Hadley et al v. Multnomah County et al, No. 3:2008cv00130 - Document 17 (D. Or. 2009)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER: Granting in Part Denying in Part the County's Motion to Dismiss 6 ;and Granting the Associations Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 13 . Signed on 3/31/09 by Judge Robert E. Jones. (mkk)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON DAVID HADLEY; ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. MULTNOMAH COUNTY, an incorporated subdivision ofthe State of Oregon; ET AL., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil No. 08-130-JO OPINION AND ORDER ) ) ) ) Roger A. Hennagin ROGER A. HENNAGIN, P.C. 8 North State Street, Suite 300 Lake Oswego, OR 97034 Attorney for Plaintiffs Jenny M. Morf OFFICE OF THE MULTNOMAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 501 S.E. Hawthorne Boulevard, Suite 500 Portland, OR 97214 David A. Snyder SNYDER & HOAG, LLC 4370 N.B. Halsey Street, Suite 124 P. O. Box 12737 Portland, OR 97212 Attorneys for Defendants JONES, Judge: Plaintiffs David Hadley, Linda Hadley, Jeff Cordes, Bret Burton, and Ofelia McMenamy bring this action against defendants Multnomah County, fonner Multnomah County Sheriff Bernie Giusto, MultnOinah County Deputy Sheriffs Association, Todd Shanks, Mark Heron, and Jay Pentheny, alleging claims for (1) discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution (2) deprivation of their constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (3) conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). This action is now before the court on defendants' motions (## 6, 13) to dismiss all of plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Federal Rule QfCivil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. For the reasons explained below, I deny Multnomah County's and Giustols, motion to dismiss plaintiffs' equal protection and section 1983 claims, and grant all of defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' section 1985(3) conspiracy claim. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The parties agree to the following, Plaintiffs were employed as deputies by Multnomah County ("County") and were dues..,paying members of the Multnomah County Deputy Sheriffs Association ("Association") during their employment. In August 2007, the County and the Association reached a collective bargaining agreement ("Agreement"). The Agreement awarded 2 - OPINION AND ORDER retroactive pay increases to covered depqties from July I, 2005 forward. By its terms, the Agreement applied only toeiDployees on the County's payroll as of the date of ratification, August 9, 2007. All five plaintiffs were employed by the County when negotiations on the Agreementbegan in July 2005; however, none ofthe five plaintiffs were still employed by the County by the time of ratification. After ratification ofthe Agreement, the County and the Association executed a Memorandutn of Exception ("MOE"), which created an exception to the Agreement to allow two fonner employees who had taken disability retirement before ratification to receive the retroactive pay increase. Plaintiffs and the two employees that are the subject of the MOE retired or resigned within the same two-year period, 2005-2007, during which the County and Association were negotiating the Agreement. In separate but similar motions, defendants County and Giusto CCounty defendants"), 1 and the Multnomah County Deputy Sheriffs Association, Todd Shanks, Mark Herron and Jay Pentheny ("Association defendants"), move to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for failure to state a claim. All defendants challenge plaintiffs' standing, as well as plaintiffs' section 1985(3) claim. The County defendants also seek dismissal of plaintiffs! Equal Protection and section 1983 claims. STANDARD A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted "unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support ofhis claim which would entitle him to relief." Pinhas v. Summit Health. Ltd., 894 F.2d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted), aff'd 500 U.s. 322 (1991). The court must treat all facts 3 - OPINION AND ORDER alleged in the complaint as true. Western Concrete Structures v. Mitsui & Co., 760 F.2d 1013, 1015 (9th Cir. 1985). All doubts are resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Preferred Conunc'ns v. City ofL. A., Cal., 754 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th CiT. 1985), affd 476 U.S. 488 (1986). DISCUSSION 1. Standing All defendants challenge plaintiffs' standing on the ground that plaintiffs have not suffered an "actual injury." Defendants argue that beyause plaintiffs were not employed by the County at the time the Agreement was signed, by its express terms they are not entitled to the retroactive back-pay benefits. Plaintiffs respond that their standing arises out ofthe arbitrary discrimination they suffered due to the defendants conferring the benefit of the Agreement to some similarly situated former employees, but not them. Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing Article ill standing bydemoilstrating that: (1) each has suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized and actual and imminent; (2) there is a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-'561 (1992). Accepting, for purposes of this Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, that plaintiffs' allegations are true, the allegations sufficiently raise an actual injury. A violation of a person's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws can give rise to an actual injury. See Council orms. Agents & Brokers v. Molasky-Arman, 522 F.3d 925, 931 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Impairments to constitutional rights are generally deemed adequate to support a finding of 'injury' for purposes of standing.") (citing Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Ouachita Parish, 274 F.3d 289,292 (5th Cir. 4 - OPINION AND ORDER 2001». Plaintiffs' interests are within the zone of interests to be protected by the equal protection clause, that is, freedom from the alleged intentional and arbitrary discrimination. McMichael v. Napa County, 709 F.2d 1268, 1272 (9th Cir. 1983). Consequently, resolving all doubts in plaintiffs' favor, I find plaintiffs' allegations sufficient to establish standing. 2. Plaintiffs' Equal Protection Claim Against County Defendants Plaintiffs allege that the County defendants discriminated against them based on their status as non-disabled retirees and resignees, and that the discrimination in favor of the disabled retirees in the form of the MOE was intentional, arbitrary, and without a rational, legal basis. Because plaintiffs have not alleged membership in a suspect or quasi-suspect class, the government's classification comports with the Equal Protection Clause so long as it is "rationally related to a legitimate state interest." E.