McMICHAEL v. COLVIN, No. 1:2015cv00528 - Document 12 (M.D.N.C. 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER on 08/31/2016. For the reasons stated herein, this Court RECOMMENDS that the Commissioner's decision finding no disability b. REVERSED, and the matter be REMANDED to the Commissioner under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. 405(g). The Commissioner should be directed to remand the matter to the,ALJ for further administrative action as set out above. To this extent, D efendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings pocket Entry 10 ) should be DENIED and Plaintiff's motion for judgment reversing the Commissioner (Docket Entry 8 ) should be GRANTED. To the extent that Plaintiff's motion seeks an immediate award of benefits, his motion should be DENIED.(Taylor, Abby)
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McMICHAEL v. COLVIN Doc. 12 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA ERIC McMICHAEL, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Plaintiff, v CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. 1:15CV528 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE TUDGE Plaintiff, Eric McMichael, seeks review of a finaI decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his claim for a Period of Disability and Disability Insurance Benefìts ("DIB"). The Court has before it the certified administrative record and cross-motions for judgment. pocket Entries 6, 8, 10.) For reasons discussed below, it is recommended that Plaintiffs motion for iudgment reversing the Commissioner (Docket Entry S) be granted, Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket Entry 10) be denied, and that the Commissioner's decision be remanded. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff applied for DIB in June 201.3, alleging a disability onset date of Jun e 27 , 201,0. Qt. 1$-6e.y His applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. [r,77 ,90.) Thereafter, Plaintiff requested ahearingde novo before an Administrative LawJudge ("ALJ"). 1 Ttanscript citations refer to the sealed administrative record which was filed with Defendant's Answer. (Docket Entry 6.) 1 Dockets.Justia.com [r 10'l-02.) Plaintiff, his attorney, and a vocational expert ("VE,") on,tpril 1,,201,4. (r.34-64.) ,{ denial of Plaintiffls application for appeared ar rhe hearing decision was issued on August 8,2014, upholding the DIB. Qr.12-33.) OnJune7,201.5,the A.ppeals Council denied PlaintifPs request fot review of the decision, thereby making the ALJ's determination the Commissioner's fìnal decision for purposes of judicial review. (Ir. 1-s.) II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Commissioner held that Plaintiff was not under a disabiliry within the meaning the ,{.ct. Under 42U.5.C. decision is specific and S of 405(g), the scope of judicial review of the Commissioner's fìnal narow. S'mith u. Schweiker,795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986). This Court's review of that decision is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the recotd to support the Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. $ a05G); Hunter u. Sølliuan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1,992); Hay u. Salliuan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1,456 (4th Cir. 1990). "substantial evidence is 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion."' Huruter,993 F.2d at 34 (cinng Nchardson 401, (1,971)). less than a "[It] as adequate u. Perale¡ 402 U.S. 389, 'consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat prepondetznce."' 1/. (quotingLnws u. Celebre7ry,368F.2d640,642 (4th Cir. 1,966)). The denial of benefits will be reversed only if no reasonable mind could accept the record adequate to support the determination. Nchardr^0n,402 U.S. ^t as 401. The issue before the Court, therefore, is not whether Plaintiff is disabled, but whether the Commissioner's finding that Plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substanaal evidence and was reached based upon a coffect application of the relevant law. Cofrzan u. Bowen, 82g tr.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). 2 Thus, "la] claimant for disability benefìts bears the burden of proving a disability," Ha// u. Haris,658 F.2d 260,264 (4th Cir. 1981), and in this context, "disability" means "'inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of rhe any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]"' Id.(quoting 42 U.S.C. S 423(dX1XÐ). Adminisffation has "To regulanze promulgated the adjudicative process, the Social Security . . . detailed regulations incorporating longsranding medical-vocational evaluation policies that take into account a claimant's age, education, and work experience in addition to fthe claimant's] medical condilon." establish a 'sequential evaluation process' to determine whethe ra Id. "These regulations claimant is disabled." Id. (internal citations omitted). This sequential evaluation process ("SEP") has up to five steps: "The claimant (1) must not be engaged in 'substantial gainful acttvity,' i.e., cunently working; and Q) musr have a 'severe' impairment that (3) meets ot exceeds the 'listings' of specified impairments, or is otherwise incapacitattng to the extent that the claimant does not possess the residual functional capaciry ("RF'C") to (4) petform [the claimant's] past work or (5) any other work." Albright u. Comm'rofSoeSec.Admin.,1.74F.3d473,475n.2(4thCir. 