Whitsette v. Marc Jacobs International, LLC, No. 1:2018cv01730 - Document 11 (N.D. Ohio 2018)
Court Description: Opinion & Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 8/22/18. The Court, for the reasons set forth in this order, denies defendant's request to dismiss and grants plaintiff's motion to remand the case to state court. (Related Docs. 5 and 8 ) (D,MA)
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Whitsette v. Marc Jacobs International, LLC Doc. 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO ----------------------------------------------------------------------: : : : : : : : : : : SABRINA WHITSETTE, Plaintiff, vs. MARC JACOBS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, Defendant. Case No. 1:18-cv-1730 OPINION & ORDER [Resolving Doc. 5] ----------------------------------------------------------------------JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: Plaintiff Sabrina Whitsette originally brought this action in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas, alleg“ng that Defendant Marc Jacobs Internat“onal, LLC ( MJI ) v“olated the Oh“o Consumer Sales Practices Act1 by falsely advertising that its Shameless Youthful Look 24-Hour Foundation makeup lasts for 24 hours on a consumer’s sk“n.2 Plaintiff sought an injunction that would require MJI to alter its allegedly misleading Ohio product messaging and to engage in a corrective marketing campaign, as well as an award of attorney’s fees and costs.3 MJI subsequently petitioned to remove the action to federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).4 Plaintiff Whitsette now moves to remand the case to state court.5 For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the motion to remand. I. Discussion Plaintiff Whitsette requests that the Court remand her case to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) on two grounds. First, she argues that her claim is not justiciable in federal court under Article III of the United States Constitution because she lacks standing. Second, she argues that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over her claim because the amount in controversy does not 1 O.R.C. § 1345.01 et seq. See Doc. 1-2. 3 Pla“nt“ff’s compla“nt does not seek monetary damages. See Doc. 1-2. 4 Doc. 1. 5 Doc. 5. Defendant opposes. Doc. 8. Plaintiff replies. Doc. 10. 2 Dockets.Justia.com Case No. 1:18-cv-1730 Gwin, J. meet the $75,000 requirement set by the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The case will be remanded to state court because Plaintiff lacks Article III standing. The ex“stence of a case or controversy “s an elemental precond“t“on of federal-court jurisdiction, and standing is one element of this requirement.6 To demonstrate standing, the plaintiff must show that she has suffered a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.7 In a suit for injunctive relief, a plaintiff lacks Article III standing unless the injury is ongoing or she is likely to suffer the alleged injury again in the future.8 A consumer seeking injunctive relief to remedy false advertising must allege that she is likely to purchase the allegedly mislabeled product again in the future to have standing.9 Here, Plaintiff seeks only injunctive relief and does not allege that she will be deceived into purchasing Shameless Youthful Look 24-Hour Foundation again in the future. She only alleges that she paid an unjustified premium for the product in the past on the bas“s of MJI’s alleged misrepresentations,10 and so she lacks Article III standing.11 Defendant MJI does not dispute that Plaintiff lacks Article III standing. Instead, relying on upon the S“xth C“rcu“t’s unpubl“shed op“n“on “n Aarti Hospitality, LLC v. City of Grove City, Ohio,12 it urges this Court to dismiss the suit outright lieu of remanding it to state court. Defendant argues that this disposition is appropriate because Plaintiff lacks standing under state law to bring her claim. However, Pla“nt“ff’s lack of Art“cle III stand“ng does not, by itself, foreclose the possibility that 6 In re: 2016 Primary Election, 836 F.3d 584, 587 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). 7 8 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548-49 (2016). See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108 (1983) (finding that plaintiff lacked standing to pursue an injunction because it was unlikely that he would be subjected to unlawful choke-holds in the future). 9 See Graiser v. Visionworks of Am., Inc., No. 1:14-CV-01641, 2015 WL 248003, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 20, 2015), vacated on other grounds, 819 F.3d 277 (6th Cir. 2016) (plaintiff lacked standing to pursue injunction barring allegedly deceptive advert“s“ng because no “n”unct“on [he] could obta“n would prevent a future “n”ury ); Neuman v. L’Oreal USA S/D, Inc. , No. 1:14-CV-01615, 2014 WL 5149288, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 14, 2014) (holding that plaintiff lacked standing because she did not allege that she would purchase the allegedly deceptive product again in the future). 10 Doc. 1-2 at ¶ 7. 