STANLEY v. COLVIN, No. 1:2014cv00986 - Document 14 (M.D.N.C. 2016)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER on 01/07/2016; that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry 10 ) be DENIED and that Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket Entry 11 ) be GRANTED. (Garland, Leah)

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STANLEY v. COLVIN Doc. 14 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA DAVID TIMOTHY STANLE,Y, Plaintiff, ) ) ) ) ) ) V C.,\ROL\AI \)ø. C OLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Secudty Administration, Civil Action No. 1:1,4CY986 ) ) ) ) ) Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff, David Timothy Stanley, brought this action pursuant to Section 205(9) of the Social Secutity Act (the ",{.ct'), codified as amended (42 U.S.C. $$ a05Q)), to obtain judicial teview of a ftr.al decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his claims fot disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Act. The Court has before it the cetified administtative tecotd and cross-motions for judgment. For the reasons foth set below, the Court recofiünends that Defendant's motion (Docket Entty 11) be gtanted and PlaintifPs motion (Docket Entty 10) be denied. I. On Febtu^ry 8, 20'1,1, PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff fìled an application for DIB alleging disability beginning Jznuary 13, 2007 due to a right shoulder impairment, seizures, and restless leg syndrome. (Tt. '169-70; 185; 189.)1 Plaintiffs claims were denied initially and upon teconsideration. (Id.) A hearing was held before an dministrative Law Judge ("AIJ") on ' l,¡ Transctþt citations refer to the administrative record which was filed with Defendant's Answer. (Docket Entry 8.) Dockets.Justia.com May 1.6, 201,3. Çr 46-75.) Plaintiff testified at the hearing, as did a vocational expet ('1/E"). (Id.) On May 24, 2013, the ALJ detetmined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the -A.ct. Qr. 34-42.) This decision became the final administrative decision aftet the Appeals Council declined review. Qt 8-1,2.) Plaintiff has exhausted all avallable administrative temedies, and this case is now ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $ a05@). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Commissionet held that Plaintiff was not undet a disability within the meaning of the Act. Under 42U.5.C. $ a05(g), the scope of judicial review of the Commissioner's fìnal decision is specific and narrou/. Srzith a. Schweiker,795 tr.zd 343,345 (4th Cir. 1986). This Court's review of that decision is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the recotd to support the Commissioner's decision. 42U.5.C. $ a05@; Hanter Salliuan, 993 tr.2d 3L, 34 (4th Cir. 1,992) þer cariam), superseded in nontelevant part by u. 20 C.F.R. S 404.1517(dXZ); Hals u. Sulliuan,907 F.2d 1453, 1,456 (4th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Hanter,993 F.2d at 34 (citng Ncbardson (1971)). U.S. 389, 40'I "It consists of mote than a mete scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat than a pteponderance." 1/. (quoting I-^aws The denial of benefits will be reversed only adequate u. ))era/es,402 less u. Celebrelry, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1,966)). if no reasorìable mind could accept the record as to support the determination. Niltardson,402 U.S. at 401.. The issue before the Court, therefote, is not whether Plaintiff is disabled, but whether the Commissioner's finding that Plaintiff is not disabled is suppotted by substantial evidence and was reached 2 based upon a coffect application 51,7 of the televant law. See id.; Cofnan u. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, (4th Cu. 1987). Thus, 'fa] clatrnant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving a disability," Ha// u. Harris,658 F.2d 260,264 (4th Cir. 1981), and in this context, "disability" means the "'inability to erìgage in ^ny substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than months,"' id. (quottng 42 U.S.C. S 12 423(dX1)(A)). "To regulanze the adjudicative ptocess, the Social Security ,\dministtation has . . . promulgated . . . detailed regulations incorporating longstanding medical-vocational evaluation policies that take into account a claimant's age, education, and work expetience in addition to [the claimant's] medical condition." Hall,658 tr.2d at 364. "These tegulations establish a 'sequential evaluaion process' to detetmine whether a claknant is disabled." Id. (internal citations omitted). This sequential evaluation ptocess ("SEP") has up to five steps: "The claimant (1) must not be engaged in 'substantial gainful actvity,' i.e., ctuently working; and (2) must have 'severe'impairment that (3) meets or exceeds the 'listings' of specifìed impairments, or is otherwise incapacitattng to the extent that the claimant does not possess the tesidual functional capacity to (4) petform [the claimant's] past work or (5) any other work." Albright u. Cornm'r of Soe Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d 473, 475 n. 2 (4th Cft. