WOODSON v. ATLANTIC CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al, No. 1:2019cv14572 - Document 29 (D.N.J. 2020)
Court Description: OPINION. Signed by Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez on 12/18/2020. (rss, )
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WOODSON v. ATLANTIC CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al Doc. 29 Case 1:19-cv-14572-JHR-JS Document 29 Filed 12/18/20 Page 1 of 10 PageID: 418 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW J ERSEY LINDA WOODSON, : : : : : : : : : : Plaintiff, v. ATLANTIC CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al. Defendants. Hon. J oseph H. Rodriguez Civil Action No. 19-14572 OPIN ION This m atter com es before the Court on Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Am end [Dkt. No. 21]. The Court has considered the parties’ written subm issions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 (b). For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s Motion to Am end. I. Background This case concerns the alleged copyright infringem ent of Linda Woodson’s (“Plaintiff”) work—a report titled, “At Risk for More than Academ ic Failure” (the “Article”), which discussed the “m easurable change in attitudes, beliefs, and values at New York Avenue School” (“Plaintiff’s Work”). [Dkt. No. 21-1 (“Second Am en d. Com pl.”) ¶ 25; Ex. A, attached to the Second Am end. Com pl.]. Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Am end her Com plaint. [Dkt. No. 21]. Plaintiff initially filed a com plaint on J uly 1, 20 19 against Atlantic City Board of Education (“ACBOE”), J am es Knox (“Knox”), and the National Association of Elem entary School Principals (collectively “Defendants”), for Copyright Infringem ent (Count I), Vicarious Copyright 1 Dockets.Justia.com Case 1:19-cv-14572-JHR-JS Document 29 Filed 12/18/20 Page 2 of 10 PageID: 419 Infringem ent (Count III), and Contributory Infringem ent (Count IV). 1 [Dkt. No. 1]. Defendants Knox and ACBOE filed a Motion to Dism iss Plaintiff’s Com plaint, [Dkt. No. 9], which was followed by Defendant National Association of Elem entary School Principals’ Motion to Dism iss. [Dkt. No. 11]. In response, Plaintiff filed an opposition and Cross-Motion to Am end her Com plaint (the “first m otion to am end”). [Dkt. Nos. 14, 15]. This Court granted both m otions to dism iss and denied the first m otion to am end. The Court, however, perm itted Plaintiff thirty (30 ) days to file a Second Motion to Am end consistent with this Court’s March 23, 20 20 Opinion. [Dkt. No. 19. 20 ]. The Court restates the factual background set forth in its previous Opinion, Woodson v. Atl. City Bd. of Educ., No. CV 19-14572, 20 20 WL 1329918 (D.N.J . Mar. 23, 20 20 ) (“Woodson I”), and incorporates the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s proposed Secon d Am ended Com plaint. Plaintiff is em ployed by Defendant, ACBOE, as a teacher at the New York Avenue School. [Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 23]. Defendant Knox is the school’s principal. (Id. at ¶ 23). “In 20 10 , Knox . . . asked Plaintiff to “facilitate the application process” for the Panason ic National School Change Award, an academ ic award;” his em ail stated: I reviewed the award criteria [sic] an d believe our school can apply with a great chance of attaining this award. I would like you to facilitate the application process this year for us. Feel free to develop a sm all com m ittee to assist you with this project. I pray you are willing to take on this project. Please advise. (Second Am ended Com plaint ¶¶ 23-24). 1 Plaintiff’s Com plaint contained no “Count II,” in her Second Am en ded Com plaint, the three claim s are properly identified in num erical order as Count I, II, and III. [Dkt. No. 21-1]. 