Maley v. Merck & Co., Inc., No. 1:2006cv04110 - Document 59 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's negligent failure to warn claim is denied. Plaintiff does not contest dismissal of all other causes of action, and therefore her strict lia bility and warranty claims are dismissed. The case will go trial on April 19, 2010 at 10 :00 a.m. Voir dire requests, requests to charge, and proposed verdict charts are to be provided to the Court and opposing counsel by the close of business on April 12, 2010. (Signed by Judge John F. Keenan on 1/27/10) Filed In Associated Cases: 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF, 1:06-cv-04110-JFK(rjm)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -------------------------------------x IN RE: FOSAMAX PRODUCTS LIABILITY : LITIGATION : -------------------------------------x This Document Relates to: : : Louise H. Maley v. Merck & Co., Inc. : Case No. 1:06-cv-04110-JFK : -------------------------------------x 1:06-MD-1789-JFK OPINION & ORDER APPEARANCES: FOR PLAINTIFF LOUISE H. MALEY: Daniel A. Osborn, Esq. Philip Miller, Esq. OSBORN LAW, P.C. Jeffrey C. Bogert, Esq. Law Offices of Jeffrey C. Bogert FOR DEFENDANT MERCK SHARP & DOHME CORP.: Norman C. Kleinberg, Esq. Theodore V.H. Mayer, Esq. William J. Beausoleil, Esq. HUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP Paul F. Strain, Esq. M. King Hill, III, Esq. David J. Heubeck, Esq. VENABLE LLP JOHN F. KEENAN, United States District Judge1: This case was selected by Merck Sharp & Dohme Corporation ( Merck or Defendant ) as a bellwether case in this multi- 1 To the extent any sealed material is discussed in this opinion, the information is hereby unsealed in light of the strong presumption of public access. 1 district products osteoporosis drug liability Fosamax. litigation Before the concerning Court is the defendant Merck s motion for summary judgment seeking the dismissal of all claims filed Plaintiff ). by For plaintiff the Louise following H. Maley reasons, ( Maley Merck s motion or is denied. I. BACKGROUND A. Fosamax and ONJ2 Fosamax is an oral bisphosphonate manufactured by Merck for the treatment of osteoporosis. Plaintiff and her experts contend that Merck has long known of studies and reports linking bisphosphonate use with the development of osteonecrosis of the jaw ( ONJ ), a condition characterized by exposed necrotic bone. Merck began warning consumers of a link between Fosamax and ONJ in July 2005, when it made the following FDA-approved addition to Fosamax s label: Osteonecrosis of the jaw, generally associated with tooth extraction and/or local infection, often with delayed healing, has been reported in patients taking bisphosphonates. Most reported cases of bisphosphonate-associated osteonecrosis have been in cancer patients treated with intravenous bisphosphonates, but some have occurred in patients with postmenopausal osteoporosis. 2 The Court provides information regarding Fosamax only to the extent that it is relevant to the instant motion. For further discussion about the drug, see the Court s ruling on the parties Daubert motions. In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 645 F. Supp. 2d 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 2 (Def. Ex. 24.) In 2006, the American Association of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgeons ( AAOMS ) issued a position paper on bisphosphonaterelated osteonecrosis of the jaw ( BRONJ ) the subset of ONJ injuries caused by bisphosphonate use. developed by a The position paper was task of and epidemiologists, force highly regarded other researchers, who clinicians, analyzed the existing literature and clinical observations of its members to provide perspectives on the risk of developing BRONJ and guidance to clinicians on diagnosing, treating, and preventing the condition. In the position paper, the AAOMS adopted a working definition of BRONJ, under which a patient is considered to have the condition if the following three characteristics are present: (1) current or previous use of a bisphosphonate; (2) exposed, necrotic bone in the maxillofacial region for more than eight weeks; and (3) no history of radiation therapy to the jaw. The AAOMS further classified the condition as stage one, two, or three, depending symptoms. the severity and type of the patient s The experts on the issue of general causation in this multi-district definition. on litigation See, e.g., have Marx used Report, the same Def. Ex. or 1, similar at 1 ( [B]isphosphonate-induced osteonecrosis of the jaws refers to a condition characterized by exposure of bone in the mandible or 3 maxilla persisting for more than 8 weeks . . . . ); Goss Report, Def. Ex. 11, at 4 (including the presence of exposed bone that fails to heal within six weeks in his working definition of ONJ caused