Petagine v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 1:2013cv06005 - Document 23 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
Court Description: OPINION re: 12 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings. filed by Commissioner of Social Security. The Court grants Defendant's motion, affirms the Commissioner's decision, and dismisses the action. (Signed by Judge Thomas P. Griesa on 12/7/2015) (spo)
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Petagine v. Commissioner of Social Security Doc. 23 USDCSDNY j .lnocmmNT UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK I J 1 ELEcrRONICALLY FILED dDATE FILED: j --·11' -1. *" . . . - ......... • • ••·• an· ••• •"• • ...,... [; f w ..... • • ._ • TYLER S. PETAGINE, Plaintiff, 13-cv-6005 v. OPINION CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Defendant. Plaintiff Tyler Petagine brings this action pursuant to section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the final determination by the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying his claims for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits. Both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings. Because the decision by the Administrative Law Judge ("AW") is supported by substantial evidence, the Court grants Defendant's motion, affirms the Commissioner's decision, and dismisses the action. 1 Dockets.Justia.com Background 1. Procedural History In January 2011, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI, alleging he has been “emotionally disabled” since November 18, 2002. R. at 79, 106. The application was denied on May 25, 2011. R. at 50. On June 15, 2011, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. R. at 56. This hearing was held in White Plains on March 28, 2012, before ALJ Katherine Edgell. R. at 20–48. Plaintiff was represented by his non-attorney mother, Sylvia Escala-DeRosa. Id. On June 6, 2012, ALJ Edgell issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled and denying Plaintiff’s claim. R. at 9–19. On July 1, 2013, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision. R. at 1. Plaintiff filed the instant action on August 23, 2013. 2. Record Plaintiff was born on May 29, 1992. R. at 95. Plaintiff was ten years old at the time of his asserted disability onset date of November 18, 2002. Id. At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was 19 years old and a student at Manhattan College. R. at 204–06. a. Medical Evidence Plaintiff has long struggled with mental illness. He began receiving psychiatric treatment while in preschool in 1996, and was hospitalized numerous times starting in 2001. R. at 227. In November 2001, he was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and assessed a Global Assessment of 2 Functioning Score (“GAF”) of 50, indicating serious symptoms or functional limitations. 1 R. at 225. Plaintiff was again diagnosed with bipolar disorder, in addition to oppositional defiant disorder and a parent-child relational problem, in April 2003. R. at 226. In May 2003, Plaintiff was hospitalized for 11 days after assaulting his mother. R. at 243–45. He was assessed a GAF of 35 on admission and diagnosed with mood disorder. R. at 239, 243. However, while in the hospital, Plaintiff was “not a behavioral problem at all.” R. at 245. Plaintiff’s doctor wrote that Plaintiff felt “caught in the middle” of his parents’ bitter divorce, and appeared “depressed, agitated and angry.” Id. At discharge, Plaintiff was assessed a GAF of 55, and prescribed medication. Id. Just a few days later, Plaintiff was back at Four Winds Hospital after his mother discovered a poem he had written that mentioned suicide. R. at 297. Plaintiff denied feeling suicidal, id., and was discharged after one week. See R. at 295. In 2009, Plaintiff was hospitalized again after assaulting his mother. R. at 319. His doctor noted that he had refused to see a psychiatrist or take psychotropic medication for at least the previous one GAF rates overall functioning on a scale of 0–100 that takes into account psychological, social, and occupational functioning. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM–IVTR”) 34 (rev. 4th ed. 2000). A GAF of 41 to 50 represents serious symptoms or functional limitations. Id. A GAF of 51 to 60 represents moderate symptoms or functional limitations. Id. A GAF of 61 to 70 represents mild symptoms or functional limitations. Id. 1 3 and one-half years. R. at 319, 335. Plaintiff was diagnosed with adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct, oppositional defiant disorder, conduct disorder, and major depressive disorder. R. at 319. He was also assessed a GAF of 45. R. at 324. In January 2011, Plaintiff began seeing Sebastian Bliffeld, a licensed marriage and family therapist at Family Services of Westchester (“FSW”). R. at 388. According to Bliffeld’s notes, Plaintiff was able to laugh and exhibit humor at their various sessions. See R. at 388, 389, 393. For example, Plaintiff expressed to Bliffeld that he believed himself to be “the laziest person ever” and that he “wants to have a job but [not] work and make lots of money.” R. at 393. However, despite Plaintiff’s jokes, Bliffeld came away from their sessions with the belief that Plaintiff had marked restrictions of activities of daily living, marked difficulty in maintaining social functioning, and frequent deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace resulting in failure to complete tasks in a timely manner. R. at 489. Bliffeld also came to the conclusion that Plaintiff was “truly incapable of supporting himself.” R. at 487. In addition to being treated by Bliffeld, Plaintiff saw Dr. Sonia Cole, a psychiatrist at FSW. R. at 369. Dr. Cole diagnosed Plaintiff with mood disorder, R. at 358, but noted that his cognitive abilities, judgment, and impulse control were generally intact. R. at 361. On one occasion, she found Plaintiff