J.C. et al v. EASTERN CAMDEN COUNTY REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT et al, No. 1:2015cv05936 - Document 22 (D.N.J. 2017)
Court Description: OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez on 3/29/17. (js)
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J.C. et al v. EASTERN CAMDEN COUNTY REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT et al Doc. 22 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW J ERSEY C.C., a m inor, individually and by his parents, J .C. and M.C., Plaintiffs, v. : Hon. J oseph H. Rodriguez : Civil Action No. 15-5936 : OPINION Eastern Cam den County Regional : School District, et al., Defendants. : This m atter is before the Court after a Com plaint was filed, but prior to the filing of an Answer or other responsive pleading, on a m otion to approve a settlem ent between the parties on behalf of a minor Plaintiff [Doc. 13]. The Court held a fairness hearing on Septem ber 13, 20 16 and the record of that proceeding is incorporated here. Because the Court finds the term s of the settlem ent not fair or reasonable to the m inor, as they provide for attorneys’ fees that are grossly disproportionate to the m inor’s recovery, the m otion to approve settlem ent will be denied. Background The underlying facts asserted in this case occurred in 20 13-14 and previously were litigated as the result of a Due Process Petition filed by Plaintiffs on April 22, 20 14 with the New J ersey Office of Special Education under docket num ber EDS 0 6359-20 14 S, agency reference num ber 20 141 Dockets.Justia.com 210 5. The Petition was transm itted to the New J ersey Office of Adm inistrative Law on May 27, 20 14, and on February 19, 20 15 the parties settled their adm inistrative, IDEA-based claim . The settlem ent agreem ent, which was approved by Adm inistrative Law J udge J ohn F. Russo on May 4, 20 15, included the following remedies: (a) IEEs to be conducted; (b) a requirem ent that subsequent HIB investigations include a determ ination as to whether C.C.’s alleged conduct was a m anifestation of C.C.’s disabilities, or a result of C.C.’s unique characteristics and/ or disabling condition; (c) C.C. be exem pt from suspension for exhibiting m anifestations of his disabilities, to be addressed by his PBIP; (d) C.C. to be subject to discipline if he exhibits behaviors identified in 20 U.S.C. §§1415(k)(7)(A)-(D); (e) Eastern m ust perform an Manifestation Determ ination before suspension, held within two school days after the incident; (f) C.C.’s HIB disciplines to be expunged; (g) Eastern to ensure C.C.’s IEP remain current; (h) PBIP to not be used as punishment against C.C.; (i) C.C.’s parents to be allowed to participate in future questionings or interrogations; (j) Eastern to provide individualized counseling goals and objectives; (k) C.C. is a m ember of a protected class under §50 4 and the ADA. (Com pl. ¶ 68.) Within the term s of the settlement included the following provision: “Petitioners release Eastern from the claim s raised in the petitions, including attorney’s fees and costs, but excluding any civil claim s.” (Com pl. ¶ 69.) As part of the settlem ent at the adm inistrative level, Plaintiffs’ attorney J am ie Epstein received attorneys’ fees of $ 98,0 0 0 . Plaintiffs state that this am ount “was based on a com promise of Mr. Epstein’s estim ate of fees for legal services rendered in the adm inistrative 2 m atter[] for 334.3 hours at $ 40 0 per hour or $ 167,150 , which was sent to ALJ Russo and Eastern on 1/ 16/ 15.” (Pl. Aug. 24, 20 16 Br., p. 15.) Plaintiffs filed the Com plaint in this Court on August 3, 20 15, invoking federal question jurisdiction, and stating that “Plaintiffs’ claim s for m onetary dam ages, punitive dam ages, and other relief . . . could not be addressed in the Adm inistrative Law setting,” (Com pl. ¶ 72). Plaintiffs set forth claim s under the Rehabilitation Act, the Am ericans with Disabilities Act, the NJ LAD, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the NJ CRA, all fee-shifting statutes, as well as a claim of vicarious liability. No further action was taken in the case. On Decem ber 9, 20 15, a Notice of Call for Dism issal on J anuary 8, 20 16 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m ) and Local Civil Rule 41.1(a) was entered on the docket. On