Amanti v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, No. 6:2011cv06378 - Document 15 (D. Or. 2012)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER. Based on the foregoing, the Commissioner's decision is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings consistent with this opinion. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed on 11/19/2012 by Judge Malcolm F. Marsh. (pvh)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON AMANDA N. AMANTI, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant. KATHRYN TASSINARI Harder, Wells, Baron & Manning, P.C. 474 Willamette, Suite 200 Eugene, Oregon 97401 Attorneys for Plaintiff S. AMANDA MARSHALL United States Attorney ADRIAN L. BROWN Assistant United States Attorney 1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600 Portland, Oregon 97204-2902 WILLY M. LE Special Assistant United States Attorney Office of the General Counsel Social Security Administration 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900 M/S 221A Seattle, Washington 98104-7075 Attorneys for Defendant 1 - OPINION 6:11-cv-06378-MA OPINION AND ORDER MARSH, Judge Plaintiff, Amanda N. Amanti brings this action for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Commissioner) (the her application Supplemental for Security Income (SSI) disability benefits under Title XVI of the Act. 42 U.S.C. to 42 U.S.C. 1381-1383f. § §§ This court has jurisdiction pursuant For the reasons set forth 405(g) and 1383(c) (3). below, I REVERSE the final decision of the Commissioner and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND November On 2008, 19, filed protectively plaintiff an application for SSI alleging disability due to obsessive compulsive disorder, agoraphobia, post traumatic stress disorder, diabetes, depression, anxiety, before hearing February an Administrative 2011, 17, acid reflux, in Eugene, Law Judge Oregon, represented by counsel and testified. Expert (VE) Jeffrey F. Ti ttlefi tz was at (ALJ) which 11, 127. A was Tr. and asthma. held on plaintiff Additionally, present was Vocational throughout the hearing and testified. On May 16, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision finding plaintiff not disabled within the meaning of the Act. After the Appeals Council denied review, plaintiff timely filed a petition for review in this court. 2 - OPINION FACTUAL BACKGROUND Born on September 14, 1981, plaintiff was 27 years old on the alleged onset date of disability, and 29 years old on the date of the hearing. year Plaintiff has a high school diploma and completed one of vocational training at a Plaintiff has no past relevant work. beauty Tr. college. 31-32. Tr. 51-52. Plaintiff alleges her various disabilities became disabling on Tr. 111. November 19, 2008. Plaintiff has seen several medical professionals for treatment, including her therapist, Irene Stamis Kulus; Richard Browning, a psychiatric and mental health nurse practitioner; and Aaron Pardini, M.D., with regard to her diabetes. Plaintiff was examined by Alison Prescott, Ph.D., who prepared an Finally, plaintiff's opinion regarding plaintiff's work capacity. records were reviewed by Robert Henry, Ph.D., who prepared a Mental Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) Assessment. THE ALJ'S DISABILITY ANALYSIS The Commissioner has established a five-step process for determining whether a person is disabled. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 416.920(a) (4) (i)-(v). claimant bears 137, 140-42 (1987); 20 sequential Bowen v. C.F.R. Each step is potentially dispositive. the burden of proof at § The Steps One through Four. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F. 3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). The burden shifts to the Commissioner at Step Five to show that a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can 3 - OPINION See Yuckert, perform. 482 U.S. at 141-42; Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098. At Step One, the ALJ found that the claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the date of the alleged onset See 20 C.F.R. of disability. 