THOMAS v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, No. 2:2019cv10572 - Document 22 (D.N.J. 2021)
Court Description: OPINION and ORDER filed. Signed by Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King (OHSD) on 6/23/2021. (km)
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THOMAS v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY Doc. 22 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY BETHANIE THOMAS, Plaintiff, Case No. 2:19-cv-10572 Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King v. ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. OPINION AND ORDER This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), regarding the applications of Plaintiff Bethanie Thomas for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. Plaintiff appeals from the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s application. After careful consideration of the entire record, including the entire administrative record, the Court decides this matter pursuant to Rule 78(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Civil Rule 9.1(f). For the reasons that follow, the Court reverses the Commissioner’s decision and remands the action for further proceedings. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On April 21, 2015, Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, alleging that she has been disabled since March 15, 2015. R. 201– 16, 81, 91. The applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. R. 123–28, 136–41. Plaintiff sought a de novo hearing before an administrative law judge. R. 142. Administrative 1 Dockets.Justia.com Law Judge Leonard Olarsch (“ALJ”) held a hearing on October 19, 2017, at which Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, appeared and testified, as did a vocational expert. R. 32–80. In a decision dated March 22, 2018, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act from March 15, 2015, Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date, through the date of that decision. R. 18–25. That decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security when the Appeals Council declined review on February 20, 2019. R. 1–6. Plaintiff timely filed this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). ECF No. 1. On September 12, 2020, Plaintiff consented to disposition of the matter by a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 19; 1 see also ECF No. 21 (consent form with corrected signature). On September 14, 2021, the case was reassigned to the undersigned. ECF No. 20. The matter is now ripe for disposition. II. LEGAL STANDARD A. Standard of Review In reviewing applications for Social Security disability benefits, this Court has the authority to conduct a plenary review of legal issues decided by the ALJ. Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000). In contrast, the Court reviews the ALJ’s factual findings to determine if they are supported by substantial evidence. Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 1 The Commissioner has provided general consent to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in cases seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision. See Standing Order In re: Social Security Pilot Project (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2018). 2 (1988) (citation and internal quotations omitted); see K.K. ex rel. K.S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-2309 , 2018 WL 1509091, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2018). Substantial evidence is “less than a preponderance of the evidence, but ‘more than a mere scintilla.”’ Bailey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 354 F. App’x 613, 616 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations and quotations omitted); see K.K., 2018 WL 1509091, at *4. The substantial evidence standard is a deferential standard, and the ALJ’s decision cannot be set aside merely because the Court “acting de novo might have reached a different conclusion.” Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. NLRB, 804 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1986); see, e.g., Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Where the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if we would have decided the factual inquiry differently.”) (citing Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999)); K.K., 2018 WL 1509091, at *4 (“‘[T]he district court ... is [not] empowered to weigh the evidence or substitute its conclusions for those of the fact-finder.’”) (quoting Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992)). Nevertheless, the Third Circuit cautions that this standard of review is not “a talismanic or self-executing formula for adjudication.” Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983) (“The search for substantial evidence is thus a qualitative exercise without which our review of social security disability cases ceases to be merely deferential and becomes instead a sham.”); see Coleman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 15-6484, 2016 WL 4212102, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2016). The Court has a duty to “review the evidence in its totality” and “take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.” K.K., 2018 WL 1509091, at *4 (quoting Schonewolf v. Callahan, 972 F. Supp. 277, 284 (D.N.J. 1997) (citations and quotations omitted)); see Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating that substantial evidence exists 3 only “in relationship to all the other evidence in the record”). Evidence is not substantial if “it is overwhelmed by other evidence,” “really constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion,” or “ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence.” Wallace v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 722 F.2d 1150, 1153 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Kent, 710 F.2d at 114); see K.K., 2018 WL 1509091, at *4. The ALJ decision thus must be set aside if it “did not take into account the entire record or failed to resolve an evidentiary conflict.” Schonewolf, 972 F. Supp. at 284-85 (citing Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1978)). Although an ALJ is not required “to use particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting [the] analysis,” the decision must contain “sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful review.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000)); see K.K., 2018 WL 1509091, at *4. The Court “need[s] from the ALJ not only an expression of the evidence s/he considered which supports the result, but also some indication of the evidence which was rejected.” Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705-06; see Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121 (“Although the ALJ may weigh the credibility of the evidence, [s/]he must give some indication of the evidence which [s/]he rejects and [the] reason(s) for discounting such evidence.”) (citing Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d. Cir. 1999)). “[T]he ALJ is not required to supply a comprehensive explanation for the rejection of evidence; in most cases, a sentence or short paragraph would probably suffice.” Cotter, 650 F.2d at 482. Absent such articulation, the Court “cannot tell if significant probative evidence was not credited or simply ignored.” Id. at 705. As the Third Circuit explains: Unless the [ALJ] has analyzed all evidence and has sufficiently explained the weight [s/]he has given to obviously probative exhibits, to say that [the] decision is supported by substantial evidence approaches an abdication of the court’s duty to 4 scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether the conclusions reached are rational. Gober, 574 F.2d at 776; see Schonewolf, 972 F. Supp. at 284-85. Following review of the entire record on appeal from a denial of benefits, a court can enter “a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Remand is appropriate if the record is incomplete or if the ALJ’s decision lacks adequate reasoning or contains illogical or contradictory findings. See Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119-20; Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 221-22 (3d Cir. 1984). Remand is also appropriate if the ALJ’s findings are not the product of a complete review which “explicitly weigh[s] all relevant, probative and available evidence” in the record. Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see A.B. on Behalf of Y.F. v. Colvin, 166 F. Supp.3d 512, 518 (D.N.J. 2016). A decision to “award benefits should be made only when the administrative record of the case has been fully developed and when substantial evidence on the record as a whole indicates that the claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits.” Podedworny, 745 F.2d at 221-22 (citation and quotation omitted); see A.B., 166 F. Supp.3d at 518. In assessing whether the record is fully developed to support an award of benefits, courts take a more liberal approach when the claimant has already faced long processing delays. See, e.g., Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2000). An award is “especially appropriate when “further administrative proceedings would simply prolong [Plaintiff’s] waiting and delay his ultimate receipt of benefits.” Podedworny, 745 F.2d at 223; see Schonewolf, 972 F. Supp. at 290. B. Sequential Evaluation Process The Social Security Act establishes a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the statute. 20 C.F.R. §§ 5 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). “The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, and the Commissioner bears the burden of proof at step five.” Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 634 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Poulos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 2007)). At step one, the ALJ determines whether the plaintiff is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If so, then the inquiry ends because the plaintiff is not disabled. At step two, the ALJ decides whether the plaintiff has a “severe impairment” or combination of impairments that “significantly limits [the plaintiff’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities[.]” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the plaintiff does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, then the inquiry ends because the plaintiff is not disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step three. At step three, the ALJ decides whether the plaintiff’s impairment or combination of impairments “meets” or “medically equals” the severity of an impairment in the Listing of Impairments (“Listing”) found at 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If so, then the plaintiff is presumed to be disabled if the impairment or combination of impairments has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. Id. at §§ 404.1509, 416.909. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ must determine the plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and determine whether the plaintiff can perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), (f), 416.920(e), (f). If the plaintiff can perform past relevant work, then the inquiry ends because the plaintiff is not disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the final step. 6 At step five, the ALJ must decide whether the plaintiff, considering the plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, can perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If the ALJ determines that the plaintiff can do so, then the plaintiff is not disabled. Otherwise, the plaintiff is presumed to be disabled if the impairment or combination of impairments has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. III. ALJ DECISION AND APPELLATE ISSUES Plaintiff 2 met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2019. R. 21. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity between March 15, 2015, her alleged disability onset date, and March 22, 2018, the date of the administrative decision. Id. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: diabetes mellitus, sleep apnea, asthma, and arthritis. Id. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not suffer an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of any Listing. R. 21–22. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work subject to various additional postural and environmental limitations. R. 22–24. The ALJ also found that this RFC permitted the performance of Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a security guard. R. 24. The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act from March 15, 2015, her alleged disability onset date, through the date of the Plaintiff is referred to as male at some points in the record and as female at other points. See, e.g., R. 379–83, 433, 436, 439, 444, 447, 450, 453, 459, 463, 466. However, neither Plaintiff nor the Commissioner raises an issue in this regard. 2 7 decision. Id. Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s findings at step four and asks that the decision of the Commissioner be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Plaintiff’s Brief, ECF No. 14; Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 18. The Commissioner takes the position that his decision should be affirmed in its entirety because the ALJ’s decision correctly applied the governing legal standards, reflected consideration of the entire record, and was supported by sufficient explanation and substantial evidence. Defendant’s Brief Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 9.1, ECF No. 15. IV. DISCUSSION Plaintiff raises a number of challenges to the ALJ’s decision, including, inter alia, that the ALJ misstated the medical evidence, which undermined the RFC determination. Plaintiff’s Brief, ECF No. 14, pp. 15–23; Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 18, pp. 1–5. This Court agrees. In making a disability determination, an ALJ must evaluate all record evidence. Plummer, 186 F.3d at 433; Cotter, 642 F.2d at 704. Moreover, “[a]n ALJ must explain the weight given to physician opinions. . . .” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 362 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2)(ii)). An ALJ’s decision must include “a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests” sufficient to enable a reviewing court “to perform its statutory function of judicial review.” Cotter, 642 F.2d at 704–05. Specifically, the ALJ must discuss the evidence that supports the decision, the evidence that the ALJ rejected, and explain why the ALJ accepted some evidence but rejected other evidence. Id. at 705–06; Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 505–06 (3d Cir. 2009); Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 42 (“Although we do not expect the ALJ to make reference to every relevant treatment note in a case . . . we do expect the ALJ, as the factfinder, to consider and evaluate the medical evidence in the record 8 consistent with his responsibilities under the regulations and case law.”). Without this explanation, “the reviewing court cannot tell if significant probative evidence was not credited or simply ignored.” Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705; see also Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705). Accordingly, “the ALJ still may choose whom to credit but ‘cannot reject evidence for no reason or the wrong reason.’” Sutherland v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 785 F. App’x 921, 928 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Morales, 225 F.3d at 317); see also Nazario v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 794 F. App’x 204, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2019) (“We have also held that although the government ‘may properly accept some parts of the medical evidence and reject other parts,’ the government must ‘provide some explanation for a rejection of probative evidence which would suggest a contrary disposition.’”) (quoting Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1994)); Cotter, 642 F.2d at 706–07 (“Since it is apparent that the ALJ cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason, . . . an explanation from the ALJ of the reason why probative evidence has been rejected is required so that a reviewing court can determine whether the reasons for rejection were improper.”) (internal citation omitted). In addition, “‘[a] cardinal principle guiding disability eligibility determinations is that the ALJ accord treating physicians’ reports great weight, especially when their opinions reflect expert judgment based on a continuing observation of the patient’s condition over a prolonged period of time.’” Nazario, 794 F. App’x at 209 (quoting Morales, 225 F.3d at 317); see also Brownawell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 554 F.3d 352, 355 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that an ALJ should give treating physicians’ opinions “great weight”) (citations omitted); Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 43 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that a treating physician’s opinions “are entitled to substantial and at times even controlling weight”) (citations omitted). However, “[a] treating source’s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight if it is ‘inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] 9 case record.’” Hubert v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 746 F. App’x 151, 153 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)); see also Brunson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 704 F. App’x 56, 59–60 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[A]n ALJ may reject the opinion of a treating physician when it is unsupported and inconsistent with the other evidence in the record.”). However, “[i]n choosing to reject the treating physician’s assessment, an ALJ may not make speculative inferences from medical reports and may reject a treating physician’s opinion outright only on the basis of contradictory medical evidence and not due to his or her own credibility judgments, speculation or lay opinion.” Morales, 225 F.3d at 317 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The ALJ must consider the following factors when deciding what weight to accord the opinion of a treating physician: (1) the length of the treatment relationship and frequency of examination; (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (3) the supportability of the opinion; (4) the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; (5) the treating source’s specialization; and (6) any other relevant factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1)–(6), 416.927(c)(1)–(6). Accordingly, “the ALJ still may choose whom to credit but ‘cannot reject evidence for no reason or the wrong reason.’” Sutherland v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 785 F. App’x 921, 928 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Morales, 225 F.3d at 317); see also Nazario, 794 F. App’x at 209–10 (“We have also held that although the government ‘may properly accept some parts of the medical evidence and reject other parts,’ the government must ‘provide some explanation for a rejection of probative evidence which would suggest a contrary disposition.’”) (quoting Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1994)); Morales, 225 F.3d at 317 (“Where . . . the opinion of a treating physician conflicts with that of a non-treating, non-examining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit[.]”); Cotter, 642 F.2d at 706–07 (“Since it is apparent that the ALJ cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason, . . . an explanation from the ALJ of the reason why 10 probative evidence has been rejected is required so that a reviewing court can determine whether the reasons for rejection were improper.”) (internal citation omitted). Here, at step four of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a limited range of light work as follows: After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the claimant is limited to occasional postural maneuvers, except never