to be “very engaged, composed, thoughtful, [and] pleasant,” and wrote that he “represented himself as in adequate 4 control of his behavior.” R. at 360. Ultimately, Dr. Cole concluded that she could not provide a medical opinion regarding Plaintiff’s ability to do work-related activities. R. at 369. On March 23, 2011, on a document signed by both Bliffeld and Cole, Plaintiff was given a GAF of 52. R. at 372–73. On May 13, 2011, at the request of the Commissioner, Dr. Fredelyn Engelberg Damari, Ph.D., conducted a consultative psychiatric evaluation of Plaintiff. R. at 396. During their meeting, Plaintiff demonstrated appropriate eye contact, normal speech, intact attention and concentration, normal memory skills, normal cognitive functioning, normal intelligence, and coherent and goal-oriented thought processes. R. at 398–99. However, Dr. Damari found Plaintiff to have poor insight and judgment. R. at 399. Ultimately, Dr. Damari concluded that Plaintiff could follow and understand simple instructions, perform simple tasks independently, maintain attention and concentration, keep a regular schedule, learn new tasks, and manage his own funds. R. at 399–400. Dr. Damari also found that Plaintiff was mildly impaired in the ability to perform complex tasks independently, moderately impaired in the ability to make appropriate decisions, and significantly impaired in the ability to relate adequately with others and deal appropriately with stress. Id. Dr. Damari wrote that Plaintiff had significant psychiatric problems that might interfere with his ability to function on a daily basis, 5 and diagnosed him with bipolar disorder, depressive disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, and personality disorder. R. at 400. Also in May 2011, Dr. T. Bruni, a state agency medical consultant, reviewed Plaintiff’s medical record and completed a Psychiatric Review Technique form and a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment form. R. at 402–20. Dr. Bruni evaluated Plaintiff’s impairments under the Listings of Impairments in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, specifically section 12.04, Affective Disorders. R. at 402–15. Dr. Bruni found that Plaintiff had a medically determinable impairment of adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct. R. at 405. While Dr. Bruni did not think that Plaintiff’s impairments met the “paragraph A” criteria for Affective Disorders, see id., he did note that “[p]ertinent symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings [] substantiate the presence of [adjustment disorder].” Id. Additionally, Dr. Bruni concluded that Plaintiff’s impairments met neither the “paragraph B” criteria nor the “paragraph C” criteria of Affective Disorders. See R. at 412–13. With respect to the “paragraph B” criteria, Dr. Bruni found that Plaintiff had mild restrictions of activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning, moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace, and that he had had one or two repeated episodes of deterioration of extended duration. R. at 412. Dr. Bruni finished his assessment by writing that Plaintiff could follow, understand, and complete simple and some complex tasks, 6 maintain attention and concentration for tasks, maintain a regular schedule, and make appropriate decisions. R. at 418. Dr. Bruni did note that a low-contact setting would be beneficial for Plaintiff, given his difficulty relating adequately with others. Id. b. Other Evidence Plaintiff received a special education classification of emotional disability beginning in sixth grade, but attended regular classes. R. at 396. It also seems that Plaintiff spent seventh and eighth grade in foster care. R. at 335. However, there is little in the record about this period of Plaintiff’s life. During the summer of 2007 Plaintiff worked as a camp counselor. R. at 27–28. That job was Plaintiff’s sole work experience as of the date of the hearing. Id. At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was a full-time student at Manhattan College, but was struggling academically. See R. at 204–06. He lived on campus and had completed 33 credits. R. at 27. The record indicates that Plaintiff had multiple confrontations with suitemates and had also gotten into trouble for underage drinking. See R. at 174–203. However, nothing in the record indicates that Plaintiff ever received a suspension or any other major discipline from the school. Plaintiff completed most of his work in his room and ate his meals in the cafeteria. R. at 33. At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that he did not go 7 out very much, but did have friends on campus that he would talk to. R. at 34. Plaintiff’s views on work were also brought to light at the hearing. Answering the ALJ’s question of why he did not reapply for his previous job as a camp counselor, Plaintiff responded succinctly: “I just don’t think working is for me, to be honest with you.” R. at 29. When asked by the ALJ to explain, Plaintiff added, “I just don’t enjoy working . . . [T]he problem today is they don’t pay enough for most jobs . . . [Y]ou can’t even get a job of your choice today.” R. at 29–30. Later in the hearing, the ALJ asked Plaintiff why he could not work as a security guard. Plaintiff replied, “I just feel like a security guard would not be productive or a productive job for me. I want to, actually, have a job where I’m interested in what the job is . . . In a security job I feel like I wouldn’t get anything out of it.” R. at 38. Plaintiff also stated that “[m]oney doesn’t motivate me enough,” and that he did not know whether he would choose to work if his parents were not supporting him. R. at 38–39. c. The ALJ’s Decision i. The Five-Step Process To be found disabled under the Social Security Act, a claimant must demonstrate an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted 8 