Clay v. Chobani LLC et al, No. 1:2015cv04698 - Document 20 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
Court Description: ORDER Denying Plaintiff's 10 Motion to Remand. Signed by Judge Roger T. Benitez on 8/10/2015. (knb) [Transferred from California Southern on 8/11/2015.]
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:'-- ! ,--"'"""". r"1 L1:: L) 1 2 2015 AUG I 0 PI1 I: 13 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CHAYLA M. CLAY, on behalf of 12 CASE NO. 14cv2258 (BEN) (DBH) herself and others similarly situated, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 13 14 vs. MOTION TO REMAND Plaintiff, 15 16 17 CHOBANI LLC; SAFEWAY, INC.; and THE VONS COMPANIES, INC., 18 19 Defendants. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Before this Court is a Motion to Remand to the San Diego Superior Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), filed by PlaintiffChayla M. Clay. Plaintiffs motion is denied. I. BACKGROUND According to the Complaint, PlaintiffChayla M. Clay is a citizen of the state of California and resides in San Diego County. Over the last three years, Plaintiff has purchased Chobani yogurt for personal consumption within California. Id. Chobani is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal executive office " 1- 14cv2258-BEN Dockets.Justia.com 1 in New York and is a citizen of Delaware and New York_ Defendant Safeway, Inc. 2 is a Delaware corporation headquartered in California. Defendant The Vons 3 Companies, Inc. is a Michigan corporation headquartered in California. /d. Vons 4 and Safeway were distributors ofChobani's yogurt in California during the Class 5 Period. 6 Plaintiff filed her Complaint on August 21,2014, in the Superior Court of the 7 State of California County of San Diego (Case No.: 37-2014-00028267-CU-BT8 CTL). According to the Complaint, Chobani "has become the best-selling brand of 9 Greek yogurt in the United States." The Plaintiff seeks to represent a California 10 class including "[a]ll persons who, while residing in California within the last four 11 (4) years, made retail purchases in California ofthe Chobani Products and/or such 12 subclasses as the Court may deem appropriate."! (Compl. 55). Plaintiff states 13 that she "is informed and believes that there are hundreds ofthousands of Class 14 members." (Compl. 58). According to the Complaint, however, the amount in 15 controversy "likely does not exceed the sum or value of$5,000,000." (Compl. 16 17 14-15; Defs.' Notice of Removal 28) (emphasis added). Plaintiff alleges California state law claims. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges a 18 violation of California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 19 17200, et seq.; False Advertising Law (F AL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500, et 20 seq.; Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750, et seq.; and 21 negligent misrepresentation. The Complaint alleges that Chobani generated 22 revenues estimated to be $1 billion for the year 2012; and in California alone, 23 Defendants have "collected tens of millions of dollars." (Compl. 14). "As a 24 result of Defendants' wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and members ofthe Class have 25 suffered and continue to suffer economic losses and other general and specific 26 ! Plaintiff later restates the class as "I a}ll r.erson [sic] who, while residing in California within the applicable statute of lImItations, made retail purchases, within 28 California, ofChobani Products(s) and/or such subclasses as Plaintiffand/or Court may deem appropriate." 27 -2- !4cv2258-BEN 1 damages, including but not limited to the amounts paid for the Products, and any 2 interest that would have been accrued on those monies." (Compl. 71). 3 On September 23,2014, Defendants removed the state action on the ground 4 that this Court has original jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of2005 5 (CAFA). 6 Attached to the Notice of Removal, Defendants submitted the Declaration of 7 John Bellardini (First Bellardini Declaration). According to the declaration, 8 Bellardini is the Vice President of Finance and the Treasurer for Chobani, LLC. 9 Bellardini declares with "certainty that Chobani's revenues from the sale of the 10 Challenged Products in California during the last four years has been substantially 11 in excess of $5 million." (First Bellardini Decl. 1,2,3). According to Bellardini, 12 the amount Plaintiff seeks would be even higher due to the other Defendants' 13 retailers' markup, which are not reflected in his calculations. (First Bellardini Decl. 14 5). 