climbing ropes, ladders, and scaffolds; and avoiding concentrated exposure to temperature and humidity extremes, must avoid even moderate exposure to fumes, odors, dust and gases. R. 22. In support of this RFC determination, the ALJ afforded “great weight” to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Ifekhar Kadri, M.D., FACC, that Plaintiff should avoid heavy lifting: Dr. Ifekhar Kadri indicated that the claimant should avoid heavy lifting based on the above impairments (Ex. 8F, p. 13 [R. 445]). This opinion is given great weight, as it is consistent with the impact that the combined severe impairments have on the claimant, and the limitations were incorporated into the above residual functional capacity. R. 23. Although the ALJ credited Dr. Kadri’s repeated statement, “Avoid heavy lifting,” see, e.g., R. 439, 445, 447, the ALJ did not explain why he at the same time implicitly discounted Dr. Kadri’s other findings, including arthritis in both of Plaintiff’s knees, 1-2+ edema, +2 peripheral pulses, swelling of the limbs, chest pain and borderline left ventricular hypertrophy, unspecified hypertensive heart disease without heart failure, and Dr. Kadri’s comment that Plaintiff “is not able to walk much.” R. 436, 438–39, 441, 443, 445–47, 450, 454, 457. Significantly, an apparent attempt to address at least some of Dr. Kadri’s specific findings was entirely unsuccessful: “Furthermore, while the claimant showed some swelling and degenerative changes in the spine and knees (Ex. 8F, p. 4; Ex. 6F, p. 6, 7).” R. 23 [sic]. 11 Although an ALJ is free to determine whether and to what extent to credit a treating physician’s opinions, the ALJ cannot reject evidence from a treating physician “for no reason[.]” Morales, 225 F.3d at 317 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 43 (stating that when an ALJ “weigh[s] the credibility of the evidence, he must give some indication of the evidence that he rejects and his reason(s) for discounting that evidence.”). In addition, by crediting only Dr. Kadri’s opinion that Plaintiff should avoid “heavy lifting,” while ignoring other positive findings in Dr. Kadri’s records, the ALJ improperly engaged in prohibited “cherry picking.” See Pastuch v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV 17-989, 2018 WL 2018063, at *9 (D.N.J. May 1, 2018) (“The ALJ must not ignore the opinions of treating professionals or cherry pick evaluations, diagnostics, or opinions that support a particular conclusion.”); DeJesus v. Colvin, No. CIV. 14-4798, 2015 WL 4902159, at *8 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2015) (“Adopting only portions of an opinion that support the ALJ’s RFC findings while failing to address those portions that contradict them . . . will not suffice as an adequate explanation.”); Cintron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:13-CV-7125, 2014 WL 6800613, at *10 (D.N.J. Dec. 2, 2014) (“An ALJ cannot rely on portions of documents from the record without also refuting ‘the statements made therein that contradict his findings.’”) (quoting Cadavid v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CIVA 12–7214, 2014 WL 839453, at *9 (D.N.J. Feb. 26, 2014)); cf. DeJesus v. Colvin, No. CIV. 14-4798, 2015 WL 4902159, at *8 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2015) (“Adopting only portions of an opinion that support the ALJ’s RFC findings while failing to address those portions that contradict them . . . will not suffice as an adequate explanation.”) (citations omitted). An ALJ’s decision must contain “sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful review.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505. The ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Kadri’s findings and opinions does not satisfy this standard. 12 Moreover, it is unclear to what extent this error infected the ALJ’s determination of Plaintiff’s RFC. R. 22–24. Thus, the Court cannot meaningfully review the ALJ’s RFC finding and determine whether substantial evidence supports that finding at step four. See Murphy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:19-CV-20122, 2020 WL 7022746, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2020) (“The ALJ’s reliance on this misconception, along with other unsupported mischaracterizations of Plaintiff’s physical abilities . . . permeates the ALJ’s decision. As stated above, these errors cannot be separated from the ALJ’s analysis of other record evidence such that the Court may determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC analysis.”). This Court concludes that remand of the matter for further consideration is appropriate even if, upon further examination of these issues, the ALJ again concludes that Plaintiff is not entitled to benefits. Cf. Zuschlag v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 18-CV-1949, 2020 WL 5525578, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2020) (“On remand, the ALJ may reach the same conclusion, but it must be based on a proper foundation.”); Jiminez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV 1912662, 2020 WL 5105232, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2020) (“Once more, the ALJ did not provide an adequate explanation that would enable meaningful review, and the Court once more cannot determine what role lay speculation played in the ALJ’s rejection of this detailed functional assessment from Dr. Marks.”); Cassidy v. Colvin, No. 2:13-1203, 2014 WL 2041734, at *10 n.3 (W.D. Pa. May 16, 2014) (“Nevertheless, that the ALJ may have misinterpreted or misunderstood Dr. Kaplan’s findings with regard to Plaintiff's postural activities does not absolve her of her error. Rather, it highlights the need for an ALJ to fully explain her findings. Otherwise, the district court is left to engage in this sort of speculation about how an ALJ arrived at her decision.”). The Court therefore concludes that the decision of the Commissioner must be 13 reversed, and the matter must be remanded to the Commissioner for further consideration of these issues. 3 V. CONCLUSION For these reasons, the Court REVERSES the Commissioner’s decision and REMANDS the matter for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order. The Court will issue a separate Order issuing final judgment pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). IT IS SO ORDERED. Date: June 23, 2021 s/Norah McCann King NORAH McCANN KING UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff asserts a number of other errors in the Commissioner’s final decision. Because the Court concludes that the matter must be remanded for further consideration of Dr. Kadri’s findings, the Court does not consider those claims. 14 3
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