IGWE v. SMITH et al, No. 1:2015cv07418 - Document 39 (D.N.J. 2018)
Court Description: OPINION. Signed by Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez on 3/26/2018. (dmr)
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IGWE v. SMITH et al Doc. 39 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW J ERSEY SALAHUDDIN IGWE form erly known as MICHAEL A. WILLIAMS, v. Hon. J oseph H. Rodriguez : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No. 15-7418 : DETECTIVE TAWAND SMITH, CAMDEN COUNTY, : DETECTIVE SHAYQUIRA WILLIAMS, OFFICER MICHAEL PANTALON, and : SERGEANT BRANDON KERSEY, Defendants. OPINION : This m atter is before the Court on Defendants’ m otion for sum m ary judgm ent pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 [Doc. 32]. The Court heard oral argument on the motion on March 13, 20 18 and the record of that proceeding is incorporated here. For the reasons expressed on the record that day, as well as those set forth below, the m otion will be granted. Background On Novem ber the 19, 20 14 at approxim ately 11:17 p.m. Officer G. Lewis of the Cam den County Police Departm ent was in the City of Cam den patrolling when a wom an approached the officer and advised him she had just been subject to rape. He im mediately called for am bulance and she was taken to the hospital. 1 Dockets.Justia.com Shortly thereafter, officers from the Cam den County Police Department (“CCPD”) went to the hospital and obtained a prelim inary identification from the victim for her alleged attacker. CCPD Detectives Shyquira William s and Tawand Sm ith responded and took a recorded statement from the victim . She indicated that the individual had m et her at the AM/ PM m ini m arket at the corner of Mt. Ephraim and Kaighn Avenues and they then proceeded to 1327 Lansdowne Avenue to smoke crack. Instead, once they entered the abandoned building where the m an claim ed to live, he brutally raped her for 27 m inutes while wielding a broom as a weapon. The woman remem bered it was 37 m inutes because she counted to 60 , 37 tim es during the ordeal. She described this individual as a tall black m ale, thin, dressed all in black, bearded, and wearing a black hat. She also indicated that he had crooked teeth, appeared dirty, and spoke “ghetto.” At or about the same tim e, that information was com m unicated to officers in the area where the victim had reported the crime. Sergeant Brandon Kersey of the CCPD saw one individual m atching the description he had received of a black m ale wearing all black with a black baseball cap; that individual was the Plaintiff. He was walking up Lansdowne Avenue from the direction where the crim e had been com m itted and proceeded directly in front of Kersey to go into the AM/ PM m ini m arket. 2 Kersey stopped Plaintiff and Officer Pantaleon detained him in his patrol vehicle. Plaintiff was taken to the police station for questioning. Upon arriving at the station, Plaintiff exercised his Fifth Am endment right and refused to give a statement. Plaintiff was then photographed. Sm ith ordered a photo array from the sheriff’s departm ent to be presented to the victim . CCPD Officer Lucas Murray, who was not involved in the investigation and was unaware which one of the eight photographs he was carrying depicted the suspect, presented the photo array to the victim in the hospital. Murray noted that the victim looked through the photographs one at a tim e. She saw the first photograph and said she thought that was her attacker. Murray then asked the victim to continue to look through the rest of the photographs, and when she got to num ber 8, which was the Plaintiff, she changed her m ind and identified Plaintiff as her attacker. She then com pared the two photographs, 1 and 8, said, “I don’t think it’s num ber 1, I think it’s num ber 8.” The officer then asked her to give him a percentage of which she was com fortable with the identification; in other words, what percent she was com m itted that this was the individual who raped her about an hour prior. She identified Plaintiff as her attacker with a 75% degree of certainty. 3 Murray then communicated that inform ation to Detective Sm ith. No charges had been officially filed at that point, but Plaintiff was being held for questioning. Detective Sm ith consulted with the Cam den County Prosecutor’s Office assistant prosecutor who was on duty that night and inform ed him of the situation. She gave him the description, where Plaintiff was apprehended, and the other information that had been given by the victim and then the details of the photo array. The assistant prosecutor advised Sm ith that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and instructed her to charge Plaintiff with aggravated sexual assault and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. Detective Sm ith filed those two charges against the Plaintiff in accordance with the Prosecutor’s Office recom mendation and instruction. Unable to post bail, Plaintiff was transported to the Cam den County Correctional Facility on November 20 , 20 14 and rem ained there until his March 7, 20 15 release from custody because his charges were dism issed. It was subsequently determ ined that the victim did not wish to cooperate with m aintaining the investigation. Plaintiff has filed claim s of unreasonable search and seizure and m alicious prosecution. Through briefing on the instant sum m ary judgm ent m otion, he has conceded his claim s