Styka v. My Merchants Services LLC et al, No. 1:2014cv06198 - Document 29 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, In line with the foregoing, the Court's order granting pltff's motion for default judgment is amended, nunc pro tunc, to reflect the Court's finding that pltff has plausibly ple aded her claims, and the R&R of Magistrate Judge Scanlon with respect to damages is adopted in its entirety as the opinion of this Court. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment for pltff in the amount of $183,060, which includes $ 120,000 in compensatory damages for pain and suffering, $2000 in back pay, $50,000 in punitive damages, and $11,060 in attorney's fees. The Clerk of Court is further directed to close this case. (Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 6/28/16) c/m Fwd. for Judgment. (Galeano, Sonia)
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Styka v. My Merchants Services LLC et al Doc. 29 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK x KAT ARZYNA STYKA, Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER -against14 Civ. 6198 (ENV) (VMS) MY MERCHANTS SERVICES LLC, and JOSE VALERIO, Detendants. : ________________________________ 1_______________ x VITALIANO, D.J. I Plaintiff KatarzynaiStyka filed this action asserting claims against defendants My ! Merchants Services ("MMS") and Jose Valerio for gender and race-based discrimination, sexual harassment, a hostile work: environment, and retaliation. She proceeds under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law§ 296 et seq. (''NYSHRL"), and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code§ 8-107 et seq. (''NYCHRL"), as well as interposing claims under New York common law for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") and assault and battery. Compl., ECF No.1. By Memorandum and Order, dated September 25, 2015, Styka's motion for default judgment against defendants was granted and referred to Magistrate Judge Vera M. Scanlon for an .inquest to determine damages. Mem. & Order, ECF No. 21. I After conducting an inquest on February 16, 2016, Magistrate Judge Scanlon issued a report and recommendation, dated March 15, 2015 (the "R&R"), recommending that defendants I be held liable for an award of$183,060, consisting of$120,000 in compensatory damages for pain and suffering, $2000 in back pay, $50,000 in punitive damages, and $11,060 in attorney's I Dockets.Justia.com fees. With notice given, no party filed objections to the R&R, and the time in which to do so has expired. For the reasons stated below, the R&R is adopted in its entirety. Background Styka alleges that, in December 2013, she was hired by defendants to work as an ' administrative assistant. Compl. ifil 15-16. MMS is a Brooklyn business that installs credit card terminals and offers its cusLmers cash advances. Id ifil 9-10. Valerio is an owner ofMMS and I ' was plaintiffs supervisor. ,fd. I ifil 12-14. Plaintiff claims that she suffered, on a daily basis, racial and sexual harassment from Valerio consisting of crude verbal comments and text messages mocking the color of her skin and her Polish heritage. Compl. ifil 17-63; Tr. 18:14-23, ECF No. 26. She claims that Valerio demanded that she engage in a sexual relationship with him. Compl. ifil 17-63. On multiple occasions, Valerio physically forced himself on Styka in the workplace by kissing her or grabbing her breasts, thighs, or buttocks. Compl. ifil 21-22, 31, 54; Tr. 6:22-7:1, 8:4-7, 20:8-14, 22:4-11. Valerio offered her a raise in exchange for sex, then threated to fire her if she did not have sex with him. Compl. ifil 28-33, 45-50. He also attempted to kiss Styka's daughter, who hid under a desk. Id. if 39. Styka repeatedly rejected Valerio' s advances, told him to stop, threatened to go to the police, and alerted others at the company and his family members to his behavior. Compl. ifil 1763; Tr. 8:25-9;12, 10:15-22, 24:7-12, 25:4-12. It was all to no avail. Styka, who had no savings or other source of income, could not afford to quit her job; she searched for other work. Compl. I 34-35; Tr. 31: 15-20. Then, when she informed Valerio that she had another job opportunity, I I I I 2 he phoned that prospective employer and told them not to hire her. Tr. 9:5-12, 23:14-25, 31 :1520; R&R at 10. In or around early April 2014, Valerio fired Styka for refusing to have sex with him, then relented and hired her back about a half-hour later. Compl. 51-52; Tr. 23:16-18. On April 15, 2014, after Styka continued to reject Valerio's advances, he terminated her employment. Compl. 62-64. 1 Styka suffered, continues to suffer, anxiety and depression, which she attributes to defendants' actions, as well as insomnia, fatigue, and fluctuations in her weight. She sees a I psychiatrist and takes anti-depressant medication. Compl. 31:21-33:5. 65-66; Tr. 13:9-14:23, 29:7-25, I Legal Standard In reviewing the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge, a district judge "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). A districtjudge is required to "determine de nova any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Where no timely objection has been made, the district court may adopt the report and recommendation, "provided no clear error is apparent from the face of the record." Dafeng Hengwei Textile Co. v. Aceco Indus. & Commercial Corp., 54 F. Supp. 3d 279, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). Discussion In line with the re(erral order, the R&R presumes the defendants' liability and expressly I addresses only the issue of damages. Which leaves the recent Second Circuit precedent noting 1 Styka alleges that, after she was fired, she reported Valerio to the police, and that he pied guilty to sexual harassment. She reports that, as part of his sentence, Valerio was required to take an anti-sexual harassment class. Tr. 11 :3-16. 3 that, "[a] default ... only establishes a defendant's liability if [the pleadings] are sufficient to state a cause of action against thel defendant." Taizhou Zhongneng Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd v. Koutsobinas, ! 509 F. App'x 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2013); see City ofNew York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 137 (2d Cir. 2011). To state a claim forl discrimination under Title VII, "a plaintiff must plausibly allege that ( 1) the employer took adverse action against [her] and (2) [her] race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision." Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015); see Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S. Ct. I I 992, 994, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002) (explaining that the familiar McDonnell Douglas framework "is I an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement"). 