15 Defendants' Notice of Removal further states that a factually similar class 16 action was filed before Plaintiffs Complaint. Specifically, on June 19,2013, Stoltz, 17 et al. v. Chobani, LLC, et al. was filed in the Eastern District of New York against 18 one of the same Defendants in this case, Chobani, LLC. 2 Stoltz also alleges a 19 violation of "California Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et 20 seq., and California's Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et 21 seq." 22 23 Plaintiff now seeks a remand back to the California state courts. II. DISCUSSION 24 25 Plaintiff argues that the Defendants cannot establish the amount in 26 controversy exceeds $5,000,000 because the First Bellardini Declaration is 27 28 2 Stoltz, et al. v. Chobani, LLC, et al., 14-cv-03827, ECF No.1 (E.D.N.Y. June 19,2014) -3- 14cv2258-BEN 1 inadmissible hearsay, and the declaration does not contain "any numbers that serve 2 as a basis for his findings_" In response, Defendants filed a second Bellardini 3 Declaration which states that the amount in controversy far exceeds $5,000,000 for 4 a single year alone. Defendants also point out that Plaintiffs own factual 5 allegations establish an amount in controversy in excess of $5,000,000. As 6 explained later, the amount in controversy requirement for CAF A jurisdiction has 7 been satisfied for this stage of the proceedings. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Plaintiff also argues the "local controversy" exception. According to Plaintiff, the facts of both her Complaint and the Stoltz complaint are the same, but her claims are purely local. Because the plaintiffs in Stoltz amended their complaint to include a California subclass after Plaintiffs Complaint here was filed, the argument goes that no other similar class action existed when Plaintiff filed her Complaint in state court. As discussed below, the local controversy exception does not apply. 15 16 III. LEGAL STANDARDS 17 CAFA provides a federal district court with original jurisdiction over a 18 putative class action when the parties are minimally diverse, the putative class 19 consists of at least 100 members, and the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds 20 the threshold amount of$5,000,000. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2); 28 U.S.c. § 21 1332(d)(5)(B); see Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc_, 478 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 22 2007). In determining whether that threshold is met, the claims of the individual 23 class members are aggregated. 28 U.S.c. § 1332(d)(6). These rules apply to 24 proposed classes and it does not matter whether the class has yet been certified. 28 25 U.S.c. § 1332(d)(8). However, whether the class has been certified matters if the 26 Plaintiff attempts to stipulate to an amount below the CAF A threshold amount. See 27 Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1349 (2013) (holding Plaintiff 28 -4- 14cv2258-BEN 1 may not stipulate to the minimum amount in controversy for the class before a class 2 is certified). 3 4 5 6 7 8 "CAFA's primary objective [is to ensure] Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance." Standard Fire Ins. Co., 133 S. Ct. at 1350 (2013) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). However, there is an exception to federal CAF A jurisdiction known as the "local controversy" exception. Serrano, 478 F.3d at 1023. The "party seeking remand bears the burden to prove an exception to CAFA's jurisdiction." Serrano, 478 F.3d at 1022. 9 IV. ANALYSIS 10 11 A. Removal Under CAFA 12 The parties disagree over whether CAF A was properly invoked by the 13 14 Defendants. This Court finds that it has original jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs 15 putative class action under CAF A. 16 1. The Parties Are Minimally Diverse 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Parties to a class action are minimally diverse when "any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(I)(2); see Serrano, 478 F.3d at 1021. Because neither party contests that Plaintiff is a citizen of California, one looks to whether any of the Defendants are minimally diverse from the Plaintiff. For purposes of28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) and § 1453, a corporation is deemed to be a citizen of the state where it has its principal place of business and the state under whose laws it is organized. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). The principal place of business "should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters." Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77,93 (2010). 28 -5- 14cv2258·BEN 1 Defendant, Chobani, LLC is organized under the laws of Delaware and 2 headquartered in New York. Thus, Chobani is a citizen of Delaware and New York. 3 Because the Plaintiff is a citizen of California, CAFA's minimal diversity 4 requirement is satisfied. 5 2. The Proposed Class Exceeds 100 Members 6 7 8 A plaintiffs allegations may satisfy CAFA's numerosity requirement. See Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2013); see 9 also Visendi v. Bank ofAm., N.A., 733 F.3d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 2013). There is no 10 11 argument on this point. 3. The Amount in Controversy Exceeds $5,000,000 12 "In any class action, the claims of the individual class members shall be 13 14 aggregated to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value 15 of $5,000,000, exclusive of interests and costs." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6). When a 16 defendant alleges the amount in controversy exceeds the CAFA threshold, the 17 notice to remove need only include "a plausible allegation that the amount in 18 controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold." Dart Cherokee Basin Operating 19 Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014) (holding the district court 20 erroneously remanded to state court when the defendant had submitted an affidavit 21 in support of his calculation on the amount in controversy). "[T]he defendant's 22 amount-in-controversy allegation should be accepted when not contested by the 23 plaintiff or questioned by the court." Id. at 553. However, when those allegations 24 are challenged by the plaintiff, Dart says: "both sides submit proof and the court 25 decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy 26 requirement has been satisfied." Id. at 553-4 (internal quotations omitted). 27 28 Here, Defendants have submitted two declarations of an executive officer. The Ninth Circuit has not yet detailed a procedure for the submission of evidence - 6- 14cv2258-BEN 1 when a plaintiff controverts the defendant's allegation on the minimum amount in 2 controversy. However, two opinions provide guidance: Ibarra v. Manheim 3 Investments, Inc., 775 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2015) and LaCross v. Knight Transp. 4 Inc., 775 F.3d 1200, 1202-03 (9th Cir. 2015). Under these decisions, Defendants 5 must "persuade the court that the estimate of damages in controversy is a reasonable 6 one." Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197-98. The district court should consider "real 7 evidence and the reality of what is at stake in the litigation," and provide each party 8 a "fair opportunity to submit proof." Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1198, 1200 (emphasis 9 added). The "evidence may be direct or circumstantial. .. [and] may require a chain 10 of reasoning that includes assumptions ... [that] need some reasonable ground 11 underlying them." Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199-200. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 LaCross further concludes that defendants satisfy that burden of proof when they "rel[y] on a reasonable chain oflogic" based on the allegations of the complaint, and "present[] sufficient evidence to establish that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million." LaCross, 775 F.3d at 1201 (reversing district court's judgment that the amount in controversy was not satisfied); see also Unutoa v. Interstate Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 2: 14-CV-09809-SVW-PJ, 2015WL 898512, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2015) ("a court should deny a motion to remand where a defendant calculates the amount in controversy by relying on the clear allegations of the complaint regarding the frequency of violation and potential liability calculations supported by real evidence"). Here, Defendants have presented a reasonable chain oflogic supported by the Bellardini Declarations, and relying on Plaintiffs own allegations. 24 25 First, it is worth noting that while Plaintiffs Complaint stipulates that the 26 amount in controversy "likely" does not exceed the CAF A threshold, the stipulation 27 means little. Standard Fire held that before a class is certified, the lead plaintiff 28 lacks the authority to bind class members on the amount in controversy because of -7- 14cv2258·BEN 1 the possibility that the "stipulation may not survive the class certification process." 2 Standard Fire, 133 S. Ct. at 1348-49 (finding that in erroneously remanding the 3 case to state court, the District Court should have ignored the stipulation by the lead 4 Plaintiff of an uncertified class that the minimum amount in controversy will not 5 exceed the $5,000,000 CAFA threshold); see also Rodriguez v. AT & T Mobility 6 Servs. LLC, 728 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasizing that the district court is 7 to ignore nonbinding stipulations made by a plaintiff on the amount in controversy). 8 At this stage, the class has not been certified and Plaintiff therefore lacks the 9 authority to stipulate that the minimum amount in controversy will not exceed the 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 CAFA threshold. Second, Defendants have relied on the factual allegations ofthe Complaint. LaCross, 775 F.3d at 1201. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs own factual allegations indicate the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. Plaintiffs own Complaint states that "[a]s a direct result of Defendants' unlawful and deceptive sales practices" and "based on public filings with the federal government," Chobani generated revenues estimated to be $1 billion for the year 2012; and in California alone, Defendants have "collected tens of millions of dollars." Assuming the allegations of the Complaint are true, the putative class is entitled to the "tens of millions of dollars" that Defendants have collected. 20 21 Nor has Plaintiff submitted any evidence, such as her own affidavit, 22 indicating what she payed for the allegedly mislabeled products and from which 23 other calculations could be reasonably extrapolated. See Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199 24 ("Ibarra contested the assumption, but did not assert an alternative violation rate 25 grounded in real evidence, such as an affidavit by Ibarra asserting how often he was 26 denied meal and rest breaks."). 