by bisphosphonate use). In late 2008, the AAOMS task force reconvened to review the research on BRONJ conducted after the release position paper and to make any necessary updates. of its 2006 As a result, in January 2009, the AAOMS released an updated position paper. It maintained the same working definition of BRONJ, which includes a finding of exposed necrotic bone that persists for more than eight weeks. The staging system was amended, though, to include stage zero BRONJ, which includes patients who have been treated with a bisphosphonate with no clinical evidence of necrotic bone, but present with other non-specific symptoms or clinical and radiographic findings. (Mayer Decl. in Support of Daubert Motion, Ex. 42, at 10.) B. Maley s Condition and the Initial Diagnosis Maley was prescribed Fosamax by Dr. Dennis Lawton ( Dr. Lawton ) beginning in January 1998. Dr. Lawton testified at deposition that he receives yearly updates to the Physician s Desk Reference ( PDR ), a published compilation of manufacturers prescribing information, and generally keeps up to date on the medications he prescribes. 4 Dr. Lawton first became aware of an alleged risk between Fosamax and ONJ in 2005. Dr. Lawton testified that despite this risk, he: (1) continues to prescribe Fosamax to patients; (2) does not inform these patients of the risk of developing ONJ; and (3) has never recommended that a patient take a drug holiday from Fosamax. In March 2004, Ms. Maley began having severe aching pain in the upper-right side of her jaw. and was treated condition with improved for She had two dental extractions Trileptal, several an months anti-convulsant. following the Her dental extractions, but it again worsened in 2005, while she was still taking Trileptal. stabbing pain She in her described jaw, having extending bad through attacks her of forehead, which would last for hours at a time. (Def. Ex. 4.) Maley s medical records indicate that she saw an array of doctors because of her jaw pain, including five different dentists, none of whom appear to have been able to diagnose her condition. In September 2005, Maley was referred to an endodontist, Dr. William Adams ( Dr. Adams ), to examine her jaw. Dr. Adams conducted exploratory surgery in Maley s jaw and performed a biopsy on a bone sample from her jaw. Dr. Adams found chronically inflamed granulation, which he described for a layperson as inflammation in her jaw which should not be there. (Adams Dep., Def. Ex. 9, at 145:15 19.) 5 This led him to diagnose Maley with osteonecrosis ( NICO ). neuralgia-inducing cavitational According to Dr. Adams, NICO occurs when small areas of bone in the jaw develop cavitations and die, causing the patient to suffer pain. Dr. Adams treated Maley s condition by surgically debriding the broken down area of her jaw, and then grafting the voided area with platelet-rich plasma and demineralized freeze-dried bone. (Id. at 135:4 136:21.) Maley continued to experience pain in her jaw after the treatment. In March 2006, Maley was directed to stop taking Fosamax by a different physician, Dr. Phillipsen, for a reason unrelated to her alleged jaw injury. regularly occasions. filled her Prior to receiving this advice, Maley Fosamax prescription but for a few She has not taken it since. In June 2006, Maley also began feeling pain in the lowerright area of her jaw. She returned to Dr. Adams, who again diagnosed her with NICO and treated her in the same fashion as he did the prior year. second surgery. Maley continued to have pain after the She generally is pleased with the result of the treatments, though, testifying at her deposition that Dr. Adams has worked wonders with [her]. (Maley Dep., Def. Ex. 3, at 302:9-16.) 6 C. Opinions Regarding Maley s Injury Dr. Adams considers himself an expert on NICO. He has been on the faculty of the Indiana University School of Dentistry since 1974. He has published articles on NICO and has lectured on the topic. Although NICO and ONJ both include the word osteonecrosis, Dr. Adams explained at his deposition that they are absolutely different diseases, which look different microscopically, behave extremely different clinically, and, unlike ONJ, NICO is not characterized by exposed bone. (Adams Dep., Def. Ex. 9, at 109:22 - 110:10.) In addition, Dr. Adams is not aware of any evidence linking bisphosphonates to NICO. Plaintiff does not allege to have developed NICO; rather, she claims to have developed ONJ from her nearly eight years of Fosamax use. Plaintiff refutes Dr. Adams s diagnosis of her injury as NICO, maintaining that it is not a generally accepted condition in the medical community. Dr. Robert E. Marx ( Dr. Marx )3 submitted an affidavit on Maley s behalf, in which he explains that NICO was first proposed as a cause of oral and maxillofacial pain in however, was