Daniels v. New York City et al, No. 1:2014cv05267 - Document 17 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM & ORDER denying 7 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Ordered by Judge I. Leo Glasser on 7/30/2015.
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Daniels v. New York City et al Doc. 17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ------------------------------------------------------x BRIAN DANIELS, Plaintiff, MEMORAN D U M & ORD ER - against 14-CV-5267 (ILG) (CLP) NEW YORK CITY, et al., Defendants. ------------------------------------------------------x GLASSER, Senior United States District J udge: Plaintiff Brian Daniels brings this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two unknown New York City police officers and the City itself, alleging that the officers falsely arrested him after observing that the rear of his van displayed a sheet of paper with his license plate num ber written on it in lieu of an official license plate. The City now m oves to dism iss the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that it is clear from the face of the Com plaint that the officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiff. 1 For the following reasons, that m otion is DENIED. BACKGROU N D The following facts, subm itted by plaintiff, are accepted as true for purposes of deciding this m otion. Plaintiff, a Brooklyn resident, owns and drives a 15-person van registered and licensed in Florida. Com pl. (Dkt. No. 1) ¶¶ 6, 11. On or about May 5, 20 14, the license plates on his van were stolen. Id. ¶ 12. He reported that theft to the 69th Precinct of the New York City Police Departm ent on that sam e date, and was given an “Incident Inform ation Slip” confirm ing that he reported the crim e of petit larceny. 1 The unknown officers have not been identified or served, but the crux of the City’s argum ent is that if its officers did not com m it a constitutional violation, the City could not have comm itted one either. See Dkt. No. 8 at 3 (citing, inter alia, City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam)). 1 Dockets.Justia.com Peterson Opp. Decl. (Dkt. No. 15), Ex. D.2 After the theft, plaintiff placed a sheet of paper “in the rear” of the van upon which he had written his license plate num ber across the m iddle, the letters “FL” in the upper-right hand corner, and the words “LOST PLATE” in the lower-right hand corner. See id., Ex. A; Com pl. ¶ 15. Plaintiff also notified the Florida Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Departm ent (com m only known as the Departm ent of Motor Vehicles or “DMV”) of the theft and requested that replacem ent plates be sent to him in New York. Com pl. ¶ 14. On or about May 21, 20 14, at approxim ately 11:30 p.m ., plaintiff was seated in his parked van with the engine turned off outside of a friend’s residence in Brooklyn. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. A police car pulled up beside the van. Id. ¶ 18. Two officers exited the car and approached plaintiff’s window. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff told the officers that his license plates had been stolen and that he was awaiting replacem ents from the Florida DMV. Id. ¶ 20 . In support of these statem ents, he showed one of the officers his Florida driver’s license, Florida vehicle registration, insurance docum ents, and the Incident Inform ation Slip he received from the 69th Precinct. Id. ¶ 21; see also Peterson Opp. Decl., Exs. B-D. The other officer stated that he had “forged plates” and told him to exit his van. Com pl. ¶¶ 22-23. When plaintiff exited the van, that officer handcuffed and arrested him . Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff asked the officers to verify his report to the 69th Precinct that his license plates had been stolen, but the officers’ response was “don’t tell us how to do our job.” Id. ¶¶ 25-26. Plaintiff was taken to the 63rd Precinct, where he was processed and held on a felony charge of forgery. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. At approxim ately 8:0 0 a.m . on May 22, 20 14, 2 The m aterials plaintiff subm itted in opposition to the City’s m otion m ay be considered by the Court because they are documents plaintiff relied upon in drafting the Com plaint. See Cham bers v. Tim e Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 20 0 2). 2 the next day, plaintiff was transferred to Central Booking, where he rem ained until he was released without being charged at approxim ately 7:30 p.m . Id. ¶¶ 29-30 . His replacem ent license plates from Florida arrived shortly thereafter. Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff com m enced this action on Septem ber 4, 20 14, alleging that his arrest violated his right under the Fourth Am endm ent of the United States Constitution to be free from unreasonable seizure. The City m oved to dism iss the case on Decem ber 2, 20 14 (Dkt. No. 8), plaintiff opposed the m otion on J anuary 30 , 20 15 (Dkt. Nos. 14-15), and the City replied on February 20 , 20 15 (Dkt. No. 16). LEGAL STAN D ARD To survive a m otion to dism iss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a com plaint m ust contain “sufficient factual m atter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 0 9) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twom bly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (20 0 7)). Although detailed factual allegations are not necessary, m ere legal conclusions, “a form ulaic recitation of the elem ents of a cause of action,” or “naked assertions” by the plaintiff will not suffice. Id. (internal quotation m arks and citations om itted). The Court m ust accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the com plaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Matson v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of N.Y., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 20 11). This Com plaint fully com plies with Iqbal and Twom bly. D ISCU SSION In New York, a federal claim that an arrest violated the Fourth Am endm ent is substantially the sam e as a claim for false arrest under state law. E.g., Weyant v. Okst, 10 1 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996) (collecting cases). In either case, a plaintiff m ust show, “inter alia, that the defendant intentionally confined him without his consent and 3 without justification.” Id. (citing Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456 (1975)). “The existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and ‘is a com plete defense to an action for false arrest. . . .’” Id. (quoting Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 10 2 (2d Cir. 1994)). Probable cause is an objective standard “established ‘when the arresting officer has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy inform ation sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been com m itted by the person to be arrested.’” Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110 , 119 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting O’Neill v. Town of Babylon, 986 F.2d 646, 650 (2d Cir. 1993) (additional quotation m arks and citation omitted)). The City argues that the officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiff both for crim inal possession of a forged instrum ent (the only stated reason for the arrest) and for violating the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law’s requirem ents regarding license plates. Neither argum ent is availing. I. Crim in al Po s s e s s io n o f a Fo rge d In s tru m e n t Under New York law, a person is guilty of crim inal possession of a forged instrum ent in the third degree “when, with knowledge that it is forged and with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he utters or possesses a forged instrum ent.” N.Y. Penal Law § 170 .20 . An “instrum ent” is an item intended to convey inform ation or privilege that is “capable of being used to the advantage or disadvantage of som e person,” and it is “forged” when, inter alia, it is “falsely m ade,” m eaning it “purports to be an authentic creation of its ostensible m aker or drawer, but . . . is not . . . .” See id. §§ 170 .0 0 (1), (4), & (7). It would be m aking a needless fortress out of the dictionary, Cabell v. Markham , 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J .), to support the conclusion that the arrest 4 of this plaintiff for the crim e of forgery was baseless. The officer didn’t have an iota of trustworthy inform ation that the paper displayed was falsely m ade or m ade with intent to deceive. The City’s assertion that he did is bottom ed entirely on the inartful representation of plaintiff’s license plate. “. . . he [the plaintiff],” it contends, “m ust still reckon with the fact that he was driving his van with no official license plate affixed to it. The only identifying inform ation on the van was a single sheet of paper with the text ‘FL BHK-D43 LOST PLATE’ scrawled on it in what appears to be black m arker. These facts alone would warrant a reasonable officer to believe that plaintiff com m itted a crim e.” Def.’s Reply at 3. That argum ent is sheer sophistry in light of the arresting officer’s refusal to even glance at the 69th Precinct’s Incident Inform ation Slip, which plaintiff urged him to look at, and his perem ptory dism issal of plaintiff’s effort to explain that his lawfully-owned Florida license plate was stolen. Assum ing that he even bothered to listen, the officer’s behavior evinced a classic exam ple of conscious avoidance—a deliberate ignorance of the dispositive fact which would dispel even a suggestion of probable cause that the crim e of forgery was attem pted or com m itted. II. Traffic Vio latio n Perhaps doubtful that a reasonable officer would have an objectively reasonable belief that the crim e of forgery was the appropriate basis for plaintiff’s arrest, the City seeks refuge in Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (20 0 4), and the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law, which was not the stated cause of plaintiff’s arrest. Section 40 2(1)(a) of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law provides that “[n]o person shall operate, drive or park a m otor vehicle on the public highways of this state unless such vehicle shall have . . . a set of num ber plates issued by the com m issioner . . . , one on the front and one on the rear of such vehicle. . . .” That provision, the City contends, dispels liability, because 5 the officer’s “subjective reason for m aking the arrest,” forgery, “need not be the crim inal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.” Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153 (em phasis added). That is to say, if the arrest for forgery was objectively unreasonable, then the violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law can fill the probable cause vacuum , given the facts known to the officer. Not m entioned by the City is 15 N.Y.C.R.R. § 21.2(a), which provides that “[w]hen one or both registration num ber plates are m issing . . . a m otorist m ay operate or park the m otor vehicle upon the public highways . . . while waiting for the issuance of a duplicate of such m issing . . . plate[s] if the m otorist places a tem porary substitute plate . . . of the approxim ate size of the m issing plate[s]” on his vehicle. That regulation was obviously not obeyed by the arresting officer, who preferred to rem ain ignorant and consciously avoided knowing the facts to which Section 21.2(a) is specifically addressed. More im portantly, if the facts were known, they would have provided no cause for arresting the plaintiff, because he was in full com pliance with the law. Devenpeck is inapplicable and distinguishable factually in any event. In fine, according to the Com plaint, Mr. Daniels was the victim of a theft. His Florida license plates were stolen. He prom ptly placed a “tem porary substitute plate” on his van, divining the N.Y.C.R.R. in doing so. He reported the theft to the local police precinct. He received a confirm ation of that report from the police. He prom ptly notified the Florida DMV and requested replacem ent plates. He did everything that the law and prudence required. He tried to inform the officer who would arrest him of those facts but was rebuked for his effort, handcuffed, and thrown in jail, where he spent a night and m ost of the following day. In seeking relief for his harrowing experience, he has clearly stated a claim upon which relief m ay be granted. 6 CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the City’s m otion to dism iss the Com plaint is DENIED. SO ORDERED. Dated: Brooklyn, New York J uly 30 , 20 15 / s/ I. Leo Glasser Senior United States District J udge 7
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