2 Case 1:19-cv-14572-JHR-JS Document 29 Filed 12/18/20 Page 3 of 10 PageID: 420 According to the proposed second am ended com plaint, Plaintiff prepared the required written m aterials (Plaintiff’s Work) on her own tim e, which “[n]o Defendants edited, created, guided or gave instruction to Plaintiff about . . . .” (Id. at ¶¶ 25-26). Knox later subm itted and published the Article, “At Risk for More Than Academ ic Failure,” in the J anuary/ February 20 11 edition of “Principal.” (Id. ¶ 31). “Principal” is a professional journal published by Defendant National Association of Elem entary School Principals (“NAESP”). Plaintiff is not a subscriber to NAESP’s website, nor to “Principal.” (Id. at ¶ 33). Plaintiff alleges that Knox’s “Principal” article “borrowed heavily from Plaintiff’s work,” and gave her no credit. (Id. at ¶¶ 27, 31). Plaintiff also alleges that, without her knowledge, Knox plagiarized her Article; she received no credit for the Article in the edition of “Principal.” (Id. at ¶¶ 31, 37). In this Court’s March 23, 20 20 Opinion, it found that Plaintiff's proposed (first) am ended com plaint plausibly alleged facts supporting her copyright ownership, but failed to plausibly allege that the statute of limitations period on her copyright claim was tolled by the discovery rule. Woodson I, 20 20 WL 1329918, at *4, *7. Plaintiff now m oves to am end her Com plaint to cure the deficiency. She subm its that her proposed am endm ent “states sufficient facts to allow Woodson to avail herself of the “discovery rule adopted in Graham I.” [Dkt. No. 21, p. 5 of 8 ]. Plaintiff’s Second Am ended Com plaint adds that she first learned of Knox’s publication in 20 18, an d “did not discover, nor in the exercise of reasonable diligen ce could or should have discovered, the basis for her claim against the Defendants” prior to 20 18 . (Second Am end. Com pl. ¶ 39). In 20 18, Plaintiff discovered the Article during a Google search for J am es Knox. (Id. at ¶ 30 ). Knox never told Plaintiff about the “Principal” publication of her article, but did send the article as an attachm ent in an 3 Case 1:19-cv-14572-JHR-JS Document 29 Filed 12/18/20 Page 4 of 10 PageID: 421 em ail to all of the New York Avenue School faculty. (Id. at ¶¶ 41-42). The em ail subject line was, “FW: Message from KMBT_ 60 0 [,]” and the m essage provided with the attachm ent stated: “Principal's Magazine article....Enjoy!!!” [Dkt. No. 21-1, Ex. F attached to the Second. Am end. Com pl.]. Plaintiff alleges that she often received e-m ails from Knox (approxim ately three to five tim es a day); and “consistent with her em ail practice, Plaintiff did not read the attachm ent to Knox’s J anuary 4, 20 11 em ail.” (Second Am end. Com pl. ¶ 47). No one at work, including Knox, ever notified Plaintiff that “the J anuary 4, 20 11 em ail and its attachm ent had any connection to her.” (Id. at ¶ 48). II. Standard on Motion to Am end Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 (“Rule 15") encourages and provides for a liberal policy for am ending pleadings. Un der Rule 15(a), leave to am end pleadings “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” In From an v. Davis, the Suprem e court articulated the liberal policy of allowing am endm ents underlying Rule 15(a) as follows: If the underlying facts or circum stances relied upon by a plaintiff m ay be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the m erits. In the absence of an y apparent or undeclared reasons– such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory m otive on the part of the m ovant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by am en dm ents previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the am endm ent, futility of am endm ent, etc.– the leave sought should, as the rules require, be “freely given.” 