BRIDGES v. TORRES, JR., No. 1:2017cv07107 - Document 19 (D.N.J. 2019)
Court Description: OPINION. Signed by Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez on 3/18/2019. (rss, )
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BRIDGES v. TORRES, JR. Doc. 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW J ERSEY MARY BRIDGES, Plaintiff, v. DETECTIVE J OSE M. TORRES, J R. Defendant. : : : : : : : : : : Hon. J oseph H. Rodriguez Civil Action No. 17-710 7 OPINION Presently before the Court is the Defendant J ose M. Torres, J r.’s Motion to Dism iss Plaintiff Mary Bridges' Second Am ended Com plaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court has considered the written subm ission of the parties, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 (b) and for the reasons that follow, grants the m otion. Backgro u n d Plaintiff Mary Bridges (“Bridges”) is the owner and sole resident of her hom e located at 12 Spruce Street, Bridgeton, New J ersey. Com pl. ¶¶ 5, 6. She com plains that the Cum berland County Prosecutor’s Office targeted and searched her residence in connection to a drug task force investigation against a target nam ed Wayne A. McClain (“McClain”). Id. at ¶¶ 7-12. McClain has no connection whatsoever to Bridges’ hom e. Id. at ¶¶ 17-19. On Novem ber 16, 20 15, Defendant, Detective J ose M. Torres, J r. (“Torres”) successfully applied for a warrant to perm it entry and search of Bridges’ hom e. Id. at ¶¶ 10 - 12. At the tim e, Torres was tem porarily assigned to the Cum berland County Prosecutor’s Office. The warrant was executed by the Bridgeton Police Departm ent 1 Dockets.Justia.com Tactical Entry Team on Novem ber 24, 20 15, at approxim ately 12:24 in the afternoon, while Bridges was hom e. Id. at ¶¶ 13-17. Despite the warrant, Plaintiff claim s entry was m ade into her hom e without her perm ission and that the Team determ ined that non e of the eviden ce used to justify the warrant was found. She challenges the veracity of the inform ation Torres proffered to obtain the warrant and claim s that Torres failed to “take reasonable professional m easures to ensure there was probable cause to search” her residence. Id. at ¶¶ 18-22. Plaintiff alleges that her rights under the Fourth Am endm ent and New J ersey State law were violated when m em bers of the City of Bridgeton Police Departm ent Tactical Entry Team m istakenly entered her hom e based upon an error in a search warrant/ Affidavit prepared by City of Vineland Police Officer J ose M. Torres, J r. in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, N.J .S.A. § 10 :6-2, the New J ersey Civil Rights Act ("NJ CRA") and N.J .S.A. 59:1-1, et seq., the New J ersey Tort Claim s Act. Defendant Torres m oves for dism issal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6) on grounds that the search warrant was valid an d/ or that Torres’ actions, at best, constitute negligence. In the alternative, Torres asserts he is entitled to qualified im m unity. For the reasons that follow the m otion to dism iss is granted. II. Standards of Review A. Motion to Dism iss Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to m ove for dism issal of a claim based on “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A com plaint should be dism issed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if the alleged facts, taken as true, fail to state a claim . Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When deciding a m otion to dism iss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), ordinarily only the allegations in the 2 com plaint, m atters of public record, orders, and exhibits attached to the com plaint, are taken into consideration. 1 See Chester County Interm ediate Unit v. Pa. Blue Shield, 8 96 F.2d 80 8, 8 12 (3d Cir. 1990 ). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead evidence. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977). The question before the Court is not whether the plaintiff will ultim ately prevail. Watson v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 150 (20 0 7). Instead, the Court sim ply asks whether the plaintiff has articulated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twom bly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (20 0 7). “A claim has facial plausibility 2 when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 0 9) (citing Twom bly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assum e their veracity and then determ ine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlem ent to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, a m otion to dism iss should be granted unless the plaintiff’s factual allegations are “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assum ption that all of the com plaint’s allegations are true (even if doubtful in fact).” 1 “Although a district court m ay not consider m atters extraneous to the pleadin gs, a docum ent integral to or explicitly relied upon in the com plaint m ay be considered without convertin g the m otion to dism iss into one for sum m ary judgm ent.” U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. H iggins, 281 F.3d 383, 38 8 (3d Cir. 20 0 2) (internal quotation m arks and citations om itted) (em phasis deleted). Accord Lum v. Ban k of Am ., 361 F.3d 217, 221 n .3 (3d Cir. 20 0 4) (citations om itted). Here, Plaintiffs’ Com plain t includes several references to exhibits attached to the Com plaint and the Court will consider these docum ents without convertin g the m otion to dism iss into a sum m ary judgm ent m otion . In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280 , 287 (3d Cir. 1999). 2 This plausibility standard requires m ore than a m ere possibility that unlawful conduct has occurred. “When a com plaint pleads facts that are ‘m erely consistent with’ a defen dant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlem ent to relief.’’” Id. 3 Twom bly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal citations om itted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not perm it the court to infer m ore than the m ere possibility of m isconduct, the com plaint has alleged-but it has not ‘shown’-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Qualified Im m unity Plaintiff’s constitutional claim s are governed by Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil rem edy against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the United States Constitution. