Lee v. Commissioner Social Security Administration, No. 6:2013cv00802 - Document 16 (D. Or. 2014)
Court Description: Opinion and Order: The ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff is not disabled under the Act is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the decision of the defendant Commissioner is affirmed. Signed on 6/2/14 by Chief Judge Ann L. Aiken. (ljb)
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Lee v. Commissioner Social Security Administration Doc. 16 ' IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON SHARLENE J. LEE, Case No. Plaintiff, 6:13-cv-00802-AA OPINION AND ORDER v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant . • Richard F. McGinty McGinty & Belcher P.O. Box 12806 Salem, OR 97301 Attorney for plaintiff S. Amanda Marshall United States Attorney Ronald K. Silver Assistant United States Attorney 1000 S.W. Third Ave., Suite 600 Portland, OR 97204 David J. Burdett Special Assistant United States Attorney Social Security Administration 701 Fifth Ave., Suite 2900 M/S 221A Seattle, WA 98104-7075 Attorneys for defendant 1 - OPINION AND ORDER Dockets.Justia.com 1 l i. j I AIKEN, Chief Judge: Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Commissioner's § 405(g), decision to obtain denying her judicial application review for of the disability insurance benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Act. Upon review of the record and the parties' submissions, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. BACKGROUND On August 13, 2009, plaintiff filed an application for DIB; it was denied initially and on reconsideration. Tr. 55-58, 62-64, 14043. On January 25, 2012, plaintiff and a vocational expert appeared and testified before an administrative law judge (ALJ). Tr. 21-39. On February 22, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision finding plaintiff not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Tr. 7-20. On April 29, 2013, the Appeals Council denied review, rendering the ALJ' s decision as the final agency decision. Tr. 1-4. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review. Plaintiff was fifty-five years old at the time of the ALJ's decision, with a high school education and past relevant work as a claims clerk. Tr. 25, 34. Plaintiff alleges disability since July 2009 due to congestive heart failure. Tr. 157-58. STANDARD OF REVIEW This court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record and the correct 2 - OPINION AND ORDER application of the law. Valentine v. Comm'r Soc. F.2d 685, 690 Sec. Admin, 574 (9th Cir. 2009). "'Substantial evidence' means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Desrosiers v. Sec' y Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988) of Health & Human (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In determining whether substantial evidence supports the decision, the court must weigh "both the evidence that supports and detracts from the [Commissioner] 's Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 conclusions." (9th Cir. 1986). Where the evidence "is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation," the Commissioner's conclusion must be upheld. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). COMMISSIONER'S DECISION The ALJ evaluated plaintiff's allegation of disability pursuant to the relevant sequential process. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. found that activity" C.F.R. § At plaintiff during the had not period of § 416.920. At step one, the ALJ engaged in "substantial alleged disability. Tr. gainful 12; 20 416.920(b) step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had medically determinable impairments of coronary artery disease and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. However, at step three, 3 - OPINION AND ORDER Tr. 12; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). the ALJ found that these impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment that is deemed so severe as to preclude gainful activity. Tr. 13; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). The ALJ next determined plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC) and found that plaintiff retained the RFC to perform sedentary work with some exertional and environmental restrictions. Tr. 13, 20 C.F.R. 416.920(e). § At step four, based on plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ found that plaintiff was able to perform her past relevant work as a claims or data clerk. Tr. 16; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). The ALJ did not proceed to step five and found plaintiff not disabled under the meaning of the Act. Tr. 16. DISCUSSION Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating the medical evidence, primarily the opinions of Dr. Woods and Ms. treating physician and nurse practitioner. Krider, a Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ gave unwarranted weight to the opinion of another physician, Dr. Scriven. The ALJ may reject the uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining physician by providing clear supported by substantial evidence in the Chater, 81 F. 3d 821, F.3d 1035, 1041 830 (9th Cir. (9th Cir. 1995). and convincing record. reasons See Lester v. 1995); Andrews v. Shalala, If contradicted, 53 the ALJ may reject the opinion with specific and legitimate reasons. Id. In forms dated August 2009, Dr. Woods and Ms. Krider indicated 4 - OPINION AND ORDER that plaintiff could return to work in September 2009. Tr. 762-63. However, in September 2009, Dr. Woods indicated that plaintiff was unable to return to work, though he did not provide a temporal limitation on plaintiff's inability to work. 2011, Dr. Woods "ever returning indicated that he did not to work." Tr. 760. Also Tr. 765. In January anticipate plaintiff in January Scriven reported that if plaintiff returned to work, 2011, Dr. she should avoid heavy lifting and dust and fumes. Tr. 761. As an initial matter, the determination of whether plaintiff can work or is to the not to a treating physician. McLeod v. Astrue, Commissioner, disabled is a matter reserved solely 640 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011). Ultimately, "[t]he law reserves the disability determination to the Commissioner." Id. Here, Dr. Woods cited no medical reports or clinical findings to substantiate his assessment of plaintiff's ability to work, and the ALJ was not required to accept his opinion. Tr. 760, 765. Thomas v. Barnhart, 2 7 8 F . 3d 9 4 7 , 957 ( 9th Ci r . 2 0 0 2 ) ( " The AL J need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings."). Further, the ALJ noted that a non-examining physician and an examining physical therapist found plaintiff less limited than Dr. Woods and able to perform light and sedentary work. Tr. 15, 48-49, 770. Notably, "the 5 - OPINION AND ORDER findings of a nontreating, nonexamining physician can amount to substantial evidence, so long as other evidence in the record supports those findings." Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, record 522 supported (9th Cir. the 1996). findings of Here, the other evidence non-examining in the physician, including the opinions of Dr. Scriven and the physical therapist. Finally, the ALJ noted that plaintiff's daily activities - including shopping, driving a neighbor to and from work, picking apples, exercising, reading, cooking, and yard work - contradicted Dr. Woods's opinion that plaintiff could not return to work. 15, 509, 532, 640, 726, 741. These are specific and legitimate reasons supported by the record. 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 Tr. (9th Cir. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 2008) (record of daily activities suggested that the claimant was capable of performing sustained work). For the same reasons, the ALJ's reasons for discrediting Dr. Woods were "germane" to the statements statements were similar to Dr. F.3d 1104, 1122 the ALJ's evidence Ms. Krider, whose See Molina v. As true, 67 4 (9th Cir. 2012). Although plaintiff disagrees with interpretation before Woods. of the ALJ of is the medical subject to record, more than "[w]hen one the rational interpretation, we must defer to the ALJ's conclusion." Batson v. Cornrn'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). CONCLUSION The ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff is not disabled under the 6 - OPINION AND ORDER I. I Act is supported by substantial evidence in the I Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. I IT IS SO ORDERED. I I DATED this of June, 2014. Ann Aiken United States District Judge 7 - OPINION AND ORDER record.
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