Ford v. Department of Social Services (DSS) et al, No. 1:2010cv03800 - Document 28 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
Court Description: OPINION:#100070 Upon the conclusions set forth in this opinion, Defendants' motions are granted and the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice and costs. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 3/21/2011) (rjm) Modified on 3/23/2011 (jab). Modified on 3/23/2011 (jab).
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UNITED STATES DI CT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -x CLIFTON LAURELL FORD, Plaintiff, 10 -against . 3800 OPINION DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES (DSS), NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCE MENT UNIT (CSEU), SUPPORT COLLECTION UNIT (SCU), and JANICE ADEL DYE, Defendants. A P PEA RAN C E S: At MARJORY CAJOUX, ESQ. 406 Atlantic Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11217 Attorney for Defendant Collection Unit MICHAEL A. CARDOZO Corporation Counsel of the City of New York 100 Church Street, Room 2-165 New York, NY 10007 By: David A. Rosinus, Jr., Esq. Attorney for Defendant New York Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, Attorney General of the State of New York 120 Broadway, 24th Floor New York, NY 10271 By: Elizabeth Cohen, Esq. Sweet, D.J. Defendant State of New York Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance ("OTDAtf) l Division of Child Support Enforcement (collectively, the "Defendants") Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b) (1) 1 moved pursuant to (2) 1 (5) and (6) to dismiss the Complaint of the plaintiff Clifton Laurell Ford ("Ford" or the" aintiffll) seeking the vacatur of the judgment of the Family Court the State entered on June 22, 1993 Col ( New York l County of New York Defendant Support "Judgment"). ion Unit of the city of New York ("SCU") has moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Based on the conclus set forth below 1 the motions are granted, and the Complaint dismi Prior Proceedings Ford filed his Complaint on May 10 1 2010 requesting this Court (1) vacate the Judgment against Ford and in favor Defendant Janice Adel Dye ("Dye'), and (2) vacate the arrears that Plaintiff owes under that judgment to Dye 1 in the amount of approximately $400 1 000.00. 1 Ford alleged that he paid at least $129,000.00 owed under the Judgment to Dye, but that Dye did not these payments to any of the government Defendants. ~~ 12-13.) He further alleged that, as a result, the to give [him] c government Defendants have "fail certain sums alleged that (Compl. money. (Id. ~ 13.)1 for" In addition, has government Defendants have miscalculated the amount of money that he owes to , and that Dye did not report to the government Defendants that the child in question did not need child se ces after age six. has alleged (Id. ~~ 14, 16.) that, as a result these circumstances, the government Defendants are "requesting payment in the amount of approximately $400,000 . does not owe to the Defendants [sic]." claims . which Plaintiff (Id. ~~ 15, 17.) Ford , because he purportedly owes this money, he has been unable to secure employment, obtain a passport, rent an apartment, or travel, and his health has the stress arising out of this situation. See id. affected by ~~ 20-23.) When a debtor is in default, Defendant SCU becomes involved in child support payments, and may issue an execution for support enforcement. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5241(b}. 2 Defendant OTDA filed its motion to dismiss on November 3, 2011, and Defendant SCU moved for judgment on the pleadings on December 14, 2010. The motions were marked fully submitted on February 9, 2011. The Applicable Standard to Rule 12, all On a motion to dismiss factual allegations in the compl are accepted as true, and all inferences are drawn in favor pleader. Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1174 (2d Cir. 1993). issue "is not whether a pI iff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitl the claims." The to offer evidence to support Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d viII 375, 378 (2d Cir. 1995) (quat Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 235-36 (1974». A facially f lack of subject matter j asserted basis for juri complaint may be dismissed for sdiction under Rule 12(b) (1) if the ction is not sufficient. See TM _P_a_t_e_n_t_s--,-_L_._P_._v_._I...-n....------t_'.. -l. . ------B.. -u.. -s.. .------._M=-=----a.. -c.. -h;.:.: .s:. . ;....------"""-"""-:=.£~., 12 1 F. Supp. 2 d 349, 367-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) i Peterson v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 3 970 F. Supp. 246, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). j J Once subject matter ction is challenged, the burden of establishing sdiction rests with the party asserting that it exists. Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446 82 F.3d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 1996). (1942) See Malik v. Meissner, i The party asserting subject matter jurisdiction the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the dence, that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. See Malik, 82 F.3d at 562; 10 v. United States Internal Revenue Serv., 950 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Robinson v. Overseas Milit Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 507 (2d Cir. 1994)). In determining a motion to di Rule 12(b} (2) for lack of personal juri ss a complaint under ction, a federal court must first apply the law of the state where the court sits to determine if personal jurisdiction over a defendant exists. Bank s Lambert v. Fiddler z, 171 F.3d ------------------------------------------------------~--- 779, 784 (2d Cir. 1999). In assessing whether personal jurisdiction is authorized under New York law, the Court looks to whether "present" in New York or has defendant is ei New York's long arm statute. committed acts within the scope See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 301, 302. 