against 4 Defendant Cam den County, and proceeds only against the individual Defendants. Sum m ary J udgment Standard “Sum m ary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of m aterial fact and if, viewing the facts in the light m ost favorable to the non-m oving party, the m oving party is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.” Pearson v. Com ponent Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 482 n.1 (3d Cir. 20 0 1) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (a). Thus, the Court will enter sum m ary judgment in favor of a m ovant who shows that it is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law, and supports the showing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact by “citing to particular parts of m aterials in the record, including depositions, docum ents, electronically stored inform ation, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . adm issions, interrogatory answers, or other m aterials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c)(1)(A). An issue is “genuine” if supported by evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is “m aterial” if, under the governing substantive law, a dispute about the fact m ight affect the outcom e of the suit. Id. In determ ining whether a genuine issue of m aterial 5 fact exists, the court m ust view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in the light m ost favorable to the nonm oving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Initially, the m oving party has the burden of dem onstrating the absence of a genuine issue of m aterial fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the m oving party has m et this burden, the nonm oving party must identify, by affidavits or otherwise, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.; Maidenbaum v. Bally’s Park Place, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1254, 1258 (D.N.J . 1994). Thus, to withstand a properly supported m otion for sum mary judgment, the nonm oving party m ust identify specific facts and affirm ative evidence that contradict those offered by the m oving party. Andersen, 477 U.S. at 256-57. “A nonm oving party m ay not ‘rest upon m ere allegations, general denials or . . . vague statements . . . .’” Trap Rock Indus., Inc. v. Local 825, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 982 F.2d 884, 890 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 50 0 (3d Cir. 1991)). Indeed, the plain language of Rule 56(c) m andates the entry of sum m ary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon m otion, against a party who fails to m ake a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an elem ent essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. 6 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. That is, the movant can support the assertion that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed by showing that “an adverse party cannot produce adm issible evidence to support the [alleged dispute of] fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). In deciding the m erits of a party’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, the court’s role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the m atter, but to determ ine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Credibility determ inations are the province of the factfinder. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am ., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). Discussion Plaintiff’s constitutional claim s are governed by Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil remedy against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the United States Constitution. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 50 3 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). Any analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should begin with the language of the statute: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im m unities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 7 to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As the above language m akes clear, Section 1983 is a remedial statute designed to redress deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and its subordinate federal laws. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n.3 (1979). By its own words, therefore, Section 1983 “does not . . . create substantive rights.” Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 20 0 6) (citing Baker, 443 U.S. at 145, n.3). To state a cognizable claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff m ust allege a “deprivation of a constitutional right and that the constitutional deprivation was caused by a person acting under the color of state law.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 20 0 8) (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 120 4 (3d Cir. 1996)). Thus, a plaintiff m ust dem onstrate two essential elem ents to m aintain a claim under § 1983: (1) that the plaintiff was deprived of a “right or privileges secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States” and (2) that the plaintiff was deprived of his rights by a person acting under the color of state law. William s v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 464 (3d Cir. 1989). The doctrine of qualified im m unity provides that “governm ent officials perform ing discretionary functions . . . are shielded from liability for civil dam ages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 8 established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 80 0 , 818 (1982). Thus, governm ent officials are im m une from suit in their individual capacities unless, “taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right” and “the right was clearly established” at the tim e of the objectionable conduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 20 1 (20 0 1). Courts m ay exercise discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified im m unity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circum stances in the particular case at hand. