KLEBOE v. COLVIN, No. 1:2014cv00914 - Document 14 (M.D.N.C. 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER signed on 3/3/2016, RECOMMENDS that Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket Entry 12 ) be GRANTED, Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket Entry 9 ) be DENIED, and that the final decision of the Commissioner be upheld. (Daniel, J)
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KLEBOE v. COLVIN Doc. 14 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA JE,SSICA LAURA KLE,BOE, Plaintiff, v CARYOLYN COLVIN, Acting Commissionet of Social Secudty, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 1,:'1.4CY91,4 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff, Jessica L. I{eboe, seeks teview of a ftnal decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying het claims for a period of disability and supplemental security income benefits ("SSI"). The Court has before it the cenified administative recotd and cross-motions fot judgment. (Docket Enuies 6, 9, 12.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that Plaintiffs motion (Docket Entty 9) be denied, the Defendant's motion (Docket E.rtty 12)be granted, and that the final decision of the Commissionet be upheld. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff applied fot SSI on October 24,2011,, alleging 24, 201,1,. a disability onset date of October Çr. 1.63-69.¡t Het application was denied initially (Tt. 110-113) teconsidetation (It. 1,1,7-1,21,.) Thereafter, Administrative Law Judge and upon Plaintiff requested ahearing de novo before an ("ALJ"). Çr. 20-21,.) Plaintiff, her attorney, and an imparlal l Transcrþt citations refer to the administrative record which was filed with Defendant's Answer pocket Entry 6.) 1. Dockets.Justia.com voctional expert appeared at the headng on May 22,201,3. Çl41,-82.) A decisiori was issued on July 1,9, 2013, upholding the denial of Plaintiffs application for SSI. Qr. 26-36.) On ugust 22, 201.4, the ,{ppeals Council denied Plaintiffs tequest fot teview of the decision, thereby making the,A.LJ's determination the Defendant's fìnal decision for putposes of judicial review. Qt.7-9.) II. STANDARD FOR REVIEW Under 42 U.S.C. $ 405(9), the scope of judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is specific and narrow. Snitlt u. Schweiker,795tr.2d343,345 (4th Cir. 1986). This Coutt's review of that decision is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. $ a05(g); Hønter 993 F.2d 31,34 (4th Cir. 1992) 404.1,51,7 (d)Q); Hay u. Sulliuan, þer cutiam), søperseded in nonreleuant u. Salliuøn, þart þt 20 C.F.R. 907 F.2d 1453, 1,456 (4th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support conclusion S a ." Hunter, 993 F .2d at 34 (citng Nchardson u. Perales, 402 U .S. 389 , 401 (1,97 1)) . It "consists of mote than a mete scintilla" "but may be somewhat less than a prepondetance." 1/. (quoting l-øws u. Celebreçe,368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)). The Commissionet must make fìndings of fact and resolve conflicts in the evidence. Ha1s,907 F.2d at 1,456 (citing King u. Calfano,599 tr.2d 597,599 (4th Cit. 1,979)). The does not conduct a de novo review of the evidence or the Commissionet's findings. Cout Schweiker, 795 F.2d àt 345. In reviewing for substantial evidence, the Coutt does not undertake to re- weigh conflicting evidence, to make credibility determinations, or to substitute its iudgment for that of the Commissioner. Craig u. Chøter,76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cit. 1996) (citing 2 Ha1s, 907 F.2d at 1,456). "ì(/here conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to diffet as to whether a clarmantis disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [Commissioner] (or the fCommissioner's] designate, the ALJ)." Craig76tr.3d at 589 (quoting lValkeru. Bowen, 834F.2d635,640 (7thCit. 