2 To state a claim for retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that "(l) defendants discriminated-or took an adverse employment action-against [her], (2) "because" [she] has opposed any unlawful employment I practice." Vega, 801 F.3q at 90. A well-pled Title VII discrimination or retaliation claim is sufficient to support a corresponding claim under the NYSHRL, as well as under the NYCHRL, which provides even broader protection than its federal and state counterparts. See Gorokhovsky v. N. Y.C. Hous. Auth., 552 f. App'x 100, 102 (2d Cir. 2014); Erasmus v. Deutsche Bank Americas I Holding Corp., No. 15 Civ. 1398 (PAE), 2015 WL 7736554, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2015). There is absolutely no doubt that Styka has plausibly pleaded such claims. 2 I Additionally, a well-pied Title VII or NYSHRL hostile work environment claim requires "facts sufficient to support the that [the plaintiff] was faced with 'harassment . . . of such quality or quantity that a reasonable employee would find the conditions of her employment altered for the worse." Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 148 (2d Cir. 2003)); see Lenart v. Coach Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 61, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). The NYCHRL offers greater protections, in that it "does not require either materially adverse employment actions or severe and pervasive conduct." Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 1:14 (2d Cir. 2013). It is a pleading bar that Styka vaults with plenty to I spare. 4 This, of course, does not mean that there are no defenses, technical or otherwise, that either or both defendants might have raised to defeat these claims of discrimination had they chosen to I I I appear and defend them. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516, 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1245, I I 163 L. Ed. 2d 1097 (2006) ("[T]he threshold number of employees for application of Title VII is an element of a plaintiffs claim for relief, not a jurisdictional issue."). But, it is to say, critically, that she has pleaded sufficient facts to earn her day in court. Defendants' liability on those py their decision to default. sufficient facts was sealed I I Additionally, there are the state law claims, over which, given the decision by defendants I to default, the Court would pave exercised supplemental jurisdiction, even ifStyka's federal claims were not plausibly pied. "Courts must consider 'the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity' when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction." Kroshnyi v. U.S. PackCourierServs., Inc., 771F.3d93, 102 (2d Cir. 2014) (Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, ' I 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S. Ct. 614, 98 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1988)). On that basis, the exercise of I I supplemental jurisdiction be, and is, appropriate. See Estate of Shefner ex rel. Shefner v. Beraudiere, 582 F. App'x 9, 12 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding that, on a motion for default judgment, the district court had discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing all federal claims). I In any event, as to her NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims, Styka's pleadings are clearly I sufficient not only to plead such claims, but to establish defendants' liability for sex and race (ethnic) discrimination, sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation. 3 3 Styka has also plausibly pleaded her common law claims. Her claims of unwanted kissing and assault and battery. See United Nat. Ins. Co. v. Waterfront groping are sufficient to New York Realty Corp., 994 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1993) (explaining assault "is an intentional placing of another person fear of imminent harmful or offensive contact" and battery "is an contact with another person without consent"). "To state a claim intentional wrongful 5 With the plausibility of the pleadings resolved, the Court now turns to Magistrate Judge Scanlon's R&R. Given that no party objected to it, the R&R is reviewed in accordance with the applicable clearly erroneous standard of review. The Court finds the R&R to be correct, wellreasoned, and free of any clear error. The R&R explains that each category of damagescompensatory damages, lost pay, punitive damages, and attorney's fees-is available as against I each defendant, given NYSHRL and/or NYCHRL. R&R 13-34. For that reason, the R&R is ' adopted, in its entirety, as the opinion of the Court. Conclusion In line with the foregoing, the Court's order granting plaintiff's motion for default judgment is amended, nunc pro tune, to reflect the Court's finding that plaintiff has plausibly pleaded her claims, and the R&R of Magistrate Judge Scanlon with respect to damages is adopted in its entirety as the opinion of this Court. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $183,060, which includes $120,000 in compensatory damages for pain and suffering, $2000 in back pay, $50,000 in punitive damages, and $11,060 in attorney's fees. for [IIED], a party must allege '(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent to cause severe emotional distress, (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the injury, and (4) severe emotional distress."' Sesto v. Slaine, No. 15 Civ. 1118 (AJN), 2016 WL 1126537, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2016) (quoting Bender v. City ofNew York, 78 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1996)). Although claims for IIED must satisfy a notoriously high bar under New York law, courts have found that claims of sexual harassment accompanied by sexual battery may be sufficient to state a claim. See Cowan v. City of Mount Vernon, 95 F. Supp. 3d 624, 656 (S.D.N. Y. 2015) (collecting cases). Certainly, plaintiff's allegations involve extreme and outrageous conduct that would meet even that exacting standard. Again, while there may be technical or substantive defenses to some or all of the state law causes of action, all that is important here is whether Styka has plausibly pleaded enough to have her day in court. The reprehensible, indeed criminal, conduct she has pleaded is certainly enough for that. The opportunity defendants had to raise any of these defenses was voluntarily surrendered when they chose to default. 6 /s/ USDJ ERIC N. VITALIANO
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