later it the 1970 s. accepted According in the to field Dr. that Marx, the cavitations perceived by dentists in patients they diagnosed 3 The Court already has found Dr. Marx qualified to serve as an expert in this matter. In re Fosamax, 645 F. Supp. 2d 164, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 7 with NICO actually are normal marrow spaces in the jaw that do not cause pain. Dr. Marx notes: [T]he vast majority of dental professionals, including the majority of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgeons, do not accept NICO as a pathological condition or as a diagnosis. (Pl. Ex. F ¶ 13.) Moreover, no oral pathology textbooks other than the one edited by the proponents of NICO recognize NICO for inclusion in their text and no association or society of medicine or dentistry recognize NICO as a real Dr. Marx shares this opinion, stating that disease. (Id.) scientific research fails to support the view that NICO is a distinct medical or dental condition. (Id. ¶ 14.) Maley has designated Dr. Rand Redfern ( Dr. Redfern ) as an expert in this case with regard to specific causation. Redfern never personally specializing in Dr. has Redfern examined oralfacial been a pain Maley. and dentist He is maxillofacial for thirty-six currently practices in Colorado Springs, Colorado. a Dr. dentist radiology. years and Dr. Redfern never has researched personally the link between bisphosphonates and ONJ. developments He on does the keep informed issue by on reading the research articles and from other medical journals and other publications, however, and also personally has treated roughly a dozen patients that he has diagnosed with BRONJ. Dr. Redfern has made several academic presentations on 8 the topic of BRONJ. Based on a review of Maley s medical records, Dr. Redfern opines to a reasonable degree of medical probability and certainty that Maley developed ONJ from using Fosamax. (Pl. Ex. A.) Dr. Redfern concedes that there is no indication in Maley s medical records that she had exposed bone. He also acknowledged that a patient can develop ONJ absent bisphosphonate use. He explained at his deposition that, although there was no finding of exposed dead bone, the pathology report included several findings, including fatty bone marrow and prominent resting lines, which he believes evidence that Plaintiff s jawbone was degenerating. (Redfern Dep., Def. Ex. 21, at 36-37.) the inefficacy of several standard courses of Moreover, treatment, including antibiotics and surgical debridement, allowed him to rule out other possible causes of Plaintiff s injury. Dr. Redfern agreed with Dr. Marx that Plaintiff does not have NICO, noting the lack of consensus in the dental community regarding the legitimacy of the condition. II. DISCUSSION The liability Complaint claims in of this action failure to initially asserted strict warn design defect, and negligence, and breach of express and implied warranties. As a federal court sitting in diversity, we apply state substantive 9 law and federal procedural law. The parties agree that Indiana law governs this matter as Plaintiff is an Indiana resident, was prescribed Fosamax in Indiana, and was treated for her alleged injuries there. It follows, then, that the Indiana Product Liability Act ( IPLA ) applies. See Ind. Code § 34-20-1-1 ( This article governs all actions that are brought by a user or consumer against a manufacturer for physical harm caused by a product regardless of the substantive legal theory or theories upon which the action is brought. ). To succeed on a products liability claim under the IPLA, Plaintiff must establish that: (1) the seller is engaged in the business of selling the product that caused the injury; (2) the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous; (3) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant s control; (4) the product was expected to and did reach the consumer without substantial change in its condition; and (5) the defective product was the proximate cause of plaintiff s injuries. Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 720 (7th Cir. 2001). A product is deemed defective only if plaintiff establishes a manufacturing defect, design defect, or a failure to warn. Ind. Code § 34-20-40-1 and -2; see Moss v. Crossman Corp., 136 F.3d 1169, 1171 (7th Cir. 1998). Merck moves for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff s 10 asserted causes of action fail as a matter of law under the IPLA. Plaintiff does not contest summary judgment to the extent Merck seeks negligence dismissal claim based of on causes a of failure action to other warn. than The the strict liability and warranty claims, therefore, are dismissed. Merck contends that the negligent failure to warn claim should be dismissed as well. It attacks Plaintiff s case on causation grounds on several fronts. A. Standard of Review Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A genuine issue of fact exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). demonstrating that The moving party bears the burden of summary judgment is appropriate. Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Celotex In determining whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255. [I]t ordinarily is sufficient for the movant to 11 point to a lack of evidence to go to the trier of fact on an essential element of the nonmovant s claim. Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 204 (2d Cir. 2009). Where the moving party meets that burden, the opposing party must come forward with specific admissible evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. B. Negligent Failure to Warn Merck s arguments on the instant motion for summary judgment are limited to the issue of causation. To Indiana prove causation on law, Plaintiff must inadequate warning was a her failure to establish substantial warn both cause claim that: of (1) under the Plaintiff s ingestion of Fosamax; and (2) the danger that made the warning inadequate was the same danger that materialized and caused her injury. See Kovach v. Caligor Midwest, 913 N.E.2d 193, 199 (Ind. 2009) (holding that to prove causation, plaintiff must establish that a warning would have been read and obeyed and that the defect in fact caused the plaintiff s injury ); Ortho Pharms. Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) ( The first question is whether the defendant s failure to adequately warn was a substantial cause ingestion of the defendant s [product]. 12 of the plaintiff s The second question is whether such ingestion was a substantial cause of the injury suffered. ). Causation is typically an issue of fact, unless only one conclusion can be drawn from the facts. Ritchie, 242 F.3d at 725. Merck argues that there is no issue of material fact to be submitted to a jury on either prong of the causation inquiry. 1. Merck s Failure to Warn as the Cause of Plaintiff s Taking of Fosamax Under the learned intermediary doctrine, the duty to warn runs from the drug manufacturer to the treating physician not the patient. See Ortho, 388 N.E.2d at 552-53. inquiry therefore focuses on the The causation hypothetical actions of Plaintiff s treating physician had he been provided a proper warning. Maley has not presented any evidence in opposition to Merck s motion which tends to show that her treating physician, Dr. Lawton, would have taken a different course of treatment by not prescribing her Fosamax had he been adequately warned. The complete lack of evidence would prove fatal under the law of some states where Plaintiff has the burden of production on this aspect of causation. See In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d 265, 277-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (applying Florida law); In re Fosamax, 06 MDL 1789, 06 Civ. 7631, 2009 WL 4042769, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2009) (applying Mississippi law). Under Indiana law, however, a plaintiff alleging a failure 13 to warn claim has the benefit of a heeding presumption, meaning that there is a presumption that an adequate warning would have been read and heeded. See Kovach, 913 N.E.2d at 199 (noting that the read-and-heed presumption establishes that a warning would have been read and obeyed ); Ortho, 388 N.E.2d at 555 n.12 ( Such a presumption works in favor of the manufacturer when an adequate warning is present. Where there is no warning, as in this case, however, the presumption that the user would have read an adequate warning works in favor of the plaintiff user. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402(A) cmt. J (1965))). The heeding presumption is not determinative on the issue of proximate cause, as it may be rebutted with evidence that an adequate warning would not have been heeded. Ortho, 388 N.E.2d at 555 n.12; see also Adesina v. Aladan Corp., 438 F. Supp. 2d 329, 338 presumption (S.D.N.Y. by 2006) introducing ( A defendant specific facts may rebut showing that this the warning would have been futile. (quotation omitted)) (applying New York law). A party seeking summary judgment on the issue of proximate cause faces a difficult burden as this generally is an issue of fact. Merck must establish that the only reasonable conclusion the trier of fact could draw from the record evidence is that Plaintiff s treating physician would not have changed 14 his course Kovach, of 913 treatment N.E.2d at had 198 he been ( [W]here adequately reasonable warned. minds See cannot disagree as to [proximate causation], the issue may become a question of law for the court. ); Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 260 F.3d 837, 844-45 