416.971; Tr. 13. § At Step Two, the ALJ found that plaintiff's attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), depressive disorder, posttraumati c stress disorder (PTSD), panic disorder with agoraphobia, personality disorder all constituted severe impairments. C.F.R. § Tr. 416.920(c); 13. Additionally , and See 20. the ALJ found that plaintiff's diabetes and left foot pain and swelling were nonsevere impairments limitations. that did not cause significant vocational Tr. 14. At Step Three, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or medically equaled a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 416.925, 416.926; Tr. 15-17. The ALJ found that plaintiff had the RFC to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, with the non-exertion al limitations that plaintiff can understand and remember simple oneto three-step instructions, but may occasionally require repeated instructions . Tr. 17-20. out simple routine tasks, 4 - OPINION The ALJ found that plaintiff can carry and could interact with familiar co- workers, but should not have public contact in the work setting. Tr. 17. At relevant work. found ALJ the Four, Step 20 C.F.R. § plaintiff that past no has 416.965; Tr. 20. At Step Five, however, the ALJ found that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff can perform, including packing line worker, marker II, and garment sorter. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.969; Tr. 21. the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled Accordingly, within the meaning of the Act. ISSUES ON REVIEW Plaintiff asserts that plaintiff argues Second, testimony. the ALJ erred in claims that incorporate all of plaintiff's limitations, Prescott's opinion, into the RFC. the ALJ failed carry its to rejected plaintiff's the ALJ improperly plaintiff First, ways. three ALJ the failed to as described in Dr. Finally, plaintiff asserts that burden of proof in finding that plaintiff retains the ability to perform other work in the national economy. STANDARD OF REVIEW The court must affirm the Commissione r's decision if the Commissioner applied proper legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence 405{g); Andrews v. 5 - OPINION Shalala, in the record. 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 42 u.s.c. {9th Cir. § 1995). "Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderanc e; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable Id. mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." weigh all court must of the whether evidence, than one rational decision must be upheld. or If the evidence is susceptible 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). more supports Martinez v. Heckler, detracts from the Commissioner 's decision. to it The the interpretatio n, Andrews, Commissione r's If the 53 F.3d at 1039-40. evidence supports the Commissioner 's conclusion, the Commissioner must be affirmed; "the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner ." Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). DISCUSSION I. Rejection of Plaintiff's Testimony In deciding whether to accept subjective symptom testimony, an ALJ must perform two stages of analysis. First, 416.929. evidence of the claimant an underlying produce must impairment that expected to produce the symptoms alleged. F. 3d 1273, 1281-82 (9th Cir. 1996). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, objective medical could reasonably be Smolen v. Chater, 80 Second, absent a finding of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of his symptoms only by offering specific, convincing reasons for doing so. 6 - OPINION Id. at 1281. clear and If an ALJ finds that the claimant's testimony regarding his subjective symptoms is unreliable, the "ALJ must make a credibility reasons the why the testimony is determination citing unpersuasive ." Morgan v. Apfel, 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). In doing so, the ALJ must identify what testimony is credible and what testimony the undermines claimant's complaints, and make ''findings sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant." Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F. 3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002). In her Function Report, plaintiff stated that her combination of disabilities makes it difficult for her to leave the house without panicking. Plaintiff claimed that she has poor Tr. 137. attention span, can only pay attention for "maybe an hour if I'm lucky," and only gets three hours of restless sleep per night. Plaintiff testified that she does not drive because it 135, 139. "makes her nervous." struggles Tr. to follow Tr. 44, spoken 137. Plaintiff reported that she instructions , but does better with written instructions , and gets along well with authority figures. Tr. 139-40. In caring for her two children, plaintiff stated she does everything a mother or father would do for their children, including house cleaning, laundry, and preparing meals. Tr. 135- 36. At the hearing, plaintiff testified that she has a friend that helps her with shopping. 