Milk Wagon Drivers and Dairy Employees v. Elmhurst Dairy, Inc. et al, No. 1:2013cv05083 - Document 36 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)
Court Description: ORDER granting 8 Motion to Dismiss; granting 15 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Ordered by Judge I. Leo Glasser on 4/17/2014. (Parachini, Alexander)
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Milk Wagon Drivers and Dairy Employees v. Elmhurst Dairy, Inc. et al Doc. 36 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ------------------------------------------------------x MILK WAGON DRIVERS & DAIRY EMPLOYEES, Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - against - 13 CV 50 83 (ILG) (VVP) ELMHURST DAIRY, INC., et al., Defendants. ------------------------------------------------------x GLASSER, United States District J udge: Plaintiffs, a group of form er em ployees of Elm hurst Dairy, Inc. (“Elm hurst”), bring this action again st Elm hurst and Milk Wagon Drivers and Dairy Em ployees, Local 58 4, International Brotherhood of Team sters, the union representin g certain em ployees of Elm hurst (the “Union,” and together with Elm hurst, “Defendants”), seeking to vacate the award issued in an arbitration between Elm hurst and the Union. Specifically, plaintiffs assert that Elm hurst violated its collective bargaining agreem ent with the Union, that the Union failed to fairly represent plaintiffs at the arbitration, and that Defendants colluded to m islead the arbitrator and m anipulate the arbitration process. Currently before the court are m otions from each of the Defendants to dism iss the com plaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons that follow, both of the m otions are GRANTED. BACKGROU N D I. Facts & Procedural History Except where otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from Plaintiffs’ verified petition, Dkt. No. 1. Ex. A (the “Petition”), and other docum ents the Court m ay consider, and are accepted as true for purposes of deciding this m otion. Plaintiffs are 42 1 Dockets.Justia.com form er senior em ployees of Elm hurst and m em bers of the Union. Petition ¶¶ 1– 2. 1 Plaintiffs were laid off by Elm hurst on Septem ber 16, 20 12. Petition ¶ 11; Award and Opinion of Arbitrator J effrey B. Tener, dated May 28, 20 13 [Dkt. No. 16-2] (the “Arbitrator’s Decision”) at 7. The Union challenged the layoffs in arbitration for violating the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreem ent between Elm hurst and the Union (the “CBA”). Arbitrator’s Decision at 1. The arbitration resulted in a decision in favor of Elm hurst. Id. at 18. At the heart of the Petition is Plaintiffs’ allegation that Elm hurst and the Union worked together to underm in e the arbitration process and render it a “charade.” Petition ¶ 8 . Because of this collusion, the Arbitrator’s Decision “was based on wrong, inaccurate and incom plete inform ation.” Id. ¶ 29. The arbitrator accordingly failed to consider a num ber of relevant factors and so decided the m atter in correctly. Id. ¶¶ 15– 17, 26– 29. In support of these allegations, Plaintiffs catalog a num ber of “blatant inaccuracies” in the Arbitrator’s Decision. Id. ¶ 13. In addition to its conduct during the arbitration, Plaintiffs refer to a num ber of other instances when the Union breached its duty to fairly represent Plaintiffs, including m isappropriating a clothing allowance, id. ¶ 13(i), and secretly agreeing to increase the length of the probationary period for Elm hurst em ployees, id. ¶ 13(o). And beyond the layoffs, Plaintiffs list additional instances of Elm hurst breaching the CBA, including leasing work to non-union subsidiaries. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiffs initiated this action by filing the Petition in the Suprem e Court of the State of New York, County of Queens on Septem ber 3, 20 13. See Dkt. No. 1. Defendants 1 As discussed below, the num ber and identity of the Plaintiffs was not m ade clear in the Petition and only addressed for the first tim e in Plaintiffs’ Oppositions. Indeed, the Petition in gen eral contains few details about the factual background of Plaintiffs’ claim s—the layoffs and subsequent arbitration. 2 filed a joint notice of rem oval in this court on Septem ber 12, 20 13. Id. On October 11, 20 13, Plaintiffs m oved to rem and the case to New York state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447, Dkt. No. 14, which m otion was denied by Mem orandum and Order dated Decem ber 26, 20 13, Dkt. No. 25. Elm hurst and the Union filed m otions to dism iss the Petition on Septem ber 26, 20 13 and October 15, 20 13, respectively. Dkt. Nos. 10 (“Elm hurst Mem .”); 17 (“Union Mem .”). Plaintiffs filed oppositions to each m otion on March 13, 20 14. Dkt. Nos. 29 (“Pls.’ Elm hurst Opp’n”); 31 (“Pls.’ Union Opp’n”). Defendants filed their replies on March 27, 20 14, Dkt. No. 34 (“Union Reply”), and March 31, 20 14 (“Elm hurst Reply”). II. Legal Standard Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a com plaint to include “a short and plain statem ent of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” To survive a m otion to dism iss, the plaintiff’s pleading m ust contain “sufficient factual m atter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 0 9) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twom bly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (20 0 7)). A claim has facial plausibility “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although detailed factual allegations are not necessary, the pleading m ust include m ore than an “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harm ed-m e accusation;” m ere legal conclusions, “a form ulaic recitation of the elem ents of a cause of action,” or “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancem ent” by the plaintiff will not suffice. Id. (internal quotations and citations om itted). This plausibility standard “is not akin to a ‘probability requirem ent,’ but it asks for m ore than a sheer possibility that a defendant 3 has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twom bly, 550 U.S. at 556). Determ ining whether a com plaint states a plausible claim for relief is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and com m on sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do n ot perm it the court to infer m ore than the m ere possibility of m isconduct, the com plaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (a)(2)). Thus, on a m otion to dism iss for failure to state a claim , “the issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultim ately prevail but whether the claim ant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim s.” York v. Ass’n of the Bar of City of N.Y., 286 F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 20 0 2) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). “In adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion, a district court m ust confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the com plaint, in docum ents appended to the com plaint or incorporated in the com plaint by reference, and to m atters of which judicial notice m ay be taken.” Serdarevic v. Centex Hom es, LLC, 760 F. Supp. 2d 322, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 20 10 ) (quoting Leonard F. v. Israel Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 10 7 (2d Cir. 1999)). The Court will accordingly consider the Arbitrator’s Decision, which is referred to exten sively in the Petition, and of which the Court m ay take judicial notice. See Henneberger v. Cnty. of Nassau, 465 F. Supp. 2d 176, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 20 0 6) (collecting cases). D ISCU SSION I. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Am end Rule 10 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil “expressly requires that civil actions be brought in the true nam e of the plaintiffs.” Doe v. Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. 154, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 20 0 6); see also Fed R. Civ. P. 10 (a) (“The title of the com plaint m ust nam e all the 4 parties.”). The Petition, which identifies the Plaintiffs only as “Milk Wagon Drivers an d Dairy Em ployees,” fails to com ply with Rule 10 (a). In their Oppositions, Plaintiffs for the first tim e identify them selves as the 42 Elm hurst em ployees who were laid off on Septem ber 16, 20 12. 2 Pls.’ Elm hurst Opp’n at 11; Pls.’ Union Opp’n at 5. Plaintiffs explain that they did not list their individual nam es in the Petition “for the sake of brevity” and seek leave to am end the Petition to com ply with Rule 10 (a). Pls.’ Elm hurst Opp’n at 11– 12; Pls.’ Union Opp’n at 5– 6. As explain ed m ore fully below, the Petition ultim ately fails to state claim s that are facially plausible. Because the additional inform ation would not cure the Petition, leave to am end is denied as futile. Mortim er Off Shore Servs., Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of Germ any, 615 F.3d 97, 114 (2d Cir. 20 10 ). II. Plaintiffs’ Petition to Vacate the Arbitration Award The first count of the Petition seeks vacatur of the arbitration award in favor of Elm hurst. Petition at 13. The Union does not contest Plaintiffs’ allegation that the arbitrator com m itted reversible error. 