COLEMAN V. COLVIN, No. 1:2015cv00751 - Document 15 (M.D.N.C. 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER on 8/9/2016; RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry 11 ) be DENIED, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 13 ) be GRANTED, and the final decision of the Commissioner be upheld. (Sheets, Jamie)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
COLEMAN V. COLVIN Doc. 15 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA GARY RAY COLEMAN, Plaintiff, v CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) t15CV751 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff, Gary Ray Coleman, brought this action pursuant to Section 205(9) of the Social Security ,ct (the "Act"), as amended (42 U.S.C. S 405(Ð), to obtain review of a ftnal decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his claims for a Period of Disability ("POD") and Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the r\ct. The Court has before it the certified administrative record and cross-motions for judgment. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff filed an application for a POD and DIB in August of 20'12 alleging a disabilìty onset date of March 18, 20L0,later amended to March 29, 201,1,. Qr.34, 152-58.)1 The 'Iranscript citations refer to the Administrative Transcript of Record filed manually with the Commissioner's r{.nswer. (Docket Entry 8.) 1 Dockets.Justia.com application was denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (d. Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an ,{.dministrative Law Judge 107.) At the May 1,2, ("VE"). (ld. at30.) ^t '11,-24.) On Augus 201,4 heanng were at 69-92, 96-'104.) (',\LJ"). (Id. at 1,05- Plaintiff, her attorney, and a vocational expert The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled under the t Act. (Id. 25, 201,5 the -Appeals Council denied PlaintifFs request for review, making the ALJ's determination the Commissioner's fìnal decision for purposes of review. (d. at 1,-5.) rr. r¡òtunr nncrcnouNo Plaintiff was 56 years old onJune 30,2013, the date last insured. (fd. at13,23.) FIe had at least a high school education, was able to communicate in English, and his past relevant work was as a conractor and floor III. layer (Id. at23.) STANDARD FOR REVIEW The Commissioner held that Plaintiff was not under a disability within the meaning the ,{,ct. Under 42 U.S.C. $ 405(9), the scope of of judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is specifìc and narrow. Smith u. Schweiker,795y.2d343,345 (4th Cir. 1986). T'his Court's review of that decision is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. $ a05(g); Hanter u. Salliuan, 993 tr.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992); Hayt u. Salliuan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1.456 (4th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is "such televant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Hanter,gg3F.2dat34 (ciingMchardson 2 u. Pera/e4402 U.S. 389,401 (1,971)). It "consists of mote than a mere scintilla" "but may be somewhat less than preponderànce." 1/. (quotingl,aws u. Celebreq7g,368tr.2d The Cc¡mmissionet must make findings of .fchweiker, 795 tr.2d ^t 345. In 640,642 (4th Cir. 1,966)). fact and resolve conflicts in the evidence. Ha1s,907 F.2d at 1456 (ciang King u. Califàno, 599 F.2d does not conduct a de nouo review 597 , 599 (4th Cir. 1979)). The Court of the evidence nor of the Commissioner's reviewing for a findings. substantial evidence, the Court does not undertake to re-weigh conflicting eviclence, to make credibility determinations, or to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Craig u. Chater, 7 6 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1,996) (citing Hay,907 F.2d at 'i456). "Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whethet a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the fCommissioner] (or the [Commissioner's] designate, the,{,LJ)." C*tg,76tr.3d at 589 (quoung ll/alker u. Bowen,834 F.2d 635,640 (7th Cir. 1987)). The denial of benefits will be reversed only if no reasonable mind could accept the record as adequate to support the determination. See Nchardson u. Pera/es,402 U.S. 389,401, (1,971). 'fhe issue before the Court, therefore, is not if Plaintiff is disabled, but whether the Commissioner's finding that Plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the televant law. See id,; Cofman u. Bowen,829 F.2d 51,4, 517 (4th Cir. 1,987). IV. THE ALJ'S DISCUSSION The Social Security ltegulations define "disability" for the purpose of obtaining disability benefits as the "inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any J medically determinable physical ot mental impairment2 which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. S 404.1505(a); definition, a claimant must have a severe al¡o 42 U.S.C. S 423(d)(1XA). see To meet this impairment which makes it impossible to do previous work or any other substantial gainful activity3 that exists in the national economy. 