SMITH v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, No. 2:2015cv02511 - Document 32 (D.N.J. 2016)
Court Description: OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 3/8/16. (sr, )
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SMITH v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES Doc. 32 NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY MOSES LEE SMITH, Plaintiff, V. ESSEX COUNTY DIVISION OF WELFARE, NEWARK PUBLIC WELFARE, Civil Action No.: 15-2511 (iLL) OPINION Defendants. Linares, District Judge. This matter comes before the Court by way of a motion to dismis s Pro se Plaintiff Moses Lee Smith’s Amended Complaint, filed by Defendant Essex County Division of Welfare (the “Division”). (ECF No. 25). On February 8, 2016, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the Division’s motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 28).’ Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78, the Court decides this motion without oral argument. For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants the Divison’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. BACKGROUND Plaintiff filed the instant action in New Jersey Superior Court on or around March 10, 2015, alleging claims only against the New Jersey Department of Human Services (the “NJ DHS”). (ECF No. 1-i). On August 5, 2015, the undersigned issued an Order dismissing the NJ DHS from this action as the NJ DHS is not a “person” subject to suit within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In its February 16, 2016 Order, this Court noted that while Plaintiff’s February 8, 2016 submission is labeled as a “Reply/Objection to allowance of extended time to defense after their time to answer the complaint has expired,” it is more properly construed as an opposition to the Division’s motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 30). I Dockets.Justia.com (ECF No. 14). The Court permitted Plaintiff the opportuni ty to amend his Complaint to “name proper defendants as afforded [to] him by law.” (Id.). Plain tiff filed the operative Amended Complaint on August 24, 2015, this time naming Essex Cou nty Division of Welfare and Newark Public Welfare as Defendants. (ECF No. 15, Amended Com plaint, “Compi.”). The Amended Complaint states, in its entirety: Plaintiff and his three children were denied Due Process and Equal protection of law by defendants which also resulted in Intentional infliction of Emotional Distress, Fraudulent Misrepresentation of documents that were used to impe ded and then deny plaintiff and his three children state benefits which included Medicaid, gran t monies and state resource for homeless. (Compi. at 1). On January 25, 2016, the Division filed the instant motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint on account of Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administ rative remedies and failure to state a claim for relief, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedur e 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), respectively. (ECF No. 25-2, “Def.’s Mov. Br.” at 1). Plaintiff has oppo sed this motion. (ECF No. 28, “P1.’s Opp. Br.”). LEGAL STANDARD To withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plain tiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defe ndant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendan t has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Threadbare 2 recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. When reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint filed by a pro se litigant, the Court has “a special obligation to construe his complaint liberally.” See Higgs v. Atty Gen. ofthe United States, 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted). That said, even a pro se litigant’s Complaint is subject to dismissal if a Court, after liberally constru ing same, finds that the plaintiff has not met the threshold pleading standards outlined by the Federa l Rules of Civil Procedure and case law, See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989) (“To the extent that a complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim lacks even an arguab le basis in law, Rule 1 2(b)(6) counsel[s] dismissal.”). Dismissal under Rule 1 2(b)(6) is particularly appropriate where, as in this case, a plaintiff fails to exhaust all administrative remedies available to him prior to filing suit. See Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1020 (3d Cir. 1997) (“It is abasic tenet of administrative law that aplaintiff must exhaust all required administrative remedies before bringin g a claim for judicial relief.”) (citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969)). ANALYSIS Plaintiffs claims arise out of the Division’s denial of “state benefit s which included Medic aid, grant monies and state resources for the homeless.” (Compi. at I). Stated differently, Plaintiff appears to be seeking an appeal of the Division’s denial of state benefits to which he believes he is entitled. In New Jersey, “whenever under statute or agency rule there is a mode of administrative review within an agency, such review shall remain unimpaired and any judicial review shall be from the final action of the agency.” N.J.S.A. 52:14B-12. However, “an agency action does not become 3 final until all avenues of internal administrative review of have been exhausted.” Bouie v. N.J Dept of Community Affairs, 407 N.J. Super 518, 527 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009); see also R. 2:2-3(a)(2) (providing that all final state administrative agency’s decisio ns are appealable as of right). The administrative review regulations with respect to public assista nce programs in New Jersey are outlined in the New Jersey Administrative Code. N.J.A. C. § 10:90-9.1 to 9.17. Specifically, an applicant of welfare benefits who has been denied same “by an action of a county agency [is] to be afforded a fair hearing in a manner established by the rules in this subcha pter” before an impartial Administrative Law Judge. N.J.A.C. § 10:90-9.3. The Director of the Division of Family Services then reviews the AU’s decision and issues a final agency decision. N.J.A.C. 10:90-9.16. Only after a public welfare applicant has secured the Director’s final decision may the applicant seek redress from a Court. However, the proper avenue for appeal of final agency decisions is the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court. R. 2:2-3(a)(2). Despite the numerous review opportunities that the State of New Jersey has provided for state benefit applicants, Plaintiffs Complaint is barren of any eviden ce that he attempted to appeal the Division’s denial of certain benefits. Accordingly, this matter is properly disposed of on account of Plaintiffs failure to exhaust his administrative remedies at the State level. Moreover, Plaintiff cannot escape the exhaustion requirement by attempting to plead a constitutional violation—namely, that the denial of benefits violated his family’s rights to “due process and equal protection.” (Compi. at 1). Indeed, “[t]he mere allegation that a constitutional issue is involved does not relieve plaintiffs of the exhaus tion requirement. To avoid this requirement, plaintiff must demonstrate not only that the constit utional question is colorable, but that the matter contains no factual questions which require admini strative determination.” Brunetti 4 v. Borough of New Milford, 68 NJ. 576, 590 (1975). Plaintiff has demonstrated neither of these requirements. Therefore—and particularly where it appears that Plaintiff is merely seeking to appeal the Division’s denial of benefits—Dismissal of Plaintiffs Complaint is warranted. Even if Plaintiff could demonstrate that he is not required to exhaust the administrative remedies he is entitled to under the laws and regulations of the State of New Jersey, this Court would dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint for failure to state a claim. As Plaintiff alleges violations of “due process and equal protection of law,” the Court wou ld construe Plaintiffs Complaint as seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To assert a claim under the statute, a plaintiff must show that he was a deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor. Woodyard v. Cnt. OfEssex, 514 F. App’x 177, 180 (3d Cir. 2013). When evalu ating the merits of a Section 1983 claim, the Court must identify the contours of the unde rlying right Plaintiff claims was violated and determine whether Plaintiff has properly alleg ed a violation of that right. Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000). The Court agrees with the Division that Plaintiffs one-sente nce Complaint, recited above, “patently fail[sj to provide any facts to support a plausible claim that a state actor, acting under color of state law deprived plaintiff of any rights secured by the United States Constitution or federal law or that such a denial was made in contravention of any state law or entitlement.” (Def.’s Mov. Br. at 6). For these reasons, the Court will grant the Division’s moti on to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to state a claim. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants the Divi sion’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: March ,2016 STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 6
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