7 - OPINION With regard to her children, plaintiff testified that she has attended a lunch event at son's her school, parent-teach er conference, and some her of sporting events when she had somebody to go with her. When asked how she fills her day, "constantly find[s] a daughter's Tr. 38-39. plaintiff testified that she something to clean," watches television, and Tr. 39-40. crochets. The ALJ rejected plaintiff's testimony as to the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms. ALJ did not make a finding of malingering. Tr. 18. The Therefore, the ALJ was required to identify clear and convincing reasons for discounting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. plaintiff's testimony. I find the ALJ's reasons readily meet this standard and are supported by substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ found plaintiff's symptom testimony inconsistent with her activities plaintiff's of daily living. alleged disabilities , The ALJ noted that, she reported "everything a mom/dad would do for their kids." that despite she Tr. 18, 135. did In addition, as the ALJ noted, plaintiff reported that she uses public transportatio n and shops in stores despite her disability. 137. Tr. 18, Finally, the ALJ noted several instances after the alleged onset of plaintiff's disability where plaintiff reported going out of town, including a fourteen day honeymoon in February of 2009; March, April, and July 2009 trips to care for her ill mother-inlaw; and a four-to-six-w eek trip to Los Angeles as her "marriage 8 - OPINION was falling apart" in October of 2009, to "help grandparents ." 18-19, 293, 295, 299, 382, 385. Tr. Considering a significant portion of plaintiff's alleged disability is anxiety caused by leaving her home and being among the public, the ALJ reasonably could find that plaintiff's activities are inconsistent with her allegation that she is completely unable to work due to her symptoms. In the addition, plaintiff's evaluation ALJ Dr. several inconsistenc ies that The ALJ noted Prescott, the in psychologist statements. with noted in plaintiff's designated to examine plaintiff with respect to her disability claim, plaintiff reported that she had never been married. Tr. 19, 332. The ALJ noted several instances where plaintiff indicated that she was married. Plaintiff does not dispute the accuracy of Dr. Prescott's note, but instead argues that there is no evidence in the record that she was ever married. Pl.'s Brief at 15; Pl.'s Reply at 6-7. Plaintiff's argument misses the point. Plaintiff's actual marital status is not at issue- instead, the ALJ found plaintiff's reports to her health care providers inconsistent and discredited her on that basis. To be sure, the ALJ's findings in this respect are readily supported by substantial evidence in the record. On February 4, 2009, plaintiff reported to her therapist that she was to get married the next day and go on a two-week honeymoon. 299. Tr. Plaintiff also told her therapist three times that she was leaving town to take care of her sick mother-in-law . 9 - OPINION Tr. 293, 295, 385; Plaintiff told Dr. Pl.'s Reply at 5. Pl.'s Brief at 14; Pardini on March 31, 2008 that she was married with two children. Tr. 220. On May 29, 2009, plaintiff referred to her "spouse" in an plaintiff apart.'" told therapist her falling was "'marriag e her that 2009, On October 23, 388. Tr. appointme nt with her therapist . Finally, on October 7, 2010, Tr. 382; Pl.'s Brief at 14. Prescott that she had a little over a month before telling Dr, never been married, plaintiff told her therapist that the car she thought was stolen was "found at 'my husband's friend's garage.'" Tr. 366. Based on evidence, this plaintiff 's statement to Dr. married inconsist ent Prescott that appropria tely discredite d plaintiff 's found reasonably she has never been reports, other her with ALJ the the and testimony on that ALJ basis. _g;_,_g_,_, Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005) (an ALJ may use ordinary technique s of credibili ty evaluation such as inconsiste nt statement s to discredit claimant) . Additiona lly, the ALJ found plaintiff 's that regarding her driving were inconsiste nt. by substanti al evidence in the record. statement s This finding is supported The ALJ noted that in her Function Report plaintiff reported that she did not drive because it makes her too nervous. Tr. 19, 137. Plaintiff repeated this assertion at the hearing, explaining that "being behind the wheel scares me to death." 