Prior v. Medved, et al, No. 9:2017cv01118 - Document 7 (N.D.N.Y 2017)

Court Description: DECISION AND ORDER: ORDERED that "Franklin Correctional Facility" is DISMISSED as a defendant in this Section 1983 action seeking money damages on Eleventh Amendment grounds; the Clerk shall modify the docket accordingly. ORDERED that if plaintiff wishes to proceed with this action he must file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the filing date of this Decision and Order. ORDERED that upon the filing of an amended complaint as directed above, the Clerk shall retur n the file to this Court for review. ORDERED that in the event plaintiff fails to file a signed amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the filing date of this Decision and Order, the Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this action without prejudice due to plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and to comply with the terms of this Decision and Order, without further order of this Court. Signed by Judge Brenda K. Sannes on 12/19/17. (Notice of Compliance Deadline 1/19/2018, Case Review Deadline 2/20/2018.) (Attachments: # 1 Unpublished Decision Cited)(alh, ) (served on plaintiff by regular and certified mail)

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Prior v. Medved, et al Doc. 7 Att. 1 Hudson v. Artuz, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (1998) 1998 WL 832708 1998 WL 832708 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, S.D. New York. Theodore HUDSON, Plaintiff, v. Christopher ARTUZ, Warden Philip Coombe, Commissioner Sergeant Ambrosino Doctor Manion Defendants. No. 95 CIV. 4768(JSR). | Nov. 30, 1998. FACTS Attorneys and Law Firms Mr. Theodore Hudson, Great Meadow Correctional Facility, Comstock. Alfred A. Delicata, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, New York. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER BUCHWALD, Magistrate J. *1 Plaintiff Theodore Hudson filed this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on April 26, 1995. Plaintiff's complaint alleges defendants violated his constitutional rights while he was an inmate at Green Haven Correctional Facility. 1 Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed sua sponte by Judge Thomas P. Griesa on June 26, 1995 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). On September 26, 1995, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. 1 Plaintiff is presently Correctional Facility. incarcerated By Judge Rakoff's Order dated April 14, 1998, this case was referred to me for general pretrial purposes and for a Report and Recommendation on any dispositive motion. Presently pending is defendants' renewed motion to dismiss. Plaintiff filed a reply on July 6, 1998. For the reasons discussed below, plaintiff's complaint is dismissed without prejudice, and plaintiff is granted leave to replead within thirty (30) days of the date of the entry of this order. at Sullivan The case was reassigned to Judge Barbara S. Jones on January 31, 1996. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) on November 25, 1996. Thereafter, the case was reassigned to Judge Jed S. Rakoff on February 26, 1997. On February 26, 1998, Judge Rakoff granted defendants' motion to dismiss, but vacated the judgment on April 10, 1998 in response to plaintiff's motion for reconsideration in which plaintiff claimed that he never received defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by four inmates in the Green Haven Correctional Facility mess hall on March 14, 1995. (Complaint at 4.) He alleges that he was struck with a pipe and a fork while in the “pop room” between 6:00 p.m. and 6:30 p.m. (Complaint at 4–5.) Plaintiff contends that the attack left him with 11 stitches in his head, chronic headaches, nightmares, and pain in his arm, shoulder, and back. (Id.) Plaintiff also states that Sergeant Ambrosino “failed to secure [the] area and separate” him from his attackers. (Reply at 5.) Plaintiff's claim against Warden Artuz is that he “fail [sic] to qualify as warden.”(Complaint at 4.) Plaintiff names Commissioner Coombes as a defendant, alleging Coombes “fail [sic] to appoint a qualified warden over security.”(Amended Complaint at 5.) Plaintiff further alleges that Dr. Manion refused to give him pain medication. (Complaint at 5.) Plaintiff seeks to “prevent violent crimes” and demands $6,000,000 in damages. (Amended Complaint at 5.) Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that: (1) the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against state defendants for money damages; (2) the plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim for a constitutional violation; (3) the defendants are qualifiedly immune from damages; and (4) plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing this suit. DISCUSSION I find that plaintiff's complaint runs afoul of Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and dismiss the complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend. Federal Rule 8 requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of this Rule “is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 Dockets.Justia.com Hudson v. Artuz, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (1998) 1998 WL 832708 permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer [and] prepare an adequate defense.”Powell v. Marine Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y.1995) (quoting Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C.1977)); see Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir.1988) (stating that the “principal function of pleadings under the Federal Rules is to give the adverse party fair notice of the claim asserted so as to enable him to answer and prepare for trial”). *2 Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires, inter alia, that the allegations in a plaintiff's complaint be made in numbered paragraphs, each of which should recite, as far as practicable, only a single set of circumstances. Moore's Federal Practice,Vol. 2A, ¶ 10.03 (1996). Rule 10 also requires that each claim upon which plaintiff seeks relief be founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence. Id. 2 The purpose of Rule 10 is to “provide an easy mode of identification for referring to a particular paragraph in a prior pleading.”Sandler v. Capanna, 92 Civ. 4838, 1992 WL 392597, *3 (E.D.Pa. Dec.17, 1992) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1323 at 735 (1990)). 