4 Pursuant to Rule 12(b) (5), dismissed for insufficient se "a complaint may be process." Weston Funding, LLC v. Consorcio G Grupo Dina, B.A. de C.V., 451 F. Bupp. 2d 585, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977 F. Supp. 654, 658 also Hawthorne v. (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (S.D.N.Y. 1997)) i see , 219 F.R.D. 47, 49 ("Without proper service a court has no jurisdiction over a de .n). matters, the plaintiff the burden of proof. On such jurisdictional McEntee, 283 F. Supp. 2d 993[ 997 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) defendant challenges See Commer v. ("Once a ficiency of service of process, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show the adequacy service.") . a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule To 12 (b) (6), "a complaint must contain sufficient matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" t v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937[ 1949 (2009) , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (quoting Bell Atl. Though the court must accept the factual allegat (2007)). of a complaint as true, it is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." at 1949 ( ing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) . 5 _1-=-__ , 129 S. Ct. iffs must allege sufficient facts to "nudge [ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." The I judgment on ----"' , 550 U.S. at 570. standard used to decide a motion pleadings made pursuant to Rule 12(c) is identical to the standard used to cide a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6), See " -----'-~""-- Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly Hills, 259 F.3d 123, . 2001) 126 (2d (collecting cases) . The Due Process Claim Is Dismissed Although Ford claims to seek vacatur of (see Compl. ~~ Judgment 1, 26), the gravamen of his Compl is that he has paid Dye at least $129,400.00 that Dye did not SCU, and that SCU has not to ted him with such payment and to seek a total of approximately $400,000,00 from him cont as a result. (See id. ~~ 13, 15.) Defendants miscalculated this amount to credit him fai I Ford contends He has also I leged that independently of their amounts already paid. (Id. ~ 14.) the Judgment has been satisfied (at least in part), not that it should be vacated, and that{ by money from PI iff in excess 6 what he owes, SCU is In attempting to deprive him of his property i.e., his money) without due process of law. However, if the process that a state provides to safeguard a plaintiff's protected rest from "mistaken or unjustified deprivation H is "constitutionally adequate," then the state has not violated that pI process rights. zinermon v. (internal quotations omitted) , 494 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1990) see i To satis reme dy . Beve See s & e . ., (citing Zinermon, 494 U.S. at rements of due process, the state must simply make an plaintiffi the pIa so Wilbur v. Harris, 53 -'---'--'--- F.3d 542, 544-45 (2d Cir. 1995) 125-26). iff's procedural due procedural remedy available to the iff need not have availed himself of that ::...:M:..::c..::.K.::.::e::...:s::..:s=-o=n~:....::...::~~.___ v....;:.---.:.D=-=.iv .---.:.o:.. .:f=----:A:.. ::.=l:..::c.. .;:o:..::h..:. o:.. l=i-=.c ___ Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 38-39 availability of a & n.21 (1990) ("The deprivation hearing constitutes a inst unlawful deprivations sufficient by procedural itself to satisfy complain if they Due Process Clause, and [litigants] cannot 1 to avail themselves of this procedure. H) Adams v. New York State Educ. i It, No. 08 Civ. 5996, 2010 WL --=~==------------------------~~--~------~-- 624020, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2010) whether a post a due ("[I]t matters not iff actually avails himself of the state court ion process. So long as that process is claim must be dismissed." 7 lable, (internal quotations omitted)) (citing Hellenic Am. Ne Action Comm. v. of New York, 101 F.3d 877, 881 (2d Cir. 1996)). In New York State, when a support collection unit issues an execution for enforcement of current support or is "an error in arrears, but amount" purportedly owed, the debtor may assert that error as a "mistake of fact" and "shall have an opportunity to make a submission in support of the object execution. within fifteen days from service of a copy" of the See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5241(a) (8) (e). & agency must then rule on the objection and "notify the debtor of its determination within 45 days." agency may fi not agree with N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5241(e). If the debtor's objection, the debtor an Article 78 proceeding in state court to have the state court review the agency's determination. See Lombardi v. Suf , No. 04-1216, 2007 WL 446733, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2007) (citing New York State NOW v. Pat --------------~ 156, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2001)). processes satisfies the 261 F.3d "The availability these ctates of due process." Id. (citing . of Elections, 470 F.3d 458, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ............~----~~~~ 466 68 (2d Cir. 2006)). Insofar as Ford claims that scu him an amount of money in excess of what 8 seeks to recover from owes to Dye, or seu has miscalculated the amount owed to Dye, he cannot bring a due process claim to rectify the situation, because state law offered him a constitutionally adequate pre-deprivation remedy. Accordingly, his due process claim is dismissed. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Bars this Action Construed liberally, the Complaint also alleges that the Judgment violated Ford's substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of his rights to money, employment, and travel. (See Compl. ~~ 1, 15, 21.) Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, this Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction to review any of Ford's substantive due process claims, because Ford, by his own admission, is asking this Court to review and vacate a state court order. (See id. ~~ 1, 26.) The Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over lawsuits "that are, in substance, appeals from state-court judgments." Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005). "The doctrine derives from the mandate that under statutes governing the federal judiciary, district courts are 'empowered to exercise original, not appellate, jurisdiction.'" 9 Phillips v. City of New York, 453 F. Supp. 2d 690, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005)). The Rooker Feldman doctrine applies in "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state court judgments rendered the district court proceedings commenced and inviting those judgments." "the principle l court review and rejection s Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. expres by Congress in 28 U.S.C. within the federal judic review state-court It arises from § 1257, that system, only the Supreme Court may isions." Hoblock l 422 F.3d at 85. Since the Supreme Court/s decision in Exxon Mobil, which examined and clarified the application Feldman doctrine l Rooker- Second Circuit has articulated four requirements the doctrine/s application, two substantive and two procedural. "Procedurally, the federal court plaintiff must have lost in state court been rendered Substant I and the state court judgment must have the district court proceedings commenced. , the plaintiff must compl of injuries caused by a state court judgment, and the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of that state court judgment." ______~, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 713; see Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85. 10 Here, Ford's substantive due process claims fit these four requirements squarely. Regarding Rooker-Feldman's procedural requirements, Ford concedes that the Judgment was "entered . . against the Plaintiff and in favor of the Defendant [Janice Adel Dye] " (Compl. ~ 1.) Moreover, the Judgment was rendered in 1993, long before Ford commenced this federal action on May 10, 2010. Thus, the Complaint easily meets the two procedural requirements for application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Ford's substantive due process claims also meet the substantive requirements of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. He asks this Court to vacate not only the Judgment generally, but also, specifically, to vacate "the arrears in the amount of approximately $400,000." (Compl. ~~ 1, 26.) Thus, the injuries that arise out of his debt are attributable to the Family Court's judgment against him. Moreover, by requesting that this Court "vacate" the Judgment, Ford seeks review and rejection of that Judgment. As a federal district court of original jurisdiction, this Court may not conduct such a review. Ford contends that he has exhausted his available remedies in state court by submitting a "motion and [a] letter" in which he "objected to the amount requested by" Defendants. 11 . Opp. 2.) Ford wrote the letter to the New York City Child Support Enforcement, but received no response. Cajoux f. ~~ 10 11.) fice See Ford's motion asked an unspecified court , but the court allegedly "failed to address the issue." Id. ~ 12.) s, Ford fails to state a procedural due process cl as a matter of law. contemplated in N.Y. C.P.L.R. within the or 5241(e). His motion did not fall §§ 5241 (a) (8) sions contemplate a debtor's making a e written objection to local support collection unit itself, alleging that a "mis fact" has been made with respect to child support payments or arrears. Moreover, even if the letter Plaintiff allegedly sent did satisfy the requirements of that procedure, Ford has not I that he filed an Article 78 to establish a procedural due proceeding, and hence cannot process claim. See Chase __________ ~~ liance LLC v. ci ____________________ Dep't of Fin., 620 F.3d 146, 153 (2d . 2010) ~L_ of New York _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ (" [A] procedural due process violation cannot have occurred when the governmental actor provides apparently adequate procedural remedies and the plaintiff has not availed himself quotations omitted)). 12 remedies." (internal Furthermore, even if Ford had properly alleged that he filed and then lost an Article 78 proceeding, that fact would be immaterial. In a due process inquiry, it is simply "'necessary to ask what process the State provided, and whether it was constitutionally adequate.'" Rivera-Powell, 470 F.3d at 465 (quoting Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 126). As discussed above, the state offered Ford a constitutionally adequate process, and that is where this Court's inquiry ends. Ford has contended that the process that state law confers on debtors in Plaintiff's situation "is inadequate to satisfy the requirements of due process under the standard set forth in Spinelli v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 160, 170-75 (2d cir. 2009)." (Pl. Opp. 3.) Spinelli's due process analysis arises out of the three-factor balancing test that the Supreme Court set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), which it used because no court had previously determined whether the post-deprivation remedy that the government provided in that case was adequate. See Spinelli, 579 F.3d at 170, 171-75. Here, by contrast, there is no need for this Court to engage in the Mathews balancing test, because, as noted above, the state process that was available to Ford is constitutionally adequate. See, e.g., Lombardi, 2007 WL 446733, at *6; Rivera-Powell, 470 F.3d at 466-68. 