Chinnock v. Navient Corporation et al, No. 1:2018cv01009 - Document 70 (N.D. Ohio 2018)
Court Description: Opinion & Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 10/26/18. The Court, for the reasons set forth in this order, grants defendants' second motion to dismiss for improper venue and lack of personal jurisdiction. It denies defendants' first motion to dismiss as moot. Finally, the Court denies plaintiff's motions to remand, for summary judgment, and to compel discovery and impose sanctions. (Related Docs. 5 , 20 , 46 , 50 , and 54 ) (D,MA)
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Chinnock v. Navient Corporation et al Doc. 70 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO -----------------------------------------------------------------: JULIE ANNE CHINNOCK, : : Plaintiff, : : vs. : : NAVIENT CORPORATION, et al., : : Defendants. : : ------------------------------------------------------------------ Case No. 1:18-cv-1009 OPINION & ORDER [Resolving Docs. 5, 20, 46, 50, 54] JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: In this case, a Washington resident sues non-Ohio Defendants, for conduct apparently unconnected to Ohio. The Court lacks jurisdiction over Defendants and venue is improper. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS D—‘—n–ants second motion to dismiss. It DENIES D—‘—n–ants ‘“rst mot“on to –“sm“ss. And the Court DENIES Plaintiff s motions to remand, for summary judgment, and to compel discovery and impose sanctions. I. Background Plaintiff Julie Anne Chinnock racked up hundreds of thousands of dollars in student loan debt pursuing two undergraduate and three graduate degrees.1 In this lawsuit, she claims she paid off her debt in full but –o—s not hav— . . . any –ocum—nts r—’ar–“n’ h—r stu–—nt loans b—caus— such –ocum—nts w—r— lost –ur“n’ h—r trav—ls. 2 She also does not identify where she went to school, where she took out the loans, where she paid off the loans, or where the loan servicing took place.3 1 Doc. 43 at ¶ 2. 2 Id. 3 Defendants claim Plaintiff attended school in Oregon and California (Doc. 50-2 at 8 n.5) and that they serviced her loans in Arizona, California, and Washington (Doc. 5-3 at ¶ 15). Dockets.Justia.com Case No. 1:18-cv-1009 Gwin, J. Plaintiff currently lives and works in Seattle, Washington,4 but claims to be a domiciliary of Ohio.5 She does not, however, indicate if, when, or for how long, she lived in Ohio. Defendants Navient Corporation ( Nav“—nt Corp. ), Navient Solutions, LLC ( Nav“—nt Solut“ons ), and Navient Student Loan Trust 2014-3 ( Nav“—nt Trust ) service Pla“nt“‘‘ s loans, and contend that Plaintiff still owes $232,730.56.6 Navient Corp. is a Delaware incorporated corporation, with its principal place of business in Delaware.7 Navient Solutions appears to be a Delaware entity, with its principal place of business in Virginia.8 And Navient Trust appears to be a Delaware entity.9 In March 2018, Plaintiff brought this suit in Ohio state court, seeking a declaration that she has paid off her debt.10 Defendants removed the case on diversity grounds11 and then moved to dismiss for Oh“o s lack of personal jurisdiction over the Defendants and for improper venue.12 The Court held the motion in abeyance pending the filing of Pla“nt“‘‘ s new complaint.13 On August 9, 2018, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, which purported to add the United States Department of Education (the D—partm—nt ) as a defendant although, as discussed infra, Plaintiff never properly served the Department.14 Defendants 4 Doc. 35 at 1. Doc. 43 at ¶ 2. 6 Doc. 5-3 at ¶ 8. 7 Id. at ¶ 7; Doc. 1-1 at 3, 30. 8 Doc. 5-3 at ¶ 7. 9 Doc. 50-2 at 5. 10 Doc. 1-1. 11 Doc. 1. 12 Doc. 5. Plaintiff opposes. Doc. 44. 13 Doc. 34. 