Decem ber 28, 20 15, Plaintiffs, Epstein, and attorney J ulie Warshaw entered into a contingency fee agreement whereby Epstein and Warshaw, referred to as “the LAW FIRM,” would “seek reim bursement of all allowable attorney’s fees beyond the initial [$ 1,0 0 0 ] retainer [paid by Plaintiffs], if any, from [Defendants] . . . . Additionally, the Law Firm shall be entitled to 25% of any dam ages awarded net of costs.” (Dec. 28, 20 15 Retainer Agm t., ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs also agreed that Epstein’s hourly rate was $ 50 0 and Warshaw’s was $ 425. (Dec. 28, 20 15 Retainer Agm t., ¶ 3.) Next, 3 the Agreement provided, “if we settle your case, you, the CLIENT, understand and agree, you are responsible for the balance of any rem aining attorney’s fees (unless the LAW FIRM is willing to com prom ise its fees) and expert’s fees and costs not recovered in the settlement. (Dec. 28, 20 15 Retainer Agm t., ¶ 5c.) Finally, under a paragraph entitled Co-Counsel Term s, the Agreement states: By 12/ 30 / 15, Attorney Warshaw shall file an entry of her appearance and shall becom e lead counsel responsible for all aspects of the case and henceforth, Attorney Epstein’s role shall be lim ited to consulting to Attorney Warshaw. Attorney Warshaw shall also seek both Attorneys’ fees. The Attorneys m ust consent to any settlem ent of their Attorneys’ fees. In the event CC is awarded dam ages via litigation or settlem ent, Attorney Warshaw shall distribute 20 % of her net attorney fees to Attorney Epstein in consideration of this referral. (Dec. 28, 20 15 Retainer Agm t., ¶ 10 .) On December 30 , 20 15, J ulie Warshaw entered her appearance for Plaintiffs, 1 and Defendants were served on J anuary 6, 20 16, term inating the J .C. and M.C. certified, on behalf of C.C., that “[a]t the beginning of this m atter, Plaintiffs were represented by J am ie Epstein, Esq. and then a Notice of Appearance was filed on Decem ber 29, 20 15 by J ulie Warhaw, Esq., Warshaw Law Firm , LLC, as attorney for Plaintiffs in this m atter. (J .C. Cert., J un. 21, 20 16, ¶ 5; M.C. Cert., J un. 21, 20 16, ¶ 5.) Further, the parents each certified “at all tim es, I understood and agreed to enter into a contingency fee arrangem ent for the payment of attorney’s fees and that payment to our attorneys would be dependent upon obtaining paym ent, if any, either by obtaining a settlem ent from or a judgment against defendants.” (J .C. Cert., J un. 21, 20 16, ¶ 13; M.C. Cert., J un. 21, 20 16, ¶ 13.) Nonetheless, each continues to request that the Court allow for payment 1 4 Notice of Call for Dism issal. By letter dated March 30 , 20 16, Warshaw inform ed the Court that this m atter had settled and requested a Friendly hearing. The May 18, 20 16 Settlem ent Agreem ent provides for paym ent to Plaintiffs of $ 33,40 0 , from which $ 10 ,0 0 0 is to be paid to the Warshaw Law Firm, LLC and $ 10 ,0 0 0 to J am ie Epstein, Esquire “to reim burse them for all disbursements, costs and expenses incurred in their representation of Plaintiffs, and to satisfy [their] contingent fees.” The Surrogate of Cam den County is to hold the net recovery of $ 13,40 0 in trust for C.C. Warshaw states that the $ 10 ,0 0 0 is a com prom ised lesser am ount which she felt was reasonable based on the total am ount of the settlement. (Warshaw Aff., J un.24, 20 16, ¶ 6.) Warshaw cites “extensive tim e, effort, expertise, negotiation, level of experience, and the difficulty of taking on a case that had been previously handled by another attorney” as justification for her $ 10 ,0 0 0 fee. Epstein declared, in support of his proposed fee of $ 10 ,0 0 0 , “[i]n this case, Plaintiffs had no obligation for attorneys’ fees meaning I would only from the settlem ent proceeds of $ 10 ,0 0 0 each to Epstein and Warshaw for the “reasonable value of the legal services provided,” as $ 20 ,0 0 0 “is fair and reasonable in relation to the am ount of tim e and effort spent on this m atter on behalf of Plaintiffs.” (J .C. Cert., J un. 21, 20 16, ¶ 14-17; M.C. Cert., J un. 21, 20 16, ¶ 14-17.) 