Arandell Corporation et al v. American Electric Power Company, Inc. et al, No. 2:2009cv00231 - Document 26 (S.D. Ohio 2010)

Court Description: OPINION & ORDER granting 4 Motion to Dismiss Complaint. Signed by Judge Michael H. Watson on 9/15/2010. (kjm1)

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Arandell Corporation et al v. American Electric Power Company, Inc. et al Doc. 26 UNrrED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION Arandell Corporation, et al., Plaintiffs, -v- Case No. 2:09-cv-231 American Electric Power Company, Inc. and AEP Energy Services, Inc., Judge Michael H. Watson Defendants. OPINION AND ORDER This is a putative class action brought by Plaintiffs Arandell Corporation, Ladish Company, Inc., Merrick's, Inc., Sargento Foods, Inc., Briggs & Stratton Corporation, and Carthage College (collectively, "Plaintiffs") under the Wisconsin Antitrust Act, specifically Wisconsin Statutes ("Wis. Stat( s).") §§ 133.14 and 133.18, Wisconsin's "Full Consideration Antitrust Statute" and "Treble Damages Antitrust Statute" respectively. Plaintiffs allege two counts: Count One seeks to void certain contracts purportedly affected by the alleged conspiracy and to recover the "full consideration" paid under such contracts, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 133.14, and; Count Two seeks treble damages for the purported injuries arising from the alleged conspiracy, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 133.18. (See Compl. mJ 17,119-29.) The matter is currently before the Court on Defendants American Electric Power Company, Inc. ("AEP") and AEP Energy Services, Inc.'s ("AEPES") (collectively Dockets.Justia.com "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss Complaint as Barred by Statute of Limitations (Doc. 4). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4). I. BACKGROUND A. Parties and jurisdiction Plaintiffs Arandell Corporation, Ladish Company, Inc., Merrick's, Inc., Sargento Foods Inc., Briggs & Stratton Corporation, and Carthage College are individually each corporations or institutions existing under the laws of the State of Wisconsin. Plaintiffs bring this class action on behalf of themselves and "a class consisting of all industrial and commercial purchasers of natural gas for their own use or consumption between January 1, 2000 and October 31, 2002 (the "relevant time period"), and which gas was used or consumed by them in Wisconsin." (Compl. 1I 1.) Plaintiffs claim Defendants engaged in a conspiracy which resulted in elevated prices for natural gas in Wisconsin, and Plaintiffs seek to recover treble damages under the Wisconsin Antitrust Act. Wis. Stat. § 133. Defendant AEP is a New York corporation with its principal place of business in Columbus, Ohio. Defendant AEPES is an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in Columbus, Ohio. AEP is a holding company, and AEPES is AEP's subsidiary. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs list several alleged co-conspirators (collectively, "coconspirators") operating in the purchase, sale, transport and/or storage of natural gas in Wisconsin that allegedly conspired or combined with Defendants and others to prevent 2:09-cv-231 Page 2 of 20 free competition and to elevate and control the market prices of natural gas. (See, e.g., Compl.1nl31, 36.) Although none of the co-conspirators are included as parties to this action, the co-conspirators detailed in the Complaint are as follows: The ONEOK Entities, The Williams Entities, The Duke Entities, The Dynegy Entities, The EI Paso Entities, The CMS Entities, The Reliant Entities, Coral Energy Resources, L.P., and The Xcel Entities. (Id. at 1nl30-90.) The Court's jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the parties are diverse entities of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. B. Factual allegations1 Wisconsin generates no natural gas; all natural gas consumed in Wisconsin is produced elsewhere. Natural gas is a primary energy source in Wisconsin for major Wisconsin industries such as food processing, brewing and dairy processing, and metal working. Plaintiffs allege that during the relevant time period, Defendants conspired to manipulate natural gas prices. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege Defendants, either directly or through their afFiliates, engaged in wash sales and manipulated market indices by reporting false trading information.2 (CompI.1l23.) In furtherance of this scheme, traders allegedly adjusted the prices and volumes of trades and reported trades that 1 The following facts are taken from the Complaint (Doc. 1). 