27 28 In relying on the allegations of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendants have thus established a "reasonable chain oflogic." LaCross, 775 F.3d at 1200, 1201. With -8- 14cv22S8·BEN 1 respect to Ibarra's "real evidence," Plaintiff contests the admissibility of the First 2 Bellardini Declaration as hearsay, on the grounds that its assertions must be 3 supported by facts or numbers under Gaus and Lowdermilk. Neither of these cases 4 apply.3 When considering the amount in controversy on a motion to remove, 5 "summary-judgment-type" evidence, such as affidavits or declarations, are to be 6 considered. Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1198, 1200; Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 7 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). Mr. Bellardini, as the Vice President of Finance and the 8 Treasurer for Chobani, LLC., declares under his general knowledge and experience 9 gained while working for Chobani, specific knowledge gained "by virtue of the 10 duties, responsibilities, and obligations of [his] current position at Chobani, and 11 personal knowledge obtained in the ordinary course of business and from reviewing 12 corporate records created maintained by Chobani," with "certainty that Chobani's 13 revenues from the sale of the Challenged Products in California during the last/our 14 years has been substantially in excess of$5 million." (First Bellardini DecI. 15 3) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs allegation is further supported because Mr. 16 Bellardini declares that "Chobani's revenues from the sale of all Challenged 17 Products in California over the entirety of the Class Period would be substantially in 18 excess" of$5,000,000. (First Bellardini DecI. 19 Bellardini also declares, "with certainty that Chobani's revenues from the California 20 sales of the Challenged Products in 2013 alone, i.e. a single year ofthe class period, 21 were well in excess of $5 million." (Second Bellardini DecI. 22 statements directly support the Plaintiffs allegation that "tens of millions" have 23 been collected in California, and that Chobani's "estimated sales revenue in 2012" 24 was $1,000,000,000. (CompI. 1,2, 4) (emphasis added). Mr. 5). Both ofthese According to Mr. Bellardini, the amount 25 26 27 28 3 Gaus is distinguishable because it did not deal with removal under CAF A original jurisdiction. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992). Lowdermilk has been effectively overruled by Standard Fire Insurance. Standard Fire, 133 S. Ct. at 1348-49; Rodriguez v. AT& T MobilityServs. LLC, 728 F.3d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 2013) ("we hold that Lowdermilkhas been effectively overruled, and that the proper burden of proof imposed upon a defendant to establish the amount in controversy is the preponderance of the evidence standard. "); see Lowdermilk v. us. Bank Nat'l Ass 'n, 479 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2007). - 9- 14cv2258-BEN 1 Plaintiff seeks would be even higher due to the other Defendants' retailers' markup, 2 which are not reflected in his calculations. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 The evidence submitted by Defendants supports their conclusion that Plaintiff's own Complaint puts the amount in controversy in excess of$5,000,000. "[T]he reality of what is at stake in the litigation" is beyond the CAFA threshold requirement because Plaintiff has put an amount more than $5,000,000 into controversy. Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1198. Defendants have satisfied their burden. Because Defendants have satisfied their burden to establish original jurisdiction pursuant to CAFA, the burden now shifts to Plaintiff to prove that an exception to CAF A applies in order warrant a remand. 11 12 B. The Local Controversy Exception Does Not Apply 13 As previously mentioned, Plaintiff argues the "local controversy" exception 14 applies. A district court is to decline jurisdiction under CAFA when the matter is a 15 "local controversy." § 1332(d)(4). The Plaintiff "bears the burden to prove an 16 exception to CAFA'sjurisdiction." Serrano, 478 F.3d at 1021-22. The local 17 controversy rule is: 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 A district court shall decline to exercise jurisdiction ... (A)(i) over a class action in which - (I) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggreg,.ate are citizens ofthe State in which the action was originally fiIea; (11) at least 1 defendant is a defendant - (aa) from wnom significant relief is sought by members of the plaintiff class; (bb) whose a1leged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by' the proposed plaintiff class; ana (cc) who is a citizen of the State in wliich tlie action was originally filed; and (III) principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the State in which the action was originally filed; and (ii) during the 3-year period Qreceding the filing oftliat class action, no other class action has been tiled asserting the same or similar factual allegations against any ofthe defendants on behalf of the same or other persons[.] 