Bateman et al v. Perdue et al, No. 5:2010cv00265 - Document 84 (E.D.N.C. 2011)
Court Description: ORDER granting 27 Motion to Dismiss; dismissing as moot 29 Motion to Dismiss; granting 32 Motion to Dismiss; dismissing as moot 62 Motion for Summary Judgment; dismissing as moot 65 Motion for Summary Judgment. Remaining before the court is plaintiffs' claim against the State Defendants. Signed by Senior District Judge Malcolm J. Howard on 3/31/2011. (Heath, D.)
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Bateman et al v. Perdue et al Doc. 84 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA WESTERN DIVISION NO. 5:10-CV-265-H MICHAEL BATEMAN, VIRGIL GREEN, FORREST MINGES, JR., GRNC/FFE, INC., and SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Plaintiffs, ORDER v. BEVERLY PERDUE, REUBEN F. YOUNG, STOKES COUNTY, and CITY OF KING, Defendants. This matter is before the court on motions to dismiss filed by defendant Stokes County [DE #27], defendant City of King [DE #32], and the State of North Carolina on behalf of defendants Beverly Perdue and Reuben F. Young [DE #29]. Appropriate responses and replies have been filed, and the time for further filings has expired. BACKGROUND At issue provisions firearms in this restricting case or are authorizing during declared states of General Statute § North Carolina the emergency. statutory restriction of North Carolina 14-288.7 makes it a Class 1 misdemeanor "for Dockets.Justia.com any person to transport or possess off his dangerous weapon or substance in any area" own premises any in which a state of emergency has been declared by the Governor, a municipality or a county. A state of emergency is defined as The condition that exists whenever, during times of public crisis, disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency, public safety authorities are unable to maintain pUblic order or afford adequate protection for lives or property, or whenever the occurrence of any such condition is imminent. N.C. Gen. Stat. § Declarations 14-288.1(10). of states of emergency may also contain "prohibitions and restrictions [u]pon the possession, transportation, sale, purchase, and use of dangerous weapons and substances." § 14-288.12(b) Stat. § 14-288.13(b) 14-288.15(d) such (municipal if or declared by the is also N.C. declarations). restriction N.C. Gen. Stat. see (county declarations); (gubernatorial prohibition misdemeanor declarations); storage, N.C. Gen. Stat. Violation punishable Governor Gen. of § any as Class 2 as and a a Class 3 misdemeanor if declared by a municipality or county. filed Plaintiffs this action seeking declaratory injunctive relief prohibiting the enforcement of and these firearm restrictions. Plaintiffs assert that these statutory provisions violate Second Amendment their right to keep Defendants each move to dismiss plaintiffs' to Rule 12 (b) (6) and bear arms. complaint pursuant for failure to state a claim upon which relief 2 can be granted. The State of North Carolina also moves to for permanent dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. COURT'S DISCUSSION I. Plaintiffs' Claim Plaintiffs' injunctive sole relief claim pursuant for to 42 relief U.S.C. is § 1983. Plaintiffs allege that North Carolina Gen. Stat. § 14-288.7, forbidding the carrying of firearms and ammunition during declared states of emergency, is unconstitutional, in that it forbids the exercise of Second Amendment rights, damaging plaintiffs in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ~ (CompI. Stat. §§ 32.) Additionally, 14-288.12(b) (4), plaintiffs claim N.C. 14-288.13(b), Gen. 14-288.14(a), and 14-288.15(d) are unconstitutional to the extent they enable government officials to prohibi t the purchase, sale, and possession of firearms and ammunition. . in that they forbid the exercise of Second Amendment rights, damaging plaintiffs in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (CompI. II. ~ 33.) Standard of Review A federal district court confronted with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should view the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See The Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 intent of Rule complaint. 12 (b) (6) is to test (4th Cir. 1997). the sufficiency of a Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 3 (4th cir. 1999). A Rule 12 (b) (6) motion" 'does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits applicabili ty of defenses.'" Martin, a facts consistent claim, or the (quoting Republican Party v. 980 F.2d 943,952 (4th Cir. 1992)). been stated adequately, of Id. of "[O]nce a claim has it may be supported by showing any set with the allegations in the complaint." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007). "[A] complaint need not 'make a case' against a defendant or 'forecast evidence sufficient to prove an element' of the claim." Chao v. Rivendell Woods, Inc., 415 F.3d 342, 349 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Iodice v. 2002) ) . However, United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 it must provide more than "an unadorned, defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Ashcroft v. to face.'" not •state Id. accept allegations. a claim to relief that is true legal Iqbal, conclusions accepted as plausible (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). as the- "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, true, (4th Cir. on its The court need couched as factual Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. III. Motions to Dismiss Stokes County and the City of King The court first addresses the motions to dismiss filed by defendants Stokes County and the City of King. are not proper defendants to plaintiffs' be dismissed from the action. 4 § They assert they 1983 claim and should "[T]he touchstone of the § 1983 action against a government body is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution [or laws of the United States]." of New York, Monell v. Dep't of Social Services of City 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Absent "official policy of some nature," a local governmental body is simply not liable under § 1983. Id. (noting that "official policy" may include governmental custom). In this case, plaintiffs challenge North Carolina statutes that restrict or authorize the restriction of declared states of emergency. firearms during Under North Carolina law, Stokes County and the City of King are authorized to declare states of emergency, as well as to impose restrictions of firearms during declared states of emergency. The -288.13. existence of See N.C. Gen. Stat. this statutory § 14-288.12, authority enough, however, to state a claim for relief pursuant to is § not 1983. To impose liability against either Stokes County or the City of King, to there must have been some "deliberate action attributable the [local governmental body]" that behind a deprivation of the plaintiffs' County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. is the "moving federal rights. 397, 400 force" Bd. of (1997). Because plaintiffs are challenging only the state statutes and not any ordinance, regulation, policy or 5 custom of either of these governmental bodies, plaintiffs' 1983 § claim against them fails. IV. Motion to Dismiss the State Defendants Also before the court is a motion to dismiss filed by the State of North Carolina on behalf of defendants Beverly Perdue, the Governor of North Carolina, and Reuben Young, F. the Secretary of North Carolina's Department of Crime Control and Public Safety Defendants") to dismiss, (collectively referred to as "the State Since the filing of the State Defendants' motion the parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment (See Plfs.' Mot. Summ. J. [DE #44]; Dfs.' Mot. Summ. J. [DE #52].) summary In their motion for judgment, the State Defendants incorporate by reference the arguments raised in the brief supporting their motion to dismiss, as well as their reply (Dfs.' brief. Plaintiffs have Brief Supp. responded Mot. to Summ. the J. State [DE #53] Defendants' at 2.) summary judgment motion, also referring to their previously filed brief opposing the State Defendants' motion to dismiss. In light of State Defendants' these circumstances, motion for the court construes the summary judgment as a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The court will rule on the parties' summary judgment motions in due course and in so doing will consider the briefs previously submitted in support and opposition of the 6 State Defendants' motion to dismiss, as well as the parties' State Defendants' summary judgment briefs. motion to dismiss [DE #29] is The DISMISSED as moot. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss filed by defendant Stokes County [DE #27] #32] are GRANTED. and defendant City of King [DE The following motions are dismissed as moot: the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Stokes County [DE #65]; the motion for City of King State [DE #62]; Defendants [DE summary judgment filed by defendant and the motion to dismiss filed by the #29]. Remaining before the court plaintiffs' claim against the State Defendants. rr This ~day of March 2011. ~~'& MALCOLM . HOWARD Senior United States District Judge At Greenville, NC #31 7 is
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