20 C.F'.lì. S 404.1505(a); see al¡o 42 U.S.C. S 423(dX2X,\). A. The Five-Step Sequential Analysis The Commissioner follows a five-step sequential analysis to ascertain whethet the claimant is disabled, which is set forth in 20 C.F.R. S 404.1520. Sæ Albright u. Comm'r oJ'Soc. Sec. Admin., 't74 F.3d 473,475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999). The ALJ must determine in sequence: (1) Whether the claimant is engaged in substanttal gainful activity claimant is working). Q) If (2.e., whether the so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Whether the claimant has a severe impairment. If not, then the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. (3) Whether the impairment meets ot equals to medical criteria of 20 C.F.ll., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, which sets forth a list of impairments thatwarcant a ' A "physical or mental impairment" is an rmpairment resulting ftom "^fiatomical, physiological, or psychological abnotmalities which are clemonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and labotatory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. $ 423 (dX3). 3 "substantial gainful activiq" is work that (1) involves performing sþifìcant or productive physical or mental duties, and (2) is done (or intended) for pay or profìt. 20 C.F.R. $ 404.1510. 4 fìnding of disability without considering vocational criteria. If so, the claimant i¡ disabled and the inquiry is halted. (4) Whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing past relevant ' work. If not, the claimant (5) Whether the claimant is able to perform any other work considering both his is not disabled and the inquiry is halted. residual functional capacity ("ltFC") and his vocational abilities. If so, the claimant is not disabled. 20 c.tr.Iì. s 404.1520. Here, the ,A,LJ first determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his amended alleged oriset date of March 29,201,1 through his date last insured on June 30, 2013. (Tr. at 13.) 'I'he A.LJ next found in step two that PlaintifPs history pulmonary emboli and history of atrial fibrillation were severe impairments. (Itf.) At of step three, the,A,LJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in, ot medically equal to, one listed in Appendix B. 1. (d. at 19.) Residual Functional Capacity Determination The LJ next determined Plaintiffls RFC based on an evaluation of the evidence, including PlaintifPs testimony and the fìndings providers. (d. at19-22.) of treating and examining health care Based on the evidence as a whole, the -A.LJ determined that Plaintiff retained the lìFC to perform medium work, except that he should also avoid concentrated exposure to hazardous machinery and heights. (d. at 5 1,9.) C. Adiustment to Other Work T'he claimant bears the initial burden of proving the existence S 423(dX5); 20 C.F.ll. S of a disability. 42 U.S.C. 404.1512; Smirh u. Califàn0,592F.2d 1235,'1236 (4th Cn. 1,979). Once the claimant has established at step four that he cannot do any work he has done in the past because of his severe impairments, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step fìve to show that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant perform consistent with his RFC, age, education, and past work experience . could Hanter, gg3 F.2d at 35; I'Vil¡on u. Califano, 617 F.2d 1050, 1053 (4th Cir. 1980). Flere, the A,LJ found that based on Plaintifls age, education, work experience, and IìFC, there were jobs that existed in signifìcant numbers in the national economy that he could perform such as a cleaner of laboratory equipmefit, a counter supply worker, and a porter bagger. (k. at 23-24.) The ALJ then concluded that that Plaintiff was not disabled from March 29,201.1, the amended alleged onset date, throughJune 30,201.3, the date last insured. (d. at23-24.) V. ANALYSIS Plaintiff taises two ovedapping contentions.4 First, he contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that he has the lìFC to perform medium work. (Docket Entry 1,2 at3.) Second, Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to give the appropriate weight to the medical opinion of nurse ptactitionet. (Id.) Taken together, the gtavamen of a Because a these objections are that the Plaintiffs claims ovedap, the Court has addressed them in the most logical fashion for ease of refetence. 