1999) (citing20C.F.R.g404.1520); ¡ee al¡o 20 C.F.R. $ 416.920. The law concetning these five steps is well-established. Mastro u. See, e.!., ApJèl,270tr.3d'1,71,,1.77-1,S0 (4th Cir. 2001); Hall,658F.2dat264-65. III. THE ALJ'S DISCUSSION The ALJ followed the well-established fìve-step sequential analysis to ascertain whether 3 Plaintiff is disabled, which is set forth in 20 C.F.R. Sec. Adnin., 1,7 4 F.3d 473, 47 5 n.2 (4th Cir. S 404.1520. See Albright u. Comm'r of 1999). In rendering her disability determination, the ALJ made the following findings later adopted by Defendant: 1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31,201,5. 2. The claimant has not engage in substantial 201.0, the alleged gainful activity since June 27, onset date Q0 CFR 404.1 571 et rcq.). 3. The claimant has the following disease and bursitis of severe impairments: degenerative joint the left knee, status post arthroscopic surgery in September 201,0; lumbar degenerative disc disease, srarus post surgely in January 201,3; degenerative joint disease of the right knee, starus post arthtoscopic surgery Soc. in November 201,4; and bilateral shoulder impingemeît Q0 CFR 404.1520(c). 4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1,525 and 404.1,526). 5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned fìnds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity ('RFC") to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1,567þ) except that the claimant is further limited to: never climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; occasional contact with workplacehazards such as unprotected heights and dangetous machinery; occasional overhead reaching with the rþht upper extremity; and he must be allowed to alternate between sitting and standing two times an hour. 4 (r. 17, 20.) In light of the above fìndings regarding Plaintiffs RFC, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work as a diplomatic security offìcer and as a chauffe ur. Çr.26.) Based upon Plaintiffs age, education, work experience, and his RFC, the ALJ concluded "there ate jobs that exist in significant numbers in the naaonal economy that the claimant can perform." Qr27 (citing 20 C.F.R. SS 404.1569,404.1.569(a),416.969, and 416.969(a)). A.ccordinglI, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. Qt.28) IV. ANALYSIS In petinent part, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to accounr for Plaintiffs mental limitations in the RFC.2 (Docket Entry 11 at 7-1,2.) "At step three of the sequential evaluation, the.A.LJ determines whethet a claimant's impairments meet or medically equal any of the impaitments listed in 20 C.F.R.Pat 404, Subpat P, Appendix pertain to mental impairments." Hodge u. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. 1. Listings 12.00 et. Mq., Admin., No. CV SAG-14-3619, 2015!øL 581,3999,atx1 0). Md. Sept. 29,201,5) (unpublished) (citing20 C.F.R. Pt.404,Subpt. P, App. 1 S 12.00). Each listing therein contains: (1) a brief statement describing its mental disorder; Q) "pangraph A critetra," consisting of a set of medical fìndings; and (3) "pangraph B criteria," consisting of functional limitations related to the impairment. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 S 12.00(Ð. Both the pangraph ,\ criteria and the pangraph B criteria must 2 Plainaff also contends that the ALJ's credibility determination is not suppored by substantial evidence. (Docket E.tt y 11 at 2-7 .) Further, Plaintiff asserts that the Court is unable to determine the basis of the ,{,LJ's RFC fìndings because she gave little weight to all opinions except for one. Qd. at 1'2-1'5.) The court declines consideration of the additional issues raised at this time. Hanrvc,þ u. Barnhart,206 F. Supp. 2d 757,763-64, n.3 flXz.D. Ya.2002) (reasoning that on remand, the ALJ's prior decision has no pteclusive effect, as it is vacated and the new hearing is c<¡nducted de novo). 5 be satisfìed for the,{,LJ to determine that the claimant meets the listed impairment. Id. "Paragraph B consists of four broad functional ate si (1) activities of daily living; (2) social functioning; (3) concentration, persisrence, or pace; and (4) episodes of decompensation." Id. S 1,2.00(C); Martin u. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Adnin., No. CV SAG-15-335, 2015ìøL7295593,ú*2(D. Md.Nov. 18,2015) (unpublished). TheALJusesa"special technique" to determine the claimant's degree of limitation in each area, based on the extent to which the claimant's impaiment "interferes with [the claimant's] ability to independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained function basis." 