Spinelli, et al v. The City of New York, et al, No. 1:2002cv08967 - Document 50 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
Court Description: OPINION that through the two letters dated 10/22/10, the Parties have filed several motions in limine. These motions were fully submitted on 10/27/10. They are resolved as further set forth in this document. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 11/1/10) (cd)
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Spinelli, et al v. The City of New York, et al Doc. 50 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK x ANGELA SPINELLI and OLINVILLE ARMS, INC., Plaintiffs, 02 Civ. 8967 against OPINION CITY OF NEW YORK and PASQUALE CARABELLA, NEW YORK CITY POLICE SARGEANT, Defendants. x Sweet, D.J. Through two letters dated October 22/ 2010, the Part have filed several motions limine. submitted on October 27/ 2010. These motions were fully They are resolved below. Both Parties' Motions to Preclude Evidence Related to the Basis for the Suspension of Olinville's Firearm Dealer's License Plaintiffs seek to exclude evidence of the security conditions at Olinville and the state alert of New York City Police Department ("NYPD") on grounds that such evidence is irrelevant to this trial for damages and prejudicial. Defendants 1 Dockets.Justia.com seek to prevent Plaintiffs from presenting evidence challenging the basis for the NYPD's suspension of Olinville's license. The propriety of license revocation is not at issue. The Second Circuit already found that "[t]he record demonstrates that the City had sufficient cause to take 'prompt action' to address the security infractions at Olinville observed by [Captain] McSherry. [Plaintiffs], while downplaying these infractions, [have] never disputed them, and indeed, took strong action to remedy them." 160, 171 (2d Cir. 2004). Spinelli v. City of New York, 579 F.3d The Circuit court then remanded the case to this court for resolution of the damages arising from the violation of Plaintiffs' procedural due process rights. Id. at 175. However, Defendants may introduce the License Division Incident Notification Report, Incident Investigation Final Report, and November 20, 2001 Memorandum as background if these documents are qualified pursuant to FRE 803(6). Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Preclude Evidence in Support of Plaintiffs' Tortious Interference with Business Claim 2 Plaintiffs, their opposition letter dated October 26, 2010, state their intention to withdraw their tortious interference claim in light of endants' arguments. Defendants' Motion to Preclude Plaintiff Spinelli's Claim for Emotional Distress and Evidence in Support of That Claim Defendants have moved Court to dismiss Spinelli's for emotional distress as a matter of law, claiming that cannot have suffered emotional s were not violated as Olinvil stress where her due process ,not Spinelli, held the license to sell firearms. Emotional distress damages may awarded in a case where a plaintiff demonstrates that § 1983 actually suffered distress because of the denial of procedural due process itself." , 435 U.S. 247, 263 (1978) i --------see so Miner v. City of Is, 999 F.2d 655, 662 (2d Cir. 1993) --------------- Under the Due Process Clause of the Amendment, ions are considered persons and may bring actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for due process violations. s v. Bowman, 563 F. Supp. 456, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). A corporation's ability to "bring suit under section 1983 eliminates the recognition of a right in sharehol 3 to bring suit on the corporation's behalf." rd. at 459. Therefore, "[a] shareholder - even the sole shareholder - does not have standing to assert claims alleging wrongs to the corporation." Jones v. Niagara Frontier Trans. Authority, 836 F.2d 731, 736 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1979) (plaintiff "cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties") . Spinelli attempts to refute Defendants' contention that the license was only issued to Olinville by pointing to the Second Circuit's opinion in this case, which referred to a violation of "Spinelli's due process rights" and "Spinelli's license" being reinstated. F.3d 160, 174 Spinelli v. City of New York, 579 (2d Cir. 2004). However, the use of Spinelli's name in these instances did not constitute a finding that Spinelli was the licensee, nor was the issue of Spinelli's emotional damages presented to the Court of Appeals. 