2 A wash sale is an agreement in which two companies sell each other the same amount of natural gas at the same prices, creating the illusion of higher demand for natural gas and higher volumes of sales. (See Compl.1J 102 (a).) Wash trades are illegal. 2:09-cv-231 Page 30f 20 never occurred. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege Defendants and co-conspirators fraudulently participated together to increase the retail price of natural gas paid by Wisconsin commercial entities. (Id. at ｾ＠ 91.) In the scheme alleged, traders overstated natural gas prices to reporting firms, which in turn, published price data incorporating the overstated prices. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege Defendants and co-conspirators were in constant communication about natural gas futures contracts and the spot price of natural gas. (Id. at ｾ＠ 93.) This scheme allegedly caused price instability and increased volatility in spot prices resulting in manipulated prices of natural gas futures. (Id. at ｾ＠ 95.) For example, in September 2002, five traders and their companies, including Defendants AEP and AEPES, and co-conspirators EI Paso Merchant Energy, LP., Williams Energy & Trading, eMS Energy, and Dynegy Marketing & Trade, admitted to providing falsified information to Gas Daily and Inside FERC, trade publications owned by Platts devoted to the natural gas industry, natural gas indexes, and reporting of natural gas market prices and volumes. 3 (Id. at ｾ＠ 92.) It is alleged that this behavior 3According to Platts' website: Platts is the leading global provider of energy and metals information and the world's foremost source of benchmark price assessments in the physical energy markets. *** Platts publishes news, research, commentary, market data and analysis, and more than 8,500 daily price assessments that are widely used as benchmarks in both physical and futures markets. It delivers real-time news and price information and end-of-day price data directly to clients' desktops; publishes more than 60 newsletters and reports; and produces over 50 sector-specific conferences every year. http://www.platts.com/AboutPlattsHome.aspx (Visited Sept. 10,2010). 2:09-cv-231 Page 40f 20 artificially inflated prices for natural gas, resulting in Wisconsin and other states' commercial entities paying inflated prices for natural gas. (Id.) Based on such schemes, Defendants and co-conspirators paid millions of dollars in civil penalties to the United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and/or the Department of Justice. (See, e.g., id. at 1MT 28,34,43,52, and 63.) C. Procedural history Plaintiffs initially filed claims against AEP and AEPES in Wisconsin state court in December 2006. See Arandell Corp., v. Xcel Energy Inc., No. 06CV4276 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane County Dec. 15, 2006) (the "Wisconsin Action"). In addition to AEP and AEPES, the Wisconsin Action included several defendants including many of the co-conspirators alleged in this case's Complaint. That case was removed from Wisconsin state court to the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin on February 9, 2007. See Arandell Corp., et al. v. Xcel Energy, Inc., et al., No. 3:07-cv-76 (Notice of Removal (Doc. 2» (W.O. Wisc. Feb. 9, 2007). Subsequently, on March 22, 2007, AEP and AEPES moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Arandell Corp., et al. v. Xcel Energy, Inc., et al., No. 3:07-cv-76 (Defs.' AEP and AEPES Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. 61» (W.O. Wisc. March 22,2007). On June 25, 2007, the case in the Western District of Wisconsin was consolidated by order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in a multidistrict litigation ("MOL") in district court in Nevada. See In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., No. 2:03-cv-1431 (Transfer Order to MOL No. 1566 (Doc. 532» (D. Nev. June 22,2007). On March 9, 2009, the United States District Court for the District of Nevada (the "MOL court"), dismissed AEP and AEPES from the Wisconsin Action for 2:09-cv-231 Page 5 of 20 want of personal jurisdiction. See In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., No. 2:03-cv-1431 (Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Doc. 