Gibbs v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority et al, No. 1:2013cv01583 - Document 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM & ORDER granting 17 Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice in its entirety as against the MTA, and with prejudice as against Robert Musso and the LIRR except as to plaint iff's claims of age discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law and age and racial discrimination under the New York City Human Rights Law, which are dismissed without prejudice. Ordered by Judge I. Leo Glasser on 11/12/2014. (Carey, Charles)
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Gibbs v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority et al Doc. 33 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ------------------------------------------------------x TERRELL GIBBS, Plaintiff, MEMORAN D U M & ORD ER - against 13-CV-1583 (ILG) (RER) METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, MTA-LONG ISLAND RAILROAD and ROBERT MUSSO, Defendants. ------------------------------------------------------x GLASSER, Senior United States District J udge: In this action, plaintiff Terrell Gibbs alleges that his form er em ployer, the Long Island Railroad (“LIRR”), Robert Musso, one of plaintiff’s supervisors at the LIRR, and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“MTA”) (together, “defendants”) all discrim inated against him on account of his race and age when the LIRR fired him from his probationary job as a Car Appearance Maintainer (“CAM”). That term ination, claim s plaintiff, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 20 0 0 e et seq.; the Age Discrim ination in Em ploym ent Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983; the New York State Hum an Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq.; and the New York City Hum an Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Adm in. Code § 8-10 7. Defendants now m ove for sum m ary judgm ent pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons that follow, that m otion is GRANTED. 1 Dockets.Justia.com BACKGROU N D Except where otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed.1 Plaintiff is an African-Am erican m ale who was born in 1989. Defs.’ Ex. A, Dkt. No. 19-1 (hereinafter “Pl. Dep.”), at 7:5-8. On Novem ber 16, 20 11, the LIRR hired plaintiff as a CAM. Id. at 19:22– 20 :7. A CAM’s duties include the proper disposal of garbage from all train cars and all aspects of cleaning car interiors, such as sweeping and m opping. Id. at 20 :16-17. CAMs work in the LIRR’s Maintenance and Equipm ent (“M/ E”) Departm ent, and the LIRR has a written code of conduct for how M/ E em ployees m ust behave. Id. at 33:10 – 34:8; Defs.’ Ex. F, Dkt. No. 19-6. Failure to follow that code of conduct m ay result in an M/ E em ployee’s term ination. Defs.’ Ex. C, Dkt. No. 19-3 (hereinafter “PAL Hr’g Tr.”), at 32:5-14; Defs.’ Ex. F, Dkt. No. 19-6 (hereinafter “Micheletti Dep.”), at 35:6-12. Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreem ent between the LIRR and the United Transportation Union, newly-hired CAMs are subject to a one-year probationary period during which they are considered at-will em ployees-in-training. See generally Defs.’ Ex. E, Dkt. No. 19-5. Plaintiff’s first assignm ent as a probationary CAM began on or about Novem ber 23, 20 11, when he was assigned to a night shift on a work gang at the LIRR’s West Side Yard for com m uter trains. Pl. Dep. at 42:10 -20 ; Micheletti Dep. at 20 :19– 21:12. At the tim e, defendant Musso, a white, 52-year-old gang forem an at that yard, was in charge of supervising between 20 and 30 CAMs there, including plaintiff and other probationary CAMs. Defs.’ Ex. B, Dkt. No. 19-2 (hereinafter “Musso Dep.”) at 5:7- 1 Plaintiff’s denials of knowledge or inform ation sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of a number of defendants’ assertions in their Local Civil Rule 56.1 Statem ent are “not sufficient to create an issue of fact for Rule 56 purposes” because Local Civil Rule 56.1(c) states that each paragraph in a party’s statem ent m ade pursuant to that rule “will be deem ed to be adm itted unless specifically controverted . . .” (em phasis added). See Alfano v. NGHT, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 355, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 20 0 9). 2 14, 24:2-21. The CAMs were of several different races, including other AfricanAm ericans besides plaintiff. Pl. Dep. at 43:21– 45:13. On J anuary 23, 20 12, Musso assigned plaintiff to m op the floors of a train’s cars. Defs.’ Ex. K, Dkt. No. 19-11, at 66. When Musso went to inspect the train, he found plaintiff wearing headphones (it is disputed as to whether they were around his neck or on his ears). Id.; Pl. Dep. at 35:23-24. Rule 121 of the M/ E Code of Conduct prohibits the use of any “electronic m usic playing equipm ent” or headphones while “perform ing services.” Defs.’ Ex. F at 3. At a hearing conducted pursuant to New York Public Authorities Law § 1276(4) (the “PAL Hearing”) regarding the allegations underlying this action, plaintiff testified that his headphones were playing m usic at the tim e Musso saw them , but plaintiff later claim ed at his deposition in this action that his headphones were not em itting any sound. Com pare PAL Hr’g Tr. at 33:5-20 with Pl. Dep. at 35:19– 36:5. Musso told plaintiff that he could not wear the headphones, and plaintiff adm itted that his use of the headphones violated the M/ E Code of Conduct. Pl. Dep. at 36:11-16; PAL Hr’g Tr. at 34:9-18. Four days later, on J anuary 27, 20 12, Musso assigned plaintiff to clean and em pty the garbage receptacles on the odd-num bered cars of a train. Defs.’ Ex. K at 66. When Musso inspected plaintiff’s work, he found garbage on at least one seat of a train car plaintiff was supposed to clean. Id.; Pl. Dep. at 75:6-11. At the end of plaintiff’s shift on that day, Musso issued a verbal warning to plaintiff about his conduct in the presence of another gang forem an, J oshua Rodriquez, and a representative from plaintiff’s union. Defs.’ Ex. K at 66; Pl. Dep. at 75:6– 76:8. Although plaintiff spoke to the union representative alone following the warning, he did not tell the representative that he believed Musso was behaving in a discrim inatory fashion. Pl. Dep. at 76:13-24. At som e 3 point between Novem ber of 20 11 and February of 20 12, plaintiff was again reprim anded by Musso for failing to clean a stain off the back of a seat in a train car. PAL Hr’g Tr. at 43:11– 44:22. Plaintiff knew that it was his responsibility to clean the stain in question, but he did not clean it until after Musso told him he had m issed it. Id. at 45:8-25. During the probationary period, CAMs’ supervisors subm it Probationary Evaluation Form s (“evaluations”) for each CAM on a quarterly basis to m anagem ent personnel. The evaluation ranks probationary em ployees on a scale of “1” to “4,” with “1” indicating an unacceptable level of perform ance and “4” a perform ance that exceeded expectations. See Defs.’ Ex. E at 3-4. Managem ent then reviews the evaluations and all other relevant m aterial (such as em ployee tim e sheets) to determ ine, with the concurrence of the hum an resources departm ent, whether or not the CAMs’ em ploym ent should continue. Id. at 4; Micheletti Dep. at 15:20 – 16:12. At all tim es relevant to this litigation, the person responsible for reviewing probationary em ployees’ evaluations in the M/ E Departm ent was Antonia Micheletti, the Manager of Equipm ent, Payroll, Auditing and Control. Micheletti Dep. at 15:20 – 16:21. Musso com pleted his quarterly evaluation of plaintiff’s work perform ance on February 25, 20 12 and forwarded it to Micheletti for review with supporting docum entation attached. Defs’ Ex. K. Musso rated plaintiff a “1” on his ability to exhibit the required level of job knowledge and/ or skills to perform his job, and a “2” (below m inim um expectations) in eight other categories. Id. The supporting docum entation Musso attached to the evaluation referenced both plaintiff’s use of headphones on J anuary 23, 20 12 and his failure to clean a train car on J anuary 27, 20 12 as grounds for the ratings plaintiff received. Id. at 66. 4 On March 2, 20 12, Micheletti indicated on the evaluation that plaintiff was not m eeting departm ental expectations because of his im proper work perform ance and violation of the M/ E Code of Conduct. Id. at 65. By that tim e, plaintiff had been transferred to a day shift, and on March 5, 20 12, Micheletti sent an em ail to plaintiff’s new gang forem en, Linwood Booker and Benjam in Torregosa, asking whether plaintiff’s perform ance had im proved. Pl.’s Ex. 3, Dkt. No. 28-3. Booker told Micheletti that plaintiff “ha[d] been quite consistent in perform ing his duties as a CAM” since being m oved to the day shift. Id. On March 6, 20 12, Micheletti wrote on a printed copy of Booker’s em ail that, based on Booker’s statem ent, plaintiff would be “evaluated again, regardless of [the] tim ing of [the] evaluation process, when he m oves to another location.” Id. In a m em orandum dated April 16, 20 12 that was placed in plaintiff’s personnel file, Micheletti indicated that she had spoken to both Musso and Rodiquez, and that “there appear[ed] to be no change with [plaintiff’s] perform ance” after Musso’s evaluation. Defs.’ Ex. L, Dkt. No. 19-12. Citing this continued poor perform ance and plaintiff’s violation of M/ E Code of Conduct Rule 121, Micheletti recom m ended to the LIRR’s hum an resources departm ent that plaintiff be term inated.2 Id. At the tim e Micheletti m ade that recom m endation, she had not m et plaintiff and was unaware of his race. Micheletti Dep. at 76:8-11. The hum an resources departm ent accepted Micheletti’s recom m endation, and plaintiff was fired on April 19, 20 12. Defs.’ Ex. N, Dkt. No. 19-14. Plaintiff was the only probationary CAM on Musso’s work gang between 2 Micheletti noted at her deposition in this action that plaintiff’s late arrival to work on two separate occasions contributed to her decision to term inate him, but this reason is not referenced specifically in the April 16, 20 12 m em orandum . Com pare Micheletti Dep. at 58:24– 59:8 with Defs.’ Ex. L. 5 Novem ber 20 11 and J anuary 20 12 who was fired after one quarterly evaluation. Musso Dep. at 24:25– 25:9. Plaintiff m aintains that Musso’s anim us towards his race and age was the true cause of his term ination. He claim s that Musso singled him out for ridicule when in the presence of other co-workers, and that Musso would repeatedly sum m on him on the yard’s radio for no proper reason. Pl. Dep. at 83:4-9. According to plaintiff, Musso m ade statem ents to him such as “I don’t kn ow why you’re here, but I am going to go over m y boss to get you out of here” and “You’re not a m an[;] start acting like a m an.” Id. at 48:17-23. Plaintiff never personally witnessed Musso treat African-Am erican em ployees differently than em ployees of other races, but heard from other co-workers that Musso did so. Id. at 56:19– 57:21; 65:5-11. Plaintiff also claim s that Musso ignored or played down other violations of the M/ E Code of Conduct when other CAMs com m itted them , but treated plaintiff’s violation far m ore seriously. Id. at 40 :23– 42:6. Musso denied these allegations at his deposition. See generally Musso Dep. Plaintiff com m enced this action on March 26, 20 13. Dkt. No. 1. Defendants answered on J une 10 , 20 13. Dkt. No. 10 . Discovery closed on May 30 , 20 14, and defendants filed their sum m ary judgm ent m otion on J uly 11, 20 14. Minute Entry of Apr. 24, 20 14; Dkt No. 17. Plaintiff subm itted opposition papers on October 6, 20 14, and defendants replied on October 27, 20 14. Dkt. Nos. 27-32. LEGAL STAN D ARD Sum m ary judgm ent is appropriate “if the m ovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fact and the m ovant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “An issue of fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non[-]m oving party. . . . A fact is m aterial 6 if it m ight affect the outcom e of the suit under the governing law.” Fincher v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 60 4 F.3d 712, 720 (2d Cir. 20 10 ) (quotation m arks and citation om itted). The party m oving for sum m ary judgm ent bears the burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issue of m aterial fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In deciding the m otion, the Court m ust “construe the facts in the light m ost favorable to the non-m oving party and m ust resolve all am biguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the m ovant.” Brod v. Om ya, Inc., 653 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 20 11) (citation omitted). However, to defeat the m otion, the non-m oving party “m ust do m ore than sim ply show that there is som e m etaphysical doubt as to the m aterial facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)), and cannot “rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.” Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 20 11) (quotation m arks and citation om itted). D ISCU SSION I. Title VII Title VII prohibits an em ployer from taking adverse em ploym ent action against an em ployee because of his “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 20 0 0 e-2(a)(1). Courts analyze Title VII claim s using the three-part fram ework set forth by the Suprem e Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 80 2-0 4 (1973). Under that fram ework, the em ployee bears the initial burden of proving a prim a facie case of discrim ination by a preponderance of the evidence. The burden then shifts to the em ployer to proffer a legitim ate non-discrim inatory reason for its actions. If it can do so, the burden shifts back to the em ployee, who m ust establish that, 7 notwithstanding the em ployer’s explanation, an illegal discrim inatory reason played a m otivating role in the adverse em ploym ent action. E.g., Kirkland v. Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 20 14) (per curiam ); Bickerstaff v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 446-47 (2d Cir. 1999).3 Plaintiff does not dispute that defendants have articulated a legitim ate nondiscrim inatory reason for firing him : his poor work perform ance. See Pl. Opp. Mem . at 15. Therefore, the only rem aining issues are whether he has stated a prim a facie discrim ination case and whether discrim ination played a m otivating role in the LIRR’s decision to term inate him notwithstanding its asserted rationale. A. Prim a Facie D is crim in atio n “The burden of establishing a prim a facie case of alleged disparate treatm ent ‘is not onerous.’” Holcom b v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130 , 138 (2d Cir. 20 0 8) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cm ty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). Plaintiff can satisfy it by showing that (1) he belongs to a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position that he held, (3) he suffered an adverse em ploym ent action, and (4) the adverse em ploym ent action occurred under circum stances giving rise to an inference of discrim inatory intent. Id. (citing Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 152 (2d Cir. 20 0 4)). Defendants contend that plaintiff was neither qualified for the position that he held nor subject to term ination under circum stances that would perm it an inference of discrim ination. 3 The third part of the McDonnell Douglas fram ework is often described as requiring the em ployee to dem onstrate that the em ployer’s proffered reason for the adverse em ploym ent action was “pretextual,” but that term seem s to im ply (and defendants indeed argue) that plaintiff m ust dem onstrate that the explanation for why he was term inated is false. He need not do so: “though a discrim ination plaintiff m ay not succeed by proving only that a proffered explanation is false but m ust prove that discrim ination m otivated the adverse action, the plaintiff is entitled to succeed by proving discrim inatory m otivation without proving that a proffered explanation is false.” Bickerstaff, 196 F.3d at 447 (quoting Renz v. Grey Adver., 135 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997)). 8 1. Jo b Qu alificatio n An em ployee who alleges that his term ination was due to discrim ination “need not do m uch to establish his qualification for the position he holds. . . .” Donnelly v. Greenburgh Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 7, 691 F.3d 134, 147 (2d Cir. 20 12). It is enough to show “that he possesses the basic skills necessary for perform ance of the job.” Id. (quoting Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am . Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 20 0 1)). Where, as here, “the em ployer has already hired the em ployee into the job in question, the inference of m inim al qualification is . . . easier to draw . . . because, by hiring the em ployee, the em ployer itself has already expressed a belief that [he] is m inim ally qualified.” Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 696 (2d Cir. 20 0 1). Although the LIRR points to Musso’s evaluation of plaintiff as evidence that he was not qualified for the position he held, Booker’s em ail to Micheletti describing plaintiff’s com petence on the day shift indicates that plaintiff possessed the basic skills of a CAM. See Pl.’s Ex. 3. Thus, plaintiff has established this elem ent of his prim a facie case, and defendants are not entitled to sum m ary judgm ent on the grounds that plaintiff was not qualified for the position he held. 2. Circu m s tan ce s Givin g Ris e to an In fe re n ce o f D is crim in ato ry In te n t An inference of discrim inatory intent m ay be drawn if an em ployee shows direct evidence of such intent or that he was subjected to disparate treatment com pared to persons who were not m em bers of his protected class but sim ilarly situated in all other m aterial respects to him self. See Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 1996). Because direct evidence of discrim inatory intent will “only rarely be available, . . . ‘affidavits and depositions m ust be carefully scrutinized for circum stantial 9 proof which, if believed, would show discrim ination.’” Holcolm b, 521 F.3d at 137 (quoting Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., LP, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994)). Plaintiff has shown no direct evidence of discrim inatory intent. He concedes that he never heard Musso or any other LIRR em ployee use racial epithets, say anything dem eaning about African-Am ericans, or even speak differently about m em bers of other races. See Pl. Dep. at 47:15– 48:7, 57:3-21; PAL Hr’g Tr. at 38:5-20 . Micheletti did not know plaintiff’s race at the tim e she recom m ended he be term inated. Micheletti Dep. at 76:8-11. Although plaintiff purportedly heard other em ployees say that Musso treated African-Am ericans differently than Caucasians, such secondhand statem ents are inadm issible hearsay to the extent that plaintiff attem pts to use them for the truth of their assertions. And even though plaintiff felt that Musso’s statem ents such as “start acting like a m an” m ight have been m ade with anim us towards his race, the statem ents are not racially m otivated on their faces, and plaintiff presents no evidence beyond his own feelings that they contained a racial subtext. In short, plaintiff has shown nothing m ore than his own subjective belief that he was discrim inated against, which is not enough to m ake out a prim a facie