11 See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495 (1974) ( Past exposure to “llegal conduct does not “n “tself show a present case or controversy regard“ng “n”unct“ve rel“ef . . . “f unaccompan“ed by any cont“nu“ng, present adverse effects. ) 12 350 F. App’x 1 (6th C“r. 2009). -2- Case No. 1:18-cv-1730 Gwin, J. she may obtain relief in state court. Th“s Court’s author“ty to grant rel“ef cons“stent w“th Art“cle III “s a d“st“nct “ssue from the Pla“nt“ff’s r“ght to br“ng su“t under state law,13 and Plaintiff may potentially have standing to bring her suit in state court. Th“s Court den“es Defendant’s request to dismiss the case for two reasons. First, because [”]ur“sd“ct“on “s the power to declare the law, th“s Court cannot proceed at all “n any cause where the requirements of Article III are not met.14 As Pla“nt“ff’s stand“ng under the Oh“o Consumer Sales Practices Act is a matter of substantive Ohio law,15 this Court lacks the author“ty to rule on Pla“nt“ff’s right to bring this claim under state law absent Article III’s federal ”ur“sd“ct“on. Second, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), which governs the treatment of cases after removal from state court, dictates that remand to state court—not dismissal—is appropriate where federal subject-matter jurisdiction over the case is lacking.16 Defendant MJI’s rel“ance on Aarti Hospitality is misplaced. There, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the pla“nt“ffs’ state-law claims for declaratory relief for lack of state-law standing, without first determining whether the standing requirements of Article III had been met with regard to these claims.17 However, the action in Aarti Hospitality was originally brought in federal court, alleging violations of both federal and state law. For that reason, dismissal (as opposed to remand) was the appropriate course in light of the jurisdictional defects the court identified. Furthermore, the court in Aarti Hospitality did not explicitly reach the issue of Article III standing with regard to the state- 13 See Aarti Hospitality, 350 F. App’x at 5 (not“ng that “n some publ“c “nterest cases, Oh“o law, unl“ke Art“cle III, does not requ“re the compla“n“ng party to have been “n”ured “n order to have stand“ng to sue ); Lee v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 2001) ( [A] plaintiff whose cause of action is perfectly viable in state court under state law may nonetheless be foreclosed from litigating the same cause of action in federal court, if he cannot demonstrate the requisite “n”ury. ). 14 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1868)). See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (not“ng that stand“ng “s the threshold quest“on “n every federal case, determ“n“ng the power of the court to entertain the suit ). 15 See Aarti Hospitality, 350 F. App’x at 4 (citing Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 225 (1996)). 16 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ( If at any t“me before f“nal ”udgment “t appears that the district court lacks subject matter ”ur“sd“ct“on, the case shall be remanded. ); see also Page v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1171 (S.D. Cal. 2012) ( Where a pla“nt“ff “n a removed act“on lacks federal stand“ng to sue, the act“on should generally be remanded, not d“sm“ssed. ). 17 Aarti Hospitality, 350 F. App’x at 5. -3- Case No. 1:18-cv-1730 Gwin, J. law claims.18 For this reason, Aarti Hospitality does not support the proposition that dismissal on substantive state-law grounds is appropriate where (as here) Article III standing is undisputedly lacking.19 Because this Court has found that Plaintiff lacks Article III standing, it is not necessary to reach Pla“nt“ff’s arguments that th“s Court also lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over her claim because the amount in controversy does not meet the $75,000 threshold established by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).20 II. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Pla“nt“ff’s mot“on to remand her case to state court. IT IS SO ORDERED. s/ Dated: August 22, 2018 James S. Gwin JAMES S. GWIN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE That the court reached the mer“ts of the pla“nt“ffs’ const“tut“onal cla“ms, at least, presupposes that the pla“nt“ffs had Article III standing to sue under federal law on some of their claims. See Aartis Hopsitality, 19 Furthermore, other Sixth Circuit decisions are contrary to the Aartis Hospitality court’s approach. See Davis v. Detroit Pub. Sch. Cmty. Dist., No. 17-1909, 2018 WL 3763429, at *5 (6th Cir. Aug. 9, 2018) ( [W]e must cons“der whether Pla“nt“ffs have standing under Article III before consider“ng whether they have stand“ng under state law ); Campbell v. PMI Food Equip. Group, Inc., 509 F.3d 776, 782 (6th Cir. 2007) (not“ng that d“str“ct court should have begun “ts “nqu“ry “nto the [pla“nt“ffs’ stand“ng under state law] w“th an analys“s under Art“cle III of the U.S. Const“tut“on ). Judge Kethledge’s concurrence in Aartis Hospitality similarly cast doubt on the ma”or“ty’s approach. See Aarti Hospitality, 350 F. App’x at 13 (Kethledge, J., concurring in part and concurring in the ”udgment) ( There “s no Supreme Court precedent . . . that perm“ts [a federal court] to address quest“ons of purely state law as to cla“ms over wh“ch we lack Art“cle III ”ur“sd“ct“on. ). 20 See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (a federal court may choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits"). 18 -4-
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