2 Rule 10 states: (b) Paragraphs; Separate Statements. All averments of claim or defense shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single set of circumstances; and a paragraph may be referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings. Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be stated in a separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth. A complaint that fails to comply with these pleading rules “presents far too heavy a burden in terms of defendants' duty to shape a comprehensive defense and provides no meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of” a plaintiff's claims. Gonzales v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y.1996). It may therefore be dismissed by the court. Id.; see also Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d at 42 (“When a complaint does not comply with the requirement that it be short and plain, the court has the power to, on its own initiative, ... dismiss the complaint”). Dismissal, however, is “usually reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.”Id. In those cases in which the court dismisses a pro se complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8, it should give the plaintiff leave to amend when the complaint states a claim that is on its face nonfrivolous. Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir.1995). In determining whether a nonfrivolous claim is stated, the complaint's allegations are taken as true, and the “complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”Conley v.. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The complaint of a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed in his favor when determining whether he has stated a meritorious claim. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). Even if it is difficult to determine the actual substance of the plaintiff's complaint, outright dismissal without leave to amend the complaint is generally disfavored as an abuse of discretion. See Salahuddin, 861 F.2d at 42–42;see also Doe v. City of New York, No. 97 Civ. 420, 1997 WL 124214, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.12, 1997). Here, plaintiff's pro se complaint fails to satisfy the requirements of Federal Rules 8 and 10. The complaint is often illegible and largely incomprehensible, scattering what appear to be allegations specific to plaintiff within a forest of headnotes copied from prior opinions. Defendants have answered with a boilerplate brief, which is perhaps all a defendant can do when faced with such a complaint. The Court is left with an insurmountable burden in attempting to make a reasoned ruling on such muddled pleadings. *3 Although plaintiff's complaint is substantially incomprehensible, it appears to plead at least some claims that cannot be termed frivolous on their face. For example, plaintiff clearly alleges that inmates assaulted him and that Dr. Manion refused to provide him medical attention. He also appears to assert that Sergeant Ambrosino failed to protect him from the attack or take steps to prevent future attacks. (Plaintiff's Reply at 5). It is well established that an inmate's constitutional rights are violated when prison officials act with deliberate indifference to his safety or with intent to cause him harm. Hendricks v. Coughlin, 942 F.2d 109 (2d Cir.1991). It is similarly well established that an inmate's constitutional rights are violated when a prison doctor denies his request for medical care with deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied,513 U.S. © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 Hudson v. Artuz, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (1998) 1998 WL 832708 1154, 115 S.Ct. 1108, 130 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1995). Although plaintiff provides few facts to support his allegations, I disagree with defendants' assertion that outright dismissal is appropriate because it “appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”Defendant's Memorandum at 5 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Because plaintiff's complaint does not comply with Rules 8 and 10, it is hereby dismissed without prejudice, and plaintiff is granted leave to replead within thirty (30) days of the date of the entry of this Order. In drafting his second amended complaint, plaintiff is directed to number each paragraph and order the paragraphs chronologically, so that each incident in which he alleges a constitutional violation is described in the order that it occurred. Plaintiff is also directed to specifically describe the actions of each defendant that caused plaintiff harm, and to do so in separate paragraphs for each defendant. End of Document Plaintiff's complaint shall contain the facts specific to the incidents plaintiff alleges occurred, and not any facts relating to any case that has been decided previously by a court of law. Plaintiff's complaint shall also contain a clear statement of the relief he seeks in addition to monetary damages. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff's complaint is dismissed without prejudice, and plaintiff is granted leave to replead within thirty (30) days of the date of the entry of this Order. IT IS SO ORDERED. All Citations Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 1998 WL 832708 © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 Sheehy v. Brown, 335 Fed.Appx. 102 (2009) 335 Fed.Appx. 102 This case was not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter. United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. Sandra SHEEHY, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Thomas P. BROWN, et al., Defendants-Appellees. No. 08-0102-cv. | June 23, 2009. Synopsis Background: Plaintiffs appealed, pro se, a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, Telesca, J., sua sponte dismissing their complaint. Plaintiffs failed to allege the formation of a conspiracy, and overt acts in furtherance of such conspiracy, as required to state a claim for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985. 