14 Doc. 43. 5 -2- Case No. 1:18-cv-1009 Gwin, J. again moved to dismiss.15 For her part, Plaintiff filed a flurry of motions, most of which the Court has already addressed. Still pending thou’h, ar— Pla“nt“‘‘ s motions for summary judgment,16 for remand,17 and to compel discovery and impose sanctions.18 The Court now considers all pending motions. II. Remand Is Not Appropriate Plaintiff has twice moved to remand this case to state court.19 Undeterred by the Court s pr“or –—n“als, Pla“nt“‘‘ mov—s y—t a’a“n.20 This time, she argues that the Department which she first named as a party in August 2018 failed to consent to a May 2018 removal. But only those defendants who have been properly joined and served must . . . consent to the removal of the action ;21 Plaintiff never served the Department of Education.22 Here, Plaintiff was required to deliver the summons and complaint to: (i) the United States Attorney for this district (or authorized designee),23 (ii) the United States Attorney General,24 and (iii) the Department.25 Plaintiff, however, served only one person: Pam Rosendale of the Department of Education s Colora–o o‘‘“c—.26 Pam Rosendale is not the United States Attorney for this 15 Doc. 50. Plaintiff opposes. Docs. 55, 56. Defendants reply. Doc. 58. Doc. 20. Defendants oppose. Doc. 29. Plaintiff replies. Doc. 32. 17 Doc. 46. Defendants oppose. Doc. 57. Plaintiff replies. Doc. 60. 18 Doc. 54. 19 Docs. 6, 25. 20 Doc. 46. 21 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 22 The Department of Education has protested service. Doc. 63. 23 Fed. R. of Civ. P 4(i)(1)(A). 24 Fed. R. of Civ. P 4(i)(1)(B). 25 Fed. R. of Civ. P 4(i)(2). 26 Doc. 46-1. 16 -3- Case No. 1:18-cv-1009 Gwin, J. district. Nor is Pam Rosendale Jeff Sessions. Thus, Plaintiff, at best, served one for three service persons. The Court denies her motion to remand. III. Defendants Have Not Waived Personal Jurisdiction Defendants move to dismiss for, inter alia, lack of personal jurisdiction. Conversely, Plaintiff argues that Defendants waived this defense.27 Defendants waived personal jurisdiction if they: (i) gave Pla“nt“‘‘ a r—asonabl— —xp—ctat“on that D—‘—n–ants w[ould] defend the suit on the merits or (ii) caus—[–] th— [C]ourt to go to some effort that would be wast—– “‘ p—rsonal ”ur“s–“ct“on “s lat—r ‘oun– lack“n’. 28 Defendants have done neither. Thus far, Defendant Navient Trust has filed: (i) a special appearance,29 (ii) a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,30 and (iii) responses to Pla“nt“‘‘ s mot“ons, in which it consistently protested personal jurisdiction.31 Meanwhile, Defendants Navient Corp. and Navient Solutions have filed: (i) a notice of removal that specifically reserved the personal jurisdiction defense,32 (ii) two motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,33 (iii) a motion for a protective order,34 and (iv) responses to Pla“nt“‘‘ s motions, in which they frequently reasserted their personal jurisdiction defense. From the outset, Defendants have consistently and diligently protested personal jurisdiction. They have litigated the case only to the extent necessary to preserve that defense. Nothing they have done has indicated an intention to defend the case on the merits or caused the Court to expend unnecessary efforts. 27 Doc. 55 at 17. 28 Gerber v. Riordan, 649 F.3d 514, 519 (6th Cir. 2011). 29 Doc. 48. 30 Doc. 50. 31 Docs. 57, 59. 32 Doc. 1. 33 Docs. 5, 50. 