5 be paid m y attorney’s fees and costs through the fee shifting provisions of C.C.’s claims.” (Epstein Aff., J un. 26, 20 16, ¶ 13.) That is, “the attorney’s fee arrangement is 10 0 % contingent and there was no retainer.” (Epstein Aff., J un. 26, 20 16, ¶ 26(8).) “C.C.’s parents paid the case costs for the com plaint filing fee and courier fee as indicated by m y bill (APX 14).”2 (Epstein Aff., J un. 26, 20 16, ¶ 14.) Epstein states, “I alone represented C.C. in the adm inistrative action,” and “I alone researched and drafted the com plaint in this m atter, after which J ulie Warshaw, Esquire entered her appearance.” (Epstein Aff., J un. 26, 20 16, ¶ 15, 16.) He then avers that “[a]fter the com plaint was served, Ms. Warshaw and I collaborated as a team on the case thereafter with Ms. Warshaw leading the negotiations with m y input, review and com m ent.” (Epstein Aff., J un. 26, 20 16, ¶ 17.) In contrast, Warshaw’s affidavit states “[a] significant am ount of tim e and effort went into the negotiations toward a settlement of this m atter and I spent a great deal of tim e with m y adversary reviewing and rewording several draft settlem ent agreements.” (Warshaw Aff., J un.24, 20 16, ¶ 4.) (Emphasis added.) While said bill lists a $ 40 0 filing fee and courier charge of $ 68.40 , these are captioned J E COSTS, with no indication that Plaintiffs already paid them . 2 6 Finally, Epstein states: “Regarding m y tim e entries, I d id n o t r e co r d a ct u a l t im e s p e n t , rather, where applicable, I reduced the actual tim e to the am ount of tim e I considered to be reasonable to bill m y clients were they fee paying clients.” (Epstein Aff., J un. 26, 20 16, ¶ 18.) (Em phasis added.) 3 The rem ainder of Epstein’s subm ission seeks to justify his proposed hourly rate of $ 50 0 . While the defense joins in Plaintiffs’ application seeking the Court’s approval of the settlem ent, counsel has m ade clear that “the quantum of counsel fees in connection with the resolution of this m atter was [not] negotiated. The resolution between the parties involved the negotiation of a gross settlement am ount of $ 33,40 0 .0 0 . The allocation of that am ount as between Plaintiffs and their attorneys was not a negotiated point.” [Doc. 18.] Nonetheless, the Settlem ent Agreem ent executed on behalf of the defense contained the precise allocation sought by Plaintiffs here. Discussion All proceedings to enter a judgment to consum m ate a settlement in m atters involving m inors . . . shall be heard by the court without a jury. The court shall determ ine whether the settlement is fair and reasonable as to its am ount and terms. . . . The court, on the request of the claim ant or the claim ant’s The use of contemporaneously recorded tim e records is the preferred practice to verify hours expended by counsel in connection with a counselfee application. Webb v. Board of Educ., 471 U.S. 234, 238 n.6 (1985). 3 7 attorney or on its own m otion, m ay approve the expenses incident to the litigation, including attorney’s fees. N.J . Ct. R. 4:44-3. The Court m ay either approve or disapprove the settlement; it does not have the authority to vary the terms of the settlement, even in the best interests of the m inor. Im pink ex rel. Baldi v. Reynes, 935 A.2d 80 8, 813-14 (N.J . Super. Ct. App. Div. 20 0 7). With respect to an attorney’s agreed contingent fee, if it is within the parameters of New J ersey Court Rule 1:21-7(c), it is entitled to approval if not clearly unreasonable in the circumstances or objectionable for other good cause. Modery v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 549 A.2d 867, 869 (N.J . Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988). In any matter where a client’s claim for dam ages is based upon the alleged tortious conduct of another, . . . excluding statutorily based discrim ination and em ploym ent claim s, . . . an attorney shall not contract for, charge, or collect a contingent fee in excess of the following lim its . . . where the am ount recovered is for the benefit of a client who was a m inor . . . when the contingent fee agreem ent was m ade . . . the fee on any amount recovered by settlem ent . . . shall not exceed 25%. N.J . Ct. R. 1:21-7(c)(6). A contingent fee agreem ent does not lim it the fee awardable under a fee-shifting statute. See Szczepanski v. Newcomb Med. Center, 661 A.2d 1232 (N.J . 