Caines v. Oudkerk et al, No. 1:2017cv03060 - Document 24 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER granting 17 Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated above, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motion (Dkt. No. 17), and to close this case. The Clerk is further directed to mail a copy of this Order, by certified mail, to pro se Plaintiff. (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge Paul G. Gardephe on 6/20/2018) (cf)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK USDCSDNY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC#: DATEF-IL-ED-:-=.:4-z_z:q-+-/~ttf==== KAMIEO CAINES, Plaintiff, - against - ORDER CAPTAIN OUDKERK; and CAPTAIN LESSEY, 17 Civ. 3060 (PGG) Defendants. PAUL G. GARDEPHE, U.S.D.J.: Prose PlaintiffKamieo Caines brings this action under 42 U.S.C. ยง 1983 against New York City Department of Corrections ("DOC") Captains Oudkerk and Lessey. 1 (Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 1)) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by denying him medical treatment and subjecting him to excessive force while he was incarcerated at the Anna M. Kross Center ("AMKC") on Rikers Island. (ML) On October 10, 2017, Defendants moved for summary judgment (Def. Mot. (Dkt. No. 17)), arguing that Plaintiffs claims are barred by a general release. (Def. Br. (Dkt. No. 21) at 1) Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to Defendants' motion. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted. BACKGROUND I. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS Plaintiff alleges that, on December 15, 2016, while he was detained at the AMKC, Captain Lessey refused to provide Plaintiff with his psychiatric medication. (Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 1) 1 The record does not reflect the full names of the Defandru:its. Dockets.Justia.com at 3) Captain Lessey also made "verbal threat[ s]" to Plaintiff, and asked Captain Oudkerk to "put [Plaintiff] to the test and see ifhe is really a [tough] guy." (@ Captain Oudkerk then "flex cuffed" Plaintiff and br~ught him to the intake area, where Captain Oudkerk asked non-party Corrections Officer Crqcker if there was "any room" for Plaintiff in one of the cell pens. @) Officer Crocker allegedly responded that the pens were filled with Plaintiff's "rivals [and] enemies," but that cell pen eight contained only three or four people. (@ "[W]ithout any further security check," Captain Oudkerk ordered Officer Crocker I to open cell pen eight, <;llld threatened to use chemical agents if Plaintiff did not enter. @) I ' Immediately after Plaintiff entered the cell pen, another inmate approached Plaintiff and began I fighting with him. (Id.) Captain Oudkerk sprayed Plaintiff with chemicals and ordered nonparty Corrections Offi~er Anderson to handcuff Plaintiff as he exited the cell. (Mt) After Plaintiff exited the cell, Captain Oudkerk warned Plaintiff that he would "put a weapon on [him]" ifhe filed a lawsuit. @) Officer Anderson then brought Plaintiff to the decontamination room, where he bent P aintiff's right index finger in an "excessive" and "unnecessary" manner. @) II. PLAINTIFF' PRIOR LAWSUIT AND SETTLEMENT On Oct ber 28, 2016 - prior to the incident that is the subject of.the Complaint - I Plaintiff filed a pro se lawsuit in this District against the City of New York and five DOC officers. (Jaffe Deel., ~x. A (Cmplt. in Kamieo Caines v. City of New York, et al. ("Caines I"), ' No. 16 Civ. 8454 (JMF)) (Dkt. No. 18-1)) In Caines I, Plaintiff asserted Section 1983 excessive ! I 2 force claims arising out! of an unrelated incident that allegedly occurred on August 31, 2016. I I (See id. at 5-6) I Plaintiff1entered into a settlement agreement with Defendants in Caines I, and executed a general releJ.~se on June 13, 2017. (Jaffe Deel., Ex. B (June 13, 2017 Release) (Dkt. No. 18-2) at 2) In perti~ent part, the release reads as follows: I I, Kamieo Cain! ... as "RELEASOR," in consideration of the payment of One Thousand ($1,0 0.00) DOLLARS to me by the City of New York, do hereby release and discharge defen ants ... their successors or assigns; and all past and present officials, employees, rep:lsentatives, and agents of the City ofNew York or any entity represented by the Office 011 the Corporation Counsel, collectively the "RELEASEES," from any and all liability, claipis, or rights of action alleging a violation of my civil rights and any and all related state ~aw claims, from the beginning of the world to the date of this General Release, including claims for costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees. I I @(emphasis in origi4al)) The release further provides that "THE UNDERSIGNED HAS READ THE FOREGOrG RELEASE AND FULLY UNDERSTANDS IT." (Id. (emphasis in original)) I On Octlber 10, 2017, Defendants moved for summary judgment in the instant action, arguing that Pl~intiff's claims are barred by the release he executed on June 13, 2017. (Def. Br. (Dkt. No. 2d at 1) Plaintiff's opposition to the motion was due on November 7, 2017. (Dkt. No. 16) To date,/Plaintiffhas not responded to Defendants' motion. Accordingly, the I Court deems Defendants' summary judgment motion unopposed. I I I DISCUSSION I I I. SUMMARY i.uDGMENT STANDARD Summa'.ry judgment is warranted where the moving party shows that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact" and that it "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A dispute about a 'genuine issue' exists for summary judgment purposes where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could decide in the non-movant's favor." 3 Beyerv. Cnty. ofNassal, 524 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Guilbert v. Gardner, 480 F.3d I 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2007)). "[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, ! Rule 56 permits the moving party to point to an absence of evidence to support an essential I element of the nonmov~ng party's claim." Bay v. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 936 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1991). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the Court "resolve[s] all ambiguities, and credit[s] all factual ,inferences that could rationally be drawn, in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Cifra v. G.E. Co., 252 F.3d 205,216 (2d Cir. 2001). However, to survive . a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff "must 'do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.' ... [He] must come forth with evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find in [his] favor." Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246,252 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Matsus~ita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). "Mere conclusory stat~ments, conjecture or speculation" by the plaintiff will not defeat a summary judgment motion. Gross v. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 58, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). "Although the same standards apply when a prose litigant is involved, 'the prose litigant "should be given special latitude in responding to a summary judgment motion."' ... . [T]he Court must liber~lly construe the claims of a prose litigant." Brown v. Selwin, 250 F. Supp. 2d 299, 306-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting Shepherd v. Fraisher, No. 96 Civ. 3283 (JGK), 1999 WL 713839, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1999) (citation omitted)). Where, as here, "the non-moving party 'chooses the perilous path of failing to submit a response to a summary judgment motion, the district court may not grant the motion without first examining the moving party's submission to determine ifit has met its burden of 4 I I demonstrating that no material issue of fact remains for trial."' Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241,244 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Amaker v. Foley. 274 F.3d 677, 681 (2d Cir. 2001)); see also D.H. Blair & Co., Inc. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 110 (2d Cir. 2006). Even an unopposed motion for summary judgment must "fail where the undisputed facts fail to I 'show that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw."' Vt. Teddy Bear Co., ' 373 F.3d at 244 (quoting Champion v. Artuz, 76 F.3d 483,486 (2d Cir. 1996)). II. ANALYSIS A. Applicable Law "Settle~ent agreements and releases are construed according to the general principles of contract law." Roberts v. Doe 1, No. 14 Civ. 9174 (AJP), 2015 WL 670180, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 201,5) (citing, inter ali~ Collins v. Harris-Bode, 303 F.3d 429,433 (2d Cir. 2002); Albany Sav. Bank FSB v. Halpin, 117 F.3d 669,672 (2d Cir. 1997)). "'Under New York law, a release that is clear and unambiguous on its face and which is knowingly and voluntarily entered into will be enforced.'" Id. (quoting Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1998)). Moreover, "[t]he proper interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a ' question of law for the court, and a dispute on such an issue may be properly resolved by summary judgment." Omni Quartz, Ltd. v. CVS Corp., 287 F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 2002). General releases, as opposed to "releases with a narrower scope," bar all claims arising prior to the execution of the release, not simply those that were alleged in a pre-existing action. Arzu v. City of New York, No. 13 Civ. 5()80 (RA), 2015 WL 4635602, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2015) (finding that general release signed by plaintiff barred his claims against the City and individual officers regarding events that occurred prior to the date of the release). Furthermore, courts have interpreted releases barring claims arising "from the beginning of the 5 world to the date of this General Release" as "unambiguous." See,~' Cuadrado v. Zito, No. ' 13 Civ. 3321 (VB), 201.:l WL 1508609, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2014). B. Analysis Here, the release signed by Plaintiff on June 13, 2017, clearly and unambiguously provides that Plaintiff"release[s] and discharge[s] ... all past and present officials, employees, I representatives, and agents of the City ofNew York ... from any and all liability, claims, or rights of action alleging a violation of [Plaintiffs] civil rights ... from the beginning of the world to the date of this General Release." (Jaffe Deel., Ex. B (June 13, 2017 Release) (Dkt. No. 18-2) at 2) Plaintiffs civil rights claims in this case arise from incidents that occurred on December 15, 2016, and accordingly pre-date the effective date of the release that Plaintiff ' signed on June 13, 2017. Moreover, Plaintiffs claims are asserted against two New York City DOC officers, and thus, fall within the scope of the claims Plaintiff relinquished in executing the release. Given the clear and unambiguous language of the release, and the absence of any evidence raising an issue as to its enforceability, the release bars Plaintiffs claims, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. See Roberts, 2015 WL 670180, at *5 ("Courts in this Circuit regularly hold that [general] releases ... bar suit against the city and its employees for conduct that pre-dates the release.") (collecting cases). 6 CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motion (Dkt. No. 17), and to close this case. The Clerk is further directed to mail a copy of this Order, by certified mail, to prose Plaintiff. Dated: New York, New York June 20, 2018 SO ORDERED. United States District Judge 7
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