Miles v. General Motors, No. 1:2018cv03589 - Document 13 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. In short, there is no basis to reconsider the Court's April 12th Order, and Mr. Miles's new complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The Court is not without sympathy for Mr. Miles given the nature of his in juries. Unfortunately, it is not enough for him to allege that he was in an accident in which his airbags failed to deploy and that he was injured as a result. He must also be able to allege that his airbags failed to deploy for reasons that would render New GM liable for his injuries. Because he cannot do so, he has no valid claims against New GM. This Court certifies, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Memorandum Opinion and Order wou ld not be taken in good faith, and in forma pauperis status is thus denied. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). The Clerk of Court is directed to close 18-CV-3589 and to mail a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to Mr. Miles. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Jesse M. Furman on 6/14/2018)*** Party James Everett Miles terminated in 14-md-2543. Filed In Associated Cases: 1:14-md-02543-JMF, 1:18-cv-03589-JMF(anc) Modified on 6/14/2018 (anc).
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Miles v. General Motors Doc. 13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----------------------------------------------------------------------------x IN RE: GENERAL MOTORS LLC IGNITION SWITCH LITIGATION This Document Relates To: Miles v. General Motors, 18-CV-3589 06/14/2018 14-MD-2543 (JMF) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER -----------------------------------------------------------------------------x JESSE M. FURMAN, United States District Judge: On April 12, 2018, the Court dismissed the complaint of pro se plaintiff James Everett Miles with prejudice pursuant to Order No. 137 (14-MD-2543, Docket No. 4840) and 14-MD2543, Docket No. 5177. Six days later, on April 18, 2018, Mr. Miles mailed to the Court a Complaint against General Motors LLC (“New GM”), as well as a Related Case Statement (see 18-CV-3589, Docket Nos. 2, 3). On April 30, 2018, the Court directed New GM to submit a letter indicating its position on the filing of Mr. Miles’s new complaint and Mr. Miles to file a reply. (14-MD-2543, Docket No. 5440). In a May 7, 2018 letter, New GM opposed the filing of a new complaint by Mr. Miles on res judicata grounds and on the ground that he failed to state a claim. (14-MD-2543, Docket No. 5465). Mr. Miles did not reply to GM’s opposition, but on June 13, 2018, the Court received a packet of information from Mr. Miles, including a letter addressed to the Court, multiple completed Plaintiff Fact Sheets, and other papers. In light of Mr. Miles’s pro se status, there is a strong argument for viewing his new complaint as a timely filed motion for reconsideration of the Court’s April 12th Order. If the Court were to do so, New GM’s res judicata argument would be without force. But Mr. Miles would run into a different problem: His new complaint falls far short of stating a plausible claim. “To state a plausible claim,” a plaintiff “must provide ‘factual content that allows the court to Dockets.Justia.com draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged ’— a standard that requires ‘more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.’” Rincon v. Covidien, 16-CV-10033 (JMF), 2017 WL 2242969, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2017). Mr. Miles does not meet that standard, as the only allegation in his new complaint is that his airbags failed to deploy. He includes no allegations whatsoever with respect to why his airbags failed to deploy — and, more to the point, includes no allegations suggesting, plausibly or otherwise, that the non-deployment was due to a reason for which New GM might be held liable, such as a defect in his vehicle (relating to the ignition switch or otherwise). Granted, the failure of Mr. Miles to state a claim would not necessarily call for dismissal of his new complaint with prejudice. That is, Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to amend a pleading should be freely given “when justice so requires,” and courts should generally grant pro se plaintiffs leave to amend “at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated,” Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam). But a district court may deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile. See, e.g., Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). That is the case here, as Mr. Miles expressly admits in his letter to the Court that he “do[es] not know why the airbag did not deploy in [his] 2002 Chevrolet Blazer.” Even more significantly, he admits in his Fact Sheets — under penalty of perjury — that his vehicle did not experience a “moving stall” or other loss of engine power, that no ignition switch defect caused a loss of power steering or power assist brakes, and that he “do[es]n’t know why the airbags didn’t deploy.” (App’x, at 9). In light of these admissions, it is plain that Mr. Miles is incapable of adding allegations to his complaint that would cross “the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); cf. Majied 2 v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-CV-5731 (JMF), 2018 WL 333519, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2018) (denying leave to amend a dismissed complaint where the pro se plaintiff had “not requested permission to file an amended complaint” and had not “given any indication that she [was] in possession of facts that would cure the problems” in her complaint (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).1 In short, there is no basis to reconsider the Court’s April 12th Order, and Mr. Miles’s new complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The Court is not without sympathy for Mr. Miles given the nature of his injuries. Unfortunately, it is not enough for him to allege that he was in an accident in which his airbags failed to deploy and that he was injured as a result. He must also be able to allege that his airbags failed to deploy for reasons that would render New GM liable for his injuries. Because he cannot do so, he has no valid claims against New GM. This Court certifies, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Memorandum Opinion and Order would not be taken in good faith, and in forma pauperis status is thus denied. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). The Clerk of Court is directed to close 18-CV-3589 and to mail a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to Mr. Miles. SO ORDERED. Dated: June 14, 2018 New York, New York The Court includes Mr. Miles’s letter and the relevant pages of one of his Fact Sheets (redacted to remove personal information) in an Appendix to this Memorandum Opinion and Order. The Court directs the Clerk of Court to file and maintain the unredacted copies of Mr. Miles’s Fact Sheets under seal so that they are part of the record. The Court will send the remainder of Mr. Miles’s submission back to him, as it includes original documents of a personal nature that were irrelevant to the Court’s decision, such as his W-2 form. 1 3 APPENDIX 4
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