34 Doc. 41. -4- Case No. 1:18-cv-1009 Gwin, J. Pla“nt“‘‘ ar’u—s that D—‘—n–ants attorn—ys —nt—r—– ’—n—ral app—aranc—s that qualify as waivers of personal jurisdiction.35 Not so. Navient Trust s attorn—ys filed a special appearance36 and, the very same day, moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction.37 Nav“—nt Corp. an– Nav“—nt Solut“ons attorneys did not file notices of appearance at all. To the extent Plaintiff argues that the notice of removal amounts to a general appearance,38 she is wrong.39 Further, in their notice of removal, Defendants stated they were preserving their personal jurisdiction defense.40 Moreover, the Court doubts that a general appearance qualifies as a per se waiver of personal jurisdiction. Pla“nt“‘‘ s —nt“r— ar’um—nt h—r— r—sts on Gerber v. Rodian.41 There, the defendants litigated for nearly three years before raising personal jurisdiction. 42 The Sixth Circuit concluded that D—‘—n–ants ‘“l“n’ o‘ a ’—n—ral app—aranc— . . . const“tut—– . . . a wa“v—r o‘ D—‘—n–ants p—rsonal ”ur“s–“ct“on –—‘—ns—. 43 Taken at face value, Gerber s language directly conflicts with an earlier Sixth Circuit case that stated, [“]n or–—r to ob”—ct to a court s —x—rc“s— o‘ p—rsonal ”ur“s–“ct“on, “t “s no lon’—r n—c—ssary to —nt—r a sp—c“al app—aranc—. 44 The Court must follow the earlier of two conflicting Sixth Circuit decisions.45 Further, a number of courts in this circuit have 35 Doc. 44 at 16. Doc. 48. 37 Doc. 50. 38 Doc. 44 at 16. 36 Wabash W. Ry. v. Brow, 164 U.S. 271, 279 (1896) ( [T]h— ‘“l“n’ of a petition for removal does not amount to a ’—n—ral app—aranc—, but to a sp—c“al app—aranc— only. ). 40 Doc. 1 at 6 7. 41 649 F.3d 514 (6th Cir. 2011). 42 Id. at 518 19. 43 Id. at 520. 44 Cnty. S—c. A’—ncy v. Oh“o D—p t o‘ Comm—rc—, 296 F.3d 477, 483 (6th Cir. 2002). See also Haile v. Henderson Nat l Bank, 657 F.2d 816, 820 n.4 (6th Cir. 1981). 45 United States v. Simpson, 520 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2008). 39 -5- Case No. 1:18-cv-1009 Gwin, J. read Gerber narrowly.46 Finally, Gerber is badly out of step with the modern approach to personal jurisdiction47 and the plain text of Rule 12, which ties waiver to factors other than the manner of appearance.48 In sum, Defendants did not waive personal jurisdiction. IV. Plaintiff Fails To Demonstrate Personal Jurisdiction Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants.49 At this stage, the Court looks only to th— part“—s pl—a–“n’s an– affidavits, considering them in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff.50 And Plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. 51 Although this burden is r—lat“v—ly slight, 52 after three complaints and fourteen motions, Plaintiff still has not carried it. Because this is a diversity case, th— Court s —x—rc“s— o‘ p—rsonal ”ur“s–“ct“on must b— both consistent with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and authorized by Ohio law.53 The Court considers first whether Plaintiff has satisfied constitutional concerns.54 There are two types of personal jurisdiction general and specific that satisfy due process.55 To invoke general jurisdiction, Plaintiff must show that Defendants are at 46 King v. Taylor, 694 F.3d 650, 660 n.7 (6th Cir. 2012); Mattson v. Troyer, No. 5:15-cv-358, 2016 WL 5338061 (N.D. Ohio Sep. 23, 2016); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Electrolux Home Prod., Inc. , No. 1:14-cv-329, 2014 WL 3615382 (N.D. Ohio July 18, 2014); ABG Prime Grp., LLC v. Innovative Salon Prod. , No. 17-12280, 2018 WL 3219647 (E.D. Mich. July 2, 2018); First Franchise Capital Corp. v. Jack in the Box, Inc. , No. 1:17-cv-397, 2017 WL 3269260 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 2017). 47 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1344 (3d ed.1998) ( [T]—chn“cal –“st“nct“ons b—tw——n ’—n—ral an– sp—c“al app—aranc—s hav— b——n abol“sh—–. ). 48 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h). 49 MAG IAS Holdings, Inc. v. Schmuckle, 854 F.3d 894, 899 (6th Cir. 2017). 