1548)) (D. Nev. March 9, 2009). The MOL court found that AEP and AEPES never made a sale or delivery to the plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that any forumrelated contact by AEP or AEPES with Wisconsin-based entities caused the harm to the plaintiffs. The MOL court found that the plaintiffs still would have been harmed in their transactions for natural gas purchases from the other defendants even if AEPES never made sales or deliveries to the third party Wisconsin-based entities. Accordingly, the MOL court found the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate their claims satisfied the personal jurisdiction test. Id. at 10. After the dismissal by the MOL court, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this case in the Southern District of Ohio on March 25, 2009. Arandell Corp. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. and AEP Energy Servs., Inc., Case No. 2:09-cv-231 (CampI. (Doc. 1)) (S.D. Ohio March 25, 2009). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A claim survives a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if it "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). In deciding whether a complaint has stated a claim on which relief can be granted, the Court will "construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, accept the allegations of the complaint as true, and determine whether plaintiffs factual allegations present plausible claims." Bowman v. United States, 564 F.3d 765, 769 (6th Cir. 2008). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer 2:09-cv-231 Page 6 of 20 possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. A complaint's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 (2007). A plaintiff must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."); Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007). "Ordinarily, dismissing claims as untimely under Rule 12(b)(6) is disfavored because plaintiffs have no duty to plead facts negating an affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations." Owner Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n, Inc. v. Comerica Bank, 540 F. Supp. 2d 925, 929 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (citing Hollander v. Brown, 457 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 2006». "However, ... dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on the basis of a limitations defense may be appropriate when the plaintiff effectively pleads herself out of court by alleging facts that are sufficient to establish the defense." HoI/ander, 457 F.3d at 691; Hoover v. Langston Equip. Assoc., Inc., 958 F.2d 742, 744 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that a statute of limitations defense may be brought on a motion to dismiss when it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the time limit for bringing the claim has passed). Further. the plaintiff bears the burden of "plead[ing] circumstances which would indicate why the [cause of action] was not discovered earlier and which would indicate why the statute should be tolled." Auslender v. Energy Mgmt. Corp., 832 F.2d 354, 356 (6th Cir. 1987). 2:09-cv-231 Page 7 of 20 III. ANALYSIS Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the premise that relief is barred under any of the three potentially applicable statutes of limitations. Specifically, Defendants argue that under Ohio's one-year, Ohio's sixyear, or Wisconsin's six­year statute of limitations, Plaintiffs' claims are time barred.  Defendants assert that despite the invocation of Wisconsin Antitrust Laws, Ohio's  statutes of limitations apply to claims brought in courts located  in  Ohio.  Plaintiffs assert that their claims are timely under any of the statutes of limitations.  Plaintiffs also state that they have been  pursuing their claims diligently and thus under  the Wisconsin's tolling statute or Ohio's savings statute, Plaintiffs' claims will  survive  notwithstanding any expired statutes of limitations.  A.  Statute of limitations in a diversity case  Both parties rely upon either outdated cases or post­dated  statutes in explaining  the relevant statute of limitations.  Accordingly,  the Court will endeavor to clarify.  "[A] federal court sitting in diversity must apply the choice of law rules of the state  in which  it sits." Charash v. Oberlin Coli., 14 F.3d 291, 296 (6th Cir.  1994) (citing Klaxon Co.  v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,  313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941».  