25 Cases that cite this headnote *103 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Attorneys and Law Firms Sandra Sheehy, pro se. Robert Sheehy, pro se. Patrick Sheehy, pro se. Bobbi Sheehy, pro se. Holdings: The Court of Appeals held that: Billie Sheehy, pro se. [1] plaintiffs failed to establish § 1983 claims arising out of their allegedly false prosecutions, and [2] plaintiffs failed to state a claim for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights. Casey Sheehy, pro se. Sherry Sheehy, pro se. PRESENT: Hon. PIERRE N. LEVAL, Hon. ROSEMARY S. POOLER and Hon. B.D. PARKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed. SUMMARY ORDER West Headnotes (2) [1] Civil Rights Criminal prosecutions Plaintiffs failed to allege that their convictions or sentences were invalidated or otherwise expunged, as required to establish § 1983 claims arising out of their allegedly false prosecutions. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 9 Cases that cite this headnote [2] Conspiracy Pleading **1 Plaintiffs-Appellants Sandra, Robert, Patrick, Bobbi, Billie, Casey, and Sherri Sheehy, pro se, appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Telesca, J.), sua sponte dismissing the complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts, procedural history and issues on appeal. Having reviewed de novo the district court's sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(e), see Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir.2001), we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing Appellants' complaint. [1] First, any 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or § 1983 claim against Appellees Lucy or Edward Sherwood, Thomas Fuoco, Mark Wattenberg, or Steve Presutti was properly dismissed, as © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 Sheehy v. Brown, 335 Fed.Appx. 102 (2009) private actors and institutions generally are not proper § 1983 defendants. See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50, 119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999) (§ 1983 actions do not reach purely private conduct). Additionally, for an individual to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, he or she “must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal ... or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus....” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Thus, any § 1983 claims arising out of the allegedly false prosecutions of Sandra, Patrick, or Robert Sheehy were appropriately dismissed, as Appellants did not allege that their convictions or sentences were invalidated or otherwise expunged. Id. *104 As for the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the Allegany County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and Appellee Presutti, claims against these defendants were properly dismissed, as Appellants did not allege any wrongdoing on their part or specify how they were involved in the constitutional violations alleged. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Next, to the extent that Appellants challenge the conduct of county district attorneys or state court judges, such actors are entitled to immunity. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 766, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). Appellants also assert § 1983 claims against: (1) county sanitation workers for entering the Sheehys' property, in violation of their property and privacy rights; (2) state troopers for use of excessive force and retaliation; and (3) Allegany County Department of Social Services employees for entering the Sheehys' property and removing the Sheehy children from their homes, in violation of their First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendment rights. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Thus, a pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” will not suffice. Id. End of Document (internal citations and alterations omitted). We conclude that because the Appellants' § 1983 allegations are so vague as to fail to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them, the district court did not err in dismissing them. **2 [2] Appellants also assert claims under § 1985, for which a plaintiff must allege: (1) a conspiracy, (2) which has an intent or purpose to deprive a person of equal protection of the law; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) which results in an injury to a person, or a person's property, or the deprivation of a federal constitutional right. See Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir.1993) (per curiam). Here, the Appellants' claims of conspiracy failed to specifically allege (1) the formation of a conspiracy; or (2) overt acts in furtherance of such conspiracy. Thus, the district court correctly dismissed any claims brought pursuant to §§ 1985 and 1986. To the extent that Appellants assert claims based on the violation of federal criminal statutes, such as 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242, these claims are not cognizable, as federal criminal statutes do not provide private causes of action. See Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 511 (2d Cir.1994). In addition, any claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, which prohibits the exclusion of individuals from a federally funded program or activity on the basis of race, color, or national origin, properly was dismissed, as Appellants did not allege that they were excluded from a federally funded program or activity and, thus, no claim exists under that statute. Similarly, although former 42 U.S.C. § 13981 authorized a cause of action arising out of a crime of violence motivated by gender, the Supreme Court has held that statute unconstitutional. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000). We have reviewed Appellants' remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. We also note here that we see no *105 indication in the record that Appellants perfected service on any of the defendants in this case. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. All Citations 335 Fed.Appx. 102, 2009 WL 1762856 © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2

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