10 - OPINION Tr. 44. Yet, as the ALJ pointed out, plainti ff told Dr. Prescot t that she drives when she has to, such Tr. as when she cannot get a ride or has to get to an appointm ent. 334. Plaintif f reported to Dr. Prescott that she owes fines for driving without a license, and has been jailed for driving with a 333. Tr. suspende d license. The record reflects that plainti ff twice cancelle d therapy appointm ents due to car trouble, Tr. 367, 391, reported being in a car acciden t, Tr. 298, and once locked her the hearing she admitted plaintif f no longer The ALJ reasonab ly could 4 4. Tr. license. Moreove r, as the ALJ noted, at Tr. 398. glucose logs in her car. has find a driver's plainti ff's testimon y that she is afraid to drive inconsi stent with her report Burch, 400 F.3d at 680. to Dr. Prescott . The ALJ also noted that plaintif f stated in her Function Report that she enjoyed reading, and testifie d at the hearing that she read "a lot." Dr. Prescot t, Tr. 40, 138. that she did "not read very much as she however, cannot concent rate." As the ALJ noted, plainti ff told Tr. 334. The ALJ reasonab ly found these stateme nts inconsi stent. Finally, the ALJ discred ited plainti ff's testimon y because she has no signific ant work history. Tr. 19. supporte d by substan tial evidence in the record. plainti ff has essenti ally never worked, This finding is As the ALJ noted, reportin g very brief employm ent as a retail associa te and office assistan t in 1999, and 11 - OPINION Tr. 32-34, some later part-ti me work as a child care provid er. A claima nt's lack of work history is a basis upon which an 142-49 . ALJ may discre dit the claima nt's testimo ny that her disabi lity preclud es work. Thomas v. Barnha rt, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. After a review of the record , I find the ALJ cited clear 2002) . and convin cing reason s, suppor ted by substa ntial eviden ce in the record , to reject plaint iff's testimo ny. Incorp oration of Medica l Testimo ny into RFC II. Plaint iff argues that the ALJ failed to incorp orate all of the limita tions include d in Dr. Presco tt's opinion into the RFC. The RFC must include all limitat ions suppor ted by substa ntial eviden ce See Baylis s v. Barnha rt, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th in the record . Simila rly, where the ALJ poses a hypoth etical questio n Cir. 2005). to a VE relies and the on include all subseq uent of the testimo ny, plaint iff's the ALJ's functio nal hypoth etical must limita tions. Flores v. Shalal a, 49 F.3d 562, 570 (9th Cir. 1995). Where the ALJ credits the opinion of a physic ian, the ALJ must transla te the plaint iff's condit ion as describ ed in the physic ian's opinion into functio nal Daniels on v. Astrue , limitat ions in the RFC. See 539 F. 3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008). Stubbs "[A]n ALJ's assessm ent of a claima nt adequa tely capture s restric tions related to concen tration , persist ence, or pace where the assessm ent is consis tent 12 - OPINION with restric tions identi fied in the medica l (8th Cir. (citing Howard v. Massanari, Id. testimony." Smith v. 2001); 255 F.3d 577, 307 F. 3d 377, Halter, 582 (6th Cir. 379 2001)). As relevant here, in her Medical Source Statement of Ability To Do Work-Related Activities plaintiff had a (Mental), limitation marked appropriately with supervisors. Dr. ability in her Tr. 341. Prescott found that to interact When asked what factors supported that assessment, Dr. Prescott wrote that plaintiff has an "unstable affect She irritably. Additionally , Dr. and labile mood with a has high anxiety and tendency to few coping lash out resources." Prescott found that plaintiff had a limitation with regard to her ability to keep "[s]ustained attention on a task - this client cannot focus well on work tasks. distracted." In this She is easily Tr. 341. case, the ALJ gave Ultimately, Dr. Prescott's opinion "great the ALJ found that the RFC and weight." Tr. available jobs identified by the VE fit within the limitations 19. assessed by Dr. Prescott. Additionally , Robert Henry, Ph.D., a non-examinin g reviewing physician, found that plaintiff was moderately limited ability to maintain concentration , persistence, and pace. in her Tr. 354. Dr. Henry also found plaintiff moderately limited in her ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods. 13 - OPINION Tr. 358. However, Dr. Henry found that plaintiff was not significantly limited in her ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number of Tr. 359. length and rest periods. plaintiff is to able carry out As such, Dr. Henry noted that routine simple, tasks on a consistent basis, and that "there is no indication that [plaintiff) would require special or constant supervision in order to remain on task." Tr. 360. The ALJ also gave Dr. Henry's opinion substantial weight, and adopted his findings in determining plaintiff's mental