COMER v. COLVIN, No. 1:2016cv00199 - Document 12 (M.D.N.C. 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER signed on 12/8/2016, RECOMMENDING that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Reversing the Commissioner (Docket Entry 8 ) be DENIED, that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 10 ) be GRANTED, and that the final decision of the Commissioner be upheld.(Daniel, J)
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COMER v. COLVIN Doc. 12 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA TIMOTHY R. COME,R, Plaintiff, V CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social S ecurity Adminis tr ation, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) '1,:1,6CY1,99 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JU-DGE Plaintiff, Timothy R. Comer, brought this action to obtain judicial review of a finaI decision of the Commissionet of Social Security denying his claims for a period of disability, and disability insurance benefìts ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("the Act"). The Court has befote it the certified administrative record and cross-motions for judgment. (Docket Entdes 6, 8, 10.) Fot the reasons set forth below, the Court recofiunends that Defendant's motion (Docket Entry 10) be granted, PlaintifPs motion pocket Entty S) be denied, and that the final decision of the Commissioner be upheld. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY In December 201,3, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB alleging a disability onser dare of April 1,2009. CIr. 160-66.)1 Plaintiffs claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Çr. 94, 1'10.) Plaintiff theteafter requested a hearing before an ,\dministrative Law Judge t Transcrþt citations tefer to the administrative record which was filed with Defendant's Answer. (Docket Entry 6.) Dockets.Justia.com (",\LJ"). Çr. 1,31,-32.) -{ hearing u/as held on September an unfavorable decision on September 1,7 8,2015. (r.26-55.) The,\LJ issued , 2015. CIt. 11-30.) This decision became the fìnal administtative decision after the Appeals Council declined review. (Tr. 1-5.) Plaintiff has exhausted all availaT:,Je administative remedies, and this case is now ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $ a05G). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Commissioner held that Plaintiff was not under a disability within the meaning the of Act. Undet 42 U.S.C. $ 405(9), the scope of judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is specific and narow. Smith u. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1936). This Court's review of that decision is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. $ a05€); Hanter u. Salliuan, 993 tr.2d 31,, 34 (4th Cir. 1,992); Hay u. Salliuan, 907 tr.2d 1453, 1,456 (4th Cir. 1990). "Substantial evidence is 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."' Htlnter,993 tr.2d at 34 (citing Nchard¡on (1971)). "[t] u. 7)era/es,402 U.S. 389,401, 'consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponder^Írce."' 1/. (quoting I,aws u. CelebreTTe, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)). The denial of benefits will be teversed only if no reasonable mind could accept the tecotd adequate as to support the determination. Nchardson,402 U.S. at 401,. The issue before the Coutt, therefore, is not whethet Plaintiff is disabled, but whethet the Commissioner's fìnding that Plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substanttal evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the televant law. Cofrzan u. Bowen,829 tr.2d 51,4, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Thus, "la] claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving a disability," Ha// 2 u. Harris,658 F.2d 260,264 (4th Cir. 1981), and in this context, "disability" means the "'inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical ot mental impaitment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous pedod of not less than 12 monthsl.]"' Id.