In Re: Motors Liquidation Company, No. 1:2009cv07794 - Document 20 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
Court Description: OPINION. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, Parker's motions for rehearing and/or entry of a vacatur are denied, and his request that the Court excise portions of the April 27 Opinion is denied. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 9/4/10) (rjm)
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In Re: Motors Liquidation Company Doc. 20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ------- --------x IN RE: MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY, et al., f/k/a GENERAL MOTORS CORP., et al., x 09 Civ. 7794 OLIVER ADDISON PARKER, Appellant, OPINION A P PEA RAN C E S: Pro Se OLIVER ADDISON PARKER 283 Codrington Drive Lauderdale by the Sea, FL 33308 Attorneys for Appellee Motors Liquidat Company WElL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP 767 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10153 Attorneys for Appellee United States of America PREET BHARARA United States Attorney for the S.D.N.Y. 86 Chambers Street, 3rd Floor New York, NY 10007 By: David S. Jones, Esq. Dockets.Justia.com Sweet, D.J. General Motors Corporation and certain of its affiliates (collectively, "GM" or the "Debtors") each commenced a case under chapter 11 of title II, United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"), in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern "Bankruptcy Court") on June I, 2009 strict of New York (the "Commencement Date") and immediately thereafter moved for approval of the sale of substant ly all their assets to a United States Treasury-sponsored purchaser, NGMCO, Inc. n/k/a General Motors, LLC (the "Purchaser" or "New GM") , pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Sale" or the "363 Transaction") . Bankruptcy Court entered an order approving the 363 Transaction dated July 5, 2009 (the "Sale Order"), and issued an 87General Motors written decision, In re ., 407 B.R. 463 (the "Sale Opinion" or " (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) Op.") . Appellant Oliver Addison Parker ("Parker" or the "Appellant") fil an appeal of the e Order and Sale Opinion, which this court denied as moot in an Opinion issued on April 27, 2010 (the "April 27 Opinion"). has moved for rehearing and/or vacatur of the 1 Parker e Order and Sale Opinion t and requested that portions of the April 27 Opinion be excised. Upon the conclusions set forth below and his request are denied. t Parker's mot Prior Proceedings Familiarity wi the facts underlying this dispute and the prior proceedings is assumed. The instant mot was marked fully submitted on June 9, 2010. Parker Has Failed to Demonstrate that the Court Overlooked or Misapprehended Specific Points of Law or Fact When "a district court is acting as an appellate court a bankruptcy case l Bankruptcy Rule 8015 provides sole mechanism for filing a motion for rehearing." J P. Inc. v. The 1 Creditor Trust Spiegel, Inc.), No. 03-11540, 06 CV-13477 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2007). granting a mot forth in the Rule 2007 WL 2609966, Although the "standard for rehearing under f, the t e 8015 is not set e's notes 'direct attention to Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of 2 In re late Procedure. "' rd. (quoting Oren v. Kass, No. 04-CV-4297, e 40 2005 WL 2859964, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. I, 2005)). requires the motion to Ustate with particularly each point of law or that the [movant] ieves the court has overlooked or misapprehended and [to] argue in support of the [motion]." Accordingly, a motion for rehearing "may be granted only where the court has overlooked matters or cont ling isions which might have materially luenced the earlier decision." Bus. Channell P' News Network Inc. Consumer Business News & . News Network Inc. In re Fin. , Bankr. No. 90 B 10891, 91 Civ. 4710, 1992 WL 19042, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1992) (quoting Caleb & Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 624 F. Supp. 747, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 980 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1992)). The purpose of a motion for rehearing is to udirect the court's attention to some material matter of law or fact which it has overlooked deciding the case, and which, had it been given consideration, would probably have brought about a different result." N.Y. v. Sokol, No. 94 CIV. 7392, 1996 WL 428381, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1996), aff'd, 108 F.3d 1370 (2d Cir. 1997). purpose is "not to permit the [movant] to reargue his case; to attempt 3 of making such to do so would be an abuse of the prlvl a [motion].11 Id. In addition, "neither new evidence nor new arguments are considered valid bases for Rule 8015 reI f.1I Spiegel, 2007 WL 2609966, at *2. Parker's request for a rehearing rests on his led to consider the United contention that the Court States Supreme Court's December 14, 2009 summary order in connection with Chapter 11 cases of Chrysler LLC (the "Chrysler Summary Order ll ), which was addressed in a letter submitted by Parker to the Court on January 7, 2010. Parker's January 7 letter was submitted in response to a December 15, 2009 letter submitted by attorneys for Appellees Motors Liquidation Company (f/k/a General Motors Corporation) and NGMCO, Inc. (n/k/a General Motors t LLC) Appellees responded to Parker's letter by letter dated January 14 t 2010. Cont to Parker's contention, Chrysler Summary Order and the arguments presented in parties t letters were addressed in See April 27 Opinion at *15 n.3. April 27 Opinion. Thus, Parker's contention that this law was overlooked is incorrect. Parker