discrim ination case under Title VII. See, e.g., Brodt v. City of New York, 4 F. Supp. 3d 562, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 20 14) (citing, inter alia, Bickerstaff, 196 F.3d at 456); Sim m ons v. AT&T Corp., No. 96 Civ. 2844, 1998 WL 751659, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1998), aff’d, 182 F.3d 90 1 (table), 1999 WL 464983 (2d Cir. J une 21, 1999). Sim ilarly, plaintiff has not shown any circum stantial proof of disparate treatm ent. Plaintiff argues that he was punished m ore severely for his transgressions than other em ployees, but he subm its no adm issible evidence in support of this claim . Although he claim s that there were “less than three” other instances when Musso 10 observed em ployees wearing headphones without disciplining them , he does not recall the races of those em ployees, and indeed provides no inform ation about those incidents beyond his own lim ited ipse dixit. See Pl. Dep. at 41:2-14.4 None of the other AfricanAm erican probationary CAMs working alongside plaintiff were fired when he was, even though, according to plaintiff, their supervisors witnessed them violating the M/ E Code of Conduct. See id. at 38:15– 40 :10 . Thus, “the m ost [the evidence] establishes, even in the light m ost favorable to the plaintiff, is that [he] was treated differently from all other em ployees, both white and black.” See Thornton v. Sim pson Thatcher & Bartlett, No. 83 Civ. 840 9, 1986 WL 60 12, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 1986), aff’d m em ., 833 F.2d 10 0 3 (2d Cir. 1986). Accordingly, he has not m ade out a prim a facie case under Title VII, and sum m ary judgm ent is granted to defendants on this issue. B. D is crim in atio n as a Mo tivatin g Ro le Even assum ing arguendo that plaintiff has stated a prim a facie discrim ination claim , he cannot defeat defendants’ m otion for sum m ary judgm ent because he has not shown that a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that racial discrim ination played a m otivating role in his dism issal notwithstanding the LIRR’s asserted legitim ate reason for firing him . Plaintiff points to Musso’s alleged statem ents that he would “go over m y boss to get you out of here” and Micheletti’s unexplained reversal of her earlier decision to re-evaluate plaintiff before recom m ending he be term inated as evidence that his firing was pretextual. But as previously noted, Musso’s statem ents do not im plicate 4 Plaintiff’s attem pt to use his deposition to backtrack from his adm ission at the PAL Hearing that he violated M/ E Code of Conduct Rule 121 by using headphones while working does not create a genuine issue of m aterial fact. In “the absence of any corroborating evidence in the record and . . . [the] inconsistencies and contradictions within the plaintiff’s deposition testim ony,” the Court cannot credit plaintiff’s belated repudiation of his earlier sworn statem ent. See J effreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 20 0 5) (citing, inter alia, Shabazz v. Pico, 994 F. Supp. 460 , 468-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (Sotom ayor, D.J .)) 11 plaintiff’s race, and Micheletti was unaware of it when she m ade the recom m endation that the LIRR fire plaintiff. The statem ents m ade by unknown LIRR em ployees about Musso’s anim us towards African-Am ericans, which plaintiff recounted at his deposition and now relies on heavily in attem pting to avoid sum m ary judgm ent, are inadm issible hearsay. He therefore fails to provide any evidence that defendants’ stated rationale, though potentially pretextual, was a pretext for firing him because of his race, and his case cannot proceed. See, e.g., Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332, 1339 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc); Cook v. Pan Am . World Airways, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 816, 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“It is not enough . . . to show that the em ployer m ade an unwise business decision, or . . . acted arbitrarily or with ill will” (quoting Gray v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 255 (1st Cir. 1986)). II. 4 2 U .S.C. §§ 19 8 1 an d 19 8 3 42 U.S.C. § 1981 protects the rights of “[a]ll persons within the United States . . . to m ake and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prohibits those acting under color of state law from depriving others of their federal rights. See Ahlers v. Rabinowitz, 684 F.3d 53, 60 -61 (2d Cir. 20 12) (citation om itted). Plaintiff alleges that the decision to term inate him violated both Section 1981 and the rights that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Am endm ent affords him via Section 1983. A. Se ctio n 19 8 1 Section 1981 applies only to instances of racial discrim ination, and plaintiff’s age discrim ination claim under the statute fails accordingly. See Lofland v. Meyers, 442 F. Supp. 955, 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). As for his race-based claim s, “[t]he substantive 12 standards applicable to claim s of em ploym ent discrim ination under Title VII . . . are also generally applicable to claim s of em ploym ent discrim ination brought under Section 1981. . . .” Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 10 6 (2d Cir. 20 10 ). In other words, an em ployee’s claim s arising out of the sam e em ployer conduct “m ust stand and fall together” regardless of whether they are brought pursuant to Title VII or Section 1981. See Wojcik v. Brandiss, 973 F. Supp. 2d 195, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 20 13) (quoting, inter alia, Feingold, 366 F.3d at 159). Since plaintiff cannot prevail on his Title VII claim s, sum m ary judgm ent is granted to defendants on his Section 1981 claim s as well. B. Se ctio n 19 8 3 Plaintiff’s equal protection claim does not allege that he is a m em ber of a specific class that suffered unequal treatm ent at defendants’ hands, but rather that defendants’ actions “singled [him ] out as separate, apart, and unequal to others sim ilarly situated.” Com pl. ¶ 73. In other words, plaintiff deem s him self a “class of one.” See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (20 0 0 ) (per curiam ) (recognizing the general availability of the class-of-one cause of action). However, the Suprem e Court has expressly forbidden em ployees from lodging class-of-one claim s against public em ployers, because “treating like individuals differently is an accepted consequence of the discretion granted” to an em ployer, even if that em ployer is the state. See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 60 3 (20 0 8). Since the LIRR is a public em ployer, see J agm ohan v. LIRR, No. 12-CV-3146, 20 14 WL 4417745, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 20 14), plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim cannot proceed, and is therefore dism issed. III. Th e AD EA Defendants note, and plaintiffs do not dispute, that the ADEA’s protections against age discrim ination only extend to em ployees who are at least 40 years old. See 13 Defs.’ Mem . at 22 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)). Plaintiff was 23 years old when he was term inated, and his ADEA claims fail accordingly. IV. In vo lve m e n t o f th e MTA Under New York law, the LIRR is a subsidiary of the MTA, and its em ployees are not em ployees of the MTA itself. See N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 1266(5). Since the MTA cannot be said to be plaintiff’s em ployer or to have taken any adverse em ploym ent action against him , sum m ary judgm ent is granted to the MTA on all causes of action listed in the Com plaint. V. State an d Lo cal Law A district court m ay “decline to exercise supplem ental jurisdiction” over state and local law claim s if it has “dism issed all claim s over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Where, as here, all federal claim s have been dism issed before trial, the usual course of action is for the Court to decline to exercise supplem ental jurisdiction. See Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 549 (2d Cir. 1994). In this case, however, the interests of judicial econom y and com ity favor im m ediate resolution of one of plaintiff’s state law claim s. “[I]t is well-established that the substantive standards for liability under the NYSHRL and Title VII are coextensive,” and plaintiff’s state law claim for racial discrim ination under the NYSHRL is therefore dism issed with prejudice for the sam e reasons as his Title VII claim . See Vuona v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 919 F. Supp. 2d 359, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 20 13). His rem aining claim s of age discrim ination under the NYSHRL and age and racial discrim ination under the NYCHRL, however, are evaluated under different standards than his federal claim s, and state courts are best equipped to resolve them . See, e.g., id. at 393-94; Thom as v. City of New York, 953 F. Supp. 2d 444, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 20 13). The Court therefore dism isses those claim s without prejudice. 14 CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ m otion for sum m ary judgm ent is GRANTED. The Com plaint is dism issed with prejudice in its entirety as against the MTA, and with prejudice as against Musso and the LIRR except as to plaintiff’s claim s of age discrimination under the NYSHRL and age and racial discrim ination under the NYCHRL, which are dism issed without prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgm ent in favor of defendants, and to close this case. SO ORDERED. Dated: Brooklyn, New York Novem ber 12, 20 14 / s/ I. Leo Glasser Senior United States District J udge 15
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