RFC. Tr. 20. The ALJ translated the limitations described by Dr. Prescott and Dr. Henry into the following RFC: and remember simple occasionally require simple routine tasks. one- to plaintiff "can understand three-step instructions, repeated instructions. but may She can carry out The claimant should not have public contact in a work setting, but could interact appropriately with coworkers with whom she is familiar." Tr. 17. Additionally, in the vocational hypothetical posed to the VE, the ALJ included a marked limitation in interacting appropriately with a supervisor. Tr. 53. Based on this RFC and the ensuing hypothetical, the VE testified, and the ALJ found, that there are jobs that exist in the national economy that plaintiff can perform. 14 - OPINION Tr. 21, 51-55. Plaintiff makes two arguments with respect to incorporating Dr. Prescott's opinion into the RFC. First, plaintiff complains that the RFC and resulting hypothetical was defective because her marked capture adequately Prescott. interacting in limitation all the of with did supervisors not by Dr. described limitations Specifically, plaintiff argues that Pl.'s Brief at 11. the ALJ erred in not including Dr. Prescott's handwritten note that plaintiff had an "unstable affect and labile mood" with a tendency to lash out irritably in the RFC and hypothetical. I disagree with plaintiff's first argument. Id. In arriving at an RFC and posing a hypothetical to a VE, the ALJ must translate the limitations described by credited medical opinions into functional limitations. case, See Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1173-74. the ALJ did so by posing Dr. In this Prescott's conclusion as to plaintiff's ability to interact appropriately with supervisors to The ALJ here properly included Dr. the VE in the hypothetical. Prescott's regard conclusion about to hypothetical; interaction he did plaintiff's marked with not need supervisors to in additionally limitation with the vocational include every symptomatic term Dr. Prescott used in arriving at that conclusion. Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1174 (citing Howard, 255 F.3d at 582; Smith, 307 F. 3d at 379). The ALJ's reliance on the VE's testimony, in this respect, was not error. 15 - OPINION Second, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to include Dr. Prescott's conclusion that plaintiff was limited in her ability to maintain "sustained attention on a task." at 12; Tr. 341. Here, Dr. Pl.'s Brief On this point, I agree with plaintiff. Prescott found that plaintiff had difficulty Yet, maintaining sustained attention on work tasks. as noted above, Dr. Henry found that plaintiff was not significantly limited in her ability to work at a consistent pace, and she would not need constant supervision to stay on task. The ALJ, however, purported to credit the opinions of both Drs. Henry and Prescott without sufficiently resolving this conflict. Additionally, neither the RFC nor the vocational hypothetical contained the focus and concentration limitations described by Drs. Prescott and Henry. This case is similar to Brink v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 343 Fed. Appx. 211, 2009 WL 2512514 at *1 (9th Cir. 2009). ALJ credited medical evidence that the There, the plaintiff had moderate difficulty maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. ALJ' s hypothetical, repetitive work." Commissioner's however, Id. argument The only limited plaintiff to "simple, The that Ninth the Circuit "simple, rejected repetitive the work" limitation accommodated the plaintiff's concentration, persistence, and pace limitations, and remanded for the Commissioner to clarify the hypothetical to account 16 - OPINION for the plaintiff's concentration, finding. the instructions ¢ repeated "occasional misses limitation plaintiff that instructions , the focus plaintiff's of substance the and While the RFC and hypothetical did concentration limitations. consider disability a Id. at *1-*2. Here, similarly new and make limitations, pace and persistence, occasionally may this ALJ treated repeated require relating as limitation to plaintiff's cognitive ability to understand instructions , rather Tr. 54. than her sustained ability to focus on work tasks. The question with regard to this limitation is not whether plaintiff can understand capacity to instructions, stay on task but such whether she is employment that the has mental available. Because the ALJ did not formulate the RFC in such a way as to resolve the conflict between the opinions of Drs. Prescott and Henry, or include any attendant focus limitations in the RFC and vocational hypothetical , the ALJ has erred. III. Other Work in the National Economy When an ALJ finds that the claimant's impairments preclude him from performing past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at Step Five to show that the claimant can perform other work that exists economy. 