20 C.F.R. 404Jt520a(c)(2). The ALJ rates a claimant's degree of limitation in the fìrst three areas either: none, mild, mod eta;te, marked, or extreme . Id. S 404.1 520 S as a(Q@. "In order to satisfy patagtaphB, a claimant must exhibit either marked limitations in two of the fìrst three ate s, or marked limitation in one of the first three areas with repeated episodes of decompensation." Hodge, 2015 WL 5813999, at *2 (citations and quotations omitted) (unpublished). If the claimant does not meet the requirements of step rhree, the ALJ conducts an RFC assessment to determine if the impairment prevents the claimant from returning to past ,. ,4þrt/, 27 0 tr .3d 17 1, 177 (4th Cir. 2001); Albright, 1,7 work. See 4 tr .3d at 47 5 n.2. According to SSR 96-8p, [Ilh. adjudicator must remember that the limitations identified in the "patagtaph B" and "pangtaph C" ctitetia are not an RFC assessment but are used to rate the severity of mental impairment(s) at steps 2 and 3 of sequential evaluation process. The mental RF'C 6 the assessmerit used at steps 4 and Ma¡tro 5 of the sequential evaluation process requires a more detailed assessment by itemizing various functions contained in the broad categories paragraphs B and C of the adult mental disorders listings SSR 96-8p,,1996WL 374184, at*4. found in . Here, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff was diagnosed with "adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood." (Tt. 1,9, 1,41,9.) At step two the ALJ found that Plaintiff had mild limitations in social functioning and in concentration, persistence or pace. (Tt. 19.) At step three, with respect to social functioning, the ALJ reasoned that Plaintiff testified that he uies to avoid being in situations that could increase his mood or anxiety symptoms,like crowded places. He is able to tolerate beingin stores and public places; he just goes when they are less crowded. The claimant told Ms. Anderson that he goes to the mall to walk and people watch when it is less crowded. He repotted that he is very social around family and close friends. (Ir. 19.) (internal citation omitted) With respect to concentration, persistence or pace, the ,{.LJ stated that Plaintiff "has no more than mild limitation." Qd.) In addition, the,A,LJ states that "as of a [Compensation and Pension examination ("C&P")] for mental disorders in September 201,4, the claimant had no complaints of impairment or memorT, attention, concentration, or executive functions 2) [r.1,9-20.) However, these findings wete made in a C & P examination that evaluated "fr]esiduals of [t]raumatic þ]rain [i]njury," not in the C & P for mental disorders. [r.1,423.) The C & P mental disorders examination, also conducted in September 20'1.4, indicated that Plaintiffs mental disorder caused an occupational and social impairment which "teduced fPlaintiffs] reliability and productivity." Qr. 1,420.) Moreover, the following symptoms 7 were checked: depressed mood; anxiety; panic attacks that occur weekly or less often; chronic sleep impairment; mild memory loss, such as fotgetting names, directions or recent events; disturbances of motivation and mood; diffìculty in establishing and maintaining effective work and social relationships; diffìculty in adapting to stressful circumstances, including work or work like setting; impaired impulse control, such violence. [t as unprovoked irritabitty with periods of 1'422.) It was concluded at the end of the examination that Plaintiffs "[a]nxiety depression irritability and other mental health symptoms ha[d] increased . . . [and] fm]ost symptoms noted above are now severe." (Id.) Without discussing this evidence the adjustment disorder was non-severe. (Tr. above, thete was in the moderate taflge, occasionally moderately 19.) ALJ determined that Plaintiffs Other than the step three analysis highlighted no discussion of Plaintiffs mild limitations in social functioning or concentration, persistence or pace elsewhere in the LJ's decision. Critically, the ALJ exptessly stated that her step three analysis is not a substitute for an in-depth RFC teview requiring a "more detailed assessment by itemizing various functions contained in the broad categories found in paragraph B of the adult mental disorders listing in 1,2.00 of the Listing of Impairments." (Tr. 20.) Thus, the ALJ understood that her step three analysis does not sufficiently considet the effect of PlaintifPs adjustment disorder, anxiety and depression on "þork-related mental activities generally required by competitive, temunetative work [, which] include the abilities to: understand, carry out, and remember instructions; use judgment in making work-related decisions; respond appropriately to supervision, co-workers and work situations; and deal with changes in 8 a routine work setting." See AshraJi