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (20 0 9). This doctrine “balances two im portant interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassm ent, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably” and it “applies regardless of whether the government official’s error is a m istake of law, a m istake of fact, or a m istake based on mixed questions of law and fact.” Id. Properly applied, qualified im m unity “protects ‘all but the plainly incom petent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (20 11) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). 9 For a right to be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right m ust be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 20 2 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). That is, “[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry in determ ining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 492 (20 0 6). “If the officer’s m istake as to what the law requires is reasonable,” the officer is entitled to qualified im m unity. Couden, 446 F.3d at 492 (internal citations om itted). Further, “[i]f officers of reasonable competence could disagree on th[e] issue, im m unity should be recognized.” Malley, 475 U.S. at 341 (1986). See also Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (20 0 4) (The general touchstone is whether the conduct of the official was reasonable at the tim e it occurred.) Finally, because qualified im m unity is an affirm ative defense, the burden of proving its applicability rests with the defendant. See Beers-Capital v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120 , 142, n.15 (3d Cir. 20 0 1). The Fourth Am endm ent prohibits seizures in the absence of probable cause. Orsatti v. New J ersey State Police, 71 F.3d. 480 , 482 (3d Cir. 1995). “[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circum stances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in them selves to warrant a 10 reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being com m itted by the person to be arrested.” Id. That is, probable cause to arrest exists when facts and circum stances within a police officer's knowledge would convince a reasonable person that an individual has com m itted an offense. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); United States v. Myers, 30 8 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 20 0 2). The inquiry is not whether the individual actually com m itted the crim e for which he was arrested, but whether the officer had probable cause to believe so at the tim e of the arrest. See Wright v. City of Phila., 40 9 F.3d 595, 60 2 (3d Cir. 20 0 5). To establish m alicious prosecution under § 1983, a plaintiff m ust establish that: (1) the defendant initiated a crim inal proceeding; (2) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding; (3) the crim inal prosecution resulted in plaintiff's favor; (4) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; and (5) the defendant acted m aliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 296-97 (3d Cir. 20 14); DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 40 7 F.3d 599, 60 1 (3d Cir. 20 0 5); Santiago v. City of Vineland, 10 7 F. Supp. 2d 512, 566 (D.N.J . 20 0 0 ). 11 In this case, the Court finds that the individual Defendants had probable cause to detain and arrest the Plaintiff, and at the very least are shielded by qualified im m unity. Considering the facts leading up to the initial stop and the circum stances that resulted in charging Plaintiff, none of the individual Defendants can be said to have violated Plaintiff’s civil rights. Notably, the Third Circuit has indicated that “a victim ’s identification, even without any other evidence, will ‘usually be sufficient to establish probable cause.’” Cooper v. City of Phila., 636 F. App’x 588 (3d Cir. 20 16) (where the plaintiff spent 77 days in jail for a crim e he did not com m it based on a faulty identification by a robbery victim) (quoting Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 790 (3d Cir. 20 0 0 )). Further, “[t]he Fourth Am endm ent does not require that an identification be perfect in all respects.” Cooper, 636 F. App’x at 590 (referring to Wilson where probable cause had been established despite that the plaintiff was four to seven inches shorter than the victim had described, am ong other factors). Conclusion In the language of the Circuit, “[a]lthough we share [Plaintiff’s frustration with the way events unfolded, [the officers] had probable cause to arrest him.” Cooper, 636 F. App’x at 589. 12 Therefore, Defendants’ m otion for summ ary judgm ent will be granted. An appropriate Order will be issued. Dated: March 26, 20 18 / s/ J oseph H. Rodriguez J OSEPH H. RODRIGUEZ U.S.D.J . 13
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