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that summary judgment is proper despite the heeding presumption [i]f the defendant produces evidence so strong that it would necessarily adequate persuade warning Ltd./Tobacco ( While any would Exps. [defendant] reasonable have Int l, need 135 only been trier of futile ); F.3d 876, produce 884 fact Pavlik (3d evidence that v. Cir. an Lane 1998) sufficient to support a finding contrary to the presumed fact to rebut the [heeding presumption] at trial, to satisfy Rule 56 the record must show that a reasonable fact finder would be bound to find [contrary to the presumed fact.] (citation omitted)). Here, Merck points to Dr. Lawton s deposition testimony, where he stated that even after he learned of the association between bisphosphonates and ONJ in 2005, he continues to prescribe Fosamax to some patients and generally does not warn them of that risk. Merck is not entitled to summary judgment based on this evidence. Dr. Lawton s testimony establishes that he prescribes Fosamax to some of his patients despite the risk of ONJ, but 15 this falls short of establishing that he would not have changed any of his earlier decisions to prescribe Fosamax to a patient had he known treatment of a on that risk. Doctors patient-by-patient determine basis, and a course it is of quite possible that although Dr. Lawton still prescribes Fosamax to some patients, he chooses an alternate course of treatment for others. Having been provided no other details regarding to whom, under or what circumstances, Dr. Lawton continues to prescribe Fosamax, it is not unreasonable to conclude that he could have chosen a different course of treatment for Plaintiff had he been adequately warned. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the non-movant, this remains an issue of fact to be determined by a jury. 2. Fosamax as the Cause of Plaintiff s Injury The Court, in its decision on the parties Daubert motions, already has found admissible expert testimony of witnesses who will opine at Maley s trial that Fosamax generally can cause ONJ.4 See In re Fosamax, 645 F. Supp. 2d 164, 187-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (admitting Hellstein, 4 and the expert Etminan). The opinions focus of of Drs. the Marx, present Goss, motion, As discussed earlier, Plaintiff has never claimed to have developed NICO in the instant litigation. Her claim is that she developed ONJ, and that Merck was negligent in failing to warn of the risk of developing ONJ. The Court need not address whether NICO is a scientifically-accepted condition or whether it can be caused by bisphosphonate use. 16 therefore, is whether Fosamax caused Plaintiff s injury in this instance i.e., specific causation. Merck argues that Plaintiff s claim fails as a matter of law because Dr. Redfern s opinion the only evidence presented by Plaintiff regarding specific causation is conclusory, based on methodology that is not scientifically valid, and is thus inadmissible under Rule 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). the Court admits Dr. Further, according to Merck, even if Redfern s testimony, Plaintiff s claim fails because Dr. Redfern conceded that there is no evidence that Plaintiff had exposed necrotic bone in her jaw, a prerequisite to a diagnosis of BRONJ in the AAOMS position paper and the reports of the general causation experts in this matter. a. Admissibility of Dr. Redfern s Opinion Rule 702 specifies that a witness may be qualified as an expert by education. viewed knowledge, skill, Fed. R. Evid. 702. liberally and may be 664 (3d Cir. 1999); In training, or Qualification as an expert is based knowledge, skills, and training. 613, experience, re on a broad range of In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ( MTBE ) Prods. Liab. Litig., No 1-00-1898, 2008 WL 1971538, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2008) (stating that [c]ourts within the Second Circuit have liberally construed 17 expert qualification requirements (quotation omitted)). However, the expert must have relevant experience and qualifications such that whatever opinion he will ultimately express would not be speculative. See Quintilla v. Komori Am. Corp., No. 04 Civ. 5227, 2007 WL 1309539 (E.D.N.Y. May 4, 2007); Barban v. Rheem Textile Sys., Inc., No. 01 Civ. 8475, 2005 WL 387660 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2005). Not only must the witness qualify as an expert, but his testimony must interpreted be Rule scientifically 702 to require valid. The Daubert district courts to Court act as gatekeepers by ensuring that expert scientific testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. This requires a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. Id. at 592-93. Daubert set forth a non-exclusive list of factors that courts might