"R.D" v. Shohola Camp Ground and Resort, No. 3:2016cv01056 - Document 239 (M.D. Pa. 2019)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 233 MOTION for Reconsideration re 231 Order, Terminate Motions, 230 Memorandum (Order to follow as separate docket entry) of the part of the Order denying Shohola, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Direct Negligence C filed by Shohola Camp Ground and Resort. A Telephonic Case Management Conference is set for 4/23/2019 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on April 12, 2019. (kjn)
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eeable third party harms, it was not dispositive to the finding that Shohola had a duty to protect R.D. See Scampone v. Grane Healthcare Co., 169 A.3d 600, 617 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (finding that a duty existed under the Restatement, and thus an analysis of the Althaus factors would be “superfluous” and “not necessary”). Accordingly, this court did not create a new 8 legal duty; the Restatement, which Pennsylvania has adopted, imposes a duty to protect on Shohola due to the special relationship between the camp and its campers. Additionally, Shohola directs us to a wide variety of out-of-state caselaw and contends that these cases support its position that specific notice was required for it to be held liable in negligence. Initially, we note that, while we cited to some of the same cases in our memorandum, (Doc. 230, at 13, n. 4), we did so only to provide examples of the trend in other jurisdictions of holding summer camps to a high standard of care, as Pennsylvania does. Our decision to impose a duty on Shohola was based solely on Pennsylvania law, as Pennsylvania law is controlling in this case. These out-of-state holdings, therefore, do not compel us as a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction to discount the existing law in Pennsylvania. Indeed, it would be a derogation of our duty to faithfully apply state law in this diversity lawsuit if we discounted applicable Pennsylvania law in favor of the law of a foreign jurisdiction. Shohola also asserts that this Court, in imposing a duty upon it to protect its campers, held the defendant to a higher standard of care than the law requires. Shohola relies on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 316 and argues that it cannot be held to a standard beyond that of a reasonable parent who knew of his or her child’s dangerous propensities. As we have already explained, § 316 is not applicable in this case. Additionally, our ruling on the summary judgment motion does not hold the 9 camp to a higher standard of care than is legally required. Sections 314A and 315 of the Restatement imposes a duty upon the camp to protect those with whom it has a special relationship. Our decision denying summary judgment on the plaintiff’s negligence claim imposes that duty, and nothing more. Finally, the defendant asserts that our holding that the inappropriate conduct in this case was foreseeable sets a dangerous precedent that will essentially open Pandora’s box in the realm of tort liability. Shohola argues that, under our holding, any person who is supervising a child in any type of situation will be liable if a sexual assault occurs. (Doc. 238, at 18). However, our holding is not so broad. Contrary to the defendant’s contention, we did not hold that “it is reasonably foreseeable that children without a known propensity will rape each other.” (Id.) Rather, we held that, in this case, it was foreseeable to the camp that inappropriate conduct could occur between campers absent appropriate supervision. (Doc. 230, at 14-16). In so holding, we relied on binding precedent from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1993), which held that foreseeability in the context of duty refers to a general type of risk, not a specific chain of events. Id. at 1369. We cannot simply abandon this binding precedent in favor of the defendant’s specific propensity approach, which we have explained is inapplicable in this case. 10 Furthermore, in addition to relying on Third Circuit precedent, we also relied on the fact that the camp’s own supervisors were subjectively aware of the general risk of inappropriate behavior occurring between campers. The deposition testimony of the camp’s directors, the camp’s manuals for its staff, and the camp’s supervisory procedures all indicate that the camp was aware that there was a general likelihood of inappropriate behavior occurring if supervision of the campers was lacking. There were procedures put in place by the camp to prevent such behavior and to deal with the behavior if it occurred. Thus, our holding does not expand the liability of this camp to any and every situation in which a person is supervising a child, like the parade-of-horribles argument presented by the defendant would suggest. Our ruling simply holds that, on the facts before us in this particular case, this defendant had a duty to this plaintiff to adequately supervise and protect him. Whether Shohola breached that duty is a question to be decided by a jury. Thus, there has been no clear error of law, and the defendant’s motion to reconsider will be denied. III. Order AND NOW, this 12th day of April 2019, in accordance with this memorandum, the defendant’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED. In light of this ruling, a brief telephonic case management conference would be in order to discuss the future course of this litigation. Accordingly, subject to counsel’s availability, a telephonic case management conference will be held in the above11 captioned case on April 23, 2019 at 10:00 a.m.. The plaintiff shall initiate the call, ensuring that all parties are on the telephone line, before contacting the Court at telephone number 717-614-4120. /s/ Martin C. Carlson Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge 12
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