13 Ford has also contended that this Court has diversity jurisdiction over the subject matter of this lawsuit. However, even when a federal district court would otherwise have subject matter jurisdiction, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests that court of jurisdiction. Although the Second Circuit does not appear to have addressed this issue directly, other federal courts have held that "Rooker-Feldman . bars suits even where diversity jurisdiction otherwise exists." 324 F. App'x 742, 743 Segler v. Felfam Ltd. P'ship, (10th Cir. 2009) F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Noel v. Hall, 341 (Rooker-Feldman applies "even if a federal question is present or if there is diversity of citizenship between the parties"); see also, e.g., Thyne v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., No. 3:09-cv-377, 2010 WL 3075185, at *3 Aug. 4, 2010) (S.D. Ohio ("[D]iversity jurisdiction does not defeat the bar of Rooker-Feldman."). That this Court might otherwise have diversity jurisdiction over the case does not ameliorate the reasoning or application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Ford has also suggested that, notwithstanding any other argument in this case, "this Court has the power to vacate a judgment" pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 60 (b) (6), which permits a district court to "relieve a . from a final judgment" for "any justifies relief." (See Pl. Opp. 3.) reason that Ford reiterates his that this Court vacate the arrears arising out of the Judgment, and suggests that the Judgment is causing him "extreme hardship." (Id.i see also Cajoux Aff. ~~ 15-16.) However, Rule 60(b) (6) only "'allows a district court to vacate its own final judgment. '" Socialist Republic of Romania v. Wildenstein & Co., 147 F.R.D. 62, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) Harman v. Paul {quot accord ~~~_ ,678 F.2d 479, 481 st's Advocate ...c....... __ ________ ~ ~ LLC v. __________ ~~ (4th Cir. 1982)) tive Arts ________________ i ., No. 01 ~ Civ. 9468, 2004 WL 728874, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2004) ("[AJ power to vacate its own judgment." district court iste, 257 F.3d 108, 110-11 {citing Fort Knox Music Inc. v. (2d Cir. 2001))). cites no authority for the proposition that Rule 60 (b) (6) ts a federal district court to relieve a party from the effects reason that justif a state court judgment for "any s relief." federal district court reI 60 (b) (6) is ent inappl Where, as here, Plaintiff seeks f from a state court judgment, Rule e to his case. Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine proscribes federal district court review of state court judgments, this Court lacks 15 j sdiction to hear these claims and, as such, they are ssed. The Action Against OTDA Is Dismissed Even if Ford had properly asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he would still have failed to state a claim against OTDA, because the actions on which Ford's claim rests attributable to the local SCU and not to Complaint is dismissed as to OTDA, any allegations or facts demonstrat rights by OTDA. State. Thus, the it does not include a violation of Ford's Therefore, pursuant to Rule 12{b) (6), the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. paid "an amount in excess of Ford alleges iled to report to OTDA." $70,000.00 to Dye which ~~ 12, 13.) {Compl. that OTDA "fail [ed] to give the He also al Plaintiff credits for payments which the Plaintiff ha[d] made throughout the [and] miscalculated the amount of (Id. ~ 14.) However, OTDA Child Support due by aintiff." is not responsible amount of arrearage owed. responsibility to That New York City Human Resources Administration ("HRA"). 16 HRA maintains a current balance due on the statewide Child Support Management System for with orders entered in New York County. § 111-h(1). support debtors 1 If the child support debtor See N.Y. Soc. Servo L. Is to make the required child support payments, HRA is required to enforce child support arrears. HRA tracks payments and maintains the case accounts, not OTDA. There iff's request to have his arrears vacated or corrected not implicate OTDA's ministerial role in supervising overall child support program in the State of New In addition, OTDA not been properly served. Under 4 (j) (2) , Federal Rule of Civil [al state, a munic corporation, or any other state-created governmental organization that is subject to suit must be served by (A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to its chief executive officer; or (B) serving a copy of each in the manner pros by that state's law for serving a summons or 1 on such a defendant. OTDA only became aware this matter when an attorney with of Social Services faxed a copy of Albany County Plaintiff's Summons and Complaint to Brian Wootan, an attorney for OTDA, on August 20, 2010. not const C.P.L.R. e § 307. (See Wootan Aff. ~ 2.) This does service on OTDA under Rule 4(j) (2) or N.Y. Complaint is therefore di 17 as against OTDA for lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficient service of process under Rule 12(b) (2) and Rule 12(b) (5).2 Conclusion Upon the conclusions set forth above t Defendants t motions are granted and the Complaint is dismis with prejudice and costs. It is so ordered. New York, NY March ~J , 2011 U.S.D.J. In addition, because Plaintiff filed the Complaint on May 10, 2010 and failed to serve the Complaint on OTDA within 120 days of that date, the Complaint is dismissed as against OTDA. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 18
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