MCMASTER v. CITY OF NORTH WILDWOOD et al, No. 1:2016cv05208 - Document 18 (D.N.J. 2017)
Court Description: OPINION. Signed by Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez on 6/1/2017. (dmr)
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MCMASTER v. CITY OF NORTH WILDWOOD et al Doc. 18 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW J ERSEY MICHAEL MCMASTER, : : Plaintiff, v. Hon. J oseph H. Rodriguez Civil Action No. 16-520 8 : OPINION CITY OF NORTH WILDWOOD, : POLICE OFFICER BRYAN SKILL, POLICE OFFICER CLIFFORD MASSIE, : POLICE OFFICER ERIC NEVIL, Defendants. : This m atter is before the Court on Defendants’ m otion to dism iss the Am ended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court has reviewed the subm issions and decides the matter based on the briefs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons stated here, Defendants’ m otion will be granted in part and denied in part. Ju ris d ictio n This is a civil action over which the district court has original jurisdiction based on a question “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff Michael McMaster asserts a violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. With respect to Plaintiff’s state law claim s, this Court has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 1 Dockets.Justia.com Backgro u n d This m atter stem s from an incident that occurred at approxim ately 5:30 a.m . on Novem ber 19, 20 15 between Plaintiff and three North Wildwood police officers – Clifford Massie, Eric Nevil, and Bryan Skill – on the sidewalk outside Plaintiff’s parents’ house in North Wilwood, New J ersey. Plaintiff had been arguing with his girlfriend when the officers arrived on the scene. A discussion ensued during which the officers advised Plaintiff and his girlfriend to return to their respective houses. Plaintiff allegedly pleaded with his girlfriend not to leave. Next, he allegedly reached for her bag and the officers “violently threw him to the ground.” (Am . Compl. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges that he did not resist, but was “com pliant,” nonetheless one, two, or three of the officers “violently and m aliciously jum ped on Plaintiff’s back with their knees with such force that it caused Plaintiff’s spleen to rupture and to fracture several ribs.” (Am. Com pl. ¶ 15.) He was transported to jail, then by am bulance to the hospital, and finally by helicopter to a traum a center. As a result, Plaintiff was hospitalized for ten days. Plaintiff has filed a Com plaint in this Court claim ing excessive force by the individual officers and Monell liability by North Wildwood. State law tort claim s pled originally have been conceded through this m otion. 2 Ap p licable Stan d ard Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to m ove for dism issal of a claim based on “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A com plaint should be dism issed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if the alleged facts, taken as true, fail to state a claim . Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When deciding a m otion to dism iss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), ordinarily only the allegations in the com plaint, m atters of public record, orders, and exhibits attached to the com plaint, are taken into consideration. 1 See Chester County Interm ediate Unit v. Pa. Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 80 8, 812 (3d Cir. 1990 ). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead evidence. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977). The question before the Court is not whether the plaintiff will ultim ately prevail. Watson v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 150 (20 0 7). Instead, the Court sim ply asks whether the plaintiff has articulated “enough 1 “Although a district court m ay not consider m atters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the com plaint m ay be considered without converting the m otion to dism iss into one for sum m ary judgment.” U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 20 0 2) (internal quotation m arks and citations om itted) (em phasis deleted). Accord Lum v. Bank of Am ., 361 F.3d 217, 221 n.3 (3d Cir. 20 0 4) (citations om itted). 3 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twom bly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (20 0 7). “A claim has facial plausibility2 when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 0 9) (citing Twom bly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should assum e their veracity and then determ ine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlem ent to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The Court need not accept “‘unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences,’” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 20 0 7) (citation om itted), however, and “[l]egal conclusions m ade in the guise of factual allegations . . . are given no presum ption of truthfulness.” Wyeth v. Ranbaxy Labs., Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 2d 60 7, 60 9 (D.N.J . 