ALLEN v. COLVIN, No. 1:2014cv00743 - Document 19 (M.D.N.C. 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION, signed by MAG/JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER on 2/29/2016, that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry 16 ) be DENIED, that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 17 ) be GRANTED, and that the final decision of the Commissioner be upheld. (Butler, Carol)
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ALLEN v. COLVIN Doc. 19 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA JE,NNIE M. ALLEN, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Plaintiff, v CAROLYN ìø. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Secutity Adminis tration, 1,:1,4CY143 ) ) ) ) Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE TUDGE Plaintiff, Jennie M. Allen, brought this action pursuant to Section 205(9) of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), codified as amended (42 U.S.C. $ a05(g)), to obtain judicial review of a îtnal decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her claims for a pedod of disability, disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Secudty Income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Act. The Court has before it the certified administative record and cross-motions fot judgment. Fot the teasons set fotth below, the Coutt recommends that Defendant's motion (Docket E.rtty 17) be granted and Plaintiffs motion (Docket Entry 16) be denied. I. On Septembet 30, PROCEDURAL HISTORY 201,1,, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB and SSI alleging a disability onset date of May 1,1,973. Qr.120.)1 Plainuffs claim for SSI was denied on October 1 Transcrþt citations refer to the administrative record which was filed with Defendant's Answer. (Docket Entry 8.) Dockets.Justia.com 1.3,2011.,because she exceeded the income requirements to be eligible for SSI. (Def.'s Bt. Ex. A, Docket Entry 18-1.) There is no indication in the record that Plaintiff appealed this determination. Plaintiffs claim for DIB was denied initially and upon teconsideration. (Tt. 60-63,66-68.) A headng was held before an,{.dministrative LawJudge (",A.LJ") on ApriI22, 201,3, as to Plaintiffs DIB claim only. ("VE") were present at the hearing. (ft. Qt 18-35.) Plaintifls attotney and a 20-21,.) Or June 7, 2013, the ALJ detetmined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (r. 8-1,2.) This decision became the fìnal administtative decision aftet the ppeals Council declined teview. has exhausted all vocational expert avallalsle administrative remedies, and this case (Ir. 1-3.) Plaintiff is now ripe fot teview pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $ a05e). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Commissioner held that Plaintiff v/s not under a disability within the meaning of the Act. Under 42 U.S.C. $ 405(9), the scope of judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is specific and natrow. Smith u. Schweiker,795F.2d343,345 (4th Cir. 1986). This Coutt's review of that decision is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. $ a05(g); Hanter u. Sø//ìuan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1,992); Hay u. Sulliuan, 907 F.2d 1,453, 1,456 (4th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusio (1971)). "It n." Hunter, 993 F .2d at 34 (ciang Nchardson u. Perales,402 U.S. 389, 401. consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a prepondernce." Id. (quottng I-.aws u. Celebre7ry,368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th denial of benefits will be teversed only if Cit. 1,966)). The no resonable mind could accept the recotd 2 as adequate to support the determination. Nchardson,402 U.S. at 401.. The issue befote the Court, therefore, is not whethet Plaintiff is disabled, but whethet the Commissioner's finding that Plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a cotrect application of the televant law. See id.; Cofrnan u. Bowen,829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1,997). Thus, "la] clatrnant for disability benefits bears the butden of ptoving a disability," Ha// u. Harris,658 F.2d 260,264 (4th Cit. 1981), and in this context, "disability" means the "'inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical ot mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous pedod of not less than 12 months U.S.C. 5$ 423(d)(1XÐ). Administration has "To l.]'' id.