evidence in the record. See Baerga v, Richardson, 500 F.2d 309,312 (3d Cir. 1974). The ALJ is empowered to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and his determination is entitled to deference by this Court. See Van Horn v, Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871,873 (3d Cir. 1983). In the decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause her alleged symptoms, however, Plaintiff's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects was not found to be entirely credible because they were inconsistent with record and Plaintiff's residual functional capacity. (R. at 15). In support of his conclusion the ALJ states the following: Claimant alleges that she suffers from pulmonary impairments, but despite the repeated warnings from her physicians to stop smoking, she continue to smoke. Claimant alleged that she experiences chronic back and knee pain, and limited shoulder mobility, but declined to participate in the recommended treatment modalities to improve her Claimant also refused to consider pain functional abilities. management options suggested by the pain management specialist. Moreover, claimant requested a pain management referral under the guise ofreducing her use ofPercocet, however, once she was referred to pain management, she insisted being prescribed Percocet along with fentanyl. Claimant's activities of daily living are also inconsistent with her allegations of chronic debilitating pain. She reported that she is able to care for young children, prepare meals, ho housework, drive and shop. (R. at 15-16). 5 Plaintiff, in her brief in support of summary judgment, points to medical records the she purports to support her testimony of the intensity of her pain symptoms. (Docket No. 10 at 4-6). These records, however, were cited by the ALl in his consideration ofPlaintiff's residual functional capacity. (R. at 13-15). As a result, the ALl did not improperly disregard or ignore medical evidence in the record. Rather, Plaintiff argues that the ALl did not properly set forth medical evidence that could reasonably be found to dispute Plaintiffs credibility. The ALl did cite to records, however, where Plaintiffs doctors' stated that her back and knees was doing well. Furthermore, the ALl pointed to the treatment notes of Plaintiff's pain specialist, Dr. Oteng, that stated that Plaintiff "dramatized her symptoms" where she routinely reported her pain to be 10 out of lOin intensity. (R. at 647). The Commissioner's brief also points out that the ALl found that Plaintiffs residual functional capacity was less than what the state agency physician opined, thus giving Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt. (R. at 15, 541-47). Because the ALl did not improperly disregard or fail to consider any ofthe medical evidence, and since there exists medical evidence in the record that could reasonably be found to contradict the intensity of Plaintiff s alleged pain symptoms, the ALl's findings as to Plaintiffs credibility is supported by substantial evidence and must be afforded deference. As a result, the ultimate decision by the ALl in finding that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act is supported by substantial evidence in the record and the decision must be affirmed. III. Conclusion In viewing the record as a whole, substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's final decision and therefore it will be affirmed. An appropriate Order follows. 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA GLENDA VAILLANCOURT, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil Action No. 10-347 ORDER AND NOW, this Zq -if; day of December, 2010, and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No.9] is DENIED, and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 11] is GRANTED. - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' c.J. ary L. Lancaster Chief United States District Judge em: All parties of record. 7

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.