20 0 6) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see also Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170 , 177 (3d Cir. 20 0 7) (quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 20 0 5) (“[A] court need not credit either ‘bald 2 This plausibility standard requires m ore than a m ere possibility that unlawful conduct has occurred. “When a com plaint pleads facts that are ‘m erely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlem ent to relief.’’” Id. 4 assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions’ in a com plaint when deciding a m otion to dism iss.”)). Accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-80 (finding that pleadings that are no m ore than conclusions are not entitled to the assum ption of truth). Further, although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlem ent to relief’ requires m ore than labels and conclusions, and a form ulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elem ents will not do.” Twom bly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations om itted). See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by m ere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Thus, a m otion to dism iss should be granted unless the plaintiff’s factual allegations are “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assum ption that all of the com plaint’s allegations are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twom bly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal citations om itted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not perm it the court to infer m ore than the m ere possibility of m isconduct, the com plaint has alleged-but it has not ‘shown’-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). 5 D is cu s s io n 4 2 U .S.C. § 19 8 3 Plaintiff’s Constitutional claim s are governed by Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil remedy against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the United States Constitution. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 50 3 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). Any analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should begin with the language of the statute: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom , or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im m unities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As the above language makes clear, Section 1983 is a remedial statute designed to redress deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and its subordinate federal laws. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n.3 (1979). By its own words, therefore, Section 1983 “does not . . . create substantive rights.” Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 20 0 6) (citing Baker, 443 U.S. at 145, n.3). 6 To state a cognizable claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff m ust allege a “deprivation of a constitutional right and that the constitutional deprivation was caused by a person acting under the color of state law.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 20 0 8) (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 120 4 (3d Cir. 1996)). Thus, a plaintiff m ust dem onstrate two essential elem ents to m aintain a claim under § 1983: (1) that the plaintiff was deprived of a “right or privileges secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States” and (2) that plaintiff was deprived of his rights by a person acting under the color of state law. William s v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 464 (3d Cir. 1989). Th e Fo u rth Am e n d m e n t The Fourth Am endm ent provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirm ation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and persons or things to be seized. A Fourth Am endm ent excessive force claim calls for an evaluation of whether police officers’ actions are objectively reasonable 1 in light of the While the question of reasonableness is objective, the court m ay consider the “severity of the crim e at issue, whether the suspect poses an im mediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attem pting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham , 490 U.S. 1 7 facts and circum stances confronting him . Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). The reasonableness of a seizure is assessed in light of the totality of the circum stances. Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 289 (3d Cir. 1999). Mu n icip al Liability A m unicipality is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Monell v. Dept. Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). However, a governm ent entity m ay be liable for its agent’s actions upon a dem onstration that a policy or custom of the m unicipality caused, or was a “m oving force” behind, the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s rights. Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)); Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996). Thus, in order to prevail against the government entity, “[a] plaintiff m ust identify the challenged policy, attribute it to the city at 396. In a claim for excessive force, “the central question is ‘whether force was applied in a good faith effort to m aintain or restore discipline, or m aliciously and sadistically to cause harm .’” Brooks v. Kyler, 20 4 F.3d 10 2, 10 6 (3d Cir. 20 0 0 ) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 50 3 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). Furtherm ore, appropriate attention should be given “to the circum stances of the police action, which are often ‘tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.’” Grom an v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Graham , 490 U.S. at 396). See also Graham , 490 U.S. at 396-97 (analyzing reasonableness of use of force “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20 / 20 vision of hindsight”). 8 itself, and show a causal link between execution of the policy and the injury suffered.” Losch v. Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 90 3, 910 (3d Cir. 1984). A plaintiff cannot seek to hold a m unicipality liable for dam ages where the officer has inflicted no constitutional harm . Acum ed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 217 n.12 (3d Cir. 20 0 9) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)). Therefore, before addressing deliberate indifference and causation, a court m ust first address whether there was a constitutional violation at all. See Grazier, 328 F.3d at 124 (“m unicipal liability requires constitutional harm ”); cf., Thom as, 749 F.3d at 223 (“The parties do not challenge the existence of . . . a constitutional violation on appeal.”). Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor its officials acting under their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). As such, an em ployee of the state named as a defendant in a civil rights action m ay be held liable only if that person has personal involvem ent in the alleged wrongs and is sued in their personal capacity. See Hafer v. Melo, 50 2 U.S. 21, 31 (1991) (“state officials, sued in their individual capacities, are ‘persons’ within the m eaning of § 1983”). 9 Qu alifie d Im m u n ity The doctrine of qualified im m unity provides that “governm ent officials perform ing discretionary functions . . . are shielded from liability for civil dam ages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 80 0 , 818 (1982). Thus, governm ent officials are imm une from suit in their individual capacities unless, “taken in the light m ost favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right” and “the right was clearly established” at the tim e of the objectionable conduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 20 1 (20 0 1). Courts m ay exercise discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified im m unity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circum stances in the particular case at hand. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (20 0 9). This doctrine “balances two im portant interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassm ent, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably” and it “applies regardless of whether the government official’s error is a m istake of law, a m istake of fact, or a m istake based on mixed questions of law and fact. Id. (internal quotation 10 om itted). Properly applied, qualified im m unity “protects ‘all but the plainly incom petent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (20 11) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). For a right to be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right m ust be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 20 2 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). That is, “[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry in determ ining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 492 (3d Cir. 20 0 6). “If the officer’s m istake as to what the law requires is reasonable,” the officer is entitled to qualified im m unity. Id. (internal citations om itted). Further, “[i]f officers of reasonable competence could disagree on th[e] issue, im m unity should be recognized.” Malley, 475 U.S. at 341. See also Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (20 0 4) (The general touchstone is whether the conduct of the official was reasonable at the tim e it occurred.). Finally, because qualified im m unity is an affirm ative defense, the burden of proving its applicability rests with the defendant. See Beers-Capital v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120 , 142, n.15 (3d Cir. 20 0 1). 11 An alys is To the extent that Plaintiff has sued the Defendant police officers in their official capacities, these are really claim s against the police department and, in turn, the m unicipality and, as such, m ust be dism issed. See Hafer, 50 2 U.S. at 25 (“official capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent”). Accordingly, the Court is left with the claim s against the officers in their individual capacities. The Court finds that excessive force has been adequately pled against the individual officers because Plaintiff alleges that he was com pliant when taken to the ground. Therefore, the use of force that followed plausibly could have been excessive. Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force will not be dism issed at this stage sim ply because he has not alleged which officer took each of several actions alleged. Although the facts pled are not fully com prehensive, they serve to highlight the favorable inferences Plaintiff enjoys on a m otion to dism iss. Next, the Court recognizes that a finding of qualified im m unity should be made at the earliest possible point in a case. A finding that Defendants are entitled to qualified im m unity on this m otion again would discount the favorable inferences that advance Plaintiff’s claim s, predicate a 12 disposition on a limited factual record, and im plicate the Third Circuit’s cautionary directive that dism issal predicated upon qualified im m unity at the m otion to dism iss stage “is generally unwise . . . as it is necessary to develop the factual record in the vast m ajority of cases.” Newland v. Reehorst, 328 F. App’x 788, 791 n.3 (3d Cir. 20 0 9). As a result, the Court finds that qualified im m unity does not attach at this tim e. As to the Monell claim , the Court finds that Plaintiff has m ade only conclusory allegations devoid of a factual basis to find a policy or practice or lack of training or discipline to im plicate the m unicipality. Despite Plaintiff’s argument, the Court will not infer lack of training or discipline by m easuring the severity of Plaintiff’s injuries. Co n clu s io n Accordingly, Defendants’ m otion to dism iss will be granted as to the City of North Wildwood and the individual Defendants in their official capacities. The Court denies dism issal of the Am ended Com plaint against the Defendant police officers in their individual capacities. An Order will be entered. Dated: J une 1, 20 17 / s/ J oseph H. Rodriguez J OSEPH H. RODRIGUEZ U.S.D.J . 13
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