(quoting 42 rcgularize the adjudicative process, the Social Secudty promulgated . . . detailed regulations incorpotating med.ical-vocational evaluation policies that take into accou nt longstanding a claimant's age, education, and Id. "These regulations work expedence in addition to fthe claimant's] medical condäon." establish a 'sequential evalvalon process' to determine whether a claimant is disabled." Id. (internal citations omitted). This sequential evaluation process ("SEP") has up to five steps: "The claimant (1) must not be engaged in 'substantial gainful acttvity,' i,e., curcentiy workingi and (2) must have a 'severe' impairment. that. (3) meets or exceeds the 'listings' of specified impaitments, or is otherwise incapacitating to the extent that the claimant does not possess the tesidual functional capacity Soc. Sec. to (4) perform fthe claimant's] past wotk ot (5) any othet work." Albright Adrnin.,174F.3d 473,475 n.2 (4thCn.1,999) (citing 20 C.F.R. J S u. Comm'r of 404.1520). The law concerning these five steps is well-established. Jee, e.g., Mastro ,. '4prtL 27 0 tr.3d 1'l1, 1'77 -1'80 (4th Cir. 2001); Ha//, 658 F.2d at 264-65. III. THE ALJ'S DECISION In his June 7, 2013 decision, the AtJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled undet Sections 216(I) and 223(d) of the Social Secutity Act through March 31.,1974, the last date insured. Qt. 1,2.) In making this disability determination, the A{ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in "substanttal gainful acttvtty" since het alleged onset date through her date last insured. (Tr. 10.) Plaintiff thus met her burden at step one of the SEP. At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled at any time ftom her alleged onset date thtough March 31,,'1.974, because there was no medical signs or laboratory findings to substantiate the existence of a medically determinable impafument during that time (citing 20 CFR S 404.1,520(c)). Qd.) Consequently, since there was no medically determinable impairment, the ALJ ended the SEP atStep 2.2 IV. DISCUSSION Plaintiff raises two issues on appeal. First, Plaintiff argues that the AIJ tailed to consider Plaintiffs SSI application. (Docket Entry 1,6-1, at 7-8.) Second, Plaintiff atgues that the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff had not engage in substantial gainful activity aftet March 31,,1,974. (Id. at 8-9.) As explained below, the undersigned concludes that the ALJ's decision 2 Because Plaintiff was found not disabled at Step 2, the ALJ did not conduct an analysis on Plaintiffls Residual Functional Czpacíry ("RFC"). "RFC is to be determined by the ALJ only after [the ALJ] considers all relevant evidence of a claimant's impairments and any related symptoms (e.9., patn)." 562-63 (citing 20 C.F.R. $ a0a.1529(a). Hines,453 F.3d ^t 4 is supported by substanttal evidence and was reached based upon a" cortect application of the relevant law. ,4.. SSI Aoolication Plaintiff argues that the AIJ was required to considet PlaintifPs SSI application. Plaintifls argument is without merit. SSI benefits are available to those who are aged, blind, - or disabled, and have met'specific income eligibiliry requfuements. Patterson u. See 42 U.S.C. S 1381 et seQ.i Calfano,475F. Srpp. 578, 583 (E.D. Ya.1,979). When Plaintiff initially applied fot SSI on September 30,201.1, her SSI appl-ication was denied for exceeding the income eligibility requirements. (Def.'s Br. Ex. A, Docket Entry 18-1.) In her "Notice of Disapproved Claim," Plaintiff was notifìed of her rþhts to file an appeal. (Id.) There is nothing in the recotd to suggest that an appealwas filed. Since Plarn:j.ff failed to of her SSI claim, the decision became final. 