consider in gauging the scientific validity of proffered testimony. Id. at 593-95. These factors include: (1) whether the theory has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error and whether standards and controls exist and have been maintained with respect to the technique; and (4) the general acceptance of the methodology in 18 the scientific community. Id. In its Daubert analysis, the Court must undertake a rigorous examination of the facts on which the expert relies, the method by which the expert draws an opinion from those facts, and how the expert applies the facts and methods to the case at hand. Amorgianos v. Nat l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 267 (2d Cir. 2002). Although the Court in Daubert focused on an expert s methodology rather than his conclusions, [a] court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). flaws in reasoning will warrant exclusion. As Only serious long as an expert s scientific testimony rests upon good grounds, based on what is known, it should be tested by the adversary process competing expert testimony and active cross-examination rather than excluded from jurors scrutiny for fear that they will not grasp its complexities or satisfactorily weigh its inadequacies. Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of Puerto Rico Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596); Olin Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd s London, 468 F.3d 120, 134 (2d Cir. 2006) ( [Cross-examination] is an appropriate way of attacking weak expert testimony, rather than complete exclusion. ). 19 It is clear from the record evidence that Dr. Redfern has specialized knowledge and is adequately qualified under Rule 702 to testify in this matter. He has practiced dentistry for over 30 years; he specializes in oralfacial pain and maxillofacial radiology; he keeps up to date with the developments in research regarding BRONJ and has given presentations on the issue; he also has practical experience in that he has treated many patients that he believes developed ONJ from a bisphosphonate. The overwhelming focus of Merck s argument in support of its motion for summary judgment is whether Dr. Redfern used a scientifically valid methodology developed BRONJ from Fosamax. in concluding that Maley Merck initially argued that Dr. Redfern s testimony is inadmissible because his methodology was conclusory and failed to address the other potential factors that could have caused Plaintiff s injury. undercut by Dr. Redfern s ordered by the Court. testimony at the This argument is Daubert hearing Dr. Redfern explained that he reached his conclusion that Fosamax caused Plaintiff s injury through the use of a differential diagnosis. patient-specific process [D]ifferential diagnosis is a of elimination that medical practitioners use to identify the most likely cause of a set of signs and symptoms from a list of possible causes. Ruggiero v. Warner-Lambert Co., 424 F.3d 20 249, 254 (2d Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). [L]ike any process of elimination, it assumes that the final, suspected cause remaining after this process of elimination must actually be capable of causing the injury. Id. (quotation omitted). While an expert need not rule out every potential cause in order to satisfy Daubert, the expert s testimony must at least address obvious alternative causes and provide a reasonable explanation for dismissing specific alternate factors identified by the defendant. Israel v. Spring Indus., No. 98 CV 5106, 2006 WL 3196956, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2006); see also Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 202 (4th Cir. 2001) ( [I]f an expert utterly fails to consider alternative causes or fails to offer an explanation for why the proffered alternative cause was not the sole cause, a district court is justified in excluding the expert s testimony. ). Dr. Redfern reached his conclusion by reviewing the records of Plaintiff s treating physicians, who went through an extensive process of attempting to rule out various causes of Plaintiff s persisting jaw condition. From their records, including the inefficacy of standard courses of treatment such as antibiotics, and a pathology report with findings consistent with dead or dying bone, Dr. Redfern was able to rule out the other potential causes for her 21 injury, including trigeminal neuralgia, metastasis of breast cancer, bone tumors or cysts, fractures, and periodontal problems, and deduce that Plaintiff suffered from BRONJ caused by her Fosamax use. On cross-examination, Merck focused on what it viewed as fatal flaws in the reasoning Redfern s conclusions. and methodology behind Dr. Merck maintains, for example, that Dr. Redfern needed an additional MRI, which was never conduced, to