HIGHLAND v. NORTH BRUNSWICK MUNICIPAL COURT, No. 3:2015cv01368 - Document 4 (D.N.J. 2015)
Court Description: OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 4/29/2015. (eaj)
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*NOT FOR PUBLICATION* UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY JOHN HIGHLAND, Civil Action No. 15-1368 (PGS) v. : Dockets.Justia.com Plaintiff, OPINION N. BRUNSWICK MUN. COURT, et al., Defendants. SHERIDAN, District Judge Plaintiff John Highland (“Plaintiff’), a prisoner currently confined at the Middlesex County Jail in New Brunswick, New Jersey, seeks to bring this action injörma pauperis. Based on his affidavit of indigence, the Court will grant Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and order the Clerk of the Court to file the Complaint. At this time, the Court must review the Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the Complaint should be dismissed at this time. I. BACKGROUND The following factual allegations are taken from the Complaint, and are accepted for purposes of this screening only. The Court has made no findings as to the veracity of Plaintiffs allegations. The “Statement of Claims” section of Plaintiffs Complaint reads as follows: On 8-2-2014 Judge W. Feingold sentence [sic] me to 6 months county jail time willingly and knowingly [sic] that my conviction only carried a sentence of community service. I am African American, and suffer from mental illness. The judge was racist and cruel. And violated my human and civil rights by sentencing me to 6 month jail time. (Compl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff is seeking “20 million dollars for this torture.” (Id. at ¶ 7.) II. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standard 1. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in which a prisoner is proceeding informa pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § § § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress 1915A(b), or brings a claim with 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding informa pauperis. According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “a pleading that offers labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twotnbly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim’, the complaint must allege sufficient “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 2 factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPIvIS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Ma/a v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). 2. Section 1983 Actions A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.... ... Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(l )); Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). 3 B. Analysis In a series of cases beginning with Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), the Supreme Court has analyzed the intersection of 42 U.S.C. U.S.C. § § 1983 and the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 2254. In Preiser, state prisoners who had been deprived of good conduct time credits by the New York State Department of Correctional Services as a result of disciplinary proceedings brought a § 1983 action seeking injunctive relief to compel restoration of the credits, which would have resulted in their immediate release. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 476. The prisoners did not seek compensatory damages for the loss of their credits. See Id. at 494. The Court held that “when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 500. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Court addressed a corollary question to that presented in Preiser; whether a prisoner could challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in a suit for damages only under proceeding. § 1983, a form of relief not available through a habeas Again, the Court rejected corpus § 1983 as a vehicle to challenge the lawfulness of a criminal judgment. [un order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. 4 Id. at 486—87 (footnote omitted). The Court further instructed district courts, in determining whether a complaint states a claim under § 1983, to evaluate whether a favorable outcome would necessarily imply the invalidity of a criminal judgment. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiffs action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit. Id. at 487 (footnotes omitted). The Court also held that “a § 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.” Id. at 489—90. “Considering heck and summarizing the interplay between habeas and § 1983 claims, the Supreme Court recently explained that, a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the confinement or its duration.” Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81—82, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005)). He is specifically challenging the conviction on the grounds that the judge improperly sentenced him because he is African-American and suffers from mental illness. cannot seek damages in a Pursuant to Heck. Plaintiff § 1 983 suit until he can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Since Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his 5 conviction has been invalidated, his § 1983 claims must be dismissed without prejudice at this time. See Brown v. City of Philadelphia, 339 F. App’x 143, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2009) (“when a § 1983 claim is dismissed under Heck, the dismissal should be without prejudice”) (internal citations omitted). 111. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice in its entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §S 1 91 5 (e)(2)(B)(ii) and 191 5A(b)( I )2 An appropriate order follows. Dated: 1’L k Peter G. Sheridan, U.S.D.J. 2 Before dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must grant leave to amend the complaint unless amendment would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 03, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). In this case, the Court finds that granting leave to amend would be futile since Plaintiff cannot maintain a § 1983 action seeking damages until such time as his conviction is invalidated. 6
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