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R. S 404.1,520). The law concetning these five steps is well-established. Jøø, e.g., Mastro, 270 F.3d at 177 -1.80; Ha//, 658 F.2d at 264-65; Hines u. Ùarnhart, 453 tr.3d 559, 567 (4th Cir. 2006). J III. THE ArIs DECISIAN In his May 24,2013 decision, the ,{LJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under Sections 216(r) and 223(d) insured. of the Social Security .ct through June 30, 20'1,0, the last date Çr a2.) In making this disability determination, the ,{LJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in "substanttal gainful activity" since his alleged onset date thtough his date last insured. (Tt. 36.) Plaintiff thus met his burden at step one of the SEP. ,\t step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffeted ftom the following severe impairments through his date last insured: status post multiple right rotator cuff surgeries; chronic obsúuctive pulmonary disease; and history of seizures. (Id.) The AIJ found at step thtee that these impairments did not meet or medically equal a disability listing. (Id. at 38 -39.) The ,AIJ next assessed PlaintifPs RFC2 and determined that Plaintiff could perform light wotk as defined in 20 CFR S 404.1567þ) with the following limitations: tasks that can be learned in less than 30 days involving no mote than simple wotk-telated decisions with few work place changes; occasional (up to two houts) overhead teaching with nght upper extremity; and avoiding workplace hazards such as dangerous machinery and unprotected heights. (Ir.39.) In light of his RtrC findings, the ALJ determined at step four that Plaintiff could not petform his past relevant work ("PRìø") which was medium and semi-skilled-to-skilled in nature (citing 20 C.F'.R. SS 404.1565). (It 40.) Reþing on the testimony of the vocational 2 "RFC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite [the claimant's] limitations." Hines, 453 F3d at 562 (citation omitted). The RFC includes both a "physical exertional or strength limitation" that assesses the claimant's "ability to do sedentary,ltgbt, medium, heavy orvery heavy work," as well as "nonexettional limitations (mental, sensory, or skin impafuments)." Hall,658 F.2d at 265. "RFC is to be detetmined by the -{LJ only aftet [the ALJ] considers all relevant evidence of a claimant's impairments and any related symptoms (e¿., pattn)." Hines, 453 F.3d at 562-63. 4 expett, the ALJ detetmined that even with Plaintiffs credibly established limitations, he could perform a signifìcant numbet of light jobs that existed in the naional economy. Qd. at 41.) Accotdingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not under a "disability," as defined in the Act, at any time fromJantary 13,2007 thtough June 30,2010, the date last insured (citing 20 C.F'.R. S 404.1s20(g). Qr az.). IV. DISCUSSION .,{.t step three, the ,ALJ found that the opinion of Dr. Jerry Barron, Plaintiffs orthopedic surgeon, regarding Plaintiffs disability was due "little weighC' because the opinion consisted of "check matks on a prepared form" and the basis for his "supposed conclusions is not provided and cannot be asceftained from his treatment rìotes." (It. 40.) Plaintiffs sole atgument in this appeal is that the AIJ ered by impropetly evaluating the opinion and fìndings of his tteating physician in violation of 20 C.F'.R. S 404.1.527. The Commissioner defends the ALJ's decision, atguing that because Dr. Baffon's opinion was unsupported by other objective evidence of record, and because the opinion itself was simply "a check box response on a letter ptepared by Plaintifls counsel," the opiniorì was not entided to controlling weight. Qef.'s Mem. at6-1.1, Docket F.,nty 12.) If a teauL¡g source's medical opinion is "well-suppotted and 'not inconsistent' with the other substantial evidence in the case recotd, it must be given controlling weight[.]" SSR 96-2p; see also 20 C.tr.R. S 404.1527 (dX2) þroviding treating source's opinion will be given controlling weight if well-supported by medically-acceptable clinical and lal:,oratory diagnostic techniques and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record); Craigu. Chater,76tr.3d 585, 590 (4th Cir. 1,996). The Commissionet typically affords greater 5 weight to the opinion of a clatrnant's tteating medical sources because such sources are best able to ptovide "a detailed longitudinal picture" C.F.R. S 404.1,5279Ø. FIowever, weight