1987). Thedenialofbenefitswillbereversedonlyifnoteasonable mind could accept the record as adequate to support the determination. See Nchardson,402 U.S. at 401. The issue befote the Coutt, therefote, is not whethet Plaintiff is disabled, but whether the Commissionet's finding that Plaintiff is not disabled is suppotted by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a coffect application of the televant Iaw. u. Bowen,829 See id.; Cofnan F.2d 51.4,51.7 (4th Cir. 1987). III. THE ALJ'S DISCUSSION The Social Security Regulations define "disability" for the purpose of obtaining disability benefits as the "inability to do any substantial gainful activity by teason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment2 which can be expected to result in death ot which has lasted or can be expected to last fot a contirìuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. $ 1382c(a)(3xÐ. To meet this definition, a clatmant must have severe impairment which makes it impossible to do previous wotk ot a any other substantial gainful activity3 that exists in the nattonal economy. Id. $ 1382c(rX3XB) A. The Five-Step Sequential Analysis The Commissionet follows a five-step sequential analysis to ascertain whethet the 2 A "physical or mental impairment" is an impairment resulting from "aîatornical, physiological, ot psychological abnormalities which are demonsffable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U .5.C. $ 1 382c(a) (3XD). ' "substantial gainful activity" is work that (1) involves performing "significant and productive physical or mental duties," and Q) "is done (ot intended) fotpay or õ J profit." 20 C.F,R. S 416.910. claimant is disabled, which is set forth in 20 C.F.R. Admin., 17 S 416.920. See Albrìgþt u. Cornm'r of Soc. Sec. 4 F.3d 473, 47 5 n.2 (4th Cn. 1,999). The ,A.LJ must determine in sequence: (1) Q) (3) IØhethet the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful ac:Jvity (i.e., whethet the claimant is wotking). If so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Whethet the claimant has a severe impairment. If not, then the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. tX/hether the impairment meets or equals to medical ctitetia of 20 C.F'.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, which sets fotth a list of impafuments that w^rcant a finding of disability without considering vocational criteita. If so, the claimant zi disabled and the inquity is halted. (4) (5) Whether the impairment prevents the claimant from petfotming past relevant work. If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry is halted. \X/hether the claimant is able to perfotm any othet wotk considering both his residual functional capacitya and his vocational abilities. If so, the claimant is not disabled. 20 c.F.R. S 41,6.920. In rendering his disability determination, the ALJ made the following fìndings latet adopted by Defendant: (1) The clumant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since Octobet CFR 416.971., et seq.). (2) The claknant has the following sevete impafument bipolat disordet with 1,4,201,1, (20 psychotic featutes (20 CFR 416.920(c)). (3) The claimant does not have an impaitment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Q0 CFR 416.920(d), 41.6.925 and 41,6.926). a "Residual functional capacíty" f'RFC'l is the most a claknant can do in a work setting despite the physical and mental limitations of his impairment and any related symptom (e.9., pan). See 20 C.F.R. $ a16.9a5(a) (1); see also Hine¡ u Bamhart,453 F.3d 559,562 (4th Cir. 2006). The RFC includes both a "physical exertional or strength limitation" that assesses the claimant's "abiJity to do sedentary, light, medium, hearJ, or vely hear,ry'work," as well as "nonexenional limitations (mental, sensory ot skin impairments);' Hallu. Harris,658 F.2d 260,265 (4th Cir. 1981). 4 (4) After careful consideration of the entire record, the undetsigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of work at all exertional levels, but with the following non-exertional limitations: she is capable of performing simple, routine, repetitive tasks, while maintaining attention, concentration, persistence or pace to stay on tasks fot periods of 2 hours at ttme during a tt¡picaI S-hour workday, as tequired to petform such ^ tasks, in a low stress work setting, which is funher defined as no productionpace or quota-based wotk, rather she requires a goal-oriented job primarily dealing with things as opposed to people, with no more than occasional changes in the work setting; with no more than occasional interpetsonal interaction v/ith supervisors andf or co-workets, but she must avoid ditect wotk with members of the public as a component of the job, such as sales or negotiations, though incidental or casual contact as it might arise duting the workday is not precluded; she is limited to no more than occasional decision-making as a component of