26 27 28 - 10- 14cv2258-BEN 1 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4) (emphasis added). The exception is to be read mindful of 2 CAFA's primary objective, which is to ensure Federal court consideration of 3 interstate cases of national importance. 4 Standard Fire, 133 S. Ct. at 1350. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Under subsections 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(bb), when an allegedly defective product is sold in all fifty states, but a class action is only brought on behalf of an in-state class against an out-of-state manufacturer and a few in-state retailers, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the "local controversy" exception does not apply. The exception does not apply where "the great bulk of any damage award is sought from the manufacturer ... rather than from the local [retailers]." Coleman v. Estes Exp. Lines, Inc., 631 F.3d 1010,1018 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing the application of the "local controversy" rule in light of the Senate Judiciary Committee's intent stated in S. Rep No. 109-14). The exception requires that one "real" defendant be local. Id. Determining whether a particular defendant is "small change" can be made solely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint. Id. 15 16 According to the Complaint, Chobani is the real defendant. It sells the 17 allegedly mislabeled product in all fifty states, and the product "has become the 18 best-selling brand of Greek yogurt in the United States." (Compl. 14). 19 Defendants Vons and Safeway are distributors. (Compl. 21). Although the Vons 20 and Safeway have allegedly collected "tens of millions of dollars from the sale" of 21 Chobani yogurt, it is Chobani that has an "estimated sales revenue in 2012 of $1 22 billion." 23 Complaint indicate that the relief sought from Vons and Safeway is "small change" 24 compared to what is sought from the real defendant, Chobani. Coleman, 631 F.3d 14). Under subsection (d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(aa), the allegations of the 25 26 4"Congress enacted CAFA in 2005 to 'curb perceived abuses ofthe class action device whicfi, in the view of CAFA's proponents, had often been used to litigate multi state or even national class actions in state courts. '" Corber v. Xanoqyne Pharm., 28 Inc., 771 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 952 (9th Cir. 2009)). 27 - 11 - 14cv2258-BEN 1 at 1018_ The exception does not fit because the real Defendant, Chobani, is not a 2 citizen of California_ 3 Even if the requirements of subsection (d)(4 )(A)(i) were satisfied here (which Bridewell-Sledge v_ Blue Cross of California, a class action was not remanded 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 under the local controversy exception because it was filed second_ See Bridewell- Sledge v_ Blue Cross of California, No_ CV 14-04744 MMM CWX, 2015 WL 179779 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14,2015). There, two related class actions were filed on the same day against the same defendant. The first was filed "13 minutes and 50 seconds" before the second class action. Bridewell-Sledge, 2015 WL 179779, at *10. The court remanded the first action under the "local controversy" exception, but not the second action. 14 15 Here, Stoltz was filed first. Both the Stoltz action and the Complaint here 16 name the same defendant, Chobani. In fact, most ofthe Stoltz Complaint is copied 17 verbatim into Plaintiff s Complaint. The Stoltz action alleges a violation of the 18 same California laws at issue here. Stoltz, was filed approximately three months 19 prior to Plaintiffs Complaint. Therefore, this matter is not a true local controversy 20 under CAF A. The claims against Chobani are of substantial national interest, as 21 demonstrated by the existence of the first-filed New York Stoltz class action. 22 Standard Fire, 133 S. Ct. at 1350. Moreover, the controversy cannot be said to be 23 truly local under subsections §§ 1332(d)(4)(A)(i) or (d)(4)(A)(ii). Therefore, the 24 Plaintiff has failed to establish the matter as a "local controversy." 25 C. There is No Presumption Against Removal 26 27 28 The Plaintiff contends that removal was improper because there is a strong presumption against removal. The Court in Dart disagrees. "It suffices to point out - 12- 14cv2258-BEN '. 1 that no antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAF A, which Congress 2 enacted to facilitate adjudication of certain class actions in federal court." Dart, 135 3 S. Ct. at 554 (holding that the District Court erroneously applied a presumption 4 against removal of a CAFA claim). There is no presumption for CAFA cases. 5 V. CONCLUSION 6 7 8 Because the Defendants have shown by a preponderance of the evidence the minimum amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, this Court has original 9 jurisdiction under CAFA. Because Plaintiff has not satisfied her burden of proving 10 that an exception to CAF A jurisdiction applies, Plaintiffs Motion to Remand is 11 hereby DENIED. 12 DATED: ,2015 13 14 15 16 Hon. oger T. Benitez United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 13 - 14cv2258-BEN
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