EDELSON v. CHEUNG, No. 2:2013cv05870 - Document 83 (D.N.J. 2015)
Court Description: AMENDED OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 9/10/15. (sr, )
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
EDELSON v. CHEUNG Doc. 83 NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUR T DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY LEONARD EDELSON, Civil Action No. 13-5870 (JLL) Plaintiff, V. AMENDED OPINION STEPHEN CHEUNG, Defendant. LINARES, District Judge. This matter comes before the Court on Leonard Edelson’s (“Plaintiff”) application for a preliminary injunction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 and a writ of attachment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ, P. 64(a) and New Jersey Court Rule 4:60 -5(a). Plaintiff seeks a writ of attachment and a preliminary injunction against Defendant Step hen Cheung (“Defendant”). The Court has considered the papers submitted, as well as the oral argument of the Parties heard on June 9, 2015. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s application for a writ of attachment and a preliminary injunction is DENIED. I. Factual Background Plaintiff Leonard Edelson has owned Westch ester Lace & Textiles, Inc. (“Westchester”), located in North Bergen, New Jersey, since 1976. (P1. Br. at 3.) Westchester sells lace to a number of large undergarment manufactur ers in the United States. (P1. Br. at 3.) Westches ter’s lace was manufactured in its North Bergen factory until 2003, when it became econom ically unfeasible for production to continue in Nor th Bergen. (P1. Br. at 3.) In 2004, Edelson and Cheung formed Eastchester Lace & Textiles (“Eastchester”) with two additional partners, Dockets.Justia.com Stephen Ma and C.K. Chiu, to manufa cture lace in China. (P1. Br. at 3-4.) Eas tchester, according to Defendant, was known as Yishida in China. (Def. Br. at I.) Plaintiff obtaine d 50% ownership interest in Eastchester, while Ma, Chi u, and Cheung shared the remaining 50%, such that each owned 16.6%. (P1. Br. at 4, Tr. at 9.) The new manufacturing facility and its main office were located in Jiangmen, China. (P1. Br. at 4.) Ma, Chiu, and Cheung were tasked wit h establishing the Chinese corporatio n due to their familiarity with business procedures in China, while Edelson provided We stchester’s name, contacts, proprietary methods, copyrig ht-protected lace designs, and his exp ertise in the lace manufacturing industry. (P1. Br.at 4.) Edelson also contributed capital to establish Eastchester, including 34 machines, parts, and equ ipment, as well as over 133,000 pounds of yarn. (P1. Br. at 4.) Additionally, Edelson paid Matthe w Ranieri, a consultant, over $250,0 00 to move to China to set up the Eastchester facility and hire and teach employees to use the mac hinery. (P1. Br. at 4.) Defendant and his sister-in-law, Lis o Lee, managed Eastchester. They also own Frontier, a related company that managed Eastche ster billing. (P1. Br. at 5.) In 2005, Defendant sent a letter to Pla intiff, Ma, and Chiu, indicating that the Bank of China was seeking repayment for loans Eastehester had taken out, tota ling approximately $237,000. (P1. Br. at 5, Def. Br. at 2.) As a result of Eastchester’s debt, the Bank of China seized several of Eastchester’ s machines, which Defendant purchased back at auction with personal funds, (Tr. at 38.) Defendant offered to handle Eastchester’ s financial issu es in exchange for acquiring full ownership of the com pany. (P1. Br. at 5.) Plaintiff, Ma, and Chiu each signed a contract (“2005 Conveyance Agreem ent”) agreeing to convey their inte rests in Eastchester to Cheung. (P1. Br. at 6.) Cheung then transferred 10% of his interest in Eas tchester to his son Marcus, allegedly in order to com ply with a Chinese law. (P1. Br. at 7, Def. Br. at 2, Tr. at 30.) 2 In 2006, Plaintiff and Defendant created a one-paragraph document that purpo rted to allow Plaintiff to exercise an op tion for 50% interest in Eastches ter (“2006 Option Agreement”). (P1. Br. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges tha t Defendant drafted the 2006 Op tion Agreement, while Defendant alleges it was drafte d by Plaintiff. (P1. Br. at 6, Tr. at 35.) The 2006 Option Agreement, dated September 14, 2006 and signed by Defendant and witnessed by a notary public, indicated that: Leonard Edelson has transferred machinery and yarn and consultant services in excess of $600,000 to Eastchester Lace of Jiangmen, China. In as much as [Defendant] will own 100% of the shares after the company is reorga nized, [Defendant] agree[s] to give 50% interest in that compan y or a successor company to Leonard Edelson at a date specif ied by him. He may exercise thi s option at any time. (P1. Br. at 6, Ex. 9). Plaintiff alleges that from 2006 through mid-2013, Defendant and Lee managed Eastchester and took profits and salaries therefrom. (P1. Br. at 7.) Defendant alleges that, while he owned Eastchester, he did no t make any profits and he invested more than $200,000 in operating Eastchester. (Def. Br. at 4.) Plaintiff further alleges tha t Defendant, though he continued to work from 2010 thr ough 2013, claimed to be retired and failed to report his income from Eastchester and Frontier during that period. (P1. Br. at 7, n. 3.) Throughout this period, Edelson continued to pay Ranie ri for his consulting services and to purchase lace from Eastchester, allegedly providing Eastchester with an average of $1.6 million in annual revenue between 2010 and 2012. (P1. Br. at 8.) In March 2009, Defendant pre sented Plaintiff with a poten tial investor. (P1. Br. at 8.) After Plaintiff expressed con cern, Defendant indicated to Pla intiff that he was the only “partn er” at Eastchester. (P1. Br. at 8.) Pla intiff alleges that Defendant beg an negotiations to sell 3 Eastchester to Hang Chen in 2012 and did not inform Plaintiff. (P1. Br. at 8.) In April 2013, Defendant established Eastchester Lace Corp. in New Yor k (“Eastchester NY”) to sell lace and textiles. (P1. Br. at 8.) Defendant did not inform Plainti ff he was opening this new business. (P1. Br. at 8.) Pla intiff alleges that Defendant hired a Westchester employee, Geremy Bernstein, to assist in openin g Eastchester and competing with We stchester. (P1. Br. at 9.) In June of 2013, Defendant forw arded Plaintiff an email from Lee, detailing financial problems allegedly afflicting Eas tchester, and asked for Plaintiffs opi nion. (P1. Br. at 9.) Plaintiff provides several emails ind icating his requests to meet with Def endant regarding these financial problems and the sale of Eas tchester. (P1. Br. at 9.) These reques ts to meet were all rebuffed. (P1. Br. at 9.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant sold Eastchester on June 3, 2013 without informing Plaintiff or allowing him to exercis e the 2006 Option Agreement. (P1. Br. at 9.) Defendant indicates that he sold Eastchester to Chen for $100,000. (Def. Br. at 4.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant sent him several emails after June 3 requesting advice regard ing the potential sale of Eastchester, though the sale had alre ady taken place. (P1. Br. at 10.) Wh ile Plaintiff and Defendant discussed the potential for sale, Plaintiff requested that Defend ant ensure that Plaintiff receive compensation for his contrib utions if Eastchester were sold. (P1. Br. at 11.) Plaintiff asserts that he tried to enforce the 2006 Option Contract at the end of July. (P1. Br. at 11.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defend ant sought to sabotage Westchester in a number of ways, including cutting off his sup ply of lace from Eastchester, acquiri ng Westchester’s customers, hiring Bernstein, advisin g the new owner of Eastchester not to do business with Westchester, copying Westcheste r’s lace patterns, selling necessary machinery, and refusing to take orders from Westchester. (P1. Br. at 12-13.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant advised that 4 Eastchester would no longer do busines s with Westchester and told Chen to notify Westchester’s customers about the end of their rela tionship. (P1. Br. at 14.) According to Plaintiff, Chen sent emails to four of Westchester’s cus tomers informing them that they sho uld direct orders to Eastchester and that they would no longer accept orders through Westch ester. (P1. Br. at 15.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is in the process of liquidating his assets and removing money to China (P1. Br. at 17.) Def endant asserts that he recently sold a property he owns and transferred funds to his father-in-la w in Hong Kong to repay a debt. (Def. Br. at 1.) II. Procedural History Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on Octobe r 2, 2013, alleging breach of con tract and breach of the implied covenant of good fait h and fair dealing. (Compl. 