6 decision of the ALJ is unsupported by substantial evidence, in large part because the ALJ failed to appropriately evaluate the medical opinion of a particular nurse practitioner. (d. at 4-9.) I The ALJ's Finding that Plaintiff Can Perform Medium Work with Environmental Limitations Is Supported bv Substantial Evidence. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that he can perform medium, rather than sedentaly, work. (Id. at7.) This argument is not persuasive. A claimant's lìFC is the most a claimant can do in a work setting despite the physical and mental limitations of his impairment and any related symptom (e.¿., pain). See 20 C.F.R. S404.1545(uXl);¡eeal¡ol-line¡ul)arnltart,453F.3d559,562(4thCir.2006).'l'helìFCincludes both a "physical exertional or stength limitation" that sedentalry, assesses the claimant's "ability to clo light, meclium, heavy, or very heavy work," as well as "nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory or skin impairments)." I-lall u. Ilarri¡,658 F.2d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 1981). Medium wotk is defìned as "lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds." 20 C.F'.R. $ a0a.1567(c). Sedentary work, in tutn, is defined as "lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket fìles, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defìned as one which involves sitting, a cefiain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties." Id. S 404J1567 (a). Here, in assessing Plaintifls RFC, the ALJ reviewed the medical record. It showed that Plaintiffs impairments responded to treatment and showed further that clinical findings were generally unremarkable. (fr. ^t 13-22.) More specifìcally, the ALJ Plaintifls history of pulmonary emboli and arrial fibrillarion (Id. 7 ^t considered 20-21,.) The ALJ correctly indicated that Plaintiff experienced bilateral pulmonary emboli in March of 201.0, prior to the relevant period. (d. at 20,31,0-11,.) During aMarch 2010 hospitahzaaon for chest pain, Plaintiff was treated with anticoagulation agents (Coumadin and Lovenox) and after his chest pain and shortness of breath resolved, Plaintiff reported "feeling 31,0-11, well." (td. at 329.) T'heteafter, Plaintiff was maintained on Coumadin. (d. at 276-77.) His hematologist, Alfred Newman, M.D., documented that PlaintifFs international normalized rat7o, an indication of clotting tendency of the blood, was mildly sub-therapeutic, and accordingly, Dr. Newman advised Plaintiff to stop binge drinking (which could alter the metabolism of Coumadin) and adjusted his Coumadin dosage. (Id. at20,331-37.) 'l'hereafter, PlaintifFs clinical findings on examination were generally normal. For example, Plaintiff appeared to be in no acute distress; his respiratory examination findings were normal showing notmal respiratory rhythm and effort, clear bteath sounds, and good air exchange; his cardiovascular examination fìndings were normal with normal heafi rate and rhythm, no murmurs or gallops, normal attertalpulses, and no peripheral edema; and his lower extremity examinations were normal with intact range of motion and no edema. (Id. at 276- 77,279-89,331-36,394.) Plaintiff routinely denied chest pain, shortness of breath, lower extremiry pain, and swelling. (d. at 277, 279-80, 281-82, 283-84, 286, 289, 331-36.) A computed tomography pulmonary angiogram in late 2010 showed no evidence for residual or recurrent pulmonary emboli. (d. at 20,336,338,397.) Accordingly, pulmonologist Jason Spiers, M.D., assessed that Plaintiff was "doing well" I in connection with this history of pulmonary emboli and had no underlying cardiopulmonary issues.s (ld. at 394.) The ALJ also considered Plaintiff s history of atrial fibrillation. In November of 201,0, prior to the relevant period, Plaintiff developed proximal atrial fìbrillation during an exercise te st, which did not require catdioversion and was stabilized with medication. Qd. ^t 20,404.) Theteafter, PlaintifÎs cardiac examinations were normal, and his atial fibrillation was assessed as stable on medication. (d. at289,529,533-34.) He appeared fot periodic, routine follow- up appointments in 2011 (the beginning of the relevant period) and 201.2. Plaintiff denied shortness of breath and chest pain, and his treating sources documented unremarkable examination fìndings. (d. at 283-290.) 