has similarly led to demonstrate that the Court misapprehended the applicability of the Chrysler 4 Summary Order and United States v.Munsingwear Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950), cited there In the Chrysler case, after the Second Circuit implemented the instructions of the Supreme Court by dismissing the appeal, the Indiana State Police Pension Trust (the "ISPPT H ) , the appellant in the Chrysler case, filed a petition with the Second Circuit requesting rehearing or, the alternative, vacatur of the Chrysler Bankruptcy Court's Section 363 sale approval , making arguments substant presented here by Parker. ly similar to those The ISPPT specifically argued that the Chrysler Summary Order and Munsingwear mandated that the Chrysler bankruptcy sale approval order be vacated. rehearing. The Second Circuit denied the petition for Ind. State Police Pension Cir. May 13, 2010). It rejected the ISPPT's contention that it had overlooked or misapprehended ei Supreme Court's the Chrysler Summary Order or ructions, or that __ vacatur of the Bankruptcy's Court's decision. is no different here: required The outcome Parker has failed to demonstrate that this Court misapprehended in of the Chrysler Summary Order. 5 way applicability to establish any material point Parker has fai law or fact the Court overlooked or misapprehended in connection with the April 17 Opinion and has therefore failed to meet his burden pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P . . R. App. P. 40. 8015 and Accordingly, his motion rehearing is denied. Parker Has Established No Basis for the Requested Vacatur Parker contends that Munsingwear and the Chrysler Summary Order require not only vacatur of the April 27 Opinion, but so vacatur of the Sale Order and remand to the Bankruptcy Court. Munsingwear However, the scussion in the "established practice of the Court in dealing with a Civil case . . which has become moot,1I 340 U.S. at 39, upon which Parker relies, is dictum and does not apply when the mootness was caused by voluntary action. See __ ____ U.S. 18, 24-25 __ (1994) __v__.__ __ r __ ___P_'__ 513 (stating that the "principal condition to which [the Supreme Court has] looked [in deciding whether to vacate a judgment] is whether the party seeking ief from the judgment below caused the mootness by voluntary action"). As set forth in detail the April 27 Opinion, Parker never sought a stay or even an expedited 6 appeal, instead allowing the 363 Transaction to be consummated notwithstanding the provisions of Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, vacatur inappropriate because the mootness lS Parker's appeal was caused by Parker's own inaction and omissions. ____ 484 U.S. 72, 83 (1987) See Karcher (concluding that the "Munsingwear procedure is inapplicable" because the "controversy did not become moot due to circumstances unattributable to any the parties," but rather because the "controversy ended when the losing party . . declined to pursue its appeal") . Moreover, Muns has no bearing upon the Order, which is final and binding by virtue of Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 363(m) is to protect the good faith purchasers bankruptcy ended property in a e from reversal or vacatur on appeal of the sale authorization, unless the authorization for the sale and the e itself were stayed pending appeal. "appellate j Thus, sdiction over an unstayed sale order issued by a bankruptcy court is statutori limited to the narrow issue of whether the property was sold to a good faith purchaser." Paolo Inc. v. Gucci , 105 F.3d 837, 839 (2d Cir. 1997). 7 "[R]egardless of the merit an appellant's challenge to a sale order," an appellate court Umay neither reverse nor modify the judicially-authorized sale if the ent that purchased or leased the property did so in good faith and if no stay was granted." Id. at 840. Parker led to seek a stay of the sale order and, on appeal, failed to establish a lack of good faith on the part of the purchaser. In the instant motion, Parker presents no additional facts or points of law relevant to the issue of good faith, nor has he identified any law or fact that the Court overlooked or misapprehended. Accordingly, Parker's motion for vacatur is denied. Parker also requests that the Court excise pages 37 through 78 from the April 27 Opinion. presents no authority However, he support of his proposition that a finding of mootness limits or prevents the Court from addressing alternat arguments raised by the part otherwise identified by the Court. for constraining judic opinion. s or is no such basis Court's discretion in crafting a It is not unprecedented a District Court to dismiss an appeal from a Bankruptcy Court order approving a Section 363 sale as moot and, in the same 8 opinion, firm the Bankruptcy's Court's sale order. ion Co. See, In re Motors 421 B.R. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding appeal of Section 363 sale order statutorily moot and Harbour affirming sale order) i Bros. In re Lehman Bros. HoI 415 B. R. 77 (S. D . N . Y. 2009) L.C. v. Lehman (same) i 255 W. 4 ________________ v. Nisselson, Nos. 95 Civ. 7218, 96 Civ. 4177, 1997 WL 154052, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1997) "is moot in addition to Court's sale order). (holding that appeal tless" and affirming Bankruptcy Parker's request that the Court excise portions of the April 27 Opinion lacks foundation and is therefore denied. 9 Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, Parker's motions for rehearing and/or entry of a vacatur are denied, and his request that the Court excise portions of the April 27 Opinion is denied. It is so ordered. \ New York, N;; , 2010 September I \ 10 /stT U.S.D.J.
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