50 Id. Id. 52 Id. 53 Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 888 (6th Cir. 2002). 54 It seems that courts in this circuit usually consider due process first. See Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 871 51 72 (6th Cir. 2002) ( [I]n —valuat“n’ wh—th—r p—rsonal ”ur“s–“ct“on “s prop—r un–—r Oh“o s lon’-arm statute, we have cons“st—ntly ‘ocus—– on [const“tut“onal conc—rns]. ); Paglioni & Associates, Inc. v. WinnerComm, Inc., 2:6-cv-276, 2007 WL 852055, *3 (S.D. Ohio March 16, 2007) (Analyzing due process before Ohio law). 55 Bristol Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal. , 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779 80 (2017). -6- Case No. 1:18-cv-1009 Gwin, J. hom— “n Oh“o meaning being incorporated or having their principal place of business here.56 Instead, Plaintiff testified that Defendant Navient Corp. is incorporated, and maintains a principal place of business, in Delaware.57 And Plaintiff does not even bother to allege where Defendants Navient Solutions or Navient Trust are at home.58 It appears they are Delaware or Virginia based. Meanwhile, Defendants have submitted an affidavit stating that they are incorporated and have principal places of business in either Delaware or Virginia.59 Pla“nt“‘‘ ar’u—s that [w]h—r— th— –—‘—n–ants ma“nta“n contacts w“th th— ‘orum stat— . . . th—y can ‘a“rly b— sa“– . . . [to b—] r—s“–—nts o‘ th— ‘orum state for jurisdictional purpos—s. 60 In fact, so confident in the superiority of her own jurisdictional understanding, she later suggests that opposing counsel inadvertently skipped the first day of the Federal Jurisdiction 101 Course in law school. 61 It is Plaintiff, however, that would do well to consult a hornbook. In 2014, the Supreme Court squarely condemned her argument as unacc—ptably ’rasp“n’. 62 To invoke specific jurisdiction, Plaintiff must show that (i) Defendants purposefully availed themselves of acting or causing a consequence in Ohio, (ii) the cause o‘ act“on aros— ‘rom D—‘—n–ants act“v“t“—s “n Oh“o, an– (“““) D—‘—n–ants acts hav— a sufficiently substantial connection to make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.63 56 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (holding that general jurisdiction may only be exercised wh—r— th— –—‘—n–ant “s at hom— an– that bus“n—ss—s ar— para–“’mat“cally at hom— “n th—“r plac— o‘ “ncorporat“on and principal place of business). 57 Doc. 1-1 at 3, 30. 58 I‘ anyth“n’, Pla“nt“‘‘ –—scr“b—s Nav“—nt Trust as a Delaware statutory trust. Doc. 43 at ¶ 6 (emphasis added). 59 Doc. 5-3 at ¶ 7. 60 Doc. 55. 61 Doc. 60 at 3. 62 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,137 S. Ct. at 1781 ( A corporat“on s cont“nuous act“v“ty o‘ som— sorts w“th“n a stat— . . . is not enough to support th— –—man– that th— corporat“on b— am—nabl— to su“ts unr—lat—– to that act“v“ty. ). 63 Id. -7- Case No. 1:18-cv-1009 Gwin, J. Plaintiff is, again, one for three. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants s—rv“c— b“ll“ons o‘ loans in Ohio and, for support, demands that the Court take judicial notice of a smattering of selectively summarized online articles.64 At th“s sta’—, Pla“nt“‘‘ s all—’at“on is likely enough to demonstrate that Defendants purposefully availe– th—ms—lv—s o‘ act“n’ “n Oh“o. But th“s “s wh—r— Pla“nt“‘‘ s success ends. She never claims that her caus— o‘ act“on aros— ‘rom D—‘—n–ants activities in Ohio. She does not claim that she attended school, took out loans, paid off loans, or that Defendants serviced her loans, in Ohio. And Defendants have testified that they have never s—rv“c—– Pla“nt“‘‘ s loans “n Oh“o.65 Thus, she has not demonstrated her case arises ‘rom D—‘—n–ants act“v“t“—s “n th— stat—. To the extent that Plaintiff argues that her alleged citizenship in Ohio66 alone would justify the exercise of jurisdiction, she is wrong. 