u. Coluin, No. 313CV00417RLVDCK, 2015 21,2015) (unpublished) (citing SSR 96-8p , 1996WL ì7L 930456'1., at 37 4184, x9 (W.D.N.C. Dec. at*5)).2 Moreovet, the RFC does not comply with the standard set forth in Masico. In Mastio, the Fourth Citcuit determined that temand was appropriate for three distinct reasons, one of which is relevant to the analysis of this case. Specifìcally, the Fourth Circuit remanded Mastio because the hypothetical the ,{LJ posed to the VE, and the corresponding RFC assessment, did not include any mental limitations other than unskilled work, despite the fact that, at step three of the sequential evaluation, the r\LJ determined that the claimant had moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace. Manio,7S0 F.3d at 637 -38. The Fourth Circuit specifìcally held that it "agree[s] with other circuits thatan-{LJ does not accountfor a claimant's limitations in concenffation, persistence, and pace by resÚicting the hypothetical question to simple, routine tasks or unskilled work." Id. at 638 (quoting ll/in¡chelu. Comm'rof Soc. Sec.,631F'.3d 11.76,'1,180 (11th Cir. 201,1)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In so holding, the Fourth Circuit emphasized the distinction between the ability to petform simple tasks and the ability to stay on task, stating that "[o]nly the latter limitation would account fot a claimant's limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace." Id. Although the Fouth Circuit noted that the -ALJ's error might have been cured by an explanation as to why the claimant's moderate difficulties in concentration, petsistence or pace 3 alsolleinhardtu. Coluin,No.3:14-CV-00488-MOC,20'1,5WL1,756480,at+3 CX/.D.N.C. Apr.17, 2015) (unpublished) (reasoning that the ,{.LJ expressly stated that "the pangraph B criteria not ^re ^ assessment,. . . .and further acknowledged that the'[RFC] assessment . . . steps 4 and 5 FIFCÌ ^t the remainder requires a more detailed assessment . . . þowever, the] court is at a loss to discover in of his determrnauon a discussion of the more detailed . . . [RFC] assessment."' See 9 did not translate into a limitation in the claimant's RFC, it held that absent such an explanation, remand was necessatry. Id. Here, discussed "þ]y fìnding in step-two ^reas, that Plaintiff suffers ftom mild limitations in the above- the ALJ admitted that facts exist which correlate with a limitation on the Plaintiffs ability to stay on task and possibly perform other work-related functions." Athcraft,201,5WL9304561,, at x9 (internal citation a omitted). "As Masúo points out, admitting limitation in concenttation, persistence and pace correlates to a limitation in ability to stay on task, one that the ALJ neither posed to the VE, nor included in his assessment." ll/edwick u. Coluin, No. 2:14CV267,2015 líL 4744389, atx23 (E.D. Va. Aug. 7,201,5) (unpublished) Moreover, there are no mental limitations at all in the RFC. Furthermore, the Ary did not provide a valid explanation as to why Plaintiffs diffìculties in maintaining attention and concenttation did not translate into a limitation in the RF'C. "The key is that the reviewing Court must be able to discern the tationale undetlying the apparent discrepancy" between the findings at step three and the Soc. Sec. Adnin., No. CIV. SAG-14-3233, 2015 WL (unpublished). A.t step three the ALJ at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 6, 201,5) & P mental disorders or ot pace." (Tr. 19.) Further, the ALJ examination suggested that Plaintiff "had no complaints of impaitment or memorT, attention, concentration, or executive 20.) (intetnal citation Powellu. Comm'r, states that "the record does not show any persistent significant complaints of concentration, persistence reasons that the C 471,5280, RFC. functions." (Tt. omitted). These findings were in the "[r]esiduals of [t]raumatic þ]rain [i]njury" C & P examination. Çl'1423.) However, the actual C & P for mental disotdets 10 expressly states that Plaintiff "has been experiencing increasing levels of anxiety, depression, irritability . . . [and] fa]lso complains of some difficulty with attention and concentrarion." Qr't421,.) The same examination details the symptoms stemming from PlaintifPs social functioning and concentration impairments concluding that most of them "are now in the modetate t^nge, occasionally moderately severe." Gr. 1,422.) Therefore, the Court cannot discern from this btief discussion why Plaintiffs mild limitations in concentration, persistence or pace did not translate to the RF'C. First, there is no discussion of PlaintifPs ability to do work related functions despitê his mental impairments. Second, the ALJ cites the wrong examination to support her assertion that there were no complaints of impairment or memor/: attention, concentration, or executive functions. As stated above the actual examination suggests that Plaintiff has moderate mental limitations tathü than mild. Third, there is at least some evidence that Plaintiff complained of difficulties in concentation and attention. "As a result, without further explanation, the ,\LJ . . . . does not provide a'logical bddge,' between the LJ's conclusion that Plaintiff suffered trruld] concentration deficits and the -A.LJ's decision . . . lto not place] ^ny Bo1et, u. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., . .. concentration-related restiction" in the RF'C. Triùa No. 1:14CV762,2016WL 614708, ar x6 (X4.D.N.C. Feb. 16, 201.6) (unpublished) (internal citations omitted); Cammìngt u. Coluin,201,6 WL 792433, at *4 (X4.D.N.C. Fel:. 26,201,6) (concluding that "the record does not appear to provide the 'logical bridge' necessalT for this Coutt to find that the RFC adequately takes into account Plaintiffs moderate difficulties in concenuation, persistence, and pace"). The ALJ's only other attempt to explain that the RFC reflects all of Plaintiffs ümitations is the ALJ's boilerplate assertion 11 that the RFC "reflects the degree of limitation the undersigned has found in the 'patagraphB' mental function analysis." (ft. 20.) This is insufficient to satisfy the standard laid our in Mavio. "!íhile . . . the fact that the ,{,LJ found mild limitations in the paragraph B criteria does not necessarily ffanslate to a work-related functional limitation, Ma¡cio cleady imposes . .a . duty to explain why such mild mental health impairments found at step two do not translate into work-related limitations See Reinhardt,2015 ïØL 1756480, ^t*3. Therefore, as m^ny other courts in the Fourth Circuit have reasoned, the ALJ's failure to account for mild limitations in the RFC requires remand.a Additionally, at PlaintifFs hearing the VE testified to three jobs that someone wirh Plaintifls physical limitations could do including work folder, and as a parking lot attendant. (Tr. 59.) a Thompson u. Coluin, No. as a production inspecror, a garment Subsequently, the ALJ posed the following 1 :1 5-CV-00234-FDW , 201,6 'ùøL 361 01 6 1., at *3 (\X/.D.N.C. July 't , 2016) (unpublished) (concluding that "the -A.LJ gave no explanation how, if at all, Plaintiffs mild mental limitation factored into the ALJ's RFC analysis or, alternatively, why the limitation was excluded ftom the RFC formulation'); 8roo,6 u. Coluin, No. 1:15-CV-00191-MOC, 201,6 WL 1.465966, at +6 $V.D.N.C. Apr.1.4,2016) (unpublished) (finding "remand . . . appropriate so that the A.LJ can either assign limitations based on plaintiff['s] mental impafuments or explain why plaintiffs impairmenrs do not rise to a level requiring the assignment of any such limitations");Ashtraft,2015'ù7L 9304561.,at *9; Straaghn u. Coluin, No. 1:14CV200,2015WL 4414275, at+4 (M.D.N.C. July 20,2015) (unpublished) (reasoning that the ALJ did not ccount for the plaintiffs mild limitations in concentration, persistence or pce by limiting the plaintiff to "simple, routine, tasks secondary to pain and her mental limitations"); Reinhardt,2Ol5 WL 1,756480, at *3 (reasoning that the ,\LJ failed to address why mild limitations in concentration, persistence or pace did not translate into a work-related limitation in the RFC); $ Masters u. Comm'r,2016WL 31,89194, at *3 p. Md. June 7,201,6) (unpublished) (concluding that while the ,{,LJ found that the plaintiff suffered moderated difficulties in concentration, persistent and pace, "the ALJ's explanation in support of that finding, however, appears to suggest more of a mild limitation" but remanding because "the ALJ imposed no limitations in the RFC assessment to addtess an inability to sustain concentration, and at no point in the opinion does the ALJ discuss, for example, an ability to sustain concentration during simple tasks but difficulties with complex ones"). 12 questions to the VE who responded: ,{il dght. ,\nd generally what are the typical breaks allowed in a normal workday? One can expect 15 minutes in the morning, 15 minutes in the afternoon, and perhaps 30 minutes to an hour for a lunch period. a All rþht. ,Are thete any additional rest breaks, say up to ten percent off task per a A workday? ,4, Yout Honor, most jobs will allow for that, yes. a A[ tight, if someone were off task 20 percent or more of the workday, would these or any jobs be available? ,\ No, Your Honor. 