(quoting 42 U.S.C. S 423(dX1XÐ). Administtation "To regulaÅze the adjudicative process, the Social Security has . promulgated . . . detailed regulations incorporating longstanding medical-vocational evaluation policies that take into account a claimant's age, education, and work experience in addition to [the claimant's] medical conditton." Id. "These regulations establish a 'sequential evaluation process' to detetmine whether a claimant is disabled." Id. (internal citations omitted). This sequential evaluation process ("SEP") has up to fìve steps: "The claimant (1) must not be engaged in 'substantial gainful activity,' i.e., curcently working; and Q) must have a 'severe' impairment that (3) meets or exceeds the 'listings' of specified impairments, or is otherwise incapacitattng to the extent that the claimantdoes not possess the residual functional capactty ("RFC") to (4) perform [the claimant's] past work or (5) any other work." Albright u. Comm'rof Soc. Sec.Admin.,1.74F.3d473,475n.2 (4thCir. 1999) (citing20 C.F.R. S 404.1520). The law concerning these five steps is well-established. Jee, e.g., Mastro 1,77-180 (4th u. Apfe[270 tr.3d 171, Cir. 2001); Hall,658F.2d at264-65. III. THE ALJ's DECISION The ALJ followed the well-established five-step sequential analysis to ascettain whether Plaintiff is disabled, which is set forth in 20 C.F.R. J S 404.1520 . See Albright, 17 4 F.3d at 47 5 n.2. In rendering his disability determination, the ,{LJ made the following findings later adopted by Defendant: 1,. The claimant last met the insured status tequirements of the Social Security Act through December 31,201,4. 2. The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from his alleged onset date of ,{.pri|1,,2009 through his date last insured of Decembet 31,,20'14 (20 CFR 404.'1571, et rcq.). 3. Thtough the date last insuted, the claimant had the following severe impairments: rþht eye blindness; right lateral epicondylitis; post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); anxietyi depression; and alcohol abuse, in remission (20 CFR a0a.1,520(c)). 4. Through the date last insuted, the claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 40 4.1, 520 (d), 40 4.1, 525 and 40 4.1, 526). 5. After careful consideration of the entire record, [the ALJ] f[ound] that, through the date last insuted, the claimant had the residual functional capacrtt¡ to petform light work as defìned in 20 CFR 404.1,567þ) except he could occasionally climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally crawl; frequently climb ramps and stairs; and frequently balance, kneel, or crouch. He was limited to occupations only requiring monocular vision and no periphetal vision on the rþht due to right eye blindness. Work was limited to simple and routine tasks with the ability to be off task up to 5o/o of the workday due to moderately impaited attention and concentration in a low sü:ess job defìned as having no fìxed production quotas; only occasional changes in the work setting; occasional interaction wrth the public and cowotkers; and occasional over the shoulder supervision. (Ir. 1,6-19.) In light of the above findings tegarding Plaintiffs RFC, the ALJ detetmined that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work 4 ^s ^rr infantyman, convenience store manage\ accounting clerk or security guard. Qr. 24.) Based upon Plaintiffs age, education, work experience, and his RFC, the ALJ concluded "there are jobs that exist in signifìcant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform." (d. (cittng 20 C.F.R. SS 404.1569, 404.1569(a)). Accotdingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. Çr.26.) IV. DISCUSSION Plaintiff raises two issues on appeal. First, Plaintiff contends that the evaluated the Plaintiffs V.A, ("Vetetan Affairs") disability '{.LJ inadequately rating. pocket Entry 9 at 4-8.) Second, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's analysis of Plaintiffs treating psychiatrist's opinion is inadequate because the ALJ failed to build ^n accura;te and logical bridge ftom the evidence to his conclusion. (Id. at9-14). Fot the reasons stated herein, the underslgned concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination to give little weight to the Plaintiffs VA disability raing and Dr. Tncy Price's opinion. A. The A.Ll's Decision to Accord Little Weisht to PlaintifPs VA Disabilitv Ratins Plaintiff contends that the LJ inadequately evaluated the disability determination of the VA. pocket E.ttty 9 at 4-8.) More specifically, the V. issued Plaintiff a VA disability tating finding that his PTSD, due to "exposure to Gulf War envitonmental hazatd," was evaluated as 70 petcent disabling and his "headaches secondary to right eye blindness" were evaluated as 30 petcent disabling. (Tt. 502.) Plaintiff notes that"la]n