the job; and she is testticted to jobs that carry a reasoning level of 1. or 2. (5) The claimant is unable to petform any of het past relevant wotk (20 CF'R 41,6.965). Qr28-3a) (footnote omitted). Additionally, the ALJ found that Plaintiff, who was 41 years old at the time of her application, met the definition of a "younger individual aged 1.8-49." Gr. 34.) The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff had a high school education and was able to communicate in English, and that ttansferability of job skilis was not an issue in the case. (Tt. 34.) Based on these factors, Plaintiffs RFC, and the vocational expett's testimony, the ,A.LJ concluded that "there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that fPlaintiffl can perform." (Tr. 35) (citing 20 C.F.R. SS 416.969 and 416.969(a)). Accotdingly, the ALJ decided that Plaintiff was not undet a "disability," as defined in the Social Security Act (the "Act"), atàîy time between October14,201,1 þoth the application and alleged onset date) and July 19, 20L3, the date of the decision. 5 (t 36.) IV. ANALYSIS Plaintiff contends that the Commissioner erred in determining that she was not disabled for purposes of the Act. Plaintiff raises two issues: (1) the ALJ conducted a flawed RFC assessment by giving less than conttolling weight to the opinion of Plaintiffs treating psychiatrist, Dr. Clark; and Q)with reference to 20 C.F'.R. S 41,6.927(eX2XÐ (improperly cited in Plaintiffls brief as $ 404.1530), the ALJ impropedy considered PlaintifÎs failute to take her prescribed medications. (Docket Ent"y 10 at 1,1-1,6.) As explained below, this Coutt concludes that the ALJ's decision to give less than contolling weight to Dt. Clark's opinion is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a coffect application of relevant law, and the ,A.LJ was not improper in considering Plainuffs failure to take her presctibed medications. 1,. Dr. Clark's Opinion Plaintiff states that, because "she is a specíalist and has personally examined fPlaintiffl on many occasions since she began treating fPlaintiff] inJuly 201.2," Dr. Clatk's opinion should be accotded controlling weight. (Id. at13.) The Commissioner typically affords greater weight to the opinion of a claimant's treating medical sources because such sources are best able to ptovide "a detailed, longitudinal picture" of 41,6.927 (c)(2); :ee ¿/r¿ SSR 96-2p,1996 ^ claimant's alleged disability. See 20 C.F.R. S ffl. 37 4188 Çtly 2, 1,996) (if a tteating source's medical opinion is "well-supported and not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record, it must be given contolling weight"). controlling weight, however, when A treating physician's opinion is not due "it is not supported by clinical evidence ot if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence." CmigT 6F.3d at 590. An ALJ refusing to accord 6 controlling weight to the medical opinion of a tr.ea:J;ng physician must consider "fctors" to determine how much weight to give factors include: (i) the frequency it. 20 C.F'.R. S 41,6.927 vadous (c)(t)-(6). These of examination and the length, nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (ü) the evidence in support of the treating physician's opinion; (üt) the consistency of the opinion with the recotd as a whole; (iv) whethet the opinion is from a specialist; and (v) other factors brought to the Social Security Administtation's attention that tend to support or contradict the opinon. Id. Significantly, as subsections (2) thtough (4) of the rule describe in gteat detail, ^ treattng source's opinion, like all medical opinions, must be both well-supported by medical signs and labotatory findings and consistent with the other substantial evidence in the c se tecotd. Id. \ a1,6.927(c)Q)-Ø) "lI)f a physician's opinion is not supported by clinical evidence ot if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, Craig 76 F.3d at 590; accord it should be accorded significantly less weight." Mastro u. Apfe/270 F3d 111, 178 (4th Cit. 2001). Opinions by physicians tegatding the ultimate issue of whethet a plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the Act never receive controlling weight because the decision on that issue remains fot the Commissioner alone. 