4-5.) The parties exchanged written discovery requests and served resp onses to the discovery requests on May 14, 2014. (ECF No. 15). On May 16, 2014, Magistrate Judge Dickson entered an Order refe rring this case to mediation and appointed Harold I. Braff to serve as the mediator. (EC F No. 17). The parties engaged in mediation sessions wit h Braff on June 27, 2014 and Januar y 13, 2015, which were both ineffective in reaching a reso lution. (ECF Nos. 19, 25). On March 12, 2015, Plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to allege two additional causes of action: fraud and unjust enrichment. (ECF No. 30). On Apr il 2, 2015, Magistrate Judge Dickson granted the motion. (EC F No. 41). Defendant was given an extension to answer the Amended Complaint from April 16, 2015 until May 4, 2015. (ECF No. 45). On April 29, 2015, Defendant’s counsel moved for leave to withdraw as counsel and requested an addition extension to answer the Amended Complai nt. (ECF No. 43.) Magistrate Jud ge Dickson extended Defendant’s time to answer to Ma y 11, 2015 (ECF No. 49.) On Ma y 1, 2015, Magistrate Judge Dickson granted Plaintiffs counse l leave to file for prejudgment atta chment. (ECF No. 49.) On 5 May 5, 2015, Magistrate Judge Dickson entered an order granting Defendant’s cou nsel’s motion to withdraw. (ECF No. 49.) On May 6, 2015, Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction and/or a writ of attachment preventing Defend ant from moving his assets overseas bas ed on the allegation that Defendant was “liquid ating his assets and removing money to China,” making Defendant judgment-proof. (ECF No. 53, P1. Br. at 17.) Ill. Legal Standard A. Writ of Attachment Fed. R. Civ. P. 64(a) provides that “ev ery remedy is available that, under the law of the state where the court is located, provid es for seizing a person or property to secure satisfaction of the potential judgment.” For a court to issue a writ of attachment pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 4:60-5(a), a plaintiff must show that (1) there is a probability that fina l judgment will be rendered in favor of the plaintiff, (2) there are statutory grounds for the issu ance of the writ, and (3) there is real or personal property of the defendant at a specific location within this State which is subject to attachment. With respect to the first prong, a fina l judgment in favor of the plaintiff is “probable if it can reasonably and fairly convincing ly be accepted as true, factual, or pos sible without being undeniably so.” Sentry Ins. V. Sky Mgmt., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 900, 905 (D.N.J 1999). This means that a plaintiff seeking a wri t of attachment must demonstrate a prima facie case against the defendant. Tanner Assoc., Inc . v. Ciraldo, 33 N.J. 51, 62 (1960). NJ.S,A § 2A:26-2(a) provides stat utory grounds for attachment “where the facts would entitle plaintiff to an order of arrest before judgment in a civil action,” a procedure known as capias ad respondendum. N.J.S.A . § 2A:15-41, 2A:15-42. A capias ad respondendum can issue in an action founded in contract or in tort. In a tort action, 2A:15-41 provides that: § 6 [a) capias ad respondendum sha ll issue.. only when the action is founded upon (a) an outrageous battery or mayhem, (b) a cla im of damages for the misconduct or neglect of a public officer, or (c) a willful or malicious act and the defendant is a nonresident or is about to remove from the state. . In a contract action, whether the contract is express or implied, § 2A: 15-42 provides that: A capias ad respondendum sha ll issue. only when the pro of establishes. (a) that defend ant is about to remove any of his property out of the jurisdiction of the court in which the action is about to be commenced or is the n pending with intent to defrau d his creditors, or (b) that defend ant has property or choses in action which he fraudulently conceals, (c) that defendant has assigned, removed, disposed of, or is about to assign, remove, or dis pose of any of his property with intent to defraud his creditors, or (d) that defendant fraudulently contra cted the debt or incurred the demand. To satisfy the third prong, a pla intiff must show that the Defen dant has real property that the Court can reach and attach . . . . . B. Preliminary Injunction Although the Court typically applies state law in diversity actions, the Court utilizes a federal standard in examining requests to federal courts for preliminary injunctions. Instan t Air Freight, Co. v. C.F. Air Freigh t, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 799 (3d Cir. 1989). A preliminary inj unction is a “drastic and extraordinary remedy that is not to be routin ely granted.” Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir.1993). Whether to issue a preliminary injuncti on is within the trial court’s discre tion. New Eng. Braiding Co ., v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 97 0 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed Cir. 1992). Th e United States Court of Appea ls for the Third Circuit has hel d that “a district court has the autho rity to grant injunctive relief in an arbitrable dispute, pro vided that the traditional prerequisites for such relief are satisfied.” Or tho Pharm. Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 882 F.2d 806. 812 (3d Cir.19 89). The court identified tho se “traditional prerequisites” as follows: (1) whether the mo vant has demonstrated reason able probability of eventual suc cess in 7 the litigation; (2) the probability of irreparable har m to movant if immediate relief is not granted; (3) the potential harm to the non-m oving party; and (4) the public int erest. 4 at 8 12-13. $çç also Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DOUE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999). A plaintiff must establish more than a risk of irre parable injury. He must demonstr ate “a clear showing of immediate irreparable injury.” Ho xworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co ., 903 F.2d 186, 205 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting ECRI v. McGr aw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 22 5 (3d Cir. 1987)). The Third Circuit has placed particular we ight on the probability of irrepar able harm and the likelihood of success on the merits, stating tha t “we cannot sustain a prelimina ry injunction ordered by the district court where either or both of these prerequisites are absent .” at 197 (quoting c Arthur Treacher’s Franchisee Lit ig., 689 F.2d 1137, 1143 (3d Cir .1982)); also Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freigh t, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 800 (3d Cir . 1989); Morton v. Beyc, 822 F.2d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 1987); Fre ixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor Co., 731 F.2d 148, 151 (3d Cir. 1984). IV. Discussion A. Plaintiff is not entitled to a wr it of attachment on Defendant’s property in New Jersey based on any of his claims. Plaintiff asserts that his request for a writ of attachment satisfies the three prongs required by New Jersey Court Rule 4:60-5 (a). He argues that there is a pro bability that final judgment on his breach of contract, breach of duty of good faith and fair dea ling, fraud, and unjust enrichme nt claims will be rendered in his favor. To satisfy the second pro ng, Plaintiff asserts that New Jersey’s capias ad respondendum statutes provide grounds for the issuance of a writ. Finally, he argues that Defendant has proper ty in New Jersey that can be att ached. Plaintiff has not shown there is a probability that final judgment 8 will be rendered in his favor with respect to any of his claims. In order to show there is a probability that fin al judgment will be rendered in Plaintif fs favor, he must state aprim afacie case on one or more of his claims. 1, Breach of Contract To state a prima facie claim for breach of contract, Plain tiff must show that (1) a con tract existed, (2) Defendant breach ed that contract, (3) the bre ach caused damage to Plaint iff, and (4) Plaintiff performed his own contractual obligations. Fre derico v. Home Depot, 50 7 F.3d 188, 203 (3d. Cir. 2007). In order to establish that a contract existe d, Plaintiff must prove the bas ic elements of a contract: (1) off er, (2) acceptance, and (3) consideration. Boro Constr., Inc. v. Lenape Reg’l High Sch. Bd . Of Educ,, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135822, 15 (D.N.J. 20 10). Additionally, the contract must be “sufficiently defini te that the performance to be rendered by each party can be ascertained with reasonable certainty.” Schulz v. United States Boxin g Ass’n, 105 F.3d 127 (3d. Cir. 1997 ). Though Plaintiff baldly ass erts that “there is no question that Edelson and Cheung entered into a valid contract,” this Court disagrees. (P1. Br . at 22). Plaintiff alleges tha t Defendant breached the 2006 Option Agreement, but fails to sho w that a contract existed. Th ough it appears from the one-paragraph agr eement that there was offer and acceptance, whether the re was consideration is in dispute. A contract is unenforceable without consideration. Bla ir v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 604. (3d. Cir. 2002). Th e 2006 Option Agreement states that Plaintiff “has transferred ma chinery and yarn and consul tant services in excess of $600,000 to Eastchester” prior to the pro mise. It is well-established that “past consideration, as opposed to true consideration. canno t form the basis for a bindin g contract.” J.C. Trading Limited v. Wa! Mart Stores, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 449, 456 (D. Del. 2013) (citing Continental Ins . Co. v. . . 