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 (1988) (citations omitted). Whether the County defendants can establish a rational and legitimate reason for discriminating between the two groups of retirees/resignees is an issue that cannot be determined in the context ofthe pending motion. For the purposes of the present motion to dismiss, I find that plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a violation of equal protection. Consequently, the County defendants' motion to dismiss the equal protection claim is denied. 3. Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Claim Against the County Defendants The two essential elements of a section 1983 claim are (1) that the defendant acted under color of state law and (2) that the conduct deprived a person ofrights, privileges. or immunities conferred by the Constitution or laws ofthe United States. See. e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,48 (1988). Plaintiffs appear to premise their section 1983 claim on their theory that the 5 - OPINION AND ORDER County defendants deprived them of their right to equal protection. The Supreme Court has held that ifthe defendant's conduct satisfies the state-action requirement for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, then the conduct also qualifies as "under color of state lawu for purposes of section 1983. Lugar v.Edmondson Oil Co.. Inc. ¢ 457 U.S. 922,935 (1982). Because plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to make out a violation of equal protection, they similarly allege sufficient facts for a violation of section 1983. The County defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' section 1983 claim is denied. 4. Plaintiffs' Section 1985(3) Conspiracy Claim Against All Defendants Plaintiffs allege that the County defendants and the Association defendants conspired to discriminate against them and thereby deny them equal protection of the. laws, in violation of section 1985(3). To prevail on a claim of civil rights conspiracy, plaintiffs must allege and prove four elements: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose ofdepriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class ofpersoIis of the equal protection ofthe laws, or of the equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance ofthis conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen oithe United States. Keenan v. Allan, 889 F.Supp. 1320, 1364 (E.n.Wash. 1995), aff'd., 91 F.3d 1275 (9th CiT. 1996). The second element of a civil rights conspiracy claim requires a showing of both a "legally protected right" and "'deprivation of that right motivated by "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators" action.''' Keenan, 889 F.Supp. at 1364 (quoting Sever v. Alaska Pulp Com., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 6 - OPINION AND ORDER 1992». The "class" that the defendant allegedly targets must be "something more than a group of individuals who share a desire to engage in conduct that the § 1985(3) defendant disfavors." Keenan, 889 F.Supp. at 1364.; see also Lopezv. Arrowhead Ranches, et aI., 523 F.2d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 1975) C'Ofitse1f, the creation ofa class of victims by tortious conduct does not bring a claim within § 1985(3); such a class is created by every tort"). Defendants argue that plaintiffs' section 1985(3) claim fails because non-disabled retirees/resignees do not constitute a cognizable class for purposes of civil rights conspiracy analysis. As defendants note, the Ninth Circuit has held that where a plaintiff does not allege discrimination on the basis of race or membership in a suspect class, he or she has not stated a claim under section 1985(3). Bums v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819,821 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiffs respond that Bums was wrongly decided in that the Ninth Circuit relied on an incorrect interpretation made in Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1985). According to the plaintiffs, Bretz misconstrued the U.s. Supreine Court case on which it relied, Griffin v. Brekenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). While plaintiffs correctly point out that in Griffin, the Supreme Court expressly reserved judgment on what classes other than race might be protected under section 1985(3), 403 U.S. at 100 n.8, plaintiffs overlook more recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. Twelve years after deciding Griffin, the Supreme Court reaffinned the Griffin analysis, stating that: "The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 610. AFL-CIO v. Scott 463 U.S. 825,834 (1983). The Court further stated that, "it is a close 7 - OPINION AND ORDER question whether. § 198'5(3) was intended to reach any class-based animus other than animus against Negroes and those who championed their cause." Id. at 836 (emphasis added). Thus, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Bums, which limits section 1985(3) conspiracy claims to discrimination on the basis ohace or other suspect class, is consistent with Supreme Court decisions in this area. Because plaintiffs have not alleged membership in any suspect class, they have no cognizable claim against either the County defendants or the Association defendants under section 1985(3). Plaintiffs' conspiracy claim against the individual defendants also fails because the individual defendants are not govetnmental actors. See Single Moms, Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 331 F.3d 743, 746 (9th Cir. 2003).~· For the above reasons, all defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiffs' section 1985(3) claim are granted. CONCLUSION Based on the forgoing, the Association defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (# 13) is GRANTED; the County defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. eiv. P. 12(b)(6) (# 6) is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part as follows: 1. The County defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim is DENIED. 2. The County defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' section 1983 claim is DENIED. 1 Because plaintiffs' section 1985(3) claims must be dismissed on the grounds stated, I do not reach the defendants' claim preclusion argument. 8 - OPINION AND ORDER 1. The County defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' section 1985(3) claim is GRANTED. . ..,' DATED this ~kiay of March, 2009. 9 - OPINION AND ORDER
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