JILLARD v. BAYSIDE STATE PRISON et al, No. 1:2016cv04118 - Document 16 (D.N.J. 2017)
Court Description: OPINION. Signed by Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez on 3/6/2017. (dmr)
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JILLARD v. BAYSIDE STATE PRISON et al Doc. 16 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW J ERSEY ROBERT G. J ILLARD, : : Plaintiff, v. Hon. J oseph H. Rodriguez Civil Action No. 16-4118 : OPINION BAYSIDE STATE PRISON, : STATE OF NEW J ERSEY, NEW J ERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, : NJ DOC COMMISSIONER GARY M. LANIGAN, ADMINISTRATOR J OHN : POWELL, SCO J OHN CALDWELL, and J OHN DOES 1 through 10 , individually and/ or in their official capacities, jointly, severally and/ or in the alternative, : : Defendants. : This m atter is before the Court on Defendants’ m otion for partial dism issal of the Com plaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court has reviewed the subm issions and decides the m atter based on the briefs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons stated here, the m otion will be granted. Ju ris d ictio n This case is a civil action over which the district court has original jurisdiction based on a question “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff asserts a violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. With respect to 1 Dockets.Justia.com Plaintiff’s claim under the New J ersey Civil Rights Act, this Court has supplem ental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Backgro u n d At all relevant tim es, Plaintiff Robert J illard was an inm ate at the Bayside State Prison. Plaintiff claim s that on J uly 7, 20 14, while he was working in the facility’s kitchen, Defendant SCO J ohn Caldwell ordered him to wheel a cart into a back room . Plaintiff alleges that he was “jum ped” by several fellow inm ates when he entered that room , but m anaged to escape without serious injury. Plaintiff claim s that another inm ate then told him to go to Caldwell’s office. Plaintiff claim s that he was then assaulted again by other inm ates, this tim e at the direction of Caldwell. Plaintiff also alleges that Caldwell actively engaged in the assault by holding him down and telling inm ates “don’t hit him in the face.” Plaintiff alleges that, after the beating, Caldwell threatened him , instructing him to tell m edical personnel that he slipped and fell rather than that he had been assaulted. Plaintiff was transported to a hospital and placed in intensive care for several days. Plaintiff alleges that while in the hospital, he was visited by m embers of Bayside Prison’s Special Investigations Division who told him that they would investigate his 2 claim s of Caldwell’s involvem ent in his assault. Plaintiff was subsequently transferred to Southern State Correctional Facility and visited again by the officers who assured Plaintiff they would be in touch regarding filing a com plaint against Caldwell. Plaintiff was released from jail on September 16, 20 14, without having been inform ed of the outcom e of the alleged investigation into his assault. Plaintiff filed the Com plaint in this m atter on J uly 7, 20 16 asserting that his Eighth Am endm ent rights were violated. Defendants presently seek dism issal of all claim s except for those against Caldwell in his individual capacity. Ap p licable Stan d ard Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to m ove for dism issal of a claim based on “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A com plaint should be dism issed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if the alleged facts, taken as true, fail to state a claim . Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When deciding a m otion to dism iss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), ordinarily only the allegations in the com plaint, m atters of public record, orders, and exhibits attached to the com plaint, are 3 taken into consideration. 1 See Chester County Interm ediate Unit v. Pa. Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 80 8, 812 (3d Cir. 1990 ). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead evidence. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977). The question before the Court is not whether the plaintiff will ultim ately prevail. Watson v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 150 (20 0 7). Instead, the Court sim ply asks whether the plaintiff has articulated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twom bly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (20 0 7). “A claim has facial plausibility2 when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 0 9) (citing Twom bly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should assum e their veracity and then 1 “Although a district court m ay not consider m atters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the com plaint m ay be considered without converting the m otion to dism iss into one for sum m ary judgment.” U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 20 0 2) (internal quotation m arks and citations om itted) (em phasis deleted). Accord Lum v. Bank of Am ., 361 F.3d 217, 221 n.3 (3d Cir. 20 0 4) (citations om itted). 2 This plausibility standard requires m ore than a m ere possibility that unlawful conduct has occurred. “When a com plaint pleads facts that are ‘m erely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlem ent to relief.’’” Id. 4 determ ine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlem ent to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The Court need not accept “‘unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences,’” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 20 0 7) (citation om itted), however, and “[l]egal conclusions m ade in the guise of factual allegations . . . are given no presum ption of truthfulness.” Wyeth v. Ranbaxy Labs., Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 2d 60 7, 60 9 (D.N.J . 