1 The License Division Incident Notification Report lists "Olinville Arms" as the licensee; the License Division Incident Investigation - Final Report lists "Olinville Arms, Inc. (Angela Spinelli)" as the licensee; and the November 20, 2001 Memorandum refers to a "Firearms Dealers License of the premise listed 1 On appeal the court referred to "Olinville's license" in the facts section 4 above," referring to Olinville Arms. Therefore, it appears that Olinville was the licensee whose due process rights were ated, and Spinelli may not emotional damages based on ation of Olinville's rights. However is presented creating an licensee l in the event that issue as to the identity that issue will is resolved in Spinelli/s favor 1 by the jury. If it may present evidence as to l emotional distress. Defendants' Motion to Limit Plaintiffs' Damages to Nominal Damages to the Extent Plaintiffs Cannot Establish That Olinville's License Would Have Been Restored The defendants contend that the plaintiffs are entitled to only nominal damages arising out of the period from the October 9 2001 1 to November 8 hearing should have been held. 1 er l according aintiffs are entitled to only nominal damages to De aintiffs establish that 01inville/s license e until the had their due process would have violated. 2001 suspens on which it has been determined that the post- the deprivat 1 ive notice for words In l Defendants claim that only obtain compensatory damages for the period when they prove 01 of its opinion. lle/s license would have 579 F.3d at 164-66. 5 s not been aintiffs may the date restored had no due process violations occurred and December 5, 2001, the date when Olinville's license was ac ly restored. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs were not actually harmed until the date the license would have been hearing. ter the post-deprivation Def. October 22, 2010 Letter at 5-6. However, the Second Circuit held as follows: The district court must t Spinelli to prove her damages, by comput the loss from the time the City should provided a prompt post-deprivation until December 5, 2001, when the suspension was lifted and the firearms were Ii, 579 F.3d at 175. In order to recover compensatory arising from a constitutional violation, a pI s injuries iff must demonstrate that she suffered an actual injury violation. constitut (S.D.N.Y. 1988). by the Soto v. Lord, 693 F. Supp. 8, 20 Where a plaintiff fails to prove injury, she is -entitled to recover nominal damages not to ., dollar." In based on the one Carey, 435 U.S. at 254-57. , the Supreme Court, addressing a § 1983 claim lure to provide adequate post-deprivation hearings to suspended public school students, expressly adopted the Circuit Court's ding that -if [the defendants] can 6 on remand that [the pI iffs] would have been suspended even if a proper hearing had been , then [the plaintiffs] will not be entitled to recover damages to compensate them for injuries caused by the suspensions." quotations omitted) i Id. at 260 (internal citations and see also Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 123 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing that "when a defendant has deprived property without affording him a for the proposition plaintiff of liberty or as required by the Due Process Clause, but the defendant would have been taken even if a proper s that the adverse action timely hearing had held, the plaintiff has not proved compensable injury and is ent led only to nominal damages.") . Under Carey, once Plaintiffs prove that they have f actual injuries as a result of violations at issue in this case, Defendants show process burden to lure to provide adequate notice and a post- deprivation hearing did not cause Plaintiffs' uries. 2 Soto, 2 The allocation of the burden to prove that the constitutional violation did not cause the aintiff's losses because the same result would have occurred absent the violation has been at issue. In Miner v. City of Glen Falls, 999 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1993), the Court held that this Circuit, the burden is normally on the ff to prove each element of a § 1983 claim, including those elements relating to damages. It was therefore [the plaintiff's] burden to show that the property or liberty deprivation for which he sought compensation would not have occurred had proper procedure been observed." at 660 (internal citations omitted). In restating the standard from Miner, this Court in Burka v. New York City Transit Authority, 747 F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1990), noted that "this rule is more burdensome on plaintiffs than the rule adapted in the majority of other circuits," where the burden is placed an the defendant. Id. at 221, citing Patterson v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 7 693 F. Supp. at 21. Defendants may carry the same result would have process violation[s].ff It is so s burden by "proving reached absent the due Id. orde New York, NY November ,2010 i U.S.D.J. 564, 568-69 (2d Cir. 1990). Placing the burden on the defendant to prove that the constitutional violation had no actual effect follows the standard stated in Car!!1: and confirmed in .I<!!ElTlan and parallels the burden placement in the majority of circuits. It is deemed appropriate here where the notice of suspension has been held inadequate. 8
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