MINA v. ENET ADVERTISING et al, No. 2:2014mc00254 - Document 2 (E.D. Pa. 2015)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDWARD G. SMITH ON 2/10/2015. 2/11/2015 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED.(lbs, )
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MINA v. ENET ADVERTISING et al Doc. 2 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA ANTHONY STOCKER MINA, Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-MC-254 v. ENET ADVERTISING, OPTIMA WEB DESIGN, RON SHUR, NICKOLAI POTAPOV, and JUDGE JOHN L. BRAXTON, Deendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION February 10, 2015 Smith, J. This matter has come beore the court on an application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") and a motion for relief under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed by the pro se plainti. In the motion, the plaintif is essentially seeking relief from an order entered in a state-court civil action. Although it appears that the plaintif is entitled to proceed IFP, his attempt to use Rule 60(b) to overturn a state-court civil order is wholly improper and, as such, the court grants the application to proceed IFP but denies the motion or relie. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY This action represents one of multiple actions iled by the pro se plaintif, Anthony 1 Stocker Mina, in September 2014. On September 11, 2014, the plaintif filed an application in this case to proceed in forma pauperis and a motion or relief from judgment. See Doc. No. 1. In the motion or relief, the plaintiff seeks relief rom an October 9, 2013 order dismissing the plaintifs complaint with prejudice entered by the Honorable John L. Braxton of the Chester County Court of Common Pleas in the matter of Mina v. Enet Advertising, et al., No. 2013-cv1 His other actions are docketed at Civil Action Nos. 14-mc-221, 14-mc-222, and 14-mc-259. 1 •1 .\ / 3 Dockets.Justia.com As indicated above, the plaintiff seeks relief under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b) provides as ollows: (b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative rom a final judgment, order, or proceeding or the ollowing reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies reliel,] Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Although Rule 60(b) provides the aorementioned grounds or relief from a inal judgment or order, this rule is inapplicable to state-court proceedings. See, e.g., Graham v. South Carolina, CA., No. 6:11-595, 2012 WL 527606, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 16, 2012) ("Petitioner misunderstands the import of Rule 60(b), which provides that a ederal district court may provide relief from its own civil judgments. Rule 60(b) does not authorize a ederal district court to review a state criminal conviction and judgment, as is the case here."). In particular, any such attempt would violate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Reardon v. Leason, 408 F. App'x 551, 553 (3d Cir. 2010) ("[B]ecause [the plaintif] is effectively asking the District Court void a Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Rule 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for ailure to state a claim under§ 1915(e)(2)(B)). Thus, to survive dismissal, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 4 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 state court conviction, he is barred rom doing so under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine." (citing Great W Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010)); Burnett v. Amrein, 243 F.App'x 393, 395 (10th Cir. 2007) (concluding district court correctly denied plaintiffs' motion to vacate state-court civil judgment insofar as "Fed.R.Civ.P.60(b) does not authorize a ederal court to relieve the [plaintifs] of a judgment entered in state court ... because any such action would violate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine." (internal quotations and 5 citations omitted)). Accordingly, because Rule 60(b) does not provide a vehicle for the type of relief that the plaintif seeks, i.e. the vacation of a state-court order, this action is rivolous and, as such, the court denies the motion for relief and dismisses this action with prejudice. III. CONCLUSION The plaintiff has established that, for purposes of this action, he is entitled to proceed IFP. Nonetheless, the plaintiff may not use Rule 60(b) to attempt to vacate the order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County. Accordingly, the court denies the motion seeking relief under Rule 60(b) and dismisses this action with prejudice. An appropriate order ollows. BY THE COURT: EDWAD G. SMITH, J. 5 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine "established the principle that ederal district courts lack jurisdiction over suits that Great . Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 165. are essentially appeals rom state-court judgments." 5
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