Suryadevara v. Unum Group, No. 1:2012cv03651 - Document 35 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)
Court Description: ORDER denying 25 Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by Judge I. Leo Glasser on 3/28/2014. (Parachini, Alexander)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Suryadevara v. Unum Group Doc. 35 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ------------------------------------------------------x RAO SURYADEVARA, Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - against - 12 CV 3651 (ILG) (RER) UNUM GROUP, Defendant. ------------------------------------------------------x GLASSER, United States District J udge: Plaintiff Rao Suryadevara (“Suryadevara”) brings this action against Unum Group (“Defendant”) for breach of contract of a disability insurance policy, seeking m oney dam ages an d a declaratory judgm ent. Suryadevara claim s that he suffered from two separate and unrelated periods of disability and, therefore, is entitled to greater benefits than he is currently receiving under the policy. Currently before the Court is Defendant’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s m otion is hereby DENIED. BACKGROU N D I. Facts Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed. In 1992, Defendant issued Suryadevara the disability insurance policy that underlies his claim s in this action (the “Policy”). Com pl. [Dkt. No. 1] ¶ 7. Am ong other things, the Policy provided for an initial m axim um m onthly benefit of $ 4,50 0 per m onth for total disability, Begos Decl. [Dkt. No. 25-2], Ex. D at 60 , which increased each year until 1997 according to the following schedule: 1 Dockets.Justia.com New Monthly Benefit for Total Disability $ 4,820 $ 5,160 $ 5,530 $ 5,920 $ 6,340 Update Increase Date J uly 1, 1993 J uly 1, 1994 J uly 1, 1995 J uly 1, 1996 J uly 1, 1997 Id. at 62. The Policy provided that a “[b]enefit increase will apply only to a period of disability which starts after the effective date of the increase. It m ust qualify as a separate period of disability.” Id. The Policy further provided that “‘period of disability’ m eans a period of disability starting while this policy is in force. Successive periods will be deem ed to be the sam e period unless the later period: 1. is due to a different or unrelated cause, or 2. starts m ore than twelve m onths after the end of the previous period . . . in which event the later period will be a n ew or separate period of disability.” Id. at 63. In 1995, Suryadevara began a cardiology fellowship at Harlem Hospital, where he rem ain ed until 1998. Millm an Aff. [Dkt. No. 32], Ex. B at 3. From 1998 through 20 0 1, he worked as an attending physician in the em ergency departm ent at New York Com m unity Hospital. Id. In 1996, Suryadevara began behaving erratically, which behavior in cluded following his supervisor, Dr. Eric Vanderbush (“Vanderbush”) out of the hospital and contin uing conversations after they ended. Id. at 4. At som e point, Suryadevara also began experiencing hallucinations an d delusions, which in 20 0 0 , led to his filing a lawsuit seeking $ 1,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 in dam ages against Vanderbush, Param ount Pictures, 20 th Century Fox, and J am es Cam eron. Id. at 5. The lawsuit alleged that they had conspired to steal the plot for a m ovie he had narrated and had used it to write the screenplay for “Titanic.” Id. Suryadevara also expressed the belief 2 that he had originated the plots of “Gone in 60 Seconds” and “Mission Im possible: 2.” Id. at 5. In 20 0 1, Suryadevara joined the cardiology departm ent at the Veterans Affairs Hospital in Danville, Illinois. Id. at 3. On two occasions in 20 0 2, Suryadevara called the police as a result of hearing voices he thought were real. Id. at 6. On the second occasion, on J uly 1, 20 0 2, the police took Suryadevara to the em ergency room , where he was diagnosed with “acute psychosis.” Begos Decl., Ex. E; id. Ex. D at 10 3– 0 4. As a result, Suryadevara was placed on m edical leave until Septem ber 16, 20 0 2. Millm an Aff., Ex. B at 6; Begos Decl. Ex. D at 182– 83. Following his return to work, he continued to experience perform ance problem s, and ultim ately resigned on August 9, 20 0 3. Millm an Aff., Ex. B at 6. On J une 25, 20 0 4, the New York Board for Professional Medical Conduct revoked Suryadevara’s license to practice m edicine, on the grounds that he had practiced while m entally ill. Id. at 17. The determ ination was upheld on adm in istrative review on October 20 , 20 0 4. Begos Decl., Ex. D at 140 . On Decem ber 13, 20 0 4, Suryadevara subm itted a claim for disability benefits, alleging that he becam e disabled as of August 9, 20 0 3 due to m ental illness. Com pl. ¶¶ 12– 13. Defendant approved the claim on Decem ber 22, 20 0 4 an d began paying Suryadevara disability benefits in the am ount of $ 6,340 per m onth, retroactive to October 15, 20 0 3. Id. ¶ 13. Suryadevara thereafter sought additional disability benefits dating back to J anuary of 1996. Id. ¶¶ 14– 17. Defendant investigated this new claim and ultim ately determ ined that Suryadevara was residually, or partially, disabled from J anuary 1996 through April 20 0 2, with the exception of certain m onths in which his earnings were too high to qualify for benefits. Id. ¶¶ 18– 24; Begos Decl. Ex. D at 186– 8 7. In