20 0 6) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see also Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170 , 177 (3d Cir. 20 0 7) (quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 20 0 5) (“[A] court need not credit either ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions’ in a com plaint when deciding a m otion to dism iss.”)). Accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-80 (finding that pleadings that are no m ore than conclusions are not entitled to the assum ption of truth). Further, although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlem ent to relief’ requires m ore than labels and conclusions, and a form ulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elem ents will not do.” Twom bly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations om itted). See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by m ere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). 5 Thus, a m otion to dism iss should be granted unless the plaintiff’s factual allegations are “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assum ption that all of the com plaint’s allegations are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twom bly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal citations om itted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not perm it the court to infer m ore than the m ere possibility of m isconduct, the com plaint has alleged-but it has not ‘shown’-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). D is cu s s io n 4 2 U .S.C. § 19 8 3 Plaintiff’s Constitutional claim s are governed by Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil remedy against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the United States Constitution. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 50 3 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). Any analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should begin with the language of the statute: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom , or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im m unities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 6 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As the above language makes clear, Section 1983 is a remedial statute designed to redress deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and its subordinate federal laws. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n.3 (1979). By its own words, therefore, Section 1983 “does not . . . create substantive rights.” Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 20 0 6) (citing Baker, 443 U.S. at 145, n.3). To state a cognizable claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff m ust allege a “deprivation of a constitutional right and that the constitutional deprivation was caused by a person acting under the color of state law.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 20 0 8) (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 120 4 (3d Cir. 1996)). Thus, a plaintiff m ust dem onstrate two essential elem ents to m aintain a claim under § 1983: (1) that the plaintiff was deprived of a “right or privileges secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States” and (2) that plaintiff was deprived of his rights by a person acting under the color of state law. William s v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 464 (3d Cir. 1989). The United States Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor its officials acting under their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). See also 7 Didiano v. Balicki, 488 F. App’x 634, 638 (3d Cir. 20 12) (finding state prison and its adm inistrator in her official capacity, as arm s of the state, did not fall within the definition of a “person” for purposes of the New J ersey Civil Rights Act; statutory definition explicitly stated that the word “person” included the State of New J ersey only in the lim ited circum stance of certain property disputes, which were not applicable). As such, an em ployee of the state named as a defendant in a civil rights action m ay be held liable only if that person has personal involvem ent in the alleged wrongs and is sued in their personal capacity. See Hafer v. Melo, 50 2 U.S. 21, 31 (1991) (“state officials, sued in their individual capacities, are ‘persons’ within the m eaning of § 1983”). Liability under § 1983 m ay not be based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 n.14 (3d Cir. 1993). As a general m atter, a supervisor m ay be held liable under Section 1983 if that supervisor was “involved personally, meaning through personal direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence, in the wrongs alleged.” McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 460 (3d Cir. 20 0 9); see also A.M. ex rel J .M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. J uvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 20 0 4) (“A supervisor m ay be personally liable . . . if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to 8 violate them , or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations.”). To sufficiently allege knowledge and acquiescence, a Plaintiff m ust provide facts suggesting that the Defendant supervisor “had