1995). “Although the underlying purpose of [fee-shifting] statutes m ay vary, they share a comm on rationale for incorporating a fee-shifting m easure: to ensure ‘that plaintiffs with bona 8 fide claim s are able to find lawyers to represent them [,] . . . to attract com petent counsel in cases involving statutory rights, . . . and to ensure justice for all citizens.’” New J erseyans for Death Penalty Moratorium v. New J ersey Dep’t of Corr., 883 A.2d 329, 338 (N.J . 20 0 5) (quoting Colem an v. Fiore Bros., 552 A.2d 141, 143 (N.J . 1989)). In all cases, fees charged or collected m ust conform to RPC 1.5(a), N.J . Ct. R. 1:21-7(e), which states: A lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determ ining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: (1) the tim e and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular em ploym ent will preclude other em ploym ent by the lawyer; (3) the fee custom arily charged in the locality for sim ilar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the tim e lim itations im posed by the client or by the circum stances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. Two especially im portant factors courts consider in determ ining a reasonable fee are whether “the case presented problems which required exceptional skills beyond that normally encountered in such cases or the case was unusually tim e consum ing.” Wurtzel v. Werres, 493 A.2d 611, 614 (N.J . Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); Mitzel v. Washington Elec. Corp., 72 F.3d 414, 418 (3d Cir. 1995). 9 With regard to awarding attorneys’ fees in fee-shifting cases, the starting point for determ ining the am ount of a reasonable fee is the lodestar, which courts determ ine by calculating the “num ber of hours reasonably expended on the litigation m ultiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). In doing so, courts are to exclude from the determ ination of the lodestar any hours not reasonably expended, and those deemed “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 455 (3d Cir. 20 0 9) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434). Although a court m ay not reduce a fee petition on its own initiative in the absence of specific objections from the party, Bell v. United Princeton Property, Inc., 884 F.2d 713, 718-19 (3d Cir. 1989), the court m ay sua sponte “reduce requested fees with respect to m atters within the judge’s personal knowledge.” Id. at 719; see also McKenna, 582 F.3d at 459 n.13 (“[I]t should not be overlooked that the awarding of an attorney fee is a judicial action and, regardless of the parties’ indifference to it, a court need not lend its im prim atur to an inappropriate order m erely because there was no objection to its entry.”). Where two (or m ore) attorneys successively have been involved in a representation, the lawyers typically share in contingent fees on a quantum 10 m eruit allocation basis for the reasonable value of the services rendered. Glick v. Barclays De Zoete Wedd, Inc., 692 A.2d 10 0 4, 10 10 (N.J . Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (respective contribution to result should determ ine allocation). A quantum m eruit fee award is an equitable determ ination which does not lend itself to “hard and fast rules.” LaMantia v. Durse, 561 A.2d 275, 277 (N.J . Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989). When considering a quantum m eruit award where a contingent fee m ust be split between two lawyers, the trial court should consider: (1) “the length of tim e each of the firm s spent on the case”; (2) “[t]he quality of representation”; (3) “the result of each firm 's efforts”; (4) “the reason the client changed attorneys”; (5) “[v]iability of the claim at transfer”; (6) and “[t]he am ount of the recovery realized in the underlying lawsuit.” Id. at 278. “[I]f the predecessor’s work, no m atter how extensive, contributed little or nothing to the case, then the ceding lawyer should receive little or no com pensation.” Silvestro v. Groupe Lacasse, Inc., No. A-3968-0 7T3, 20 0 9 WL 348589, at *2 (N.J . Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 13, 20 0 9). Mindful that public policy favors settlem ent, the Court is satisfied that the am ount of the settlement, $33,40 0 , is fair and reasonable, but its term s are not. This is a unique situation in that it is not the defense 11 attem pting to im pose unreasonable or unfair term s, it is the m inorPlaintiff’s own counsel. Pursuant to Third Circuit precedent, the Court gives no significant weight to the affidavits of J .C. and M.C. “The Third Circuit has noted the inherent and inevitable conflict that exists when an attorney seeks a fee pursuant to N.J .R. 1.21-7(f).” King v. County of Gloucester, 483 F. Supp. 2d 396 (D.N.J . 