20 C.F.R. seek review S of the initial determination 404.905 ("An initial determination is binding unless you request a reconsideration within the stated time petiod, ot we revise the initial determination."). The record lacks evidence that Plaintiff requested a reconsidetation of het SSI claim. Neithet is thete indication that the initial detetminatiori was revised. Thus, Plaintiff s claim fails.3 Even if Plaintiff made a request for reconsideration of het SSI claim, het atgument with regards to het SSI application is not propedy before this Court. "The Coutt of Appeals 3 Plaintiffls argument is unsuccessful for another reason. It appears Plaintiff had another oppottunity to address any disputes she had with the income determination made as to Plaintiffs SSI application. After requesting a hearing before the ,{,LJ as to Plaintiffs DIB claim, Plaintiff and her counsel wete notified of the issues to be considered at the hearing (concerning Plaintiffs period of disability and DIB application). (Tr. 90-91.) If Plaintiff disagreed with the issues listed, the hearing notice required Plaintiff to state in wdting why she disagreed. Çr. 92.) Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel addtessed in writing any concerns about the issues presented, nor raised concerns about Plaintiffs SSI claim. 5 for the Fourth Circuit has held that, '[a]s a general matter, it is inappropriate for courts reviewing appeals of agency decisions to consider arguments not raised before the administrative agency involved."' Drake u. Coluin, No. 1:13CV694, 201.4 WL 4659487 , at x5 (I\4.D.N.C. Sept. 17, 201,4) (citing Plea¡ant Vallel Hosþ,, Inc, u. Shalala,32F.3d 67,70 (4th Cu.1994)). In social security cases, failute to raise arguments before the administrative agency have amounted to waiver by the claimant. Id.; WL 63961.8, see also Banton u. Coluin, at x5 (À{.D.N.C. Feb. 18, 201,4) (collecting cases), No. 1:10CV786,2014 adopted, No. 1:10CV786 (À4.D.N.C. Mar. 10, 201,4). "Even though disability benefits hearings 'are non-adversarial in nature' claimants, especially those represented by counsel, 'must taise all issues and evidence at their administtative hearings in otder to preserve them on appeal."' Dra,Þ.e, No. 1:13CV694, 201,4WL 4659487, at x4 (citingMeanel u. Apfel 172tr.3d 1,1.1.1,,1115 (9th Cir.1999), a: arnended [une 22, 1999)). t the hearing, the ALJ stated that "a Title II claim only" was before him. Çr.21,.) At no point dudng the hearing did Plaintiffs counsel indicate that he believed the ALJ was proceeding on both the DIB and SSI claims. Having failed to raise objections to this puported issue at the hearing, Plaintiff has waived this argument by asserting it for the ftst time befote this Cout.a B. Substantial Gainful Activity Next, Plaintiff argues that the A{ etred in finding that Plaintiff did not substantial activity aftet March 31,1,974. (Docket Entry '1,7-1, at 8-9.) The Court engage in ftst notes 4 This conclusion does not disturb the Supreme Court's opinion tn Sirns u. Aprt[ 530 U.S. 103 (2000) (holding that issues raised before the ÄLJ but not the Appeals Counsel, ate s ;ll within the disttict court's reviewing authoriry). The Court explicitly stated that "[w]hether a claimant must exhaust issues before the ALJ is not before us." Id. at1.07. Here, Plaintiff did not raise the issue of het SSI application before either the ALJ ot the Appeals Council. 6 that Plaintiff misstates the LJ's findings. The ALJ found that Plaintiff "did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from her alleged onset date through her date last insured of March 31,1.974." (Ir. 10.) Substantial of May 1., 1.973 gainful activity is "work activity that is both substanttal and gainful . . . Substanial work activity is wotk activity that involves doing sígnificant physical or mental activities . . . Gainful work activity is work activity that you do for p^y ot profit. . . ." 20 C.F'.R. S 404.1,572. Genetally, the pdmary consideration for determining whether a claimant may have engaged in substanttal activity is thtough "the earnings la claimantf derive[s] from the wotk activity." 