67 Plaintiff has not demonstrated the constitutional requirements for personal jurisdiction. As such, the Court need not consider whether Ohio law authorizes personal jurisdiction in this case.68 Fundamentally, Pla“nt“‘‘ s cho“c— o‘ ‘orum “n th“s cas— “s a myst—ry. In fact, she herself has twice moved to excuse her personal appearance in court because it would impos— an un–u— bur–—n ‘or h—r . . . to trav—l hal‘way across th— country. 69 No doubt true, but then why file it here? The Court is perplexed as to why Plaintiff would file suit in Doc. 43, Ex. A. Therein, she proposes a–”u–“cat“v— ‘acts of such relevance as: [B—tsy] D—Vos financial ties . . . “llustrat— how mot“vat—– sh— “s to mon—t“z— [th—] publ“c —–ucat“on syst—m an– Oh“o “s rat—– th— 45 th least affordable state for college. 65 Doc. 5-3 at ¶ 7. 66 Doc. 43 at ¶ 2. 67 See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 86 (2014) (hol–“n’ that, to sat“s‘y –u— proc—ss, th— pla“nt“‘‘ s c“t“z—nsh“p cannot b— th— –—‘—n–ant s only cas—-related connection to the forum state). 68 Although, the Court notes Ohio law similarly requires a connection between the cause of action and the state. 69 Doc. 21-3 at 1; Doc. 21-2 at 1; Doc. 35. 64 -8- Case No. 1:18-cv-1009 Gwin, J. an inconvenient forum with no connection to the case. For the stated reasons, the Court ’rants D—‘—n–ants s—con– mot“on to –“sm“ss ‘or lack o‘ p—rsonal ”ur“s–“ct“on. V. Venue Is Improper Defendants also move to dismiss the case for improper venue.70 Venue would be proper if: (i) a Defendant resided in this district and all Defendants resided in Ohio, (ii) a substantial part of the facts underlying the case occurred in this district, or (iii) if neither of the first two avenues is available, any district where there is personal jurisdiction.71 None of these options are available here. As discussed supra, Defendants do not reside in Ohio, Plaintiff has not alleged that any part of the case occurred here, and the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Thus, the Court also ’rants D—‘—n–ants second motion to dismiss for improper venue. 72 VI. The Remaining Motions The Court turns to the remaining motions. As discussed supra, D—‘—n–ants ‘“rst motion to dismiss has been superseded by a new complaint and new motion to dismiss. As such, th— Court –—n“—s D—‘—n–ants ‘“rst mot“on to –“sm“ss as moot. Plaintiff moves for summary judgment arguing that Defendants failed to respond to discovery requests filed in the state action pre-removal.73 Having concluded that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendants, the Court denies the motion. Plaintiff also moves the Court to compel discovery and impose sanctions regarding certain discovery requests filed in this action.74 Similarly, because the Court must dismiss the case, it denies Pla“nt“‘‘ s 70 Doc. 5; Doc. 55. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (3). 72 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) ( Th— –“str“ct court o‘ a –“str“ct “n wh“ch “s ‘“l—– a cas— ly“n’ v—nu— “n th— wron’ –“v“s“on shall –“sm“ss . . . . ). 73 Doc. 20. 74 Doc. 54. 71 -9- Case No. 1:18-cv-1009 Gwin, J. motion as moot. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS D—‘—n–ants second motion to dismiss for improper venue and lack of personal jurisdiction. It DENIES D—‘—n–ants ‘“rst mot“on to dismiss as moot. And it DENIES Pla“nt“‘‘ s mot“ons to r—man–, ‘or summary ”u–’m—nt, an– to compel discovery and impose sanctions. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: October 26, 2018 s/ James S. Gwin JAMES S. GWIN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE -10-
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