'fhe ALJ also considered the effectiveness of PlaintifFs conservative treatment course 5 The,{,LJ also took into consideration two accidents PlaintifFs had. Ql14,20,22) First, prior to the relevant time period, in July of 201,0, Plaintiff fell off a lawn ttactor and sustained a lower extremity hematoma and cellulitis, but diagnostic testing showed no evidence of fracture or cleep vein thrombosis. (Id. at 14,365-66.) During hospitahzation, PlaintifFs hematoma was aspirated. (d. at 366.) His left lower extremity pain and swelling improved, and he was discharged. (Id, at366.) The following month, in August of 201,0, l)laintrff reported "feeling pretty good" and denied lower extremity pain and swelling. (Id. at 335.) ,{t subsequent medical appointments, Plaintiffs lower extremities were normal with full range of motion and no edema. Qd. at 283-87.) Second, in F-ebruary of 201,3, Plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident. (Id. at 1,6, 292.) Plaintiff reported mental symptoms such as lack of concentration and impaired sensation in his left foot. Qd. at 292-93.),4. computed tomography evaluation of Plaintiffs head was unremarkable, and he was assessed with post-concussive syndrome. (Id. at 293,306.) A left leg arterial ultrasound showed no peripheral vascular disease. (Id. at 308.) At follow-up appointments in F'ebruary, Plaintiff had no swelling in his lower extremities; he had intact sensation in his feet and could discern light touch although he could not discern blunt or sharp sensations; he had intact deep tendon reflexes and normal motor strength; and he walked with a normalgait. (Id. at293,296,299.) In March of 2013, Plaintiff reported that his leg pain was better. (d. at 303.) In June 201 3, Plaintiff had normal range of motion in his lower extremities, no edema, and intact sensation to light touch þut could not discern blunt and sharp sensations). (Id. at 533-34.) In July of 201.3, Plaintiff reported being "90o/o back to normI," and Nurse Practitionet l7ilson documented a normal physical examination including full range of motion in his lower extremities, no edema, normal sensation and motor sftength, and intact deep tendon reflexes and pulses. (d. at 1,6,529.) 9 (Id. at'16-17,21.) For example, PlaintifPs hypertension and hyperlipidemia wete controlled with medication. (Id. at 276,279,281,283,285,288, 533.) Likewise, PlaintifFs history of atrial fìbrillation and pulmonary emboli were stable on medication with no reoccurrence of either, including duting the relevant period for this disability claim. (Id. at 289,338, 534.) In addition to Plaintiffs treatment records, the consultative examiner's findings and the opinions of the state agency experts offered further support for the ALJ's RFC assessment. (d. at 2'l-22.) Consultative examiner Vincent Flillman, M.D., whose opinion the ALJ gave "great weight," did not document any disabling functional limitations during his evaluation. (d. at 2'1, 424-27.) llather, Dr. Hillman found that Plaintiff was able to sit, stand, and ambulate without diffìculty, and found further Plaintiff had, a normal gait. (Id. at 426.) Further, the opinions of the state agency experts, which were given "substantial weight" and were consistent with the evidence of record, offered further support for the .{LJ's assessment that Plaintìff could perform meclium work with environmental ^t22,71-78,80-90.) See RFC limitations. (Id. 20 C.tr.R. S 404.1,527 (e)(Z)(i) (explaining that state agency physicians and psychologists are highly qualifìed and experts in Social Security disability evaluation) T'he ALJ also considered Plaintiffs activities of daily living. Fot example, the record indicated that while he was allegedly disabled, Plaintiff went to his tile installation business and checked e-mails and took care of business. (fr. 18-21,35, 41,4.) In addition, Plaintiff went outside when there was nice weather; he took "walk[s] around and work[ecl] out a little bit"; he prepated meals; he washed laundry; he mowed his lawn with a riding mower; he left his house once to twice a day; he drove ^ c t; he shopped in stores; he ran etrands; and he went l0 out to e^t at restaurants . (f d. ^t 18-20,228-32, 4'14.) ,All of this ptovides substantial evidence for the AIJ's RFC determination that Plaintiff could perform medium work with environmental limitations II. The ALT's Decision to Give No Weisht to Nurse Practitioner Wilson Is Legally Correct and Supponed by Substantial Evidence. Plaintiff also contends that the r\LJ's llFC assessment was flawed because he did not give greater weight to the opinions of I(ristina Wilson, a nurse practitioner. (Docket Entty 12 at 5-9.) This contention also lacks metit. 'I'he treating source rule requires an ALJ to give controlling weight to the opinion of treating source regarding the nature and severity 404.1,527 (cX2) ( a of a claimant's impairment. 