CALGON CARBON CORP v. ADA-ES, INC., No. 2:2008cv01355 - Document 215 (W.D. Pa. 2010)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM and ORDER denying 196 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion for New Trial and 198 Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Gary L. Lancaster on 10/14/10. (map)
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CALGON CARBON CORP v. ADA-ES, INC. Doc. 215 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA CALGON CARBON CORP., Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 08-1355 ADA-ES, INC., Defendant. MEMORANDUM Gary L. Lancaster, Chief Judge October 14, 2010 This is primarily a breach of contract action. On July 29, 2010, a jury found that Calgon Carbon had breached its contract with ADA, and awarded ADA $12 million in damages. Calgon has filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, a motion for a new trial, and a motion for amendment of judgment [doc. nos. 196, 198]. In short, Calgon contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, and that the court made numerous errors in instructing the jury, and ruling on evidentiary matters. Calgon also contends that the jury's damages award was the result of "an obvious mathematical error," which this court must correct. Dockets.Justia.com We have reviewed the record as a whole and find that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, and that none of the rulings made by the court require a new trial. Moreover, Calgon has not demonstrated that jury's damages award is so unreasonable as to require court ion. As such, all motions will be denied. I. Factual Background We write relevant facts. for the parties, who are familiar with the We refer other readers to previous memorandum opinions issued in this case for background cts [doc. nos. 145, 175, and 176]. II. Applicable Legal Standards A. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Whenever a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 (a) (1) is not granted at t a l , t moving party may renew the motion after judgment has been ent .R.Civ.P. 50(b}. motion for judgment as a matter of law will "viewing the evidence in the light most A granted only if, to nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could" reach its verdict. Lightning Lube, 2 Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993). In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict, the court cannot reweigh the evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or substitute its version of the facts for the jury's version. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., B. Id.; Fineman v. 980 F.2d 171, 190 (3d Cir. 1992). Motion for a New Trial A moving party may be granted a new trial under Fed. R.Civ.P. 59 even when the court determines that entry of judgment as a matter of law in that party's favor is not appropriate. Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 735-36 (3d Cir. 1988). New trials because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence are proper only when the record shows that the jury's verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the verdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks our conscience. Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1076 (3d Cir. 1996); Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1353 (3d Cir. 1991). C. Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment - Remittitur The Court of Appeals for the consistently held that in order to disturb a Third Circuit has jury verdict, "the damages assessed by the jury must be so unreasonable as to offend the conscience of the Court.H Keller v. County of Bucks, 209 Fed. 3 Appx. 201, 207 (3d Cir. 2006) Inc., 883 F.2d 1223, 1230 Inc., 823 F.2d 768, 771 (citing Motter v. Everest & Jennings, (3d Cir. 1989); Gumbs v. (3d Cir. Pueblo Int' L 1987); and Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 152 (3d Cir. 1979)). Where a court rmines that the jury's damages verdict is unreasonable and not supported by the evidence, the court may not substitute its damages award the jury's; r the court must afford the prevailing party at trial the option of a new trial. Hetzel v. Prince William County, 523 U.S. 208, 211 (1998). III. A. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law 1. Breach of Contract Claim Calgon has moved for judgment as a matter of law on breach of contract claim. According to Calgon, interpretation of the Memorandum of Understanding, its propos expressed as option (a) under Question Number 1 of the verdict slip [doc. no. 182], was the only possible reasonable interpretation of the MOU. As such, Calgon contends that the court erred by including option (b) (ADA's Regardless, proposed interpretation) on the verdict even if it was proper to present option sl (b) to the jury, Calgon argues that ADA presented no evidence in support of its proposed inte (b) improper. ion, making the jury's selection of option gon also argues, 4 in the alternative, that ADA sented no evidence to support the jury's finding that Calgon/s sales to Midwest resulted from ADA's joint marketing activities. [doc. no. 182 1 Question Number 2]. We deny the motion because, upon review of the entire record, we find that the jury's verdict was supported by su At icient evidence in all re summary judgment I resurrected argument that the t aI, we Calgon has identified no new ng the court to change its prior ruling. considered interpretations. rej ected Calgon I snow s proposed interpretation was the only reasonable interpretation of the MOU. cts or law requi court cts. and discussed each party's At proposed As a result l we rejected one of ADA/s theories as a matter of law [doc. no. 176], and we determined that, under the s of this case l the jury could not find that neither party/s proposed interpretation was correct I Therefore l we found that [doc. no. 193 1 p. 12]. options (a) and (b) under Question Number 1 were both reasonable and were both supported by suf cient evidence to warrant submission to the jury. disagrees with the court/s Furthermore l favor of ADA nding does not create legal error. we find no error in the jury's by selecting That Calgon option (b). There sion to rule in was sufficient dence, in the form of witness testimony, documentary evidence, and evidence of the parties' course of performance, to support the jury's decision. 