1071 in significant numbers in the national Lockwood v. Comm'r Social Sec. Admin., (9th Cir. 2010). 17 - OPINION 616 F.3d 1068, The Commissioner can meet this burden by having a vocational expert testify at vocational hypothetical. 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. Id. the hearing based on a (quoting Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1999)). A vocational hypothetical is sufficient if it includes all of the claimant's limitations that are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 427 F. 3d at 1217-18. See Bayliss, An ALJ may exclude limitations unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. Because the RFC and resultant vocational hypothetical were in error, the Commissioner cannot rely on the VE testimony to carry his burden that plaintiff can perform other work available in the national economy. Commissioner, I Because this necessitates a remand to the decline to address plaintiff's other Step Five arguments. IV. Remand After finding the ALJ erred, this court has the discretion to remand for benefits. further or for immediate payment of Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 further proceedings u.s. 1038 (2000). proceedings. appropriate where there The issue turns on the utility of A remand is no for useful an award purpose of to benefits be is served by further proceedings or where the record is fully developed. The Ninth Circuit has established a three-part test "for determining when evidence should be credited and an immediate award 18 - OPINION of benefits directed." Id. The Court should grant an immediate award of benefits when: (1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting such evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence credited. Id. Where it is not clear that the ALJ would be required to award benefits were the improperly rejected evidence credited, the court has discretion whether to credit the evidence. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2003). In this case, there are outstanding issues that must resolved before a determination of disability can be made. the ALJ erred in failing to include plaintiff's be Here, focus and concentration limitations in the RFC and vocational hypothetical, or to resolve the conflict as to the extent and nature of the plaintiff's alleged limitation. Specifically, it is unclear whether Dr. Prescott's finding that plaintiff "cannot focus well on work tasks" and is "easily distracted" is consistent with Dr, Henry's findings of moderate limitations with regard to the ability to maintain concentration, persistence, or pace, and yet is not significantly limited in her abilities to work at a consistent pace and work without constant supervision. 19 - OPINION Accordingly, on remand the ALJ should determine whether the opinions of Drs. Henry and Prescott are consistent. If so, the ALJ should explain why the opinions are consistent, and translate them into a functional limitation to be incorporated into a new RFC and vocational hypothetical. If the ALJ finds the opinions are inconsistent with each other, he should credit one opinion over the other in this respect, and accordingly incorporate the credited opinion into a new RFC and vocational hypothetical. The ALJ must provide one legally sufficient opinion over the other. (9th Cir. 1995). See reasons for crediting doctor's Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 In doing so, however, the ALJ may utilize all of the traditional tools of weighing medical opinions, including the nature of opinions' rely on the doctor's relationship with the plaintiff, the internal consistency, the extent to which the opinions plaintiff's discredited testimony, and the opinions' consistency with plaintiff's activities of daily living. In short, resolved, because outstanding issues remain which must be and it is not clear from the record that Plaintiff is entitled to disability benefits, the Court reverses the ALJ's decision and remands for further administrative proceedings. Ill Ill Ill 20 - OPINION CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Commissioner's decision is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings consistent with this opinion. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED this ~day of November, 2012. Malcolm F. Marsh United States District Judge 21 - OPINION
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