addition, Defendant determ ined that Suryadevara was totally disabled from J uly 3 1, 20 0 2 through Septem ber 16, 20 0 2, and from August 10 , 20 0 3 through the present. Com pl. ¶¶ 18– 24; Begos Decl. Ex. D at 186– 87. Because Defendant determ ined that Suryadevara becam e disabled in J anuary of 1996, the m axim um m onthly benefit due to Suryadevara pursuant to the benefits schedule in the Policy was $ 5,530 per m onth, rather than the $ 6,340 per m onth it had been paying him . Com pl. ¶ 18; Begos Decl. Ex. D at 18 6– 87. Suryadevara disputed these determ inations, and argued that he is en titled to the higher m onthly ben efit for his claim from August 9, 20 0 3 through the present. First, he argued that the m ental illness he suffered in August of 20 0 3 was of a different kind than the illness he had experienced during his prior period of disability from 1996 through 20 0 2. Com pl. ¶¶ 25– 27. Second, Suryadevara argued that he had neither applied for disability benefits nor suffered lost pay between J uly of 20 0 2 and August of 20 0 3, and therefore he was not disabled for a continuous twelve-m onth period prior to becom ing totally disabled on August 9, 20 0 3. Id. ¶ 29. Defendant rejected these claim s an d this litigation followed. II. Pro ce d u ral H is to ry Suryadevara initiated this action on J une 25, 20 12 in the Suprem e Court of the State of New York, County of Queens, and defendant rem oved the case to federal court on J uly 23, 20 12. Dkt. No. 1. On Decem ber 10 , 20 12, Defendant m oved to dism iss the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. No. 8. Defendant’s m otion was denied by Mem orandum and Order dated April 19, 20 13. Dkt. No. 21. Discovery, in cluding expert discovery, followed. On Decem ber 11, 20 13, Defendant m oved for sum m ary judgm ent, arguing that Suryadevara’s treating psychiatrist and expert witness adm it that Suryadevara 4 experienced psychotic sym ptom s and suffered from a psychotic disorder during both purported periods of disability, and accordin gly there is no genuine issue of m aterial fact regarding the existence of a second, distinct period of disability. Dkt. No. 25-4 (“Def.’s Mem .”). Suryadevara filed his opposition on February 10 , 20 14. Dkt. No. 31 (“Pl.’s Opp’n”). Defendant filed its reply on March 4, 20 14. Dkt. No. 34 (“Def.’s Reply”). D ISCU SSION I. Le gal Stan d ard Sum m ary judgm ent is appropriate “if the m ovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fact and the m ovant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “An issue of fact is genuine if the eviden ce is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonm oving party. A fact is m aterial if it m ight affect the outcom e of the suit under the governing law.” Fincher v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 60 4 F.3d 712, 720 (2d Cir. 20 10 ) (quotation om itted). The m oving party bears the burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issue of m aterial fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A court deciding a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent m ust “construe the facts in the light m ost favorable to the non-m oving party and m ust resolve all am biguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the m ovant.” Brod v. Om ya, Inc., 653 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 20 11) (quotation om itted). When the burden of proof at trial would fall on the nonm oving party, it ordinarily is sufficient for the m ovant to point to a lack of evidence to go to the trier of fact on an essential elem ent of the non-m ovant’s claim . Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322– 23. To defeat a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, the non-m oving party “m ust do m ore than sim ply show that there is som e m etaphysical doubt as to the m aterial facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586– 87 (1986)), and 5 cannot “rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.” Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 20 11) (quotation om itted). II. Bre ach o f Co n tract As both parties acknowledge, resolving this case ultim ately involves a narrow question. See Def.’s Mem . at 5– 6; Pl.’s Opp’n at 5. The parties agree that Suryadevara’s disability from 1996 through 20 0 2 was caused by Psychotic Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (“NOS”). But they disagree as to the cause of Suryadevara’s disability from 20 0 3 through the present. Defendant asserts, based largely on the testim ony of its expert, Dr. David Lowenthal (“Lowenthal”), that Suryadevara continued to experience psychotic sym ptom s after 20 0 3 and therefore continued to suffer from the sam e disability. Def.’s Mem . at 8 – 11. Suryadevara disagrees, pointing to testim ony from his expert, Dr. David Salvage (“Salvage”), that he becam e disabled due to ObsessiveCom pulsive Disorder beginning in 20 0 3. Pl.’s Opp’n at 5– 7. In addition, he argues that the m ere existence of psychotic sym ptom s does not establish that he still suffered from Psychotic Disorder NOS. Id. at 8 – 9. At the outset, it should be noted that “[w]here, as here, there are conflicting expert reports presented, courts are wary of granting sum m ary judgm ent.” Harris v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 20 0 2). This is unsurprising, since the court’s task “is carefully lim ited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of m aterial fact to be tried, not to deciding them . Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding; it does not exten d to issue-resolution.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, where “intelligent adjudication requires m ore than the use of lay knowledge and the resolution of a disputed issue hin ges in large m easure upon conflicting opinions and judgm ents of 6 expert witnesses, sum m ary judgm ent is not appropriate.” Klein v. Tabatchnick, 610 F.2d 10 43, 10 48 (2d Cir. 1979). This is precisely such a case. Whether Suryadevara is entitled to a higher m onthly benefit under the Policy ultim ately rests on the diagnosis for the condition that has caused him to be disabled since 20 0 3. The parties have offered conflicting expert testim ony as to that diagnosis, and indeed Suryadevara’s treating psychiatrist has offered a third alternative diagnosis. 1 See Begos Decl., Ex. G at 239, 248. It is clear, then, that adjudicating this case “hinges in large m easure”—if not entirely—on resolving the “conflicting opinions and judgm ents of expert witnesses.” Accordingly, sum m ary judgm ent is inappropriate. Defendant’s argum ents to the contrary are unavailing. Notably, Defendant does not seek to preclude Salvage’s testim ony. Instead, Defendant asserts that Salvage’s testim ony is rife with contradictions and adm issions, such that his conclusion—his diagnosis—creates only a sham issue of fact. It is well established that a party cannot defeat sum m ary judgm ent sim ply by offering expert evidence that contradicts previous sworn testim ony. In re Fosam ax Prods. Liab. Litig., 70 7 F.3d 189, 193 (2d Cir. 20 13). But a sham issue of fact exists only when “the contradictions in an expert witness’s testim ony are inescapable and unequivocal in nature.” Id. at 194. Salvage’s testim ony does not contain “inescapable an d unequivocal” contradictions. In the first place, som e of the supposed contradictions and adm issions are taken out of context. For exam ple, Defendant points to an instance where Salvage appears to concede that in October of 20 0 3—during the alleged second period of disability— 1 Suryadevara’s treatin g psychiatrist offered a diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder (“BPD”). Begos Decl., Ex. G at 239, 248. Unlike Salvage and Lowenthal, she disagrees that Suryadevara suffered from Psychotic Disorder NOS from 1996 to 20 0 2. She believes instead that Suryadevara suffered from BPD durin g both periods of disability, and that his psychotic sym ptom s were the result of stress. Id. 7 Suryadevara continued to suffer from the sam e psychotic disorder that caused his first period of disability. Def.’s Mem . at 13 (quoting Begos Decl., Ex. I at 323). But Defendant om its the fact that Salvage was responding to questions related to a psychiatric evaluation of Suryadevara perform ed in October of 20 0 3 that he had not previously reviewed. Begos Decl., Ex. I at 321. And m ore im portantly, Defendant om its the fact that, after reviewing that evaluation in m ore depth, Salvage clarified his earlier testim ony. Id. at 324. He explain ed that the report was flawed because it was the result of inadequate exam ination and attributed certain sym ptom s to Suryadevara without justification, and that accordingly he no longer agreed with its conclusions. Id. In light of this clarification, and construing the evidence in favor of the non-m ovant, the Court cannot conclude that Salvage’s earlier statem ent was an inescapable and unequivocal contradiction. Defendant also points to adm issions an d contradictions in Salvage’s testim ony related to the existence of psychotic sym ptom s during Suryadevara’s second period of disability. See Def.’s Mem . at 7– 11. Neither Salvage nor Suryadevara’s treating psychiatrist disputes the existence of these sym ptom s, but this does not render Salvage’s conclusion contradictory. As both of these doctors explained, these sym ptom s, standing alone, do not establish that Suryadevara continues to suffer from —or, m ore precisely, to be disabled by—Psychotic Disorder NOS. Begos Decl., Ex. G at 277; id., Ex. I at 339. Indeed, Salvage specifically considered those sym ptom s, but noted that they appeared to be largely controlled by antipsychotic drugs, and ultim ately concluded that Suyardevara is disabled due to his Obsessive-Com pulsive Disorder. Id., Ex. I at 310 – 11. To the extent that Defendant asserts that Salvage’s conclusion is not credible, this is sim ply irrelevant at the sum m ary judgm ent stage. Scanner Techs. Corp. v. Icos Vision Sys. Corp., 253 F. 8 Supp. 2d 624, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 20 0 3) (“The credibility of com peting expert witnesses is a m atter for the jury, and not a m atter to be decided on sum m ary judgm ent.”). The conflicting conclusions of Suryadevara’s and Defendant’s expert witnesses as to the cause of Suryadevara’s disability create a genuine issue of m aterial fact. Accordingly, sum m ary judgm ent is inappropriate. CON CLU SION For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s m otion is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED. Dated: Brooklyn, New York March 28, 20 14 / s/ I. Leo Glasser Senior United States District J udge 9
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
