DITULLIO v. BOROUGH OF BERLIN et al, No. 1:2016cv02775 - Document 33 (D.N.J. 2019)
Court Description: OPINION. Signed by Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez on 3/18/2019. (rss, )
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DITULLIO v. BOROUGH OF BERLIN et al Doc. 33 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW J ERSEY J AMES DITULLIO, : Hon. J oseph H. Rodriguez Plaintiff, : Civil Action No. 16-2775 v. : BOROUGH OF BERLIN and PATROLMAN RYAN HERON, OPINION : Defendants. : This m atter is before the Court on Defendants’ m otion for sum m ary judgm ent [24] pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The Court has reviewed the subm issions and decides the m atter based on the briefs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons stated here, the m otion will be granted. Ju ris d ictio n This is a civil action over which the district court has original jurisdiction based on a question “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff asserts a violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Backgro u n d On May 18, 20 14 at the Berlin Farm ers Market in Berlin, New J ersey, Plaintiff J am es DiTullio interjected him self into a situation where police officers were questioning another patron attem pting to sell puppies at the 1 Dockets.Justia.com m arket without a perm it. An altercation between the police officers and Plaintiff ensued, resulting in Plaintiff’s arrest. In this case, Plaintiff has asserted claim s against Defendant Heron under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest/ im prisonm ent, excessive force, conspiracy, and bystander liability as well as a Monell claim against the m unicipality. In briefing the opposition to the m otion before the Court, Plaintiff has conceded the Monell claim . Su m m ary Ju d gm e n t Stan d ard “Sum m ary judgm ent is proper if there is no genuine issue of m aterial fact and if, viewing the facts in the light m ost favorable to the non-m oving party, the m oving party is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.” Pearson v. Com ponent Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 482 n.1 (3d Cir. 20 0 1) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (198 6)); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (a). Thus, the Court will enter sum m ary judgm ent in favor of a m ovant who shows that it is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law, and supports the showing that there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fact by “citing to particular parts of m aterials in the record, including depositions, docum ents, electronically stored inform ation, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . adm issions, interrogatory answers, or other m aterials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c)(1)(A). 2 An issue is “genuine” if supported by evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonm oving party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is “m aterial” if, under the governing substantive law, a dispute about the fact m ight affect the outcom e of the suit. Id. In determ ining whether a genuine issue of m aterial fact exists, the court m ust view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in the light m ost favorable to the nonm oving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Initially, the m oving party has the burden of dem onstrating the absence of a genuine issue of m aterial fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the m oving party has m et this burden, the nonm oving party m ust identify, by affidavits or otherwise, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.; Maidenbaum v. Bally’s Park Place, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1254, 1258 (D.N.J . 1994). Thus, to withstand a properly supported m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, the nonm oving party m ust identify specific facts and affirm ative evidence that contradict those offered by the m oving party. Andersen, 477 U.S. at 256-57. “A nonm oving party m ay not ‘rest upon m ere allegations, general denials or . . . vague statem ents . . . .’” Trap Rock Indus., Inc. v. Local 825, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 982 F.2d 884, 890 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 50 0 (3d Cir. 1991)). Indeed, 3 the plain language of Rule 56(c) m andates the entry of sum m ary judgm ent, after adequate tim e for discovery and upon m otion, against a party who fails to m ake a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an elem ent essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. That is, the m ovant can support the assertion that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed by showing that “an adverse party cannot produce adm issible evidence to support the [alleged dispute of] fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). In deciding the m erits of a party’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, the court’s role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the m atter, but to determ ine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (198 6). Credibility determ inations are the province of the factfinder. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am ., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). D is cu s s io n 4 2 U .S.C. § 19 8 3 Plaintiff’s Constitutional claim s are governed by Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil rem edy against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the United States Constitution. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 50 3 U.S. 115, 120 4 (1992). Any analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should begin with the language of the statute: Every person who, under color of an y statute, ordinance, regulation, custom , or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im m unities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As the above language m akes clear, Section 198 3 is a rem edial statute designed to redress deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and its subordinate federal laws. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n.3 (1979). By its own words, therefore, Section 1983 “does not . . . create substantive rights.” Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 20 0 6) (citing Baker, 443 U.S. at 145, n.3). To state a cognizable claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff m ust allege a “deprivation of a constitutional right and that the constitutional deprivation was caused by a person acting under the color of state law.