A federal court located in  Ohio  applies the procedural law of the forum state,  including the statute of limitations of the  forum state, even if the case requires application of another state's substantive law.  Charash, 14 F.3d at 299 (citing Howard v. Allen, 30  Ohio St. 2d  130, 133 (1972»;  Schwartz v. Cincinnati Museum Ass'n, 35 F.  App'x 128,131  (6th Cir. 2002); Metz v. Unizan Bank, 416 F.  Supp. 2d  568,  573­74 (N.D. Ohio 2006) <"In  Ohio, the statute of  limitations of the forum state are applied even if liability is determined by the use of  2:09­cv­231  Page 8 of 20  another state's substantive law.").  In  Sun Oil Co. v. Woriman, the United States  Supreme Court stated:  "This Court has long and repeatedly held that the Constitution  does not bar application of the forum State's statute of limitations to claims that in  their  substance are and must be governed by the law of a different state."  486 U.S. 717, 722  (1988).  As this Court is located in  the Southern District of Ohio, the Court will apply the  procedural law of Ohio,  including the statutes of limitations of Ohio, even though the  case is brought under Wisconsin Antitrust laws.  "The Ohio Supreme Court has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of  Laws ["Restatement"] as the governing law for Ohio conflicts issues."  Cole v. Mileti, 133  F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir.  1998) (citations omitted); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF  LAWS  § 142 (1971).  Although other courts in this district found that Ohio courts would  adopt the 1988 Revision (the "Revision") to the 1972 Restatement,  see Curl v. Greenlee Textron, Inc., 404 F.  Supp. 2d  1001, 1005­08 (S.D. Ohio 2005), the Court need not  opine on this matter as it is inconsequential to the outcome.  Under either the  Restatement or the Revision,  a claim will  be dismissed if the forum  state's statute of  limitations bars the claim.  The Restatement states:  (1) An action will not be maintained if it is barred by the statute of limitations  of the  forum,  including  a  provision  borrowing  the  statute  of limitations  of  another state.  (2) An action will be maintained if it is not barred by the statute of limitations  of the forum, even though it would  be barred  by the statute of limitations of  another state . . . .  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS  § 142 (1971).  2:09­cv­231  Page 9 of  20  The Revision states:  Whether a  claim  will  be  maintained  against the  defense of the  statute  of  limitations is determined under the principles stated in § 6.ln general, unless  the exceptional circumstances ofthe case make such a result unreasonable:  (1) The forum will apply its own statute of limitations barring the claim.  (2) The forum  will  apply its own  statute  of limitations permitting the claim  unless:  (a) maintenance ofthe claim would serve no substantial interest ofthe  forum;  and  (b) the claim would be barred under the statute of limitations of a state  having  a  more  significant  relationship  to  the  parties  and  the  occurrence.  RESTATEMENT § 142 REVISION (1988).  Plaintiffs rely on two Sixth Circuit decisions for the proposition that when the  substantive law of another state is to be used,  if "the statute creating a cause of action  also fixes a limitation of time in which an action may be brought. the limitation is  regarded as part of the substantive law of the cause of action and is controlling when  brought in a sister state."  (Pis.' Opp'n to Defs: Mot. to Dismiss (Doc.  16) at 6­8) (citing  Myers v. Alvey-Ferguson Co.,  331  F.2d 223,224 (6th Cir.  1964) (interpreting Ohio law  as to whether statutes of limitations should be regarded  as "substantive" law for choice  of law analysis);  Davis v. Dracketl Prods. Co., 536 F.  Supp. 694, 696 (S.D. Ohio 1982».)  Notably, the 1964 and  1982 decisions focus on when a statute of limitations  should be regarded  as "substantive law"  during a choice­of­Iaw analysis; however, the  Supreme Court of Ohio abandoned the substantive/procedural dichotomy over twenty  years ago.  See,  e.g., Curl, 404 F.  Supp. 2d at 1005.  Prior to the 1980s, Ohio courts  traditionally applied the "substance/procedure dichotomy" in which the substantive law of  2:09­cv­231  Page 10 of  20  the place of the injury and the procedural law of the forum were applied in choice of law  cases.  