when "it is not ^ treaLtling of a claknant's alleged disability. See 20 physician's opinion is not due controlling supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence." C*tg,76 tr.3d at 590. "Courts evaluate and weigh medical opinions pursuant to the following nonexclusive list (1) whether the physician has examined the applicant, Q) the treatment telationship between the physician and the applicant, (3) the suppoftability of the physician's opinion, (4) the consistency of the opinion with the record, and (5) whether the physician is a specialist." Joltnson u. Barnhart, 434 tr.3d 650, 654 (4th Cir. 2005);20 C.F'.R. S 404.1527(d). ",{n '{IJ's decision not to afford contolling weight to a tteating physician's opinion must be supported by substantial evidence in the record." Dyda u. Coluin,47 tr. Supp. 3d 318, 324 M.D.N.C.2014) (citing Vtinford u. Chater,91,7 F. Supp.398, 401) (E.D.Va.1,996)). Plaintiff injuted his tþht shouldet in an on-the-job accident in Decemb er 2006. Gr. 261). fter conservative treatment failed to ptovide relief, Plaintiff underwent his frst rotator cuff tepait surgelT in November 2007. Gt 595.) Because he continued to experience chronic pain, Plaintiff was refered to Dt. Banon for treatment of his orthopedic condition. Qr 41,2.) In Match 2009, Plaintiff underwent tevision surgelT due to tear and impingement, followed by a second revision surgery in October 2009. Çr. In Jannry 201.3, 41,5; 667 .) Dr. Barron tesponded to a request from Plaintiffs attorney, ptoviding responses to questions regatding Plaintiffs condition. (Tr. 708-10.) In response to this questionnafue, Dt. Baron opined that Plaintiffs condition rendered him unable to 6 perform sedentatT work and would teasonably have been expected to cause chronic severe pain. (Ir. 708-09.) He also stated that Plaintiff s chronic pain andf or use of pain medication would interfere with his ability to sustain a normal eight hour workday, five days a week, and that ptior to June 30, 201,0 ttwas reasonable to assume that the chronic pain and or use of pain medicate could have intetfered with PlaintifPs ability to stay on task for at least 25o/o of a wotkday. space provided at the (It. 709.) Dr. Barton included a few suppotting comments in bottom of the checklist form. In these notations, Dr. Baron indicated that Plaintiffs injury was over six yeats ptiot to the date of the opinion, that Plaintiff had undetgone fout sutgical ptocedures, experienced signifìcant chronic pain and deptession and was taking oxycodone for pain and other medication for depression. (fr. 709.) Coutts genetally have found checklist opinions to be entitled to relatively litde weight. See MtGlothlen u. Astrue, No. 7:1.1.-CY-148-RJ, 2012 WL 364741,1,, at *6 @,.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 201,2) ("form reports. . . ^te argluaï:'Jy Halloran u. Bamhart, 362 tr.3d 28, "only marySnally 3'1, entitled to little weight due to the lack of explanation"); n. 2 & 32 Qd Cin. 2004) (standatdized form opinions are useful" and not particulady "informative"); Cmig 16 F'.3d þhysician's opinion that is not supported by objective evidence should be ^t 590 accorded significandy less weight); r-re1 u. Bowen,816 F'.2d 508,515 (10th Ch. 1,987) (checklist forms "unaccompanied by through written repotts or persuasive testimony, are not substantial evidence") (citing Third Circuit authority); Berrios Iupt<u. Sec)t of Health dy Høman Sera¡.,951. F.2d 427,431 (1st Cir. 1,991) (checklist opinions disfavoted); 4041527 see al¡o 20 C.F.R. (c)Q) ("The more a medical source presents televant evidence to support 7 S an opinion . . . the more weight we will give that opinion. The better an explanalon a source ptovides for an opinion, the more weight we will give that opinion"). Plaintiff corectly points out that the ,AIJ did not specifically refer to each of the factors set out in the tegulations to determine the weight given to the opinions of treating physicians. However, there is nothing in the tegulations requiting a detailed analysis as to each fzctof; rather, "the regulations mandate only that the ALJ give þood reasons' decision fot the weight ultimately allocated to medical source opinions." Tucker in the u. Astrae, 897 F. Srrpp. 