5 The fact that certain pieces of ADA's evidence could support the proposed interpretation that was rejected by court (the "second theory"), as well as the proposed interpretat was submitted to the jury (the "first jury's verdict improper. ory") does not render the [doc. no. 176, p. 4]. The jury was not privy to the discussions in chambers regarding ADA's "f "second" theories. the court during that st" and Nor was the jury privy to the opinion issued by trial that rejected ADA's "second theory." Instead, the court explained in its instructions that each party had a proposed int ation regarding the meaning of the MOU, and directed the jury to select the int retation that they found to be supported by the evidence. We need not reach Calgon's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the jury's finding that the Midwest sales resulted from the ADA-Calgon marketing activities. Question Number 2]. [doc. no. 182, As ADA notes, and Calgon does not challenge, Calgon did not raise this argument in the motion it made at the close of the evidence. However, regardless, we would find that sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict on this issue as well. Al though Calgon submitted evidence to the contrary, ADA submitted evidence proving that the Midwest sales resulted from its efforts. The court is not to reweigh credibility of witnesses, or subst r the jury's version. evidence, dete e its version of the facts Having found that there was suf 6 the cient evidence to support the jury's verdict on this matter, our inquiry must end. Calgon's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the breach of contract claim will be deni 2. Unjust Enrichment Claim Calgon also contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the unjust enrichment claim. render a verdict on this claim. The jury did not We instructed the jury to render a verdict on this claim only if ADA did not prevail on the breach of contract claim. [doc. no. 182]. Because the jury found in favor of ADA on the breach of contract claim, it never reached the unjust enrichment claim. Nevertheless, judgment According as to a matter Calgon, Calgon of law on because s al all that unjust t of ADA's it is entitled enrichment evidence to claim. concerned Calgon's contractual obligation to pay it a commission, and because a contractual obligation precludes the availability of equitable relief, the unjust enrichment claim should not have been submitted to the jury. permitt Calgon also contends that the jury was imprope to consider the value which ADA was compensated by third ADA's testing services, y for ies, in assessing damages. nally, Calgon argues that the jury had no evidence on which to base an award of equitable damages because the court excluded Dr. 7 Pifer's report on this issue. [doc. no. 175]. Aside from the fact that many of Calgon's arguments are hypothetical enrichment thereon, that aim, we and the thus, jury did did not not award reach any the unjust damages ect each argument summarily on the mer based s. The proper scope of ADA's unjust enrichment claim in light of ADA's contract aim was a matter considered by the court and discussed with the parties throughout trial. presented by case ies on the issue and notified the parties of law court research. The court reviewed case law had located through its own independent 1 of this authority was discussed with the and ultimately, ies, the court ruled that we would not allow ADA to pursue the equitable remedy for those periods of time during the term of the MOU. turn, [doc. no. 195, pp. and We, in 186 88]. carefully instructed the jury regarding how the ch of contract c im and the unjust enrichment claim related to each other, and which time periods equitable relief was a possible remedy. Calgon has identified no legal error in the court's conclusion, and presents no new legal authority in support position. its Calgon disagrees with the conclusion we reached at trial is not grounds for entry of judgment as a matter of law. S larly, calculate damages not, it had s we find that had the jury been requi to the unjust enrichment claim, which it was ficient evidence and guidance on which to rna 8 such a finding. The jury instructions included an adequate explanation how to calculate equitable damages, and what the jury could, and could not, consider in formulating an award. Calgon's argument, apart from being hypothetical in nature, is without support, and in no event rises to the level requi to justify entry of judgment as a matter of law on this ground. Calgon's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the unjust enrichment claim will be denied. B. Motion for a New Trial 1. Objections On Same Grounds Raised in Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Calgon moves for a new t reasons as discussed above." 1 "on all claims for the same Just as none of the grounds asserted above warrant entry of judgment as a matter of law, none of them warrant a new trial. The jury's ve ct was not contrary to the great weight of the evidence, does not cry out to be overturned, or conscience, nor did it resu shock on any of the grounds discussed above. in a miscarriage of justice We deny Calgon's motion on this basis. 2. Objections to Jury Instructions Calgon contends that a new trial is warranted because of numerous errors in the jury instructions. into two categories: first, objections 9 These objections based on a fai 11 to instruct jury regarding ADA's objections based on a failure to "second theory"; instruct on and second, Pennsylvania law regarding oral modifications. We will address the second objection first. instructed that " ... neither party contends that modified or a new oral contract was agreed to." unnecessary, court to offer instructions jury, explaining regarding oral contract modification. the for the law Thi s obj ection is wholly to justify al. The remaining objections regarding court's failure to jury that ADA's "second theory" had been rejected, instruct failure was it was Pennsylvania without merit, and does not meet the standards requi a new t MOU As such, and would have been confusing to then The jury was to explain the difference between ADA's " rst" and "second" theory, and failure to instruct the jury "on how it was to meet testimony of