See Phelps v. McClellan, 30 F.3d 658, 661  (6th Cir.  1994).  As these rigid  rules,  however, "have gradually fallen out of favor in Ohio and elsewhere," the Supreme Court  of Ohio formally adopted the more flexible approach by adopting the Restatement of the  Law of Conflicts to preclude forum  shopping arising from the use of the  substantive/procedural dichotomy.  Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co.,  15 Ohio St.  3d  339,  341­42  (1984) ("[w]e hereby adopt the theory stated in the Restatement of the Law of  Conflicts"); Phelps, 30 F.3d at 661.  Accordingly, the Court declines Plaintiffs' request to  employ the six­year statute of limitations provided for in the Wisconsin Antitrust Act.  Likewise, Defendants err in suggesting the Court must employ Ohio's borrowing  statute in this case.  (Defs.' 8r. 4.)  Defendants argue that Ohio's borrowing statute bars  the civil action because the statute of limitations is not met in both Ohio and  Wisconsin.  Ohio's borrowing statute reads as follows:  (8) No civil action that is based upon a cause of action that accrued in any  other state, territory, district, or foreign jurisdiction may be commenced and  maintained  in this state if the period of limitation that applies to that action  under the laws of that other state, territory, district, or foreign jurisdiction has  expired or the period of limitation that applies to that action under the laws  of this state has expired.  OHIO REV.  CODE § 2305.03(8).  Defendants' reliance on  Ohio's borrowing statute,  however,  is misplaced.  The borrowing statute codified at Ohio Rev.  Code § 2305.03  was enacted on April 7,  2005, after the alleged injury accrued during the relevant time  period, but before the case was filed.  At least two district courts in Ohio have denied  retroactive application of Ohio's borrowing statute and declined to apply it to claims that  accrued before the statute was enacted.  See Executone of Columbus, Inc. v. Inter-Tel, 2:09­cv­231  Page 11  of  20  Inc., Case No.  2:06­cv­126, 2009 WL 3210354, at *15­16 (S.D.  Ohio Sept. 30, 2009)  (Smith, J.);  Dudek v. Thomas and Thomas Attorneys &  Counselors at Law, LLC, 702 F.  Supp. 2d  826, 835­40 (N.D. Ohio March 22, 2010) (O'Malley, J.).  As the face of the  Complaint provides that the claims accrued before the borrowing statute was enacted in  2005, the Court declines to apply Ohio's borrowing statute retroactively.  See State v. LaSalle, 96 Ohio St.  3d  178, 181  (2002) ("[A]bsent a clear pronouncement by the  General Assembly that a statute is to be applied retrospectively,  a statute may be  applied prospectively only.").  In sum, the Court will apply the statutes of limitations of Ohio and determine  whether Plaintiffs claims are barred  by Ohio's statutes of limitations even if liability is  determined by the use of Wisconsin's substantive law.  B.  Ohio's statutes of limitations  The Ohio Rev. Code supplies two statutes of limitations for claims premised on  statutory violations.  An action based "upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture" must be  brought within one year.  OHIO REV. CODE § 2305.11.  An action based "upon a liability  created  by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty" must be brought within six years.  OHIO REV.  CODE  § 2305.07.  Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs' claims are barred  by both the one­year  and six­year Ohio statutes of limitations, the Court need not decide which of Ohio's  statutes of limitations apply to Plaintiffs' claims.  See OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2305.07,  2305.11.  Defendants aver that even under the longer six­year statute of limitations  Plaintiffs' claims are barred  because Plaintiffs allege the relevant time period for the  antitrust violations occurred between January 1,2000 and  October 31,2002.  (CompI.  11 2:09­cv­231  Page 12 of  20  1.)  Defendants reason that Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this case on  March 25,  2009, after the alleged October 31,  2008 expiration of the six­year statute of limitations.  Defendants further posit that no discovery rule that would toll the statute of limitations  applies to Plaintiffs' claims and that Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts in their Complaint  about the reason for delay in discovering their claims.  (Defs: Br. 6.)  