20 C.F.R. S "[T]reating sources . . . provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant's] medical impairment(s) and may bting a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical fìndings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations."). -I'he rule also recognizes, however, that not all treating sources ot treating source opinions merit the same deference. T'he nature and extent of each treatment relationship appteciably tempers the weight an ALJ affords an opinion. \'ee 20 C.F.tl. SS 404.1 527 Moreover, as subsections (2) through (a) (c)(2)(n). of the rule describe in source's opinion, like all medical opinions, deserves deference only if detail, a treating well-supported by medical signs and laboratory finrlings and consistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record. See 20 C.F.ll. SS 404.1527 (c)(Z)-(). "[I]f a physician's opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded l1 signifìcantly less weight." Crai¿,76F.3d ^t 590. As for nurse practitioners in particular, they do not constitute "acceptable medical sources," "other sources," ¡ee see 20 C.f,.R. S 404.1513(a)), but rather are 20 C.F.Iì. S 404.1513(d), whose opinions cannot receive controlling weight, but may be used to "show the severity of . . . impaitment(s) and how [they] affect[] claimant's] ability to work." [a Id. Flere, Nurse Practitioner Wilson wrote a letter onJuly 12,2012 stating, "Please excuse this patient from jury duty for meclical reasons. fPlaintiffl has a history of blood clots [and] pulmonary embolus. He is tteated with coumadin and therefore should not sit or stay in one position for any extended period of time. -Iherefore jury dury." (I'r.29'1.) She also I feel that he is unable to perform on wtote a short letter on March 20,201,4, stating that Plaintiff "has been a patient in my practice since 2008. He has numerous medical problems including atrial fibrillation, anxiety, pulmonary embolism and hypertension. .s a result multiple medical problems, plaintiffl is unable to work." of these (Id, at 51,6.) Nutse Ptactitioner Wilson next fìlled out medical source statements on April 22,2014 checking boxes indicating that Plaintiff could only lift ten pounds, had limitations in sitting and standing and pushing and pulling, had postural and manipulative limitations, had problems heating, and had numerous environmental limitations. (d. at 605-608, 617-625,631,-634.) She also wrote a short letter on May 23,2014, stating Plaintiff "has multiple medical problems including a history of fdeep vein thrombosis] in lower extemities. As a result he may need to use a walker to assist with ambulation." (ld. at 635.) 'fhe ALJ accutately recited the applicable regulations for t2 assessing Nurse Practitioner \X/ilson's opinions and also discussed these opinions at considerable 22.) length. (Id. at13-'15,20- Beyond this, the ,{LJ explained that Nurse Practitioner \ùTilson's opinions were entitled to no weight because (1) they addressed administrative issues reserved to the Commissioner; (2) they lacked "supporting evidence or an explanation"; (3) they "rel[yl almost exclusively on the claimant's subjective reports that are not even consistently documented within her own treatment notes;" and (4) because they wete "wildly inconsistent with the record as a whole." (Id.) Fot the following reasons, these conclusions are supported by substantial evidence. First, Nurse Practitioner \X/ilson's opinion that Plaintiff is limited to sedentary work with a number of additional limitations is rendered in a conclusory fashion. Practitioner \X/ilson provides little-to-no explanation oF the evidence used Nurse to form her opinions, which are set forth either in shott and conclusory letters or in a check box form, and the record lacks objective medical evidence in support of her conclusory assertions. (d. at 605-608, 61.7 -625, (¡3't-635, 516, 291.) 5.ee 20 C.þ'.11. S 404.1,527 (c)(3) (stating that the better explanation a source provides for an opinion, the more weight the Commissioner gives that opinion); Ma¡on u. \'l¡a/a/ø,994 F.2d 1058, 10ó5 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Form reports in which a physician's obligation is only to check a box or fìll in a blank are weak evidence at best."). Instead, as the ALJ noted, Nurse Practitioner Wilson appears to have been relying in large p^tt, ot perhaps exclusively, on Plaintiffs own self-reporting. (d. zt 13-14.) 