evaluation of 70 percent is assigned because the evidence shows panic attacks, irritability, impaired sleeping, obsessive behavior and an inability to establish and maintain effective relationships that result in occupational and social impairment, with deficiencies in most ateas, such as work, school, 5 family relations, judgment, thinking ot mood." (Docket Entty 9 at 6; Tr. 515.) Plaintiff contends that "'[t]he ALJ's conclusory remark that the VA disability rating is 'inconsistent with the overall evidence of tecord' also fails to satisfy þird u. Commis¡ioner 699 tr,3d 337 , 343 (4th Cu. 2012)], because the ALJ does not point to specific pieces of evidence which contradict the VA's disability determination."' pocket Entty 9 at 5) (internal citation omitted). Consequently, evaluating the strength of Plaintiffs argument requires an understanding of Bird, 699 F.3d at343. In Bird, the Founh Circuit considered "the precise weight that the SS must afford to a VA disability rating." Id. at 343. In addressing this question, the Fourth Circuit noted that, "the VA and Social Security programs serve the same governmental purpose of ptoviding benefits to persons unable to work because of a serious disability." Id. at 343. It reasoned futther that "þ]oth programs evaluate a claimant's ability to perfotm full-time work in the national economy on a sustained and continuing basis; both focus on analyzing a claimant's functional limitations; and both tequite claimants to present extensive medical documentation in support of their claims." Id. (quotaions omitted). The Fourth Circuit concluded that "þ]ecause the purpose and evaluation methodology of both programs are closely related, disability rating by one of the two agencies is highly relevant to the disability detetmination the othet agency." Id. Thus, "in making a disability determination, the SSA [Social a of Security Administtation] must give substantial weight to a VA disability rating." Id. "However, because the SS-4. employs its own standatds for evaluating a claimant's alleged disability, and because the effective date of covetage for a claimant's disability under the two programs likely will 6 v^ry, ^n,{LJ may give less weight to a VA disability rzttr'g when the record before the ALJ clearly demonsttates that such a deviation is appropriate." Id. Here, with respect to his disability determination the ALJ stated the following: I considered the V rating decision in accordance with SSR 06-03p. Little weight is given to said decision as it is inconsistent with the overall evidence of recotd. Because the Vr\,s ratings are based upon standards not entirely relevant to a disability determination made by the Social Security Administration, great weight cannot be given. Qr. 23.) (internal citations omitted). The ,A,LJ's statement that V,\ disability ratings cannot be given gteat weight because they "are based upon standards not entitely relevant to a disability determination made by the Çr 23.) In Bird, the Fourth Citcuit of evaluation and purpose of both programs "are closely Social Security Administration" is inconsistent with Bird. expressly states that the methods telated . . . [and] highly relevant to the disability determination of the othet agency." Bird, 699 F.3d at 343. Thus, this portion of the ,{.LJ's determination is erroneous. .1¿¿ Thomas u. Coluin, No. 4:12CV1,79,201,3 WL 5962929, at *9 (E,.D. Va. Nov. 6,201,3) (internal citation omitted) (teasoning that the Fourth Circuit has now made it apparent that the ALJ must give the VA's disability determination substantial weight or explain the reason for giving because it less weight "[t]he reasons cited by the Commissioner in [the plaintiffls] case-different rules and diffetent 5¡2nd2¡6ls-¡¡¡ould apply to every case and thus cannot be relied upon to avoid scrutiny of the V-d decision under Bird's ptesumptive standard"). However, the Court concludes the ALJ's decision to accotd little weight to the VA disability rating because it "is inconsistent with the overall evidence of record" is supported 7 by substantial evidence. (Ir. 23.) In support of the LJ's determination that the VA disability rattngis inconsistent with the record, elsewhete in the decision, the A.LJ states that [t]he claimant received inpatient psychiattic treatment during the pedod of May 23-27,201.1., due to depression and suicidal ideation with a plan after an argument with his wife . . . . The claimant was treated with medications and reported no symptoms of mental distress. He appropriately interacted with peers, staff, and roommate; and, he was fiot a rrranaeement problem in the unit. At discharge, his mental status examination showed he was alert and oriented; maintained good eye contact; mood and affectwere euthymic; impulse control, judgment, and insight were good; and, there v/as no evidence of thought disorder. He was advised to continue his medications as prescribed and followup with outpatient mental health. Subsequent mental status examinations were typically unchanged, demonstating essentially normal fìndings. He had calm, pleasant moods with congruent affect; normal speech; no involuntarT movements; fair to good insight; and good impulse conttol and judgment. His was normal; ^ppeataîce memoty was intact; attention f concentation was good; eye contact was good; and, signs of hallucinations, thought disorder, psychomotor slowing f agitatson, paranoid ideations, or suicidal/homicidal ideations were not evident. He was in no acute disttess, aIert, znd oriented; he typically denied side effects of medications; he posed no risk to self or others; and depression screens were mostly negative. Actually, the claimant often reported he was stable with help from his medications (i.e., Venlafaxine, Aripiprazole, Quetiapine, Clonazepam) and therap!, as he had no hallucinations, suicidal/homicidal ideations, or bipolar symptoms; nightmares/flashbacks were only "off and on"; and feelings of deptession were denied. He repotted improved energy levels and motivation; better relationships with his wife and son; and being active with his youth ministry at chutch. Hence, he requested to continue on his curent psychottopic regimen, to which his provider agreed would maintain his stabilization and prevent futher deterioration andf or relapses. Çr. 21-22.) (internal citations omitted). The ALJ also addressed PlaintifÎs headaches secondaty to nght eye bìindness. The ALJ stated that "physical examinations through the date last insured frequently revealed he was in no acute disress . . . [i]" fact, the claimant typically denied difficulties." (Tt. 20.) Subsequently, "examinations of the rþht I eye pain or vision eye remained normal despite the fact the claimant sporadically repotted his loss of vision caused balance problems resulting in frequent falls and running into things." Qd.) (internal citations omitted). "Thereafter, examinations continuously demonstated normal findings regarding the claimant's tight eye and dght elbow. In fact, he still denied joint and/or muscle pain as well as any problems related to right eye blindness." (Tr. 21.) Furthermore, upon review of the record the undersigned concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings. With respect to Plaintiffs PTSD, the majority of the objective medical evidence indicates non-severe mental status examinations showing no signs of hallucinations, thought disorder, paranoid ideations, or suicidal/homicidal ideations and physical examinations showing normal affect and no acute distress. [t 275,277,284,383- 84, 393, 41.2, 431., 442, 451,, 462, 496, 530, 536,550, 563, 575-76, 593, 610). Likewise, notwithstanding a few examinations, the vast majority of PlaintifPs physical examinations indicate that Plaintiff denied suffering ftom headaches. Çt275,279,294,296,307,31,0,313, 374, 522, 628-29, 632,634; but ¡ee 281,371, 642.) Thus, the Court concludes that the ALJ propedy detailed his reasons for according little weight to the V-{ disability rating and the ALJ's decision is supported by substannal evidence. MtDonald u. Coluin, No. 3:15-CV-00598- MOC, 201,6 WL 4084040, at x7 CX/.D.N.C. JuIy 29,201,6) (finding that the -A.LJ satisfied the requirements articulated in Bird notwithstanding the LJ's erroneous statement that the VA disability rating is of "little probative value," because the ALJ ultimately determined that the VA disability rating was "simply not supported by the evidence of record"); Bennett u. Coluin, No. 5:13-CV-871-D, 2015 ïØL 354170, at x6 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 27 ,201,5) ("conclud[ing] that the ALJ's assessment of the VA's decision is suppoted by substantial evidence and based on 9 proper legal standards" because the ,tLJ discussed why the V's decision determining that Plaintiffs headaches and back pain were disabling was inconsistent