Plaintiffs argue a discovery rule does apply, asserting that because the Wisconsin  Antitrust Act itself codifies a discovery rule,  it shows the Wisconsin legislature intended  the discovery rule to apply.  Plaintiffs state that "to determine whether a discovery rule  should apply in a particular instance, a court should  review the statutory scheme to  determine whether the legislature meant for the accrual of the statute of limitations to  occur upon the discovery of the facts giving rise to the cause of action."  (Pis.' Opp'n to  Defs.'  Mot.  to  Dismiss (Doc.  16) 12.)  1.  Ohio's six­year statute of limitations  Defendants argue Plaintiffs' claims are barred under Ohio's six­year statute of  limitations.  Defendants argue the claims accrued more than six years prior to the filing  of the Complaint and Ohio does not recognize a discovery rule tolling the statute of  limitations.  Defendants further assert that even applying a discovery rule,  Plaintiffs'  Complaint claims Defendants' illegal behavior became public in October 2002.  Plaintiffs argue that under Ohio's six­year statute of limitations, it is left to judicial  determination when a cause of action accrues.  Plaintiffs argue as a discovery rule is  part of the statutory scheme of the Wisconsin Antitrust Act, the discovery rule thus tolls  the statute of limitations in this case.  Ohio law provides that "an action ... upon a liability created by statute other than  2:09­cv­231  Page 13 of  20  a forfeiture or penalty, shall be brought within six years after the cause thereof accrued."  OHIO REV. CODE § 2305.07.  When determining when a cause of action accrues,  "[a]bsent legislative definition, it is left to the judiciary to determine when a cause 'arose'  for purposes of statutes of limitations."  Metz, 416 F.  Supp. 2d at 575 (citing  O'Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp., 4 Ohio St.  3d  84 syllabus 11'  1 (1983».  In  Ohio, the "general rule [is]  that the statute of limitations commences to run at the time the cause of action accrues .  . . . The cause of action accrues ... in the case of statutory actions  when the violation of  the statute occurs." Arbor Viii. Condo. Ass'n v. Arbor Viii. Ltd., L.P., 95 Ohio App. 3d  499,506 (Ohio Ct. App.  Dist.  10 1994) (emphasis added) (citing  Squire v. Guardian Trust Co.,  79 Ohio App. 371  (Ohio Ct. App.  Dist. 8 1947».  In this case, the Complaint  alleges the relevant time period for the statutory violations to be no later than October  2002.  Accordingly, on the face of the Complaint, the Court finds the violation of the  statute occurred more than six years prior to the filing of the instant action.  Plaintiffs, however, argue that despite the statutory violation occurring at latest in  October 2002, they did not discover the violation until less than six years before the filing  of this action.  Plaintiffs suggest the discovery rule codified in the Wisconsin Antitrust Act  tolls Ohio's six­year statute of limitations.  In  some instances, a discovery rule is applied to toll  a statute of limitations.  A  "'discovery rule' generally provides that a cause of action accrues for purposes of the  governing statute of limitations at the time when the plaintiff discovers or,  in  the exercise  of reasonable care,  should have discovered the complained of injury."  Investors REIT One v. Jacobs, 46 Ohio St. 3d  176, 179 (1989).  2:09­cv­231  Page 14 of  20  Plaintiffs suggest this Court should apply the discovery rule codified within the  Wisconsin Treble Damages statute:  "A cause of action arising under this chapter does  not accrue until the discovery, by the aggrieved person, of the facts constituting the  cause of action."  Wis. Stat.  § 133.18(4).  Plaintiffs cite to  Metz for the proposition that  "[t]he Court also considers the legislature's intent when determining whether a statute of  limitations should be extended through the application of a discovery rule."  Metz, 416 F.  Supp. 2d at 576.  That case,  however, is inapposite in that it is not considering whether  a discovery rule codified by the legislature of a foreign state can be used to extend the  statute of limitations of a forum  state.  Notably,  Plaintiffs offer no such authority.  The Court declines to adopt Plaintiffs' request to apply the discovery rule of the  Wisconsin statute to the Ohio statute of limitations.  