20 0 7) (citing Mitzel, 72 F.3d at 419-20 ; Burd v. Hackensack Hosp. Ass’n, 477 A.2d 843, 844 (N.J . Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (“It is virtually im possible for lay persons to m ake inform ed judgm ents as to the reasonableness of attorneys’ contingent fees, since they do not have the experience required to m ake a comparative evaluation of the factors involved in a particular case . . . .”)). Turning to the tim e the attorneys spent on the case, essentially Epstein drafted a Com plaint in the area of his expertise, using a form of pleading previously filed. See Compl. ¶ 7, referring to the m inor as A.S., the initials of Epstein’s plaintiff in Civil Action No. 14-147 (NLH). No further action was taken in the case. Because of the inaction, a Notice of Call for Dism issal was entered. Warshaw then entered an appearance and served the Defendants. The case settled within three m onths, without the filing of a responsive pleading. On the eve of the friendly hearing, both attorneys 12 updated their tim e records on the docket. Epstein estim ated spending 47.5 hours on this case, at a value of $ 23,750 .0 0 , and Warshaw “billed” 46.5 hours for $ 19,762.50 . Thus, Plaintiffs’ attorneys have represented to the Court that the value of their com bined 94 hours of legal services they provided in this case is $ 43,512.50 . All of this tim e was spent on the heels of the adm inistrative proceeding, on which Epstein spent 334.3 hours and for which Epstein received $ 98,0 0 0 from the Defendants. The Court finds that the am ount of tim e logged and resulting fees are disproportionate to the activity reflected on the docket. The retainer agreem ent between Plaintiffs, Epstein, and Warshaw provided for attorneys’ fees of 25% of any dam ages awarded net of costs, yet Plaintiffs’ lawyers have allocated 60 % of the settlement proceeds for them selves. The retainer agreement also provided that after Warshaw entered an appearance, Epstein’s role would be lim ited to consulting and Epstein would be allocated 20 % of Warshaw’s net attorney’s fees resulting from settlem ent. This is not reflected in the tim e records provided or in the proposed allocation of settlement proceeds. Despite the 334.3 hours Epstein had spent on the adm inistrative case, he billed 3.9 hours to review the adm inistrative record in preparing to file the Com plaint in this case. Notwithstanding the expertise that prom pts 13 Epstein to charge $50 0 per hour, he spent an additional 4.7 hours researching the causes of action for the Com plaint and 3.1 hours drafting the Com plaint, which, as stated above, is of essentially the same form as the com plaint filed in Civil Action No. 14-147 (NLH). Epstein previously has been adm onished for overcharging in drafting a com plaint. See J .L. v. Harrison Twp. Bd. Of Educ., Civil No. 14-2666, 20 16 WL 4430 929, *14 n.18 (Aug. 19, 20 16) (finding that an experienced attorney could easily draft such a pro form a com plaint in 2.5 hours). Prior to filing the Com plaint, alm ost 4 additional hours were charged, including a half hour to “draft” a legal services agreem ent with the Plaintiffs which Epstein later charged another half hour to am end. Once the Com plaint was filed, Epstein charged to review the cm/ ecf e-m ail4 reflecting that he filed the Com plaint. After no activity for four m onths, Epstein next charged to review the Court’s Notice of Call for Dism issal for his own failure to prosecute the case. Of interest, although Epstein claim s to be an expert in education law, he saw the need to have Warshaw join him in this m atter. In preparing to hand over the case to Warshaw, Epstein billed 5.3 hours, whereas Warshaw It appears he charged 1.2 hours or $ 60 0 to review docket entries in the case. 4 14 billed 1.9. Despite Warshaw’s alleged expertise, Epstein billed $ 150 to “explain contents of file” to her. On the day the Complaint finally was served on Defendants, Warshaw billed 6.2 hours to review file and docum ents; the next day, she billed 4.8 hours to review exhibits and start