2d 448,468 (S.D. W. Va. 201,2). Social Security Ruling 96-2p simply requires that a decision denying a claim "must contain specific reasons fot the weight given to the tteating source's medical tecord, suppotted by the evidence in the case record, and must be suffìciendy specific to make clear .. . the weight þiven] to the source's medical opinion and the teasons for thatweight." SSR 96-2p; apptoaches taken by different courts see alsoTucker,897 tr. Snpp. 2dat 468 (discussing in explaining the weight given to treating opinions, concluding that "[s]imply stated, the adequacy physician of the wdtten discussion is measured by its clarity to subsequent reviewers."). Here, the ALJ engaged in a lengthy and fztÄy detarled discussion of PlaintifPs medical impairments and treatment history befote making his RFC determination and specifìcally noted that he consideted the opinion evidence in accotdance with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. S 404.1,527 and SSR 96-2p, SSR 96-5p, SSR 96-6p and SSR 06-3p. (Ir. 39.) The ,{LJ then discussed Plaintiff s a[egations of pain and functional limitations, noting the opinion Dr. Banon, tecognizing him as of Plaintiffs tteating orthopedic surgeon, but fìnding that the opinion was not suppoted by PlaintifPs treatment tecotd and other objective medical 8 evidence, including a Disability Detetmination report on reconsideration (dated December 24, 201,1) finding that Plaintiff was capable of light exertional work. (Jee Disability Determination Expianation atTL 87-97.) The ALJ noted that this report was completed by a physician and "sets forth at some length the supporting evidence undedymg those conclusions." (Tr. a0.) Additionally, the AIJ noted that out of an abundance of caution he asked the vocational expert to consider functional limitations consistent with the more testrictive functional capacity evaluation, finding that as testified to by the VE, "jobs would be available even at that exertional level." (Ir. a0.) The ,\LJ's stated rationale for giving litde weight to Dt. Barron's opinion, in conjunction with the entirety of his review and analysis of the tecord, provided specific and legitimate reasons to reject a teanng source medical opinion. Substantial evidence supports the AIJ's decision not to credit Dr. Baron's opinion with controlling weight. The ,AIJ noted the checklist form used by Dt. Barron, but further found that Dr. Barron's opinion was not suppoted by his own treatment notes and was inconsistent with other evidence of tecord. Indeed, as noted by the ALJ, Dt. Baffon's post-surgical notes in NovemL¡er 2009 indicate that Plaintiff had no specific complaints (Ir. 428) and follow-up treatment notes in Febtuary 2010 noted that Plaintiff had "good range of motion overall passively" and active range of motion to 95 degtees. Cfr. 430.) A March 2010 MRI showed only "mild" cuff tendinopathy and ptior shouldet tepairs to be intact. Çr a31,.) While Dt. Batton also noted Plaintiffs continued pain, the tecotds show that PlaintifPs condition improved following his sugedes. 9 Moteovet, othet objective evidence in the record supported the -AIJ's decision to not afford Dt. Baron's opinion great weight. Fot instance, tecords show that Plaintiff showed marked improvement following his 2007 surgery and "almost complete" range of motion. Cfr. 280.) By May 2008, Plaintiff had "full raîge of motion" with no muscle weakness ot drop atm sign. Çr. 278.) ,{n August 2008 independent medical evaluation showed active r^nge of motion to 130 degtees and a fìve pound lifting restriction. (Tr. 270-71,.) Octobet 2008, Plaintiff had forwatd elevation to 1.45, adduction to 100, full internal rotation, good gdp strength, and no weakness with forward elevation. teleased By Çr. 276.) Plaintiff was to wotk with a restriction to avoid tepetitive ovethead lifting and a five pound overhead lifting restriction. [r. 276.) On May 10,20'I'1,, state agency consultant Dr. Dakota Cox opined that Plaintiff could petform light wotk with no more than occasional teaching with his right arm. (Ir. 81-83.) Dt. Cox based this opinion on objective medical evidence which was cited in the determination. Likewise, in a disability determination dated Decembet 22, 2011, another state agency physician found, based on a review of Plaintiffs complete medical tecotd, that Plaintiff could perform light work with ovethead teaching. Çr. %-9a.) See 20 C.F.R. S 404.'|527GX2XÐ (AIJ may rely upon and must considet as opinion evidence professional assessments from state agency physicians). Notes from Plaintiffls treatment at a rchaÏ¡ center in 201,1 showed improvement, and Plaintiff reported that he was exetcising every day and following a physical thetapy ptogram. [r a77.) Consequently, considedng the record as a whole, the Court finds the ALJ's treatment of Dt. Batron's opinion complied with the applicable regulations and rulings and was suppoted by substantial evidence. 10 V. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court surnmary judgment Q)ocket E.rtry 10) be RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs motion fot DENIED and that Defendant's motion fot judgment on the pleadings @ocket Entty 11) be GRANTED Joe. L. Webster nited States Magistrate Judge N January Carohna 201,6 71

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