By doing so,  it would effectively  make Ohio's statute of limitation of no moment and would  require a forum  state to  accept a claim  permitted in a foreign  state while barred by its own statute of limitations.  Instead the Court looks to whether Ohio Rev.  Code § 2305.07 contemplates a  discovery rule.  In  Arbor Village, the court refused to apply a discovery rule to a claim  invoking the six­year statute of limitations in Ohio Rev.  Code § 2305.07.  Arbor Viii., 95  Ohio App. 3d at 506.  The Arbor Village court found  no reason to depart from the rule  that for statutory actions, the statute of limitations begins to run when the violation of the  statute occurs.  Id. See also Settles v. Overpeck Trucking Co.,  1993 WL 534700, *1  (Ohio Ct. App.  Dist.  12 1993) (interpreting Ohio Rev.  Code § 2305.07, the court found  "[t]here is no case law to support plaintiffs argument that the discovery rule ... extends  to breach of contract claims.").  Accordingly, the Court finds a discovery rule should  not  2:09­cv­231  Page 15 of  20  be applied to the six­year statute of limitations provided under Ohio Rev.  Code § 2305.07.  In  sum,  it is apparent from the face of the Complaint that Plaintiffs' claims are  untimely under the six­year statute of limitations pursuant to Ohio Rev.  Code § 2305.07.  2.  Ohio's one­year statute of limitations  Defendants also assert Plaintiffs' claims are barred under Ohio's one­year statute  of limitations for "an action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture ...."  OHIO REV.  CODE § 2305.11.  Plaintiffs concede that if Ohio's statutes of limitations apply, the six­year statute of  limitations and not the one­year statute of limitation applies.  {See Pis.' Opp'n to Defs.'  Mot. to  Dismiss (Doc.  16) 2.)  Accordingly,  as Plaintiffs waived arguments regarding the one­year statute of  limitations, the Court declines to decide whether the one­year statute of limitations would  apply.  C.  Tolling provisions  Defendants argue no tolling provision applies to Plaintiffs' claims.  Defendants  assert that despite Plaintiffs' filing of a suit in Wisconsin, bringing claims in the wrong  court does not entitle Plaintiffs to an  enlargement of the statute of limitations in this  action.  Plaintiffs concede that they have "never argued that the doctrine of equitable  tolling applies" (Pis.' Opp'n to  Defs.' Mot. To Dismiss (Doc.  16) 16) and the Court so  finds.  Instead Plaintiffs assert Wisconsin's tolling statute saves their claims, or,  in the  2:09­­cv­231  Page 16 of  20  alternative, Ohio's saving statute preserves their claims.  See OHIO REV.  CODE  § 2305.19.  Wisconsin's tolling statute states:  A  law  limiting  the  time  for  commencement  of an  action  is  tolled  by  the  commencement of the  action  to  enforce the cause  of action  to  which  the  period of limitation applies.  The law limiting the time for commencement of  the action is tolled for the period from the commencement of the action until  the final disposition of the action.  Wis. Stat.  § 893.13.  Plaintiffs, however, do not cite any authority that Wisconsin's tolling  statute would apply to an action that was originally dismissed in a court that lacked  jurisdiction or would apply to this action brought in a federal court in  Ohio applying an  Ohio statute of limitations.  Cf.  Irvine v. Wisconsin Dept. of Transp., 118 Wis.2d 825, at  *8 (Wis. App.  1984) (Interpreting Wis. Stat.  § 893.13, the court held "[i]f an action is  commenced in a court which lacks jurisdiction and then,  after the statute of limitations  has run,  it is refiled in the proper court, the statute of limitations is not tolled by the initial  improper filing.") (citing Schafer v. Wegner, 78 Wis.2d 127, 135 (1977); Heifetz v. Johnson, 61  Wis.2d 111, 117 (1973».  Accordingly, the Court declines to  apply Wis.  Stat.  § 893.13's tolling statute to the current action.  Similarly, Ohio's savings statute does not apply.  It states:  In any action that is commenced or attempted to be commenced, ... if the  plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff ... may commence  a  new  action  within  one  year  after  the  date  of  ... the  plaintiff's  failure  otherwise than upon the merits or within the period of the original applicable  statute of limitations, whichever occurs later.  OHIO REV. CODE  § 2305.19(A).  In Howard v. Allen, the Ohio Supreme Court held the  Ohio saving clause applies only to actions "commenced or attempted to be commenced"  2:09­cv­231  Page 17 of  20  in Ohio within the appropriate statute of limitations.  