or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Moreover, an individual will be found to be disabled “only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) has established a fivestep sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). At step one, the ALJ must decide whether the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)–(b). If the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity, he will be found to be not disabled. Id. If the claimant is not engaging in substantial gainful activity, the analysis proceeds to the second step. At step two, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment that is “severe” or a combination of impairments that is “severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a), (c). If the claimant does not have a severe medically determinable impairment or combination or impairments, he will be found to be not disabled. Id. If the claimant does have a severe medically determinable impairment or combination or impairments, then the analysis proceeds to the third step. 9 At step three, the ALJ determines whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals the criteria of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P (the “Listings”). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a), (d). If the claimant’s impairment meets a Listing, the claimant will be found to be disabled. Id. If the impairment does not meet a Listing, the analysis continues. At step four, the ALJ determines the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a), (e). A claimant’s RFC is “the most [claimant] can still do despite [his] limitations.” § 416.945. 20 C.F.R. If the claimant’s RFC permits him to perform any past relevant work, he will be found to be not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a), (f). If the claimant is unable to do any past relevant work, the analysis proceeds to the final step. At step five, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant’s RFC, age, education and work experience allow him to perform any other work which exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a), (g). If he is incapable of performing such work, he will be found to be disabled. Id. If he can perform such work, he will be found not disabled. Id. ii. The ALJ’s Analysis ALJ Edgell applied the five-step process in determining that Plaintiff was not disabled. R. at 9–15. At step one of the five-step analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 5, 2011, the application date. R. at 11. At 10 step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did have a severe impairment, and that this severe impairment was affective disorder, variously described as adjustment disorder with disturbance of emotions and conduct, mood disorder, or bipolar disorder. Id. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the Listings. R. at 11–12. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not satisfy the “paragraph B” criteria of listing 12.04, Affective Disorders, because he had only mild restrictions in his activities of daily living and moderate restrictions in his social functioning and concentration, as opposed to marked restrictions in those areas. R. at 11. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff was a full-time student at Manhattan College, talked to friends on campus, worked out a lot, and visited other family members. R. at 12. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform work at all exertional levels but was restricted to simple work involving only occasional interaction with co-workers and the general public. Id. The ALJ was explicit in giving “little weight” to the opinion of Bliffeld that Plaintiff was unable to support himself. R. at 14. Rather, the ALJ gave greater weight to the findings of Dr. Bruni. Id. The ALJ also wrote that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [his] symptoms are not entirely credible since they are not 11 consistent with the objective medical evidence or his essentially normal daily activities.” Id. At step five, the ALJ determined that work existed in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. Id. The ALJ wrote that Plaintiff’s limitations “have little or no effect on the occupational base of unskilled work at all exertional levels.” R. at 15. Thus, the ALJ found Plaintiff to be not disabled. Id. Legal Standard This Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla” and “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation omitted). The substantial evidence standard is “very deferential” and “means once an ALJ finds facts, we can reject those facts only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.” Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Com’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Therefore, a reviewing court does not determine de novo whether a claimant is disabled. Id. at 447. Rather, the court is limited to two levels of inquiry: first, the court must determine whether the correct legal principles were applied in reaching a decision; second, the court must 12 decide whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987). Additionally, the court must be satisfied that the claimant had a full hearing and the ALJ affirmatively developed the record. Echevarria v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 685 F.2d 751, 755 (2d Cir. 1982). Discussion For the reasons set forth below, the court holds that Plaintiff was provided a full hearing, that the ALJ affirmatively developed the record and applied the correct legal principles, and that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. 