with the objective medical evidence and assessments conducted by nonexamining state agency consultants); Owens Coluin, u. No. 0:14-CY-21,49 DCN,2015 \)øL 2399781,,atx12 (D S.C. May 1.9,2015) (fìnding that the -A.LJ's reasoning for according only some weight to the VA disability ratings in part because "clinical examinations and objective test results have not revealed the presence of any acute or chronic abnormalities that would be severe enough to prevent the fPlaintiffJ from performing at least some sedenta{, low sffess, low social contact work acld,vtty" was suppotted by substantial evidence). B. The ALJ's Decision to Accord Little Weight to Dr. Trac]¡ Price's Opinion is Supoorted bv Substantial Evidence Plaintiff contends that the ALJ inadequately evaluated the medical opinion of Plaintiffls treating psychiatrist, Dr. Price. (Docket Errtty 9 at8-14). More specifically, Plaintiff contends that "the ALJ . . . failed to provide an adequate explanation for why he assigned little weight to Dr. Ptice's medical opinion" by only making conclusory statements fot discounting her opinion. Q)ocket Entry 9 at 9.) The "treating physician rule," 20 C.F.R. \ generally provides more weight to the opinion of a treating source, because it detailed, longitudinal picture 404.1,527 (cX2), may "provide a of [the claimant's] medical impairmentþ) fwhich] may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence . . . ;' 20 C.F.R. S 404.1,527 (r)(2).t An ALJ refusing 2 SSR 96-2p provides that "[c]ontrolling weight may not be given to a treating source's medical opinion unless the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." SSR 96-2p,1996 !øL 3741.88, at *1 (fuly 2,1996). However, where "atteatingsource's medical opinion is well-supported and not inconsistent with the othet substantial evidence in the case recotd, it must be given controlling weightl.]" Id. 10 to accord contolling weight to the medical opinion of a teaang physician must consider various "factots." to detetmine how much weight to give it. 20 C.F.R S 404.1527GX2)-(6). These factots include: (i) the frequency of examination and the length, nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (ü) the evidence in support of the treating physician's opinion; (ür) the consistency of the opinion with the tecotd as a whole; (iv) whether the opinion is from a specialist; and (v) other factors brought to the Social Security Administration's attention that tend to support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R S 404.1527 (c)(Z)-(A). Significantly, as subsections (2) through (4) of the rule describe in great detail, a treaing source's opinion, Iike all medical opinions, must be both well-supported by medical signs and Iaboratory fìndings as well as consistent u¡ith the other substantial evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R S 404.1,527(c)(2)-(4). "lIlf a physician's opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less weight." Craigu. ChaÍer,76F.3d 585, 590 (4th Cit. 1996); øccvrd Mastro,270F.3dat178. "Social Security Ruling 96-8p explains that the RFC 'assessment must include a nan:airve discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., labotatot-y ûndings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations)."' Monroe u. Coluin, 826 tr.3d 176, 189 (4th Cir. 201,6) (internal quotations omitted). The Fourth Circuit has held tha;t"'a necessary predicate to engaging in substantial evidence review is a record of the basis fot the -{LJ's ruling," including "a discussion of which evidence the ALJ found ctedible and why, and specific application of the pertinent legal requitements to the recotd evidence."' Id. at 189 (citing Radford u. Coluin,734F.3d288,295 (4th Cir. 201,3)). 11 Here, Dr. Pdce provided a medical source statement regarding Plaintiffs mental abilities.3 Qt602.) The ALJ expressly noted Dt. Price's findings: [Dr. Price] opined that fPlaintiffl had mild restrictions in activities of daily living; in social functioning; deficiencies of concenttation, persistence, pace resulting in frequent failure to complete tasks in a timely manner (in work settings or elsewhete); tepeated episodes of detetioration or decompensation in work or work-like setting which cuse withdtawal ot exacerbation of symptoms; but he was not unable to function independently outside the area of his home. He was moderately impaired in his ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended pedods; sustain ordinary work routine; make simple work-telated decisions; accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism; and set realistic goals or make plans independendy. The claimant was matkedly impaired in the ability to perform activities within a schedule or maintain regular attendance; work in cootdination with, or proximity with, others; and respond appropriately to changes in the work setting. He was further extremely impaited in his ability to complete a normal workday or workweek without interruptions; interact appropdately with the public; and travel in unfamiliar places or use public ttansportation. marked difficulty Çr.23,602-03.) The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Price's opinions because "they [were] too resttictive and not consistent with her own treatment records or the overall evidence of record." Çr ^naccvta;te 23.) Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's analysis is conclusory and fails to be build and logical bddge from the evidence to his conclusions. Q)ocket Entry 9 at9.) The Court finds that it can follow the -A,LJ's reasoning fot according little weight to Dr. Price's decision. First, the ALJ details Dr. Price's medical source statement findings. Çr.23.) Next, the '{,LJ states the Dr. Price's treatment notes are inconsistent with her medical source ¡ Dt. Price's medical source statement is a pre-printed form with check boxes to indicate the severity of the person's impairment on a particular function. Pre-printed fotms that require little in the way of explanation re generally not looked upon favorably. See 20 C.F.R. $ a0a.1527(c)(3) þtating that the better explanation a source provides for an opinion, the more weight the Commissioner gives that opinion); Mason u. Sha/a/a,994F.2d 1058, 1065 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Form reports in which a physician's obligation is only to check a box or fill in a blank are weak evidence at best."). 1.2 statement. (Id.) In addition, the ALJ cities to portions of the record that include Dr. Price's treatment notes when he states that Plaintiffs "mental status examinatiorìs were typically unchanged, demonsttating essentially notmal fìndings impulse conttol and , , . fair to good insight; and good judgment. His appearzince was normal; attenionf concentration was good . . . signs of hallucinations, . memory was intact; paraíroid ideations, or suicidal/homicidal ideations were not evident." 1.22.) A review of Dr. Price's examinations typically indicated that Plaintiff was alert, oriented to place, person and time. Qr 479, 61.0, 61.9, 625, 661,670.) Plaintiff had fair eye contact. Normal rate, tone and volume of speech. (Tr. 479,61,0,61,9,625,661,,670.) Dr. Price noted that Plaintiff did not have any auditory hallucinations, thought disotdets, suicidal ideations, visual hallucinations, pararÌoid ideations or homicidal ideations. Qr. 479,6'1,0,61,9,625,661,, 670.) His mood ranged from: "abight," "kind of down," "a little more irritable," "anxious, depressed alot," "up and down, . . . mostly down," "about the same up, . . . up, down, . . . all around," "still depressed and anxious." Qr. 479, 61,0, 61,9, 625, 661,, 670). His affect was typically congruent to his mood. Sr479,610,619,625,661,670). In October 2}1,4,Plaintiff told Dr. Price that while Plaintiff believed his anxiety level had not decreased due to therapy sessions focused on past military combat, "he notes that increased dosage [was] very of Clonazeparn helpful." Çr. 61,6.) Plaintiff also stated that his "fe]nergy level . . . improved on current dosage of Fluoxetine, [which has help Plaintiff become] more motivated to do tasks." (Ir. 61ó.) InJanuary 2015, Plaintiff told Dr. Price that "Clonazeparn helps quite a lot with his anxiety; states the anxiety comes and goes depending on the situation." (Ir. 608.) Plaintiff noted that "he has had some depression but not feeling hopeless at all. . . . He continues to 1,3 see individual therapist at outside clinic and says this helps ^ grea;t deal." Qd.) In,A.pdl 2015, Dr. Price noted that, according to Plaintiff, "he continue[d] to have some depression though feels Duloxetine may be helping slighdy since it was started at last appointment." (Tr. 659.) The ALJ summarized these findings in his decision creating a logical bddge between the evidence and his conclusions. Jenkins u. Coluin, No. 5:15-CV-00010-F'DW, 