30 Ohio St. 2d  130, 134­35 (Ohio  1972).  That ruling,  however, has been narrowly limited.  In interpreting the Ohio savings  statute, the Supreme Court of Ohio relied on two United States Supreme Court  decisions and held "that the filing of a class action, whether in Ohio or the federal court  system, tolls the statute of limitations as to all asserted  members of the class who would  have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action.  We modify  Howard to the extent that it conflicts with this holding."  Vaccariello v. Smith &  Nephew Richards, Inc., 94 Ohio St. 3d  380, 382 (Ohio 2002) (relying on American Pipe &  Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 ("[T]he commencement of a class action suspends the  applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would  have  been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action.") and  Crown, Cork &  Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker,462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983) (expanded the scope of  American Pipe and found "a tolling rule for class actions is not inconsistent with the  purposes served by statutes of limitations [which are] intended to put defendants on  notice of adverse claims and to prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights."».  While  Vaccariello allows the savings statute to save an individual member's  claims when class certification fails,  it does not speak to a putative class action originally  filed in a foreign jurisdiction and dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.  See Ruble v. Ream, 2003 WL 22532858 (Ohio App.  Dist. 4 Oct. 29, 2003) ("Vaccariello did not  address whether [Ohio Revised Code §] 2305.19 saves a standard civil suit that is  originally filed in a foreign jurisdiction [and dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction].  Thus, we do not agree ... that  Vaccariello effectively overruled  Howard."). 2:09­cv­231  Page 18 of  20  In this case, the putative class action was commenced outside of Ohio and  never  proceeded to the class certification phase as it was dismissed for lack of personal  jurisdiction by the MDL court.  As such, the Court does not find  this case falls within  Vaccariello's narrow holding preserving individual class members claims upon noncertification of the class. The Court instead will follow the Supreme Court of Ohio's "unambiguous holding that the savings statute is not to be applied to protect actions originally filed in other states" and the Court therefore refuses to apply Ohio's saving statute to this action. Monroe v. Stop-N-Go Food Stores, Inc., 91 Ohio App. 3d 186, 189 (Ohio App. Dist. 2 1993) (pursuant to Howard. refusing to apply Ohio's savings statute to action originally commenced in foreign state). IV. CONCLUSION As previously mentioned, the procedural posture of this case is unusual. The case was originally filed by Plaintiffs in December 2006 in Wisconsin state court. It was then removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, and then the action in the Western District of Wisconsin was later consolidated into the MDL occurring in Nevada. On March 9, 2009, the MDL court in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada dismissed AEP and AEPES from the Wisconsin Action for want of personal jurisdiction. That this case is unusual, however, does not warrant departure from the provisions of Ohio's statutes of limitations. This Complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on March 25, 2009, more than six years after the Complaint states the alleged statutory violation ＲＺＰｾｶＭＳＱ＠ ended on October 31,2002, and outside of the six-year statute of limitations provided for Page 19 of 20 by the Ohio Revised Code.  Neither the Wisconsin tolling statute nor the Ohio savings  statute preserve Plaintiffs' action.  Accordingly. the Court finds the Complaint was not  timely filed.  V. DISPOSITION The Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint as Barred by  Statute of Limitations (Doc. 4).  The Clerk is instructed to  REMOVE Document 4 from  the pending motions list.  Lastly. the Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Defendant  and against Plaintiff and terminate the case from the Court's docket.  ＲＺＰｾｶＭＳＱ＠ IT IS SO ORDERED. Page 20 of  20 

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