1. The Plaintiff received a full hearing and the ALJ affirmatively developed the record. Plaintiff’s hearing on March 28, 2012, was full and fair, and Plaintiff does not argue to the contrary. Plaintiff does contend that the ALJ failed to develop the record. However, at the hearing, the ALJ heard from both the Plaintiff and his mother, who was representing him. R. at 22–48. The ALJ also informed Plaintiff that she would find medical records particularly helpful. R. at 47. Plaintiff took the ALJ’s advice, and submitted a large amount of medical and other evidence that the ALJ was able to refer to in making her decision. The administrative record totals nearly 500 pages. ALJ fulfilled her obligation to affirmatively develop the record. 13 The 2. The ALJ applied the correct legal principles. As discussed above, the ALJ properly followed the SSA’s five-step sequential analysis in determining that Plaintiff was not disabled. 3. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. At step one of the five-step analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 5, 2011, the application date. R. at 11. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did have a severe impairment, and that this severe impairment was affective disorder, variously described as adjustment disorder with disturbance of emotions and conduct, mood disorder, or bipolar disorder. Id. Naturally, neither of these findings is contested by Plaintiff. a. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff did not have an impairment that met or medically equaled a Listing. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the Listings. R. at 11–12. The dispute here centers on whether Plaintiff’s condition met the listing for section specifically the “paragraph B” criteria. 2 12.04, Affective Disorders, To satisfy the “paragraph B” criteria, Plaintiff’s mental impairment must result in at least two of the 2 Plaintiff’s brief discusses how his symptoms met the required symptoms in paragraph A of section 12.04. Pl.’s Br. 12–13. However, the ALJ never found that Plaintiff’s condition failed to meet the “paragraph A” criteria. See R. at 11– 12. Instead, the ALJ merely found that Plaintiff’s condition did not meet the “paragraph B” or “paragraph C” criteria, one of which is required under 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Section 12.04. Id. Plaintiff does not contend that his condition meets the “paragraph C” criteria, but does argue that his condition meets the “paragraph B” criteria. 14 following: marked restriction of activities of daily living; marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; marked difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; or repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appx. 1, § 12.04. The ALJ found only mild restrictions in Plaintiff’s activities of daily living and moderate restrictions in his social functioning and concentration. R. at 11. There is substantial evidence to support these findings for the following reasons. First, the ALJ’s findings directly mirror those of Dr. Bruni, whose assessment was designed to determine whether a claimant satisfied step three. See R. at 412. Second, the ALJ pointed out that Plaintiff was a full-time student at Manhattan College, talked to friends on campus, worked out a lot, and visited other family members. R. at 12. Third, much of the medical evidence in the record supports the ALJ. Dr. Cole found Plaintiff’s cognitive abilities, judgment, and impulse control to be generally intact, and found Plaintiff to be “very engaged, composed, thoughtful, [and] pleasant.” R. at 360–61. Dr. Damari noted that Plaintiff had appropriate eye contact, normal speech, intact attention and concentration, normal memory skills, normal cognitive functioning, normal intelligence, and coherent and goal-oriented thought processes. R. at 398–99. Dr. Damari also found that Plaintiff could 15 follow and understand simple instructions, perform simple tasks independently, maintain attention and concentration, keep a regular schedule, learn new tasks, and manage his own funds. R. at 399–400. On the other hand, there is some medical evidence in the record that contradicts the ALJ’s findings, most notably, the evidence from Plaintiff’s therapist, Sebastian Bliffeld. Bliffeld found that Plaintiff had marked restrictions of activities of daily living, marked difficulty in maintaining social functioning, and frequent deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace resulting in failure to complete tasks in a timely manner. R. at 489. However, the ALJ did not credit Bliffeld’s findings regarding the severity of Plaintiff’s impairments. i. The ALJ did not err in giving little weight to Bliffeld’s opinion. Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner should be reversed because the ALJ failed to give appropriate weight to Bliffeld. This contention is unavailing. Under the “treating physician rule,” the medical opinion of a claimant’s treating physician is given controlling weight if it is well supported by medical findings and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. However, “[o]nly acceptable medical sources can be relied on to establish the existence of a medically determinable impairment or be considered treating sources whose opinions are entitled to controlling 16 weight under the ‘treating physician’ rule.” Coleman v. Colvin, No. 14-cv2384 (SAS), 2015 WL 1190089, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2015). The relevant federal regulation does not include therapists in its list of “acceptable medical sources,” instead categorizing therapists as “[o]ther sources” who can be used to show the severity of an impairment and how it affects ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513. So while Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 06-03P indicates that these “other sources” should still be considered in making a disability determination, they are not entitled to controlling weight under the treating physician rule. As a therapist, Bliffeld cannot be considered a treating physician and his opinion does not need to be given controlling weight. The ALJ properly addressed Bliffeld’s opinion. The ALJ noted Bliffeld’s claim that Plaintiff “is truly incapable of