diagnose Plaintiff with stage zero BRONJ because the existing radiology was not diagnostic; that he admitted on cross- examination that he did not recall reviewing a specific medical record which, according to Merck, cuts against his conclusion that Plaintiff did not have trigeminal neuralgia; and that Dr. Redfern s testimony regarding the exact mechanism by which bisphosphonates allegedly cause ONJ does not fully comport with the opinions of the general causation experts. Merck s objections to the soundness of Dr. Redfern s opinion are noted, but they do not lead the Court to conclude that there is such a large analytical gap between the conclusion as to warrant exclusion. medical records and his Cross-examination is the appropriate method for Merck to expose what it believes are flaws in Dr. Redfern s reasoning. Dr. Redfern s expert testimony is admissible on the issue of specific causation. 22 b. The Court does not Stage Zero BRONJ agree with Merck s position that Plaintiff s claim fails as a matter of law without evidence that she had exposed necrotic bone in her jaw. The BRONJ position paper was updated over one year ago based on new research in the field to include stage zero BRONJ, which does not require exposed necrotic bone. The AAOMS task force is comprised of highly regarded experts in this field, including Dr. causation. Dr. Marx, one of Plaintiff s experts on general Another expert on general causation in this matter, Hellstein, testified that he regards the AAOMS as the leading body in oral surgery (Sept. 16, 2009 Daubert Hr g Tr. at 357.); that the task force that drafted its position paper on BRONJ was a panel of careful and experienced researches in the field (Id. at 361.); and that he has adopted the staging system set forth in paper. (Id. at 352-53.) Merck seemingly ignores that, for those reasons, this Court already has recognized stage zero BRONJ. (S.D.N.Y. See 2009) In re Fosamax, (recognizing 645 stage F. zero Supp. 2d as sub-class a 164, 171 of patients with BRONJ); In re Fosamax, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 276 (finding that plaintiff developed ONJ no later than September 2003 because an expert testified that, in his opinion, plaintiff s symptoms as of that time could have been stage zero 23 BRONJ). Merck has not presented the Court any authority or expert that disagrees with the AAOMS s position that stage zero BRONJ should be considered an ONJ injury. Nor does Merck cite any authority that disputes that bisphosphonates can cause this less advanced form of the injury. Rather, Merck attempts to play on an inconsistency within the definition of BRONJ promulgated by the AAOMS and the experts in this matter. Specifically, Merck argues that BRONJ by definition requires exposed necrotic bone, so stage zero, which is not characterized by exposed necrotic bone, cannot be a recognized form of the condition. The AAOMS definition of BRONJ first set forth in 2006 must be read in light of the 2009 amendments. The Court is mindful of the apparent inconsistency of including stage zero into the spectrum of BRONJ injuries while that spectrum remains defined by exposed necrotic bone. It is important to note, though, that stage zero BRONJ is not merely a sub-clinical injury of those at risk of later developing BRONJ, but rather includes a class of patients including Plaintiff who present real symptoms, including aching jaw pain. Although the definitional inconsistency is troubling, it also seems highly dubious to the Court that the AAOMS would include stage zero within the spectrum of BRONJ injuries if it were something other than a less severe form of 24 the injury Moreover, Merck's position that stage zero BRONJ is merely a predecessor stage to the actual injury is further belied by the statement in the AAOMS position paper that the frequency at which stage zero patients advance to more serious stages of the disease currently is unknown. (Mayer Decl., Ex. 42, at 10.) Plaintiff's claim does not fail as a matter of law from a lack of evidence of exposed necrotic bone. Specific causation remains a material issue of fact for the jury, and therefore Merck' s motion is denied. 111. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for summary judgment on denied. causes Plaintiff's negligent Plaintiff does not of action, and 19, 2010 at 10:OO a.m. to warn contest dismissal of therefore warranty claims are dismissed. failure her strict claim all is other liability and The case will go trial on April Voir dire requests, requests to charge, and proposed verdict charts are to be provided to the Court and opposing counsel by the close of business on April 12, 2010. S O ORDERED. Dated: New York, New York January 27, 2010 i U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Judge
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