9 Rutledge & Co., 750 A.2d 1219, 1232 (Del. Cli. 2000 )). According to the Resta tement (Second) of Contracts, § 86 Commen t a, “past consideration is inc onsistent with the meaning of consideration.” See also Sta rr v. Katz, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14437 (D.N.J. 1994 ); Van Brunt yjcheeg, 799 F. Su pp. 1467, 1471 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Thus, it is not clear that Edelson and Cheung entered into a valid contract. Alternatively, Plaintiff ass erts that at least one of the following constitutes consid eration: (a) Plaintiffs transfer of his ownership of Eastchester to Defendant, (b) Plaintiffs co ntinued purchasing relationship wi th Eastchester, and (c) Plain tiffs continued payment of Ranieri’s consultant fee. For purposes of the extraordinary remed y sought, plaintiff has not made a sufficient showing of cons ideration. Because past pro mises cannot constitute cons ideration, the transfer of interest in the 2005 Conveyance Agreeme nt may not constitute conside ration for the 2006 Option Agreement. Because it appears that Plain tiff is unable to show there was a valid contract at this time, he has failed to show there is a probability that final jud gment will be rendered in his favor with respect to his breach of co ntract claim. Thus, he has failed to satisfy the first req uirement for obtaining a writ of attachm ent on this claim. 2. Breach of the implied co venant of good faith andfair dealing The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implicit in all contracts in New Jer sey. Pepe v. Riva Co., 85 F. Su pp. 2d 349, 390 (D.N.J. 19 99). However, in the absen ce of a valid contract, there can be no implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Since Plaintiff has not adequately establishe d that there was a valid con tract, he has failed to sho w that there is a probability that final judgm ent will be rendered in his favor on this claim. There fore, he has not 10 satisfied the first requirem ent for obtainin g a writ of attachment with respect implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim. to his breach of the 3. Unjust enrichment Plaintiff asserts that Defen dant received a benefit and de prived Edelson of valuable equity, property, services, and money without providing Edelson his share of Eastc hester. (P1. Br. at 24.) To show that De fendant was unjustly enric hed, Plaintiff must prove tha t Defendant received some benefit, and that retaining that benefit wo uld be unjust. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 471 (D .N.J. 1999). Plaintiff has no t adequately shown that De fendant received any benefit and do es not rebut Defendant’s ass ertion that he sustained signif icant losses in maintaining Eastcheste r’s operations. Additionally, it seems that Edelson was not entitled to any share of Eastchester aft er the 2005 Conveyance Ag reement. Though the 2006 Option Agreement purports to allow Edelson to obtain 50% of Ea stchester upon exercise of the option, Plaintiff has not adequatel y shown that the 2006 Optio n Agreement was a valid contract. 4. Fraud To state a claim for fraud under New Jersey law, Plain tiff must allege (1) a mater ial misrepresentation of fact, (2) knowledge or belief by the defendant of its falsity, (3) intention that the other person rely on it, (4) reasonable reliance thereon by the other perso n, and (5) resulting damage. Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 N.J. 582, 610 (1997). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), a party alleg ing fraud “must state with particularity the circums tances constituting fraud or mistake.” With respect to the 2005 Conveyance Agreement, Pl aintiff suggests that De fendant 11 materially misrepresented Eastc hester’s financial situation. (P1 . Br. at 6.) Plaintiff also sugges ts that Defendant represented to him that the business relationship between Eastchester and Westchester would not chang e, and that this was false. (P1 . Br. at 6.) However, Plaintiff has provided no evidence that De fendant misrepresented Eastc hester’s financial situation. Pla intiff has also failed to provide any evidence indicating that, at the time the 2005 Conveyance Agreement was signed, Defen dant represented to him that the business relationship betwe en Eastchester and Westchester would not change. With respect to the 2006 Optio n Agreement, Plaintiff conten ds that Defendant made a matenal misrepresentation to Plaintiff in asserting that he owned 100% of Eastchester, when he owned 90% and his son owned 10%. (P1. Br. at 7). Though it app ears that Defendant’s assertion that he owned 100% of Eastc hester was a misrepresentation , there is no evidence that it was material or that Plaintiff relied upon it. Whether Defendant owned 100% or 90% of Eastc hester, he would still be able to convey 50% of Eastchester to Plaint iff. Plaintiff also alleges that De fendant was dishonest about Eastchester’s financial situati on in June of 2013. (P1. Br. at 9). However, Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant’s des cription of Eastchester’s finances wa s a misrepresentation. Plaintiff makes a conclusory statement . Plaintiff asserts that “Cheung forwarded an e-mail to Edels on that presented a false pic ture of Eastchester Lace’s financial condition” without providing any factual basis for concludin g that his representation of Eastches ter’s financial condition wa s false. (P1. Br. at 9). Further, there is no evidence that Cheung intended for Edelson to rely on this inf ormation; he merely asked for Edelson’s opinion regarding Eastchester’s financial situati on. (P1. Br. at 9, Ex. 13). Pla intiff asserts that “Cheung intended to deceive Edelson.. .so as to discourage Edelson from exercising his option for 50%” of Easte hester, but again provides no factual basis for this conclusio n. (P1. 12 Br. at 9). Plaintiff further alleges tha t Defendant made a mater ial misrepresentation wi th respect to the timing of the sale of Eastchester, and that Plain tiff relied on this misrepre sentation in choosing not to exercise his option for 50% of the company. (P1. Br. at 9). If the 2005 Conveyance Agreement is enforceable, Plaintiff no longer had any interest in Eastchester prior to its sale, and Plaintiff has not produced sufficient ev idence to show that the 2005 Conveyance Agreement is unenforceab le. Plaintiff has also not sufficiently shown that the 2006 Option Agreement constitutes a contract, so even if Defen dant had told Plaintiff about the sale before it occurred, there is no evide nce that Plaintiff could have exercised his alleged right to 50% of Eastehester. Therefore, the alleged misrepresentation seems immaterial and does not justify the extraordinary remedy so ught. Since Plaintiff has not provided facts supp orting allegations of a material misrepresentation of fact, this Court finds tha t he has failed to adequa tely state a prima jacie fraud claim. Because Plaintiff has fai led to state aprimafacie case for any of his claim s, he has failed to satisfy the tirst prong required for a writ of att achment. Thus, this Co urt declines to issue a writ of attachment. B. Plaintiff is not entitled to a preliminary injuncti on Under Hoxworth, a prelim inary injunction demonstrates both a reaso nable probability of probability of Plaintiff based on any of his cla ims. cannot be granted unless Plaintiff eventual success in the lit igation and the suffering irreparable harm . Plaintiff argues that he will suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary inj unction is not granted, based on allegations that Defenda nt has begun moving his assets to Ch ina and will therefore be judgment proof. Howeve r, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of eventual su ccess in the litigation for the reasons 13 described above with res pect to the writ of attachm ent. Because Plaintiff ha s failed to state a prima jàcie case for an y of his claims, he has fai led to satisfy an element necessary for granting a preliminary injunction. As a result, this Court de clines to issue a prelim inary injunction. V. CONCLUSION Therefore, having deter mined that Plaintiff has not demons trated a likelihood of su ccess on his breach of contrac t, breach of the covena nt of good faith and fai r dealing, unjust enrichment, and fraud cla ims, the Court denies Pl aintiffs request for the issue of a writ of attachment and a prelim inary injunction. An appropriate Order fol low s this Opinion. DATED: ofSepternber,2O5. JoL LtNARS u.S. DISTRICT JUDG E 14
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