one of ADA's witnesses likewise do not " inte the stringent requirements grant of a new t a l . forth above warranting the The jury did not know what ADA's "first" theory and "second" theory were. was not set As we scussed above, the jury ivy to any in-chambers discussions, or court opinions, on the matter. ADA was never permitted to a its "second theory" to the jury. The jury was cautioned during trial that it would determine the proper way to interpret the MOU. The jury received detailed instructions regarding how to make that determination, as 10 well as how testimony. to judge the weight and credibility of witness It would have been improper, and confusing to the jury, to present an alternative proposed interpretation of the MOU and then direct the jury not to consider it. Regardless, failure to do so did not result in a verdict that was contrary to the great weight of the evidence, cries out to be overturned, shocks the conscience, or results in a miscarriage of justice. 3. Objections to Verdict Slip Next Calgon objects to the court's wording of Question Number l(b) on the verdict slip, its removal of option l(c), and its inclusion of Question Numbers 4 and 5 (unjust enrichment). First, Calgon objects to the word "commenced" being used in Question Number l(b) on the ground that the word allowed ADA to present its rejected "second theory" to the jury. not the case. to the That is simply ADA was not permitted to argue its "second theory" jury and the court instructed the jury repeatedly and precisely on the proposed interpretation being advanced by each party. Use of the word "commenced" did not inj ect the "second theory" into the case, or result in errors warranting a new trial. Calgon next objects to the removal of option l(c) under Question Number 1 of the verdict slip. In short, proposed option l(c) allowed the jury to find that neither party had proven that its proposed interpretation of the MOU was correct. 11 The court expl itly addressed the removal of Question Number l(c) from the ve ct slip with the parties several times during t a l . Because both parties agreed that the MOU was a valid contract, the court found that option l(c) could not produce a valid jury verdict based on the evidence admitted at t pp. 202-206]. al. [doc. nos. 193, p. 12 and 195, That Calgon still disagrees with this finding does not result in a manifest injustice, t or otherwise warrant a new al. Finally, we have previously addressed the propriety of ructing the jury on the unjust enrichment claim, and need not do so again here. ve ct slip The inclusion of Question Numbers 4 and 5 on the did not result in a miscarriage of justice or otherwise warrant a new trial. 4. Objections to the Admissibility of Evidence Finally, Calgon seeks a new trial on the ground that the court committed numerous errors of law in admitting resulting in a jury verdict that was against evidence, great weight of the evidence. In particular Calgon objects to the admission of: (1) related evidence interpretation; regarding (2) Calgon's to ADA's evidence offi "second theory" of contract (both documentary and testimonial) als' understanding of the commission provisions under the MOUi (3) expert testimony from John Lagarennei and (4) Dr. Pifer's "lump sum" 12 damages calculation. We have already discussed the evidence and jury instructions regarding ADA's rejected "second theory" above, and found them to be proper. The same discussion applies here. The court ru on Calgon's second and fourth objections in the context of motions Calgon has presented no new legal autho y or limine. dence indicating that the rulings made on those motions were contrary to law, otherwise improper. Calgon did not obj ect to Mr. or Lagarenne' s testimony on the basis that it was improper expert testimony at t 1, and therefore, that objection has been wa none of these objections to the admissibil a new t Therefore, y of evidence warrant al. C. Motion to Amend Judgment - Remittitur Calgon has asked the court to alter or amend the jury's damages verdict. Specifically, Calgon asks the court to either replace the jury's lump sum damages award with a pay as you go damages award of $3 million for past lost commissions and 15% commission on future sales to be paid as they occur, or lump sum damages award for both past and future commissions from $12 million to $8.8 million. According to Calgon, the jury's award of $12 million was "an obvious mathematical error". We can sturb the jury's damages verdict only if it is so unreasonable as to o the evidence. conscience of the Court or has no support in Keller v. County of Bucks, 209 Fed. Appx. 201 (3d 13 2006) (citations omitted). We find that Calgon has failed to meet this stringent standard. Although one explanation for the jury's damages award could be that offered by Calgon, that is not the only explanation. Instead, based as ADA points out, all of Dr. on minimum quanti ties and Pifer's calculations were steady prices. Evidence was admitted at trial that Midwest required increased quantities and agreed to increased prices in the past. The jury was free to make, and apparently did make, its own calculations without applying Dr. Pifer's limitations. and cannot That we were not privy to those calculations, recreate them after the fact, does not make the resulting damages verdict unreasonable. Moreover, Calgon does not even allege that the jury's verdict was the result of prejudice or passion. Authority, 273 F.3d 346, 352 (3d Cir. 2001). Evans v. Ra ther, Port Calgon contends that the jury's damages award, at worst, was the result of a mathematical error. unreasonableness, Without any showing of prejudice, passion, or lack of evidence, we will not disturb the jury's damages verdict. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, will be denied. Calgon's post-trial motions An appropriate order will be filed in conjunction with this memorandum. 14 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA CALGON CARBON CORP., Plaintiff, v. ADA-ES, Civil Action No. 08-1355 INC., Defendant. AND NOW this ordered that Calgon's mot no. 196] i .ORDER of October, 2010, it is hereby for judgment as a matter of law [doc. motion for a new trial [doc. no. 196] i alter or amend judgment [doc. no. 198] are DENIED. and motion to
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