contem poraneous, personal knowledge of [the alleged violation(s)] and acquiesced in it.” See Evancho, 423 F.3d at 353 (explaining that a civil rights com plaint “is adequate where it states the conduct, tim e, place, and persons responsible”). For a failure to supervise claim , a “plaintiff m ust identify a supervisory policy or practice that the supervisor failed to em ploy, and then prove that: (1) the policy or procedures in effect at the tim e of the alleged injury created an unreasonable risk of a constitutional violation; (2) the defendant-official was aware that the policy created an unreasonable risk; (3) the defendant was indifferent to that risk; and (4) the constitutional injury was caused by the failure to im plem ent the supervisory practice or procedure.” Barkes v. First Correctional Medical, Inc., 766 F.3d 30 7, 317 (3d Cir. 20 14) (overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 20 42 (20 15)). An alys is The Court m ust dism iss Defendant State of New J ersey and arm s of the State New J ersey Department of Corrections and Bayside State Prison, as these Defendants are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. The 9 Court also will dism iss the official capacity claim s for dam ages against all individual Defendants, who are State em ployees, because these claim s are essentially dam ages claim s against the State. Accordingly, the Court is left with the claim s against the individual Defendants in their personal capacities. Again, the State does not seek dism issal of the individual capacity claim against Defendant Caldwell. As to the supervisory Defendants, State Departm ent of Corrections Com m issioner Lanigan and Bayside Adm inistrator Powell, Plaintiff has alleged: At all relevant tim es, it was the policy, practice and/ or custom of Defendants Bayside State Prison, State of New J ersey, New J ersey Department of Corrections, Com m issioner Lanigan and Adm inistrator Powell to inadequately supervise and train their corrections officers regarding the lawful use of force and the proper care, safety and protection of inm ates. These defendants were aware of, and yet recklessly and deliberately indifferent to the need for additional training, supervision, testing, rules, regulations, policies, procedure, guidelines, directives, investigation and/ or discipline relating to: proper treatment and/ or handling of inm ates; preventing abusive, threatening, harassing, retaliatory, vindictive and/ or violent behavior against inm ates; and investigating complaints of inm ate abuse. These defendants also m aintained a custom , policy and/ or practice of failing to discipline corrections officers and/ or encouraging the aforesaid unlawful behavior. Com plaint, ¶¶, 43, 44. Plaintiff further alleged that these defendants were aware of: 10 Bayside’s long and sordid history of inm ate abuse, yet failed to take corrective action. Following the fatal attack of a corrections officer in 1997, hundreds of inm ates confined at Bayside filed civil com plaints alleging abuse by corrections officers. In a February 25, 20 14 article written by Bayside inm ate, Latif Lam onte, Lam onte describes a history of “beatings, stom pings and set-ups” that inm ates at Bayside State Prison were forced to endure during his period of confinement. One of these inm ates, Dione Brown, complained that he was assaulted four tim es on J une 28, 20 0 7 by correctional staff after attem pting to file an inm ate grievance. Another inm ate, Lewis Williford, died following a May 2, 20 0 5 beating by corrections officers. More recently, Inm ate Terry Form an filed a civil com plaint alleging that he suffered physical abuse on February 5, 20 13 at the hands of corrections officers at Bayside. Michael Leski, sim ilarly claim ed that he was attacked and assaulted by two corrections officers at Bayside on J une 1, 20 14. While recovering from injuries associated with his beating, Plaintiff J illard was also advised that SCO Caldwell had a history of assaulting inm ates, and that there m ust have been some eight inm ate complaints filed against Caldwell. Com plaint, ¶ 45. The Court finds that the Com plaint pleads m erely conclusory allegations as to the supervisory Defendants with insufficient facts to show that Powell and Lanigan plausibly had contem poraneous, personal knowledge of the alleged past violations and acquiesced in Caldwell’s behavior. Even considering the allegation that Caldwell had a history of assaulting inm ates, and that there had been eight inm ate com plaints filed against him, the Court would not be perm itted to infer m ore than the mere possibility of m isconduct by Powell and/ or Lanigan. 11 Accordingly, the Defendants’ m otion to dism iss m ust be granted. The unsupported conclusory statements regarding the supervisory Defendants are insufficient to withstand a m otion to dism iss. The dismissal will be without prejudice to his right to file an am ended com plaint, if Plaintiff can do so consistent with the direction in this Opinion. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 20 0 7) (explaining that Third Circuit precedent “supports the notion that in civil rights cases district courts m ust offer am endment—irrespective of whether it is requested—when dism issing a case for failure to state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or futile”). Conclusion For these reasons, Defendants’ m otion for partial dism issal of the Com plaint is granted. An Order will accom pany this Opinion. Dated: March 6, 20 17 / s/ J oseph H. Rodriguez J OSEPH H. RODRIGUEZ USDJ 12
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