20 C.F.R. S 404J,529(a) (claimant's allegations alone are insufficient to establish disability). Second, Nurse Practitioner Wilson's conclusions are inconsistent with the remainder of the record, described in detail above, which l3 indicates that PlaintifPs ailments were essentiallystableandwell-reated. See llobertsu.Aúraq1:11-cv-00236-MR,201,3WL663306, *6 flX/.D.N.C. Feb. 22, 201,3) (unpublished) (concluding that "an opinion of a physician is not entitled to controlling weight if it treattng is unsupported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques andf or inconsistent with other substantial evidence of record") (citing 20 C.F'.R. S 404.1527 (.XZ)) Third, Nurse Practitioner Wilson's treatment notes, which the ALJ sctutinized, were inconsistent with her opinions. Q'r. '13-17 ,20-22.) Specifìcally, Nurse Practitioner \X/ilson's progress notes documented that Plaintiff's hypertension and hypedipidemia were "doing well" on medication; his history of alr.tal fibrillation was "stable" on medication; and his pulmonary emboli was managed on medication. (Id.Ãt 276-80,283-89,533-34.) Moteover, Nurse Practitioner \X/ilson frequently documented unremarkable physical examinations with normal respiratory, cardiovascular, and lower extremity findings. (d. at276-80,283-89,533-34,626.) Fourth, as discussed above, Plaintiff performed ^ mnge of daily activities, including some wotk activity, walking, exercising, meal ptepatation, yard work, household chores, and social activities. 'Ihese activities are inconsistent with Nurse Practitioner Wilson's vague and unsupported conclusions that Plaintiff could only perform a limited range of sedentary work. Fifth, as noted above, opinions by medical practitioners regarding the ultimate issue of whether a plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the Act nevet receive contolling weight because the decision on that issue remains for the Commissioner alone. 20 C.F.ll. 404.'1527(d). Nurse Practitioner Wilson states Plaintiff is "unable to work." (See, e,g., in the record in a conclusory fashion Tr.516.) However, thatis 14 $ that an issue reserved for the Commissioner and Nurse Practitioner Wilson's opinion on this issue is entitled to no weight. Last, PlaintifÎs argums¡¡s-v/þich essentially propose alternative ways to view and weigh the evidence-on this issue are not persuasive. 'fhe fact that plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ's assessment of Nurse Practitioner Wilson's conclusions does not render the decision improper. lìor all these reasons, the,A,LJ's decision to give no weight to the medical opinions of Nurse Practitioner \X/ilson is supported by substannal evidence. 'lo summarize, Plaintiff has presented no basis for remand. 'Ihe AIJ reviewed and weighed the evidence of record. 'I'he ,A,LJ also determined an RFC that accounted for his credibly 6 supported functional limitations. For the reasons explained above, substantial evidence supports the,\LJ's decision, and accordingly, his decision should be affirmed. 7 VI. CONCLUSION After a carcful consideration of the evidence of record, the Court ûnds that the ó l'laintiff does not challenge the ALJ's credibility determination directly, and the Court finds no error regardingit. See Crai¿,76\t,3dar593-96;20 C.F.lì.. $ 40a.1529(a)-(c); Soc. Sec.lì. 96-7p, 1996 NøL 374186, at *1 n. 1,*2 Çuly 2,1996). The ALJ's credibility analysis also provides further substantial evidence in support of the llFC determination. t lrlaintiff also atgues that if the ALJ had given Nurse Practitioner !Øilson's opinions the weight they deserwed, he would have had no choice but to find Plaintiff disabled. This is because, Plaintiff reasons, the VE tesufied that a person with the kinds of limitations Nurse Practitioner líilson attributed to Plaintiff could not work at any exertional level. (Docket Entry 12 at 7 citing '[r, 66) However, as explained in detail in this llecommendation, the ALJ had many good reasons for giving Nurse Practitioner \ùTilson's opinions no weight. Consequently, the VE's answer to a hypothetical adopting Nurse Practitioner \Wilson's limitatrons is immaterial. See e.g., Johnson u. Commissioner oJ'Social .Çec.,398 F. App'x 727,735 (3rd Cir.2010) (concluding thatALJ's failure to explain why he did not consider VE's answer to second hypothetical question, which included work restriction of frequent breaks, dicl not render his finding defìcient because it was obvious the answer was immaterial once the ALJ made lìFC determination, which did not include need for frequent breaks); Boynlon u. Apfel, No. 98-1987, L999 nøL 38091, *4 (7th Ciu- Jan.7,1.999) (unpublished) (concluding that ALJ did not neecl to explicitly acldress second hypothetical because his findings implicitly rejected the basis for it). l5 Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, this Coutt RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry 11) be DENIED, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Ettt"y 13) be GRANTED, and the final decision of the Commissioner be upheld. J August q -, 201,6 l6 ebster States Magisttate Judge
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