3 Elm hurst opposes vacatur, arguing that the petition to vacate is untim ely and that it fails to allege sufficient grounds to justify vacating the award. a. Tim eliness Because Section 30 1 of the LMRA does not contain a statute of lim itations, federal courts m ust borrow the appropriate state statute of lim itations. Local 8 0 2, Associated Musicians of Greater N.Y. v. Parker Meridien Hotel, 145 F.3d 8 5, 8 8 (2d Cir. 2 The Arbitrator’s Decision states that only 39 em ployees were ultim ately laid off. Arbitrator’s Decision at 1, 7. 3 The Court notes, however, that the Union did not oppose Elm hurst’s action to confirm the award. See Elm hurst Dairy, Inc. v. Milk Wagon Drivers & Dairy Em ps., Local 584, Int’l Bhd. of Team sters, No. 13-cv50 0 1 (ILG)(VVP) [Dkt. No. 10 ]. 5 1998). The appropriate lim itations period for m otions to vacate arbitration awards is the ninety-day statute of lim itations contained in New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”) § 7511(a), which runs from delivery of the award. Id.; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511(a). New York courts have repeatedly held that “delivery” includes delivery to the union or agent representing an individual. See, e.g., Case v. Monroe Cm ty. College, 89 N.Y.2d 438, 443 (N.Y. 1997); Lowe v. Erie Ins. Co., 865 N.Y.S.2d 465, 468 (N.Y. App. Div. 20 0 8). The arbitration award was issued on May 28, 20 13 and m ailed to the parties— Elm hurst and the Union—on May 29, 20 13. Elm hurst’s Reply at 2. 4 Section 210 3 of the CPLR provides that the statute of lim itations begins to run five days after m ailing where service is m ade by m ail. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 210 3(b)(2). Accordingly, the statute of lim itations began to run on J une 3, 20 13—five days after the award was delivered to the Union. 5 Ninety days after J une 3, 20 13 is Septem ber 1, 20 13. Because Septem ber 1, 20 13 was a Sunday, and Septem ber 2, 20 13 was Labor Day—a public holiday—the lim itations period expired on Septem ber 3, 20 13—the day Plaintiffs filed the Petition. See Scuderi v. Bd. of Educ. For City Sch. Dist. Of Yonkers, 374 N.Y.S.2d 130 , 133 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975); N.Y. Gen. Constr. Law § 25-a(1). Accordingly, the Petition is tim ely. b. Merits “[C]ourts play only a lim ited role when asked to review the decision of an arbitrator.” United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (198 7). They “are not authorized to reconsider the m erits of an award even though the parties m ay allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on m isinterpretation of the 4 The award was also delivered to the parties by em ail on May 29, 20 13. Doren Decl., Ex. F. Plaintiffs’ calculations are erroneous, but their m istake is ultim ately irrelevant. See Pls.’ Elm hurst Opp’n at 5 (“J une 4, 20 13 is five days after . . . May 29, 20 13.”). 5 6 contract.” Id. Indeed, “as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he com m itted serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.” Id. at 38. Accordingly, the party seeking vacatur “bears the heavy burden of showing that the award falls within a very narrow set of circum stances,” including “corruption, fraud, or som e other im propriety on the part of the arbitrators.” Duferco Int’l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/ S, 333 F.3d 383, 388 (2d Cir. 20 0 3). A court m ay also vacate an award that exhibits “m anifest disregard of law,” that is, “that the arbitrators were fully aware of the existence of a clearly defined governing legal prin ciple, but refused to apply it, in effect, ignoring it.” Id. at 389. It is not im m ediately clear from the Petition on what grounds Plaintiffs seek to vacate the arbitration award. Plaintiffs cite a laundry list of alleged factual inaccuracies in the Arbitrator’s Decision, but disagreem ent with an arbitrator’s fact-finding is not an appropriate ground for vacating an arbitration award. Misco, 48 4 U.S. at 37– 38 (“Because the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by an arbitrator chosen by them rather than by a judge, it is the arbitrator’s view of the facts and of the m eaning of the contract that they have agreed to accept . . . . [A]n arbitrator m ust find facts and a court m ay not reject those findings sim ply because it disagrees with them .”). Plaintiffs also assert that the “arbitration process was n othing but a charade” because the Defendants colluded to m islead the arbitrator. Petition ¶ 8 . This conclusory allegation is insufficient to state a claim that the award was procured through fraud. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 . In their Opposition, Plaintiffs assert for the first tim e that the Arbitrator’s Decision exhibits a m anifest disregard of law because it ignores the principle of 7 seniority. 6 Plaintiffs are incorrect. Seniority derives from contract—it is not a “legal principle.” Brennan v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 260 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 20 0 1). But even if it were, the Arbitrator’s Decision does not exhibit a m anifest disregard of law. The arbitrator did not disregard the seniority provisions of the CBA, but rather concluded that Elm hurst’s em ployees were subject to two different collective bargaining agreem ents depending on their date of hire, and therefore constituted two different groups for seniority purposes. Arbitrator’s Decision at 16– 18 . And the arbitrator cam e to his conclusion only after a detailed analysis of the parties’ bargaining history an d the language of their various collective bargain in g agreem ents. Id. at 14– 15. “Only a barely colorable justification for the outcom e reached” is required to enforce an arbitration award. D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdeiner, 462 F.3d 95, 110 (2d Cir. 20 0 6) (quotation om itted). The arbitrator’s reasoning far surpasses that threshold. And given the deference due to arbitration awards, the Court can not conclude that the arbitrator im properly applied a clear an d plainly applicable legal principle. See Duferco, 333 F.3d at 390 . Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for vacatur is denied. III. Plaintiffs’ Hybrid 30 1/ Fair Representation Claim s The Petition also asserts a so-called hybrid 30 1/ fair representation claim —that Elm hurst breached the CBA an d the Union breached its duty of fair representation. See DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. Of Team sters, 462 U.S. 151, 164– 65 (1983). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that they were laid off by Elm hurst in violation of the seniority provisions of the CBA and that the Union failed to fairly represent them in the 6 The Court need not address this argum ent, Galiano v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., No. 0 8-CV-4711 (TCP) (WDW), 20 10 WL 944750 5, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 20 10 ) (stating that “[n]ew facts and allegations, first raised in a plaintiff’s opposition papers, m ay not be con sidered” on a m otion to dism iss); Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, 124 F. Supp. 2d 836, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 20 0 0 ) (“parties are not entitled to assert new facts in subm issions on a m otion to dism iss”), but in any event it does not cure the Petition . 8 arbitration proceeding regarding those layoffs. “To prevail against either the com pan y or the Union, em ployee-plaintiffs m ust not only show that their discharge was contrary to the contract but m ust also carry the burden of dem onstrating breach of duty by the Union.” DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165 (quotations om itted). In order to establish a breach of a union’s duty of fair representation, a plaintiff m ust establish two elem ents: (1) “that the union’s actions or inactions are either arbitrary, discrim inatory, or in bad faith”; and (2) that there is “a causal connection between the union’s wrongful conduct and [plaintiff’s] injuries.” Vaughn v. Air Lin e Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 60 4 F.3d 70 3, 70 9 (2d Cir. 20 10 ) (quotations om itted). “A union’s actions are arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the tim e of the union’s actions, the union’s behavior is so far outside a wide range of reasonablen ess, as to be irrational.” White v. White Rose Food, 237 F.3d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 20 0 1) (quotation om itted). “This ‘wide range of reasonableness’ gives the union room to m ake discretionary decisions and choices, even if those judgm ents are ultim ately wrong.” Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 45– 46 (1998). “[M]ere negligence, even in the enforcem ent of a collective-bargaining agreem ent” does not establish a breach of the duty of fair representation. United Steelworkers of Am . v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 372 (1990 ). “A showing of bad faith requires a showing of fraudulent, deceitful, or dishonest action,” White, 237 F.3d at 179, and that the union acted “with an im proper intent, purpose, or m otive,” Spellacy v. Airline Pilots Ass’n-Int’l, 156 F.3d 120 , 126 (2d Cir. 1998). “A union’s acts are discrim inatory when substantial evidence indicates that it engaged in discrim in ation that was intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitim ate union objectives.” Vaughn, 60 4 F.3d at 70 9 (quotations om itted). 9 Plaintiffs assert that the Union’s actions were arbitrary or in bad faith because the Union “failed to fairly represent the interests of [Plaintiffs].” Petition ¶23. This is m erely “a form ulaic recitation of the elem ents of a cause of action” and does not suffice to state a claim . Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 . Plaintiffs also assert that the Union failed to correct unspecified inaccuracies during the arbitration. Petition ¶ 29. But without m ore this vague allegation does not support a plausible inference of bad faith—rather, it only suggests that the Union was negligent or m ade a “tactical error,” which is sim ply insufficient to state a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation. See, e.g., Barr v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 8 68 F.2d 36, 43– 44 (2d Cir. 1989). Plaintiffs also assert that the Union acted in bad faith because it conspired with Elm hurst to underm ine the arbitration process and “m ade secret side deals” with Elm hurst. Petition ¶¶ 25, 31. A conclusory allegation of the existen ce of a conspiracy, however, is a legal conclusion not entitled to the presum ption of truth and is therefore insufficient to state a plausible claim . See Twom bly, 550 U.S. at 556– 57. Finally, Plaintiffs appear to allege that the Union’s actions were discrim inatory because all of the Plaintiffs are m inorities. Petition ¶ 24. Plaintiffs, however, fail to allege any facts that would support a plausible inference of discrim inatory intent on the part of the Union. See Reyes v. Fairfield Props., 661 F. Supp. 2d 249, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 200 9) (“Even liberally construed, plaintiffs’ com plaint fails to allege any facts relating to race, other than a conclusory statem ent that defendants retaliated and discrim inated against plaintiffs based on their being African– Am erican, which is in sufficient under Iqbal.”). 10 Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argum ents, the Arbitrator’s Decision dem onstrates that the Union argued vigorously against the layoffs. 7 It reflects that the Union argued that the parties had n ever agreed to create two separate seniority groups, that Elm hurst had always treated all of its em ployees as part of one seniority group, and that seniority is a “key right” for which unions fight. See Arbitrator’s Decision at 8– 10 . Indeed, the arbitrator noted that it was “unusual” that there were two separate seniority groups, but the plain language of the CBA com pelled that conclusion. Id. at 18. Plaintiffs m ay disagree with this finding and the outcom e of the arbitration, but that is sim ply not a sufficient ground for a claim against the Union. Barr, 8 68 F.2d at 43. Because the Petition fails to state a plausible claim that the Union breached its duty of fair representation, Plaintiffs’ hybrid 30 1/ fair representation claim m ust be dism issed. IV. Plaintiffs’ Rem aining Claim s To the extent that the Petition alleges claim s against Elm hurst for other breaches of the CBA, or against the Union for instances prior to the arbitration in which it failed to fairly represent Plaintiffs, those claim s all accrued well m ore than six m onths prior to the filing of the Petition and are therefore tim e-barred. See DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. Of Team sters, 462 U.S. 151, 169 (1983). CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ m otions to dism iss are hereby GRANTED. SO ORDERED. Dated: Brooklyn, New York April 17, 20 14 7 In addition , the Court notes that the Un ion took action against Elm hust prior to takin g the m atter to arbitration . The Union called for a strike in protest of Plaintiffs’ layoffs, which led to Elm hurst filin g an action in this Court and obtainin g an injunction to stop the strike. See Elm hurst Dairy, Inc. v. Milk Wagon Drivers & Dairy Em ps., Local 584, Int’l Bhd. of Team sters, No. 12-cv-5269 (ILG) (VVP) [Dkt. No. 17]. 11 / s/ I. Leo Glasser Senior United States District J udge 12
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