reviewing transcripts. She charged to draft and file the Sum m ons and proof of service, and then to e-m ail Epstein regarding service, and Epstein charged to read her e-mail. After the Com plaint was served, Warshaw billed another 12.7 hours leading up to the execution of the settlem ent agreem ent, 3.3 hours of which were billed after Warshaw notified the Court that the case had settled. From the tim e the settlement agreem ent had been signed until the friendly hearing, Warshaw billed another 14.3 hours. In contrast to the retainer agreem ent with Plaintiffs that indicated Epstein would m erely consult on the case after Warshaw entered her appearance, Epstein charged another 9.6 hours leading up to the execution of the settlement agreem ent, 3.6 hours of which were billed after Warshaw notified the Court that the case had settled. “[W]ork expended after the sole source of success was achieved . . . cannot be thought of as having contributed to that success.” A.V. v. Burlington Twp. Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 0 6-1534, 20 0 8 WL 4126254, at *6 (D.N.J . Sept. 3, 20 0 8). 15 Although Warshaw was to be the lead attorney of record, after she entered her appearance, Epstein charged 8.7 hours to conference with an insurance adjuster, research school board settlements, research release issue, review friendly draft m otion papers, and research ordered brief issues. Epstein charged 7 hours for em ails and calls with Warshaw that do not even appear on her tim e records. Epstein billed 16.3 hours after the settlem ent agreement was executed, before the friendly hearing. He billed over 3 hours in conjunction with drafting his Affidavit of Services. 5 “Mr. Epstein is very experienced with fee litigation, and he should have used a previous affidavit as a tem plate.” C.G. v. Winslow Twp. Bd. Of Educ., Civil No. 12-6278, 20 15 WL 7760 356, *5 (D.N.J . Dec. 2, 20 15) Thus, after the settlem ent was finalized but before the Court held a hearing to determ ine its fairness, Epstein and Warshaw charged the file over 30 hours. 6 The record shows that they consulted together for approximately 8 hours at the combined rate of $ 925 for a total of $ 7,40 0 . This was on a case that had no discovery and no defense. Warshaw did not charge for the hour she spent to draft and finalize her Affidavit of Counsel. 6 Additionally, Epstein listed as his cost the Com plaint service courier charge, but the Plaintiffs had already paid that expense. 5 16 This is not a case where Plaintiffs received equitable relief at the adm inistrative level that cannot be quantified, but Plaintiff’s counsel was not awarded fees. Counsel received attorney’s fees and the defense was released from any claim for attorney’s fees and costs to the exclusion of civil claim s. While couched in claim s for dam ages not awarded at the adm inistrative level, it appears that the instant lawsuit was filed for the purpose of recouping attorneys’ fees in addition to the $ 98,0 0 0 already awarded. Within three months of service, the defense offered to settle the case for $ 33,40 0 . Plaintiffs’ attorneys advanced the term s of allocating that sum . Fee-shifting, however, contem plates payment from one’s adversary, not the client. To avoid m aking an application for attorneys’ fees that Defendants could challenge, counsel incorporated what they represent to the Court to be “fee-shifting m oney” into the Settlement Agreement. It is understandable that the school board settled quickly without m ounting a defense in order to avoid the fee-generating process of Plaintiffs’ counsel. Under the circum stances of the case, however, this places the entire financial burden on the m inor. The Court fails to see how doing so advances the public policy underlying fee-shifting. The Court rejects the settlement as not fair and reasonable to the m inor. It is the Court’s strong suggestion that the parties revisit the terms of the settlem ent in view of this Opinion. 17 Conclusion For these reasons, and in consideration of concerns placed on the record during oral argument, the parties’ m otion to approve the settlem ent in this m atter will be denied. An appropriate Order will be entered. Dated: March 29, 20 17 / s/ J oseph H. Rodriguez J OSEPH H. RODRIGUEZ U.S.D.J . 18
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