20 C.F.R. S 404.1,57 4; Palne u. Salliuan, 946tr.2d1081, 1083 (4th Cu. lggì). A rebuttable presumption arises if PlaintifFs earnings exceed the income guidelines set forth in 20 C.F'.R. S 404.1,574þ)(2) Id. (ctttng 20 C.F.R. 404.1574þ)QÐ. If a claimant is ultimately will not be found disabled. Id. at $ able to engage in substantial gainful activity, she 1,082. (citing 20 C.F.R. S 404.1571). Here, Plaintiffs wotk history reports indicate that she did not exceed the income guidelines set fotth in 20 C.F.R. 404J574þ)Q). ÇeeTr.1,54-165 (indicatingthàtPlaintiff did not engage $ in substantial activity dudng work pedod)). Thus, the AIJ's decision that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial activity from the alleged onset date through the date last insured is suppotted by substantial evidence.5 s In any event, a determination that Plaintiff engaged in substantialacttvíty between theyears 1'974 and 1.994 would have undermined Plaintiff s argument that she was disable d. Pa1ne, 946 F ,2d at 1'082 ("[I]f a claimant is able to engge in substantial gainful activity, he will be found to be not disabled.") (internal quotations and citations omitted). 7 It is possible that Plaintiff is arguing that the ALJ's finding as to Plaintiffls date last insured was in error. However, based upon the evidence of the tecord, the ALJ's conclusion is supported by substanlal evidence. The fedetal tegulations set fotth the requitements for determininga clumant's disability insured status. 20 C.F.R. S 404.130. This detetmination is based upon the number of quarters of cover age a claimant has based upon work activity during a specific ttme. Id.; see also Schacht u. Bamhart, No. CIV.3:02 CY 1483 DJS, 2004WL2915310, at x7 (D. Conn. Dec. L7, 2004) (unpublished) ("The Commissionet detetmines eligibility for DIB by counting the number of quarters per year. a" person wotks during a specific time pedod prior to the onset of the disability."). Here, the ALJ's finding is supported by the Field Office Disability Report. Çr. 142,185,192.) At the hearing, the ALJ asked Plaintiffs counsel if there was any documentation showing that Plaintiffs date last insuted should be later than March 31, 1,974. Qr. 25-26.) Counsel indicated that thete was no documentation to substantiate that a later date should apply. Qr. 26.) Furthetmore, Plaintiffs specifically stated that he had nothing futther to submit in Plaintiffs case. Çt counsel 29.) Thus, Plaintiffs argumeût fatIs. Vanhlzryru. Astrwe, No. 107CV01.622DFHT48,2008 WL 5070474, at *10 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 26, 2003) (unpubl-ished) (no evidence to dispute that the ALJ propedy determined his date last insured). Moreovet, since Plaintifls last date insured was March 31,1,974, medical evidence in the record beginning in 1993 Qt. 204-221) would have been beyond Plaintrfls date last insuted. "Medical evaluations made aftet a claimant's insuted status has expited ate not automatically barred ftom consideration and may be relevant before the claimant's fdate last insuted] to prove a disability arising ." Bird u. Comm'r of Soe Sec. Admin., 699 F.3d 331 ,340 8 (4th Cit. 201,2) (citing lI/ooldridge u. Bowen,81,6 F.2d 1,57,1,60 (4th Cir. 1987). However, the ALJ is not required to give consideration to evidence of impaitments that were not linked to a clumant's condition priot to the date last insuted. See Johnson u. Barnhart,434 F.3d 650, 655- 56 (4th Cir. 2005) (discteditrng post-headng assessments that indicated new impaitments that were not linked to the plaintiff s condition prior to the date last insuted). Hete, the ALJ found that there u/ere no medical recotds between the alleged onset date and Plaintiffs hst date insuted. Gt. 11.) As such, any medical evidence generated in1,993 would have been ittelevant to Plaintiffs DIB claim. Thetefore, Plaintiffs atgument fails. V. CONCLUSION After a careful consideration of the evidence of record, the Court finds that the Commissioner's decision is supponed by substantial evidence and was teached based upon correct application of the televant law. Accordingly, this Cout RECOMMENDS a that Plaintiffs Motion fot SummaryJudgment (Docket E.rtty 16) be DENIED, that Defendant's Motion forJudgment on the Pleadings pocket Entry 17) be GRANTED, and that the fìnal decision of the Commissionet be upheld. rñtt$ter J0e L S mtcr l{4gistm¡e J"rl,gp Dutham, Notth Caroltna Febtuary 29,201,6 9
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