2016 ú *6-7 WL 4373701, CX/.D.N.C. Arg. 12, 201,6) (concluding that the ,{.LJ's analysis including his findings that the plaintiffs subjective complaints were inconsistent with the medical evidence, which índicated that the plaintiff had no "psychiattic hospitalizations and there were multiple reports of het conditions being either level or controlled with medicatlon," created a logical bddge between the evidence and the ALJ's decision); ll/ilkerson u. Coluin,No. 1:15CV00944,201.6WL 3264311, at x5 O4.D.N.C. June 1,4, 201,6) (unpublished) (finding that "the ALJ's decision sufficiently showfed] that he consideted Plaintiffs ability to 'stay on task,'which . . . created 'afi ^ccurate and logical bridge,' between the recotd evidence and his conclusion that Plaintiff can perform fsimple routine and repetitive tasks], notwithstanding moderate limitation in [concentration persistence or pace]") (internal citations omitted); l:-itqgerald u. Coluin, No. 1:13- CV-45, 2014WL 38661,33, at t3 (À4.D.N.C. ,{.ug. 6, 201,4) (concluding that although the ALJ did not discuss the plaintiffls mother's testimony regarding the plaintiffs inability to stay on task while working fot the famlly business, the court found that "the ALJ did discuss other aspects of [the plaintiffs mother's] testimony and provided a fair summary of her testimony" creating an logical bridge between the evidence and her conclusions). In addition, the Court concludes that the ALJ correctly determined that Dr. Price's opinion is not suppoted by substantial evidence. ,\s stated above the majority of the objective 14 medical evidence shows normal and non-severe fìndings. (Tr. 27 5,277 ,284,383-84,393, 41,2, 431.,442,451,,462,486,530,536,550, 563,575-76,583,610). In his bdef, Plaintiff details the history of the impact of his mental impairments on his ability to sleep, interact with family, friends and othets, and his overall mental state. (Docket Entty 9 at 1,0-1,4.) Plaintiff states that in 201,1,, he received regulat suicidal plans mental health treatment after being hospitalized due to to shoot himself. (d. at 1,0) Additionally, Plaintiff states that while he was emotionally stable, he still suffered from intrusive thoughts from past combat traumas and socially isolated himself despite medication and counseling treatment. Qd.) Thereafter, Plaintiff notes that his depression was under bettet conüol, but that with regards to his anxiety, he woke up ftequently at night, felt he needed to be guarded and checked locks after his son. (1/.) Howevet, these statements are notattons of Plaintiffs subjective complaints. rt doctor's observations of Plaintiff' subjective complaints are not sufficient observations into 'clinical evidence.' of If ftheir] this were true, it would completely vitiate any notion objective clinical medical evidence. There is nothing objective about a doctor saying, without more, 'I observed my patient telling me she was in pain."' see to "'tlansfotmfl al¡o Miller u. A$rue, No. CIV.A . 8:1,0-'1,1,42-HMH, 2011, WL See 1.57 6203, Craig 7 6 F.3d at 590; *1.7 ^t P.S.C. ,\pr. 7, 2011), report and recommendation adopted ¡ub norn. Miller u. Cumm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. C.A 8:10- 1.1,42-HMH-JD,{, 2011 WL 1561058 (D.S.C. Apr. 26, 201,1) (upholding the ,tLJ's decision to discount the doctor's decision, in part, because it was "based on the þ]laintiffls subjective complaints and inconsistent with examinations, objective findings, progress notes, evidence of malingedng, . . . and conservative tteatment"). Thus, the ,{.LJ's analysis created a logical 15 bridge between his decision to accord little weight to Dr. Price's opinion and the evidence of tecotd. Furthermore, the,{LJ's decision is supported by substanlal evidence. V. CONCLUSION ,{fter a carefil consideration of the evidence of record, the Court finds that the Commissionet's decision is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon coffect application of the televant law. Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS a that Plaintiffs Motion fotJudgment Reversing the Commissioner pocket Entty 8) be DENIED, that Defendant's Motion forJudgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 10) be GRANTED, and that the fìnal decision of the Commissioner be upheld. U December 8,201,6 Durham, North Carolina 1,6 oe e tef States MagistateJudge
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