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 50 3 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). Any analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should begin with the language of the statute: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom , or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im m unities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As the above language m akes clear, Section 1983 is a rem edial statute design ed to redress deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and its subordinate federal laws. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n.3 (1979). By its own words, therefore, Section 1983 “does not . . . create substantive rights.” Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 20 0 6) (citing Baker, 443 U.S. at 145, n.3). To state a cognizable claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff m ust allege a “deprivation of a constitutional right and that the constitutional deprivation was caused by a person acting under the color of state law.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 20 0 8) (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 120 4 (3d Cir. 4 1996)). Thus, a plaintiff m ust dem onstrate two essential elem ents to m aintain a claim under § 1983: (1) that the plaintiff was deprived of a “right or privileges secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States” and (2) that the plaintiff was deprived of his rights by a person acting under the color of state law. William s v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 8 91 F.2d 458, 464 (3d Cir. 1989). The doctrin e of qualified im m unity provides that “governm ent officials perform ing discretionary functions . . . are shielded from liability for civil dam ages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 8 0 0 , 8 18 (1982). Thus, governm ent officials are im m une from suit in their individual capacities unless, “taken in the light m ost favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right” and “the right was clearly established” at the tim e of the objectionable conduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 20 1 (20 0 1). Courts m ay exercise discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified im m unity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circum stances in the particular case at hand. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (20 0 9). This doctrin e “balances two im portant interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassm ent, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably” and it “applies regardless of whether the governm ent official’s error is a m istake of law, a m istake of fact, or a m istake based on m ixed questions of law and fact.” Id. (internal quotation om itted). Properly applied, qualified im m unity “protects ‘all but the plainly incom petent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 5 20 74, 20 8 5 (20 11) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). For a right to be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right m ust be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 20 2 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). That is, “[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry in determ ining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 492 (20 0 6). “If the officer’s m istake as to what the law requires is reasonable,” the officer is entitled to qualified im m unity. Couden, 446 F.3d at 492 (internal citations om itted). Further, “[i]f officers of reasonable com petence could disagree on th[e] issue, im m unity should be recognized.” Malley, 475 U.S. at 341 (1986). See also Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (20 0 4) (The general touchstone is whether the conduct of the official was reasonable at the tim e it occurred.) Finally, because qualified im m unity is an affirm ative defense, the burden of proving its applicability rests with the defen dant. See Beers-Capital v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120 , 142, n.15 (3d Cir. 20 0 1). III. Analysis Plaintiff alleges violations of her civil rights under the Fourth Am en dm ent, the New J ersey Civil Rights Act, § 10 :6-2, and the New J ersey Tort Claim s Act, 59:1-1. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim s fail to set forth a constitutional violation of her civil rights because the allegations sound in n egligence. In addition, to the extent a cognizable constitutional violation can be inferred from the Com plaint, Defendant Torres is entitled to qualified im m unity. Plaintiff’s challenge to the validity of the search warrant centers on her claim that Torres subm itted erroneous inform ation in his affidavit to the m agistrate judge in 6 violation of her Fourth Am endm ent rights, in ter alia. To succeed on her claim , Plaintiff m ust satisfy the two-part test developed by the Suprem e Court in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2676-77, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978 ). See Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490 , 150 2, 150 4 (3d Cir. 1993). Plaintiff m ust prove “by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) that the affiant knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, m ade false statem ents or om issions that create a falsehood in applying for a warrant; an d (2) that such statem ents or om issions are m aterial, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.” Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations om itted). On a m otion to dism iss the Court m ust accept the allegations in the Com plaint as true in considering whether the facts dem onstrating the right to relief rise above the speculative level. Twom bly, 550 U.S. at 556. Using this standard, Plaintiff com plains that Torres failed to take sufficient actions in determ ining that her hom e was used in the facilitation of McClain’s drug trafficking schem e and that this failure constitutes a breach of "a duty to discover and disclose inform ation he knew an d inform ation he should have known to the issuing m agistrate." (Id. at ¶ 20 ). Torres, the Com plaint avers, leapt to the conclusion that Plaintiff’s hom e was the site of McClain’s activity without observing McClain or anyone else enter the hom e and/ or without taking any steps to investigate who owned and/ or occupied the hom e. Specifically, the Com plaint alleges that “neither the confidential inform ant nor the surveillance team observed the suspect go in through the door of 12 Spruce Street or com e out through the door of 12 Spruce Street” and that “the surveillance team did not observe the confidential inform ant go into or com e out of 12 Spruce Street to purchase narcotics." (Com pl. at ¶ 19). Torres also failed “to take reasonable professional 7 m easures to ensure there was probable cause to search the dwelling at 12 Spruce Street nam ed in the warrant, includ[e:] checking with the local utility to identify who was receiving service at 12 Spruce Street; checkin g the deed for 12 Spruce Street to determ ine ownership; finding that they m atched, checking with the local police to determ ine if the individual had a police record; finding that they m atched and she did not, conducting additional surveillance on 12 Spruce Street to determ ine who was going in and out. Id. at 21. Finally, Plaintiff alleges Detective Torres "had a duty to discover and disclose inform ation he knew and inform ation he should have known to the issuing m agistrate." (Id. at ¶ 20 ). "The error of identifying a m istaken street address for the residen ce to be searched, by the Defen dant, Detective J ose M. Torres, J r., as described, supra, directly and proxim ately led to the execution of the search pursuant to a warrant at the 12 Spruce Street address on Novem ber 24, 20 15 by the Bridgeton Police Departm ent Tactical Entry Team ." (Id. at ¶ 24) Plaintiff does not claim that Torres acted with the requisite disregard for the truth when he gave the m agistrate judge the inform ation to secure the warrant. Ordin arily, an officer can presum e a warrant is supported by probable cause and thus valid if such a belief is objectively reasonable. Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 273 (3d Cir. 20 0 0 ). To succeed on a claim against the affiant and/ or to im pugn the validity of the warrant, a plaintiff m ust have evidence “that a false statem ent knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and [that] the allegedly false statem ent is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Am endm ent requires that ... the fruits of the search [m ust be] excluded to the sam e extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the 8 affidavit.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 98 S. Ct. at2676– 77; United States v. Frost, 999 F.2d 737, 742– 43 (3d Cir. 1993). Here, Torres’ warrant application derived from inform ation that McClain, while under surveillance by law enforcem ent, purchased illegal substances from confidential inform ants on two occasions and then went back to the address of 12 Spruce Street, which is Plaintiff’s hom e. 1 Affidavit of J ose M. Torres, J r., pp. 5-7, Ex. B. The Com plaint’s characterization of Torres’ presentation of inform ation to the m agistrate judge as m istaken, careless, and in com plete does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. “There m ust be allegations of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth, and allegations of negligence or innocent m istake are insufficient[.]” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 145 (20 0 9). Torres’ alleged “m istake” or error in identifyin g Plaintiff’s hom e address as the target of the warrant is grounded in the inform ation supplied to Torres by other law enforcem ent officials who observed the target of the warrant near and around Plaintiff’s hom e. Plaintiff’s assertion that Torres should have done m ore to assure him self of the veracity of the police officers assertion finds n o basis in law. The facts plead do not underm ine the reasonableness of Torres’ reliance on the inform ation provided to him or Because Torres’ Affidavit is integral to and relied upon in in the Com plaint, the Court m ay consider its contents. U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 20 0 2) (“Although a district court m ay not consider m atters extraneous to the pleadings, a docum ent integral to or explicitly relied upon in the com plaint m ay be considered without converting the m otion to dism iss into one for sum m ary judgm ent.”); Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 20 0 0 ) (When reviewing a factual attack, the court m ay weigh and consider evidence outside the pleadings.) 1 9 the warrant application itself. Viewing the Com plaint in a light m ost favorable to Plaintiff, there are no facts which suggest that Torres operated in bad faith or in reckless indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. At best, the com plaint espouses com m on law negligence, which is “not encom passed within § 1983.” Davidson v. O’Love, 752 F.2d 8 17, 8 25 (3d Cir. 1984). In addition, even if Torres’ conduct rose to the level of a constitutional violation, he is entitled to qualified im m unity. Qualified im m unity “gives am ple room for m istaken judgm ents” by protecting “all but the plainly incom petent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Hunter v. Bryant, 50 2 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S. Ct. 534, (1991) (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 343). Here, there is no allegation that Torres knowingly violated the law and the facts set forth in his affidavit dem onstrate that his reliance on the inform ation provided by other law enforcem ent officers is objectively reasonable. Orsatti v. NJ State Police, 71 F.3d 480 , 483 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding officers only lose qualified im m unity where there is clear indicia that the existence of probable cause is unreasonable). The Court finds that a reasonable officer could have believed that there was probable cause to search Plaintiff’s hom e and that Plaintiff’s claim of m istake does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Because Torres is entitled to qualified im m unity, Plaintiff’s claim s under §1983, the NJ CRA, and the NJ TCA are dism issed. IV. Conclusion For the reasons states above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Com plaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. An appropriate Order shall issue. Dated: March 18, 20 19 s/ J oseph H. Rodriguez HON. J OSEPH H. RODRIGUEZ United States District J udge 10
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