372 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 20 0 0 ). The Third Circuit has elaborated on the proper an alysis to apply: The trial court’s discretion under Rule 15, however, m ust be tem pered by considerations of prejudice to the non-m oving party, for undue prejudice is 4 Case 1:19-cv-14572-JHR-JS Document 29 Filed 12/18/20 Page 5 of 10 PageID: 422 the “touchstone for the den ial of leave to am end.” . . . In the absence of substantial or undue prejudice, denial m ust be grounded in bad faith or dilatory m otives, truly undue or unexplained delay, repeated failure to cure deficiency by am endm ents previously allowed or futility of am endm ent. Heyl & Patterson Int’l, Inc. v. F.D. Rich Housing of the Virgin Islands, 663 F.2d 419, 425 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Cornell & Co. v. Occupational Safety an d Health Review Com m ’n, 573 F.2d 8 20 , 8 23 (3d Cir. 1978); see also Bechtel v. Robinson, 8 86 F.2d 644, 652 (3d. Cir. 198 9). Although courts place a heavy burden on opponents of m otions to am end, it is well established that the futility of am endm ent is one of the factors that m ay be considered by the Court in denying a m otion to am end. From an, 371 U.S. at 182; see also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 8 50 , 8 74 (3d Cir. 1994); Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 8 79 F.2d 1196, 120 3 (3d Cir. 1989). “‘Futility’ m eans that the com plaint, as am ended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Shane, 213 F.3d at 115. In assessing futility, a district court m ust apply the sam e standard of legal sufficiency that applies under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Id. (citing 3 Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 15.15[3], at 15-47 to -48 (3d ed. 20 0 0 )). 2 Thus, if the proposed am endm ent “is frivolous or advances a claim or defense that is legally insufficient on its face, the court m ay deny leave to am end. If a proposed am endm ent is not clearly futile, then denial of leave to am en d is im proper.” Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1487 at 637-642 (2d ed. 1990 ) (footnote om itted). 3 Finally, the Third 2 In addition, the court is “not perm itted to go beyond the facts alleged in the Com plaint and the docum ents on which the claim s m ade therein were based.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410 , 1425 (3d Cir. 1997). 3 To dem onstrate that a claim is “legally insufficient on its face,” and that it could not withstand a m otion to dism iss, the opposing party m ust be able to dem onstrate that “it 5 Case 1:19-cv-14572-JHR-JS Document 29 Filed 12/18/20 Page 6 of 10 PageID: 423 Circuit has held that an am en dm ent is futile when the claim s asserted by the plaintiffs are tim e-barred under the state of lim itations. In re NAHC, Inc., Sec. Litig., 30 6 F.3d 1314, 1332 (3d Cir. 20 0 2). III. Analysis The issue before this Court is whether Plaintiff’s Second Am ended Com plaint provides facts sufficient to satisfy the discovery rule, so as to toll the statute of lim itations on her claim s under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 10 1, et seq. Generally, copyright claim s accrue “at the m om ent at which each of its com ponent elem ents has com e into being as a m atter of objective reality, such that an attorney with knowledge of all the facts could survive a m otion to dism iss for failure to state a claim .” William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, 646 F.3d 138, 150 (3d Cir. 20 11) (“Graham II”). The statute of lim itations under the Act is three years. 17 U.S.C. § 50 7(b). As discussed in this Court’s earlier Opinion, Plaintiff brings the present suit alm ost nine (9) years following Defendants alleged infringem ent on Plaintiff’s copyright, in “J anuary/ February 20 11.” Woodson I, 20 20 WL 1329918, at *4. On the face of Plaintiff’s original com plaint, an d her first am en ded com plaint, Plaintiff’s claim s were undisputedly outside of the lim itations period. Plaintiff argues that the proposed Second Am en ded Com plaint shows that the discovery rule tolls the lim itations period until she discovered the infringem ent in 20 18 , placing her claim s within the three-year period. [See Dkt. No. 21]. The discovery rule is an equitable doctrine, which the Third Circuit held “com ports with the text, structure, legislative history and underlying policies of the Copyright Act. appears beyond doubt that the [party] can prove no set of facts in support of [the] claim which would entitle [the party] to relief.