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 20 0 8) (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 120 4 (3d Cir. 1996)). Thus, a plaintiff m ust dem onstrate two essential elem ents to m aintain a claim under § 1983: (1) that the plaintiff was deprived of a “right or privileges secured by the 5 Constitution or the laws of the United States” and (2) that plaintiff was deprived of his rights by a person acting under the color of state law. William s v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 464 (3d Cir. 1989). [W]hen a state prisoner seeks dam ages in a § 1983 suit, the district court m ust consider whether a judgm ent in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily im ply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the com plaint m ust be dism issed unless the plaintiff can dem onstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determ ines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not dem onstrate the invalidity of any outstanding crim inal judgm ent against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of som e other bar to the suit. Heck v. Hum phrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). In this case, Plaintiff was indicted and charged with obstructing the adm inistration of law in violation of N.J . Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-1A; assault on a police officer in violation of N.J . Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-1B(5)(A); resisting arrest in violation of N.J . Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-2A(3)(A); and sim ple assault in violation of N.J . Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-1a. He com pleted New J ersey’s PreTrial Intervention Program (PTI) in October of 20 15 and, as a result, the charges against him were dism issed. However, this does not constitute a favorable term ination; for Heck purposes, it is akin to a conviction. See Fernandez v. City of Elizabeth, 468 F. App’x 150 , 154 (3d Cir. 20 12); Bustam ante v. Borough of Param us, 994 A.2d 573, 582 (N.J . Super. Ct. App. Div. 20 10 ). 6 Plaintiff’s claim s of false arrest and excessive force are barred by Heck because a favorable outcom e on those claim s here would be inconsistent with the adm issions Plaintiff m ade in State court in order to enter into the PTI program . By pleading guilty to resisting arrest, Plaintiff acknowledged that Defendants did not use unlawful force in effectuating his arrest, see Bustam ante, 994 A.2d at 585-86, and there are no allegations of force subsequent to the arrest. Accordingly, a judgm ent in favor of the Plaintiff on his claim s here would necessarily im ply the invalidity of his underlying crim inal “conviction” in State court. Additionally, the doctrine of qualified im m unity provides that “governm ent officials perform ing discretionary functions . . . are shielded from liability for civil dam ages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 80 0 , 818 (1982). Thus, governm ent officials are im m une from suit in their individual capacities unless, “taken in the light m ost favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right” and “the right was clearly established” at the tim e of the objectionable conduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 20 1 (20 0 1). Courts m ay exercise discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified 7 im m unity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circum stances in the particular case at hand. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (20 0 9). This doctrine “balances two im portant interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassm ent, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably” and it “applies regardless of whether the governm ent official’s error is a m istake of law, a m istake of fact, or a m istake based on m ixed questions of law and fact. Id. (internal quotation om itted). Properly applied, qualified im m unity “protects ‘all but the plainly incom petent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 5623 U.S. 731, 743 (20 11) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). For a right to be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right m ust be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 20 2 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). That is, “[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry in determ ining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 492 (3d Cir, 20 0 6). “If the officer’s m istake as to what the law requires is reasonable,” the officer is entitled to qualified im m unity. Id. (internal citations om itted). 8 Further, “[i]f officers of reasonable com petence could disagree on th[e] issue, im m unity should be recognized.” Malley, 475 U.S. at 341. See also Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (20 0 4) (The general touchstone is whether the conduct of the official was reasonable at the tim e it occurred.). Finally, because qualified im m unity is an affirm ative defense, the burden of proving its applicability rests with the defendant. See Beers-Capital v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120 , 142, n.15 (3d Cir. 20 0 1). A Fourth Am endm ent excessive force claim calls for an evaluation of whether police officers’ actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circum stances confronting him . Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). While the question of reasonableness is objective, the court m ay consider the severity of the crim e at issue, whether the suspect poses an im m ediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attem pting to evade arrest by flight. Id. In a claim for excessive force, “the central question is ‘whether force was applied in a good faith effort to m aintain or restore discipline, or m aliciously and sadistically to cause harm .’” Brooks v. Kyler, 20 4 F.3d 10 2, 10 6 (3d Cir. 20 0 0 ) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 50 3 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). Furtherm ore, appropriate attention should be given “to the circum stances of the police action, which are often ‘tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.’” Grom an v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 9 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Graham , 490 U.S. at 396). See also Graham , 490 U.S. at 396-97 (analyzing reasonableness of use of force “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20 / 20 vision of hindsight”). A § 1983 claim for the failure to stop the use of excessive force rises to the level of a constitutional violation if excessive force was used and defendants had a reasonable opportun ity to prevent the use of excessive force. See, e.g., Sm ith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 20 0 2). In this case, Defendant Heron enjoys qualified im m unity as the undisputed facts support the arresting officer’s probable cause to arrest the Plaintiff. In addition, because the Court finds no basis for constitutional violations, there can be no conspiracy or bystander liability. Co n clu s io n For these reasons, Defendants’ m otion for sum m ary judgm ent [24] pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 will be granted. An appropriate Order will accom pany this Opinion. Dated: March 18, 20 19 s/ J oseph H. Rodriguez J OSEPH H. RODRIGUEZ U.S.D.J . 10
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