20 C.F.R. S 416.927(d). Moreover, coutts have genetally found checklist opinions to be entitled to relatively little weight. See MtGlothlen u. Astrae, No. 7:11-CV-148-RJ,2012WL3647411,at*6 (E.D.N.C. Atg. 23, 2012) ("form reports are ar.guably entitled to üttle weight due to the lack of explanation"); Halloran u. Bamhart,362F .3d 28,31.-32,31n.2 Qd Cß. 2004) (standatdized form opinions are "only matginally useful" and not particulatly "infotmative"); Berrios luþt<.u. of Health dy Human Seras., 951 F.2d 427 Sec'1 , 431, (lst Cir. 1991) (checklist opinions disfavoted); 7 Frelt u. Bowen,816 F. 2d 508, 515 (10th Cir. 1987) (checklist forms, "unaccompanied by thorough written reports or persuasive testimony, ate not substantial evidence"); a/¡o 20 see C.F.R. S 416.927 (c)(3) ("The more a medical source ptesents relevant evidence to support an opinion . . . the more weight we will give that opinion. The better an explanation a source provides for. an opinion, the mote weight we will give that opinion."). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision to accord Dt. Clatk's opinion limited weight. The ALJ noted that Dr. Clark's opinion was in the form of a checklist-style questionnaire. (Tr. 33 ) The ALJ also found inconsistencies between Dr. Clark's checklist form, her treatment notes, and Plaintiffs presentation ather hearing. The ALJ explained: To begin with, there was no cleat evidence that Dr. Clark had four years of expetience treating the claimant. As pteviously discussed, the claimant requested the switch from Dr. Russell to Dr. Clark in October 201.2. Mote significantly, howevet, the opinions of Dt. Clatk were inconsistent with the treatment tecotd, including her own ptogress notes. These records confìtm that the claimant was generally stable on medication, with intact memotry, attention, concenttation, thought processes, speech, fund of knowledge, and interact. Moreover, the claimant's ptesentation at the heating was not consistent with the degree of resttiction averred by Dt. Clatk. abil-ity to (Id.) Indeed, as noted by the ALJ, Plaintiff, while "depressed" ^nd Dr. Clatk's progress notes in May 2013 indtcate that "anxious," was still stable; had normal tate, volume, and articulation in her speech; had generally normal thought processes; was devoid of any violent ideations; and exhibited fair judgment and insight. Çr. 460-62.) Treatment notes prior to l'/.ay 201,3 indicate good judgment and insight, euthymic and pleasant moods, exchange and interaction with family members, participation in community activities, and an ability to travel. Çr. 466-68, 469-70, 476-83,485, 489-90.) Several of these individual capacities were corroborated by PlaintifFs testimony duting the May 22, 201.3 8 AIJ heating. (Tt. 64-68) (Plaintiff maintains communication with mother and college ftiend several times a week; walks dog; visits church from time to time; goes grocery shopping; and cooks for herself.). Other objective evidence in the tecord supported the ALJ's decision not to accotd Dt. Clatk's opinion great weight. Dr. Russell, Plaintiffs treating physician prior to Dr. Clatk, reported that ftom August to December 201,1, Plaintiff had generally normal, goal ditected thoughts; good mood, affect, and judgment; was pleasant in mood and appearance; maintained good attention and focus; and cognition was within normal limits. Çr.426-39.) State agency consultants, aftet reviewing the record, opined that Plaintiff was capable of performing simple, routine, repetitive tasks in a low stress, non-ptoduction demands. Gr. 83-108.) ,A.dditionally, Plaintiffs mother, environment with limited social in October. 2011,, reported that Plaintiff feeds and walks her dogs, bathes, fixes her own meals, shops for food, mows the lawn as needed, does laundry, reads, wtites, uses email, and actively makes phone calls. (fr. 205.) This Court tecognizes that the recotd is not entitely devoid of episodes of decomposition-in May 201,2, for example, Plaintiff stopped het medications and was subsequently btought in fot evaluation by a police officer who reported that Plainuff had been at a restaurant for several days. to het disability heating Qr pr. 494;542-556; 585-592.) Plainttff also reported stress prior 460); oversleeping and feeling sad after returning home from a visit to het mothet in Chicago (Tr. 475); and a drop in mood and affect following the death of her father ffr. 427-28). Howevet, each of these episodes is atuibutable to either a signifìcant life event or momentary f.ailure to comply with her medicine