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 6 Case 1:19-cv-14572-JHR-JS Document 29 Filed 12/18/20 Page 7 of 10 PageID: 424 Thus . . . the federal discovery rule governs the accrual of civil claim s brought under the Copyright Act.” William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, 568 F.3d 425, 437 (3d Cir. 20 0 9) (“Graham I”). In Graham II, the circuit court explained that “[t]he rule is an exception to the usual principle that the statute of lim itations begins to run im m ediately upon accrual regardless of whether or not the injured party has any idea what has happen ed to him .” 646 F.3d at 150 . The discovery rule will toll the statute of lim itations until “the plaintiff discovers, or with due diligen ce should have discovered, the injury that form s the basis for the claim .’” Graham I, 568 F.3d at 433 (quoting Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 20 9 (3d Cir. 20 0 8)). In applying the discovery rule, the Court m ust ask whether Plaintiff Woodson, “in the exercise of reasonable diligen ce, should have known of the basis for [her] claim s,” and that “depen ds on whether [she] had ‘sufficient inform ation of possible wrongdoing to place [her] on ‘inquiry notice’ or to excite ‘storm warnings' of culpable activity.’” Benak ex rel. All. Prem ier Growth Fund v. All. Capital Mgm t. L.P., 435 F.3d 396, 40 0 (3d Cir. 20 0 6) (quoting In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 30 6 F.3d 1325 (3d Cir. 20 0 2)). “The test for storm warnings is ‘objective,’ based on what a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have perceived.” Grant Heilm an Photography, Inc. v. McGrawHill Glob. Educ. Holdings, LLC, No. CIV.A. 12-20 61, 20 15 WL 127950 2, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20 , 20 15) (quoting Benak, 435 F.3d at 40 0 ). There is no exhaustive list as to what constitutes a storm warning. Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 260 F.3d 239, 252 (3d Cir. 20 0 1). The burden is on Defen dants to show that any storm warnings were present; if Defendants m eet this burden, Plaintiff has the burden to show she “exercised reasonable due diligen ce and yet [was] unable to discover [her] in juries.” Graham I, 568 F.3d at 438 (quoting Benak, 435 F.3d at 40 0 ). 7 Case 1:19-cv-14572-JHR-JS Document 29 Filed 12/18/20 Page 8 of 10 PageID: 425 Here, Defendants have not m et their burden. Defendants subm it that Plaintiff’s Second Am ended Com plaint, on its face, establishes that Plaintiff should have discovered her alleged injury in 20 11—when she received Knox’s em ail containing the Article. [Dkt. No. 23, p.4; Dkt. No. 22, pp. 11-12 of 13]. Specifically, ACBOE and Knox argue that Knox’s em ail put Plaintiff on inquiry notice. In other words, Defendants contend that this em ail was a storm warning. The Court finds, however, that the em ail itself did not contain sufficient inform ation of possible wrongdoing such that Plaintiff should have recognized the em ail as a storm warning. First, the em ail did not reference Plaintiff’s Work or the Application for which it was used. In fact, the em ail was not directed at the Plaintiff, but sent in a chain to all New York Avenue staff, with an unrelated subject line: “FW: Message from KMBT_ 60 0 [.]” The body of the em ail read: “Principal’s Magazin e article….Enjoy!!!” Even the attachm ent (the Article itself) is not identified in a suspicious m anner; instead, the title of the attachm ent is “SKMBT_ 60 0 110 10 322341.” [Dkt. No. 21-1, Ex. F, attached to the Second Am ended Com plaint]. According to the Second Am en ded Com plaint, Plaintiff never opened this em ail attachm ent. (Second Am end. Com pl. ¶¶ 43, 47). Accepting the facts alleged in the Proposed Second Am ended Com plaint as true, Plaintiff prepared her Work for award eligibility and was never told her Article would be subm itted for publication in the “Principal”—a professional journal whose articles “[o]nly NAESP m em bers have full access to” and that she was not a subscriber to. (Second Am end. Com pl. ¶¶ 30 -34). At the tim e she received Knox’s em ail, Plaintiff was only aware that Knox possessed her Work. “The m ere fact that a copyright