supporting himself,” R. at 487, but chose to give it little weight because it was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s level of functioning. R. at 14. The ALJ highlighted Plaintiff’s status as a student at Manhattan College, including the 33 credits he had been able to complete and the lack of any suspension. R. at 13–14. The ALJ also mentioned the social time Plaintiff would spend with friends and cousins. R. at 14. Moreover, Bliffeld’s opinion clashes with the medical evidence cited above that supports the notion that Plaintiff had, at worst, only moderate functional limitations. And a March 2011 document signed by Bliffeld 17 himself, as well as Dr. Cole, assessed Plaintiff a GAF of 52, indicating moderate symptoms or functional limitations. R. at 372–73. Bliffeld’s opinion is further belied by Plaintiff’s own testimony at the hearing. Plaintiff stated “I just don’t think working is for me,” R. at 29, “I just don’t enjoy working,” id., “they don’t pay enough for most jobs,” id., “I want to, actually, have a job where I’m interested in what the job is,” R. at 38, and “[m]oney doesn’t motivate me enough,” id. These statements paint a picture of a young man who relies on his parents’ support and who chooses not to work for reasons other than disability. Plaintiff’s attitude is further illuminated by the statement of Yasmin Mendez, the Public Safety Office Manager at Manhattan College, who wrote that she provided Plaintiff with a list of available campus jobs but that he rejected them “because he feels he deserves more than the minimum wage.” R. at 165. Given Plaintiff’s daily life as a student, medical evidence from other sources, and Plaintiff’s own statements at the hearing, it would be misguided for the Court to find that the ALJ was not supported by substantial evidence in giving little weight to Bliffeld’s opinion. ii. The ALJ did credibility. not err in assessing Plaintiff’s Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ’s determination of Plaintiff’s credibility was not supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ, and not the reviewing court, has the responsibility “to appraise the credibility of witnesses, including the claimant.” Carroll v. Sec’y of Health & Human 18 Servs., 705 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983). The court “must show special deference” to “explicit credibility findings of the ALJ.” Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Reich, 38 F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Snell, 177 F.3d at 135 (“After all, the ALJ is in a better position to decide issues of credibility.”). Here, the ALJ made an explicit credibility finding that is entitled to deference. The ALJ wrote that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [his] symptoms are not entirely credible since they are not consistent with the objective medical evidence or his essentially normal daily activities.” R. at 14. For the same reasons that the ALJ was entitled to give Bliffeld’s opinion little weight, her decision to discount certain statements by Plaintiff is supported by substantial evidence. Given that the ALJ did not err in discounting certain statements made by Bliffeld and Plaintiff, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff did not have an impairment that met or medically equaled a Listing. b. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination of Plaintiff’s RFC. A claimant’s RFC is “the most [claimant] can still do despite [his] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform work at all exertional levels but was restricted to simple work involving only occasional interaction with co-workers and the general public. R. at 12. 19 Such a determination is supported by Plaintiff’s lack of any physical impairment, Dr. Cole’s observations that Plaintiff’s cognitive abilities, judgment, and impulse control were generally intact, R. at 361, and Dr. Damari’s findings that Plaintiff could follow and understand simple instructions, perform simple tasks independently, maintain attention and concentration, keep a regular schedule, learn new tasks, and manage his own funds, R. at 399–400. The ALJ also took into consideration the various reports that indicated Plaintiff’s difficulty relating to others by restricting Plaintiff’s RFC to simple work involving only occasional interaction with co-workers and the general public. R. at 12. Thus, the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence. c. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was able to perform work that exists in the national economy. The ALJ wrote that Plaintiff’s limitations “have little or no effect on the occupational base of unskilled work at all exertional levels.” R. at 15. Thus, the ALJ concluded that there exists work in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform—namely, simple, unskilled, low-contact work. See R. at 14–15. Unskilled work “ordinarily involve[s] dealing primarily with objects, rather than with data or people.” 1985 WL 56857, at *4. SSR 85-15, The evidence in the record strongly suggests that, while Plaintiff had difficulty interacting with other people, he could 20 complete simple tasks independently. See, e.g., R. at 399–400. Thus, simple, non-contact work is appropriate. This is a difficult case. It is clear that Plaintiff’s impairment is severe and that he struggles in many settings, particularly when dealing with others. However, the ALJ was tasked with deciding if there was any substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). The ALJ decided that such work did exist, and this Court cannot say there is not substantial evidence to support that decision. 21 Conclusion The Court grants Defendant's motion, affirms the Commissioner's decision, and dismisses the action. SO ORDERED. Dated: New York, New York December 7, 2015 Thomas P. Griesa U.S. District Judge 22
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