tegiment. Otherwise, the tecord fiom the televant time pedod demonsttates that Plaintiff was mentally functional, sociable, and able to perform a wide range of activities. Consequently, the Coutt finds the 9 ALJ's teatrnent of Dr. Clark's opinion complied with the applicable tegulations and was supported by substantial evidence. Likewise, for the reasons stated above, PlaintifPs argument that state agency physicians were impropedy given gteatet weight than Plaintiffs tteating physician also fails. (Jee Docket Entry 1,0 at 1,6.) State agency physicians re "highly qualified . . . experts in Social Security disability evaluation," 20 C.F.R. S 41,6.927 (.X2XÐ, and it is within the disuetion of the ALJ to give gteater weight to a non-treating state agency physician, particulady when the opinion of the non-treating physician is supported by substantial evidence ot thete is petsuasive evidence conttary to the opinion of a tteattne physician. Il/illiam¡ 201,2 WL 5361,032, at *1.3 @,.D. Va. Oct. u. Aslrwe, No. 3:11-CV-764-HEH, 1,6, 201,2) report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:1,1CY764-HEH, 201,2WL 536101,4 (E.D. Va. Oct. 31,,201,2) (fìnding that the ALJ did not err in giving greater weight to opinions of non-tteating physicians when substantial evidence in the tecotd supported the opinion s); Hanter,993 F.2d at 35 (finding that "the A{ his discretion in giving fnon-treating physician's] testimony gteatet weight . . . was within ."). Here, Dt. Cyt-McMillon and Dr. Grubbs'opinions, which opined claimant's functioning abilities, were genetally consistent with the entire medical record. Qr. 83-92; 103-06.) In making the ultimate detetmination as to Plainuffs disability, the A{ also considered the medical evidence submitted after the opinions of the state agency physicians were rendered, thus taking into account the entire medical record in his decision. (r. 31,-34.) In light of substantial evidence supporting the opinions of the state agency physicians, the ALJ did not ett in according great weight to Dt. Cyt-McMillan and Dt. Grubbs'opinions. Thus, Plaintiffs argument fails. 10 2. Failute to Take Prescribed Tteatment Plaintiff also asserts that consideration of het imptoved state following compliance with her presctibed medicine regiment is impropet. To the contrary, she argues that her inconsistent compliance with said regimentis a symptom of het underþing disability. (Docket Entry sets 1.0 at1.5-1.6.) To support her atgument, Plaintiff references 20 C.F.R. forth the need to follow prescribed treatment. See 20 C.F.R. $ 416.930; S 416.930s see which also SSR 82-59, 1,982WL31384 (1,982) ("An individualwho would otherwise be found to be under a disability, but who fails without justifiable cause to follow tretment . . . cannot by virtue of such 'failure' be found to be under a disability."). If a claimant fails to follow tretment plan "without a good teason[,]" she will not be found disabled. 20 C.F.R. S 416.930. Howevet, this only applies if.aclaimantwould otherwise be found disabled undet the 1,:1.2CY1,247,201,5 Act. Smith u. Coluin,No. WI- 350520L, at *5 n.7 (À4.D.N.C. June 3, 2015) (finding that SSR 82-59 only applies when the ALJ has detetmined an individual "would be found disabled under the Act") (quotation and citation omitted). Here, the ALJ did not find Plaintiff disabled, not did he deny benefits based on Plaintiffs failure to follow a ptescribed coutse of treatment. Thus, the tegulation is inapplicable here. Hambl u. Coluin, No. 1:12-CV-00395-GCM, 2014 ìfL 1,874979, at *6 CX/.D.N.C. May 9,201,4) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (finding that SSR 82-59 only applies when plaintiffs failure to follow the ptescribed treatment is the "tipping point between a finding of disabled verses a finding of not disabled"). s Ptaintiff inadvertently cites to 20 C.F.R. S 404,1530, which references prescribed treatment in disability insutance benefits cases undet Title IL 1,1 V. CONCLUSION Based on the fotegoing, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant's motion fot judgment on the pleadings pocket Errtry 1,2)be GRANTED, Plaintiffls motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket E.rtty 9) be DENIED, and that the final decision of Commissioner be upheld. L. ebster J United States Magistrate Judge March 3,201,6 Durham, Notth Caroltna 1,2 the
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