owner has notice that another person also possessed its copyrighted m aterial an d m ay fin d it useful to copy should not and does not by itself constitute a storm warning of possible 8 Case 1:19-cv-14572-JHR-JS Document 29 Filed 12/18/20 Page 9 of 10 PageID: 426 infringem ent.” Graham I, 568 F.3d 425, 440 . Therefore, Knox’s em ail alone was not suspicious. More specifically, on the face of the proposed am endm ent, there are no facts that would have prom pted Plaintiff to read the attachm ent of Knox’s em ail. Furtherm ore, whether the em ail at issue qualifies as a storm warning, is an objective inquiry—one that requires evaluating the facts “from the perspective of a detached, dispassion ate observer, not from the subjective perspective of the individual involved in the case.” Grant Heilm an Photography, Inc., 20 15 WL 127950 2, at *11; see also Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 260 F.3d 239, 252 (3d Cir. 20 0 1). Although, as Defendants contend, Plaintiff could have discovered the alleged copyright infringem ent if she had opened and read the attachm ent, the clock starts when Plaintiff should have discovered the infringem ent. See Benak, 435 F.3d 396, 40 0 (3d Cir. 20 0 6). Here, Plaintiff never read the attachm ent, and Defendants fail to cite to any authority that supports finding Plaintiff was under som e duty to do so. Notably, in Woodson I, the Court acknowledged “that determ ining when a reasonable person would have becom e aware of a copyright infringem ent is a factsensitive enterprise.” Warren Freedenfeld Assocs., Inc. v. McTigue, 531 F.3d 38 , 44 (1st Cir. 20 0 8); Stephen s v. Clash, 796 F.3d 281, 288 (3d Cir. 20 15) (“[F]ederal courts ‘m ay not allocate the burden of invoking the discovery rule in a way that is inconsistent with the rule that a plaintiff is not required to plead, in a com plaint, facts sufficient to overcom e an affirm ative defense.”’) (quoting Schm idt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 20 14)). In fact, “only where the facts are so clear that reasonable m inds cannot differ m ay the com m encem ent of the lim itations period be determ ined as a m atter of law.” Raucci v. Candy & Toy Factory, 145 F. Supp. 3d 440 , 448 (E.D. Pa. 20 15). Defendants acknowledge that “[w]hether an individual's conduct satisfies the 9 Case 1:19-cv-14572-JHR-JS Document 29 Filed 12/18/20 Page 10 of 10 PageID: 427 reasonable standard is norm ally an issue for the jury.” But they contend that “the Plaintiff’s lack of reasonable diligence (or an y diligence whatsoever for that m atter), and the fact that Plaintiff absolutely had access to the article within the lim itations period, are so clear that reason able m inds cannot differ.” [Dkt. Nos. 23 & 24, p. 7]. Defendants’ suggestion that the m ere fact that Plaintiff had access to the Article confirm s that Plaintiff’s action is tim e-barred, is also unconvincing. See Music Force, LLC v. Sony Music Holdings Inc., No. CV19-6430 , 20 20 WL 5733258, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 20 20 ) (“In the context of statutes of lim itations, parties are not required to police their copyrights or search the internet for possible infringem ent of their copyrights.” (citing to Mackie v. Hipple, 20 10 WL 3211952, *2 (W.D. Wash. 20 10 ) and Warren Freedenfeld Associates, Inc., 531 F.3d at 46 (1st Cir. 20 0 8))). In light of the proposed allegations, it is not clear that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have perceived Knox’s em ail to contain a reason to investigate whether they m ay have suffered an injury. See Warren Freedenfeld Assocs., Inc., 531 F.3d at 44. Therefore, the em ail is insufficient to start the lim itations clock; and the proposed am endm ent is not clearly futile. IV. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, the Second Motion to Am end will be granted. An appropriate order shall issue. Dated: Decem ber 18 , 20 20 _ _ / s/ J oseph H. Rodriguez ____ Hon. J oseph H. Rodriguez, UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 10
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