'Iwenty percent off task is excessive in terms of normal allowable break time and would not be consistenr with gainful employment. a A[ right, and how about absences on a monthly basis? \X/hat's generally the tolerance for that? A One could expect eight to '12 days per year, about one day per monrh. At the uppet end, about one day per month of allowable absenteeism. Beyond that certainly becomes problematic. (lr. 60-61.) Subsequently, the hearing was terminated with no other fìndings related to the amount of time an employee would have to stay on task. Qr 61,-62.) It appears that rhe ALJ attempted to address Plaintiffs mental impairments by posing two hypothetical questions regarding Plaintifls limitations in his ability to stay on task. Çr.6'l-62.) The -A.LJ asked the VE if being off task 10 percent or 20 percent of the workday was consistent with gainful employment. Çr. 61,-62.) The VE testified that being off task 20 percent of the workday would create a situation that "would not be consistent with gainful employment." (fr. 61.) Despite the VE's testimony, the ALJ made no findings in the RF'C regarding Plaintiffs ability to stay on task. See AshcraJt,2015 føL 9304561, at *11. (concluding that the ALJ failed to account for the VE's determination that the inability to focus causing the plaintiff to be off task for 20 percent of the work day would prevent him for being able to do the jobs highlighted by the VE). Thus, the Court concludes that it is unable to conduct a meaningful review of 13 the r\LJ's RFC assessment. Defendant contends that the recotd contains only one mental health evaluation finding that Plaintiff only had mild anxiety symptoms. pocket Enty 11 at10-11;Tr.1547.) Thus, according to Defendant, the record "supports the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff had no mental impairments dudng the relevant period that signifìcantly affected his activities of daily living, social function, or concentration, persistence or pace, and there were no episodes of decompensation." (Docket Entty 11, at 1,1,.) However, the ALJ did not mention the contradictory evidence discussed above. The C & P mental disorders examination suggests that Plaintiff suffered from moderate limitations with respect to: memory loss, difficulty in establishing and maintaining effective work and social relationships; diffìculty in adapting to stressful circumstances, including work or work like setting; and impaired impulse control, such as unprovoked irritability with periods of violence. Çr 1422.) ,\dditionally, the examination fìndings suggest that "most of the symptoms . . . [are] occasionally moderately severe." (Id.) .,tll of these impairments are related concentration, persistence or pace. See to either social functioning or 20 C.F'.R. Part 4}4,Subpart P, ,{ppendix 1. Listings 12.00(c). The LJ discussed another examination evaluating Plaintiffs ftaumatic brain injury but inaccutately called it the C & P mental disorders examination. (Tr. inaccurate discussion of the C 19.) Based on the ALJ's & P mental disorders examination, finding most of Plaintiffs mental impaitments to be moderate and occasionally moderately severe, the Court cannot determine whether the examination was taken into .14 account. "The Court acknowledges that an ,\LJ's 'failure to discuss every specific piece of evidence does not ss¡¿þlish that she failed to consider it.' However, the ALJ's decision must still ultimately'reflect that she conducted a thorough teview of the evidence before her."' Sarford u. Coluin, No. 1:14CV885, 2016WL 951.539, at x4 (À4.D.N.C. Mar. 9,201,6) (unpublished) (finding that "the ALJ's decision omitted all discussion of PlaintifPs physical impairments and the related medical evidence . . . [and that] the relevant medical evidence was not addressed at any [other] point in the evaluation process") (internal citation omitted); see al¡o Had¡on u. Coluin,No. 7:12-CV-269-FL,201.3WL 6839672, at x8 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 23, 201,3) (unpublished) (reasoning that the ALJ failed to discuss relevant inconsistent evidence in the record and that "his silence . . . raises the question whether he even considered this evidence, notwithstanding his boilerplate representations that he considered all the evidence"). Thus, the ",{.LJ's failure to address evidence that contradicts her assertion that no mental impairments during the relevant period significantly impacted PlaintifPs social function, or concentration, persistence or pace requires expresses no opinion regarding whether remand. The Court Plaintiff is ultimately disabled under the Act and the Court declines consideration of the additional issues raised by Plaintiff at this time. Hancoc'k, 206 F. Srrpp. 2d at763-64 n.3 (on remand, the ALJ's pdor decision has no preclusive effect, as it is vacated and the new hearing is conducted de nouo). V. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated herein, this Court RECOMMENDS that the Commissioner's decision finding no disability b. REVERSED, and the matter be REMANDED to the Commissionet under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. $ a05€). The Commissioner should 15 be directed to remand the mattet to the ,tLJ for further administrative action as set out above. To this extent, Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings pocket Entry 10) should be DENIED 8) should be and Plaintiffs motion for judgment teversing the Commissioner (Docket Entty GRANTED. To the extent that Plaintiffs motion seeks an immediate award of benefits, his motion should be DENIED. oe Webster United States Magistrate Judge Á.ugust 31,2016 Durham, North Carchna 16
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