HARTE v. SEA VILLAGE MARINA, LLC et al, No. 1:2014cv03231 - Document 34 (D.N.J. 2016)
Court Description: OPINION. Signed by Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez on 2/4/2016. (drw)
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HARTE v. SEA VILLAGE MARINA, LLC et al Doc. 34 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW J ERSEY DANIEL T. HARTE, : : Plaintiff, v. SEA VILLAGE MARINA, LLC Hon. J oseph H. Rodriguez Civil Action No. 14-3231 : : Defendant. Op in io n : This m atter com es before the Court on Motion to Dism iss [Dkt. No. 25], pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 8(a), of Defendant Wells Fargo & Com pany. The Court has considered the written subm issions of the parties without oral argum ent. For the reasons that follow, Wells Fargo & Com pany’s Motion to Dism iss is granted. I. Backgro u n d This case is related to a m atter in the Superior Court of New J ersey. The underlying state court lawsuit revolved around a contract that Plaintiff Daniel T. Harte entered into, on or about August 25, 20 0 5, to purchase a m ariner houseboat, located at Defendant Sea Village Marina (“SVM”), for the am ount of $ 132,50 0 .0 0 . Plaintiff purchased the houseboat from J ohn Best. During the course of litigation, Defendant Barbara Lieberm an, Esquire represented the Estate of J ohn Best. Allegedly, based upon her representations to the state court that the Estate was insolvent, Harte agreed to dism iss the claim s against the Estate. Harte was unaware at that tim e that Lieberm an was under crim inal investigation by the New J ersey Attorney General. Lieberm an was 1 Dockets.Justia.com recently convicted of various fraud counts. On February 24, 20 14 Harte and SVM entered into a settlem ent agreem ent in the Superior Court of New J ersey in Daniel T. Harte v. Sea Village Marina, LLC, Docket No. ATL-L-2616-12. Under the term s of the Settlem ent Agreem ent, Harte had sixty days to produce to SVM proof of unencum bered title. Harte claim s that Wells Fargo(also referred to as Wachovia Bank in the Am ended Com plaint) had the title, but could not locate the title and eventually ceased responding to Harte’s requests. It appears Harte never received verification that the title was unencum bered and then he suffered a stroke. The Settlem ent Agreem ent also required Harte to m eet certain paym ent obligations. It appears he did not satisfy the term s of the Settlem ent Agreem ent. On May 20 , 20 14, Harte filed this action seeking a declaratory ruling that the Settlem ent Agreem ent is unenforceable due to newly discovered evidence of fraud: Ms. Lieberm an’s crim inal indictm ent. In addition, the Com plaint alleges a claim of com m on law fraud against all of the nam ed Defendants. On J uly 3, 20 14, Defendant SVM filed a m otion to Dism iss. Then on J uly 14, 20 14, the Superior Court of New J ersey entered a J udgm ent in the am ount of $ 50 ,0 0 0 in favor of Sea Village Marina, Inc. and against Daniel T. Harte. The J udgment was entered as a result of Daniel T. Harte’s failure to honor the term s of the Settlem ent Agreem ent with SVM. The judgm ent notes the pendency of the present action: The defendant has dem onstrated that this m atter was settled between the parties on February 24, 20 14.In the opinion of this court, the fact that plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court is not a reason to deny the defendant's m otion to enforce the settlem ent and enter the judgm ent. The plaintiff could have prevented the defendant from entering the judgm ent by m aking the paym ents the plaintiff agreed. to m ake on 2 February 24, 20 14. The settlem ent agreem ent shall be enforced. J udgm ent shall be entered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff in the am ount of $ 50 ,0 0 0 .0 0 See Cert. of Aaron M. Bender, Esq., Ex. E, J udgm ent, Daniel T. Harte v. Sea Village Marina, LLC, Docket No. ATL-L-2616-12. The Court granted SVM’s m otion to dism iss. The rem aining Defendants are Barbara Lieberm an, the Estate of J ohn Best and Wells Fargo. The claim s are as follows: Count I, Declaratory J udgm ent That the Settlem ent Agreem ent Is Void and Unenforceable and Related Prelim inary and Perm anent Injunctive Relief; Count II, Fraudulent Inducem ent; Count III, Com m on Law Fraud. Counts I and II are plead against all of the Defendants, while Count II is plead against Barbara Lieberm an only. There is no proof of service of the Sum m ons and Com plaint on the docket as to Defendants Lieberman and the Estate of J ohn Best. As a result, the claim s against these defendants are dism issed.1 The only rem aining defendant, Wells Fargo, m oves for dism issal on several 1 Absent strict com pliance with Rule 4's sum m ons and service requirem ents, “a court ordinarily m ay not exercise power over a party the com plaint nam es as a defendant.” Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, 526 U.S. 344, 350 , 119 S.Ct. 1322, 143 L.Ed.2d 448 (1999) (quoting Om ni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 10 4, 10 8 S.Ct. 40 4, 98 L.Ed.2d 415 (1987) (“Before a ... court m ay exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural requirem ent of service of sum m ons m ust be satisfied.”); Miss. Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 327 U.S. 438, 444– 45 (1946) (“Service of sum m ons is the procedure by which a court ... asserts jurisdiction over the person of the party served.”)). At the tim e the Com plaint and the Am ended Com plaint were filed in this m atter, Fed. R. Civ. P. m (4) provides for dism issal where a defendant is not served within 120 days after the com plaint is filed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m ). Plaintiff has not dem onstrated good cause for the failure to serve Lieberm an and/ or the Estate of J ohn Best. 3 grounds, including Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Wells Fargo argues that Plaintiff’s claim s are barred by the Rooker-Feldm an Doctrine, the Entire Controversy Doctrine, res judicata, and Collateral Estoppel. Finally, Wells Fargo argues that Plaintiff’s claim s are tim e-barred. II. Stan d ard o f Re vie w Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), a defendant m ay challenge a plaintiff's right to be heard in federal court by asserting the court lacks subject m atter jurisdiction over the controversy. See Robinson v. Daulton, 10 7 F.3d 10 18, 10 21 (3d Cir. 1999). Unless it is affirm atively dem onstrated, a federal court is presum ed to lack subject m atter jurisdiction. Cohen v. Kurtzm an, 45 F.Supp.2d 423, 429 (D.N.J . 1999) (citations om itted). Dism issal is proper under Rule 12(b)(1) when the claim “clearly appears to be im m aterial and m ade solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or ... is wholly insubstantial or frivolous.” Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 140 6, 140 8– 0 9 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)). A claim is insubstantial if “‘its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for interference that the questions sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.’” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (quoting Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 , 32 (1933)). Under a Rule 12(b)(1) m otion, the party asserting jurisdiction, the plaintiff, bears the burden of dem onstrating in the record that jurisdiction is proper. Packard v. Providential Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 10 39, 10 45 (3d Cir. 1993); Developm ent Finance Corp. v. Alpha Housing & Health Care, Inc., 54 F.3d 156, 158 (3d Cir. 1995). However, 4 “no presum ptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed m aterial facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the m erits of a jurisdictional claim .” Mortensen v. First Fed'l Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). The trial court is free to weigh the evidence to determ ine whether it has subject m atter jurisdiction. Id. A m otion to dism iss under Rule 12(b)(1) m ay be treated as either a facial or factual challenge to the court's subject m atter jurisdiction. Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 20 0 6) (citations om itted); Gould Electronics Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 20 0 0 ) (citing Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891). Rule 12(b)(1) facial attacks contest the sufficiency of the pleadings, and the trial court m ust take all allegations in the com plaint as true and in the light m ost favorable to the plaintiff. Gould, 220 1 F.3d at 176 (citing PBGC v. White, 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993); see also In re Kaiser Group Int'l Inc., 399 F.3d 558, 561 (3d Cir. 20 0 5) (In evaluating “facial” subject m atter jurisdiction attacks, the court ordinarily accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and views all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.). Essentially, a “facial” challenge by the defendant contests the adequacy of the language used in the pleading. Turicentro, S.A. v. Am erican Airlines, Inc., 30 3 F.3d 293, 30 0 n. 4 (3d Cir. 20 0 2). Rule 12(b) (1) factual attacks, however, contest the factual basis for subject m atter jurisdiction; that is, in a factual challenge to jurisdiction, the defendant argues that the allegations on which jurisdiction depends are not true as a m atter of fact. Id. at 30 0 . As such, no presum ptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations and “the 5 court m ust weigh the evidence relating to jurisdiction, with discretion to allow affidavits, docum ents, and even lim ited evidentiary hearings.” Id. at 30 0 n. 4. If the defendant contests the jurisdictional allegations, then “it is incum bent upon the plaintiff to respond to the defendant's sworn factual assertions” with som ething m ore than conclusory responses. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 673 F.2d 70 0 , 711 (3d Cir. 1981). If the plaintiff fails to “m eet and controvert the defendant's factual proofs, then the district court m ust determ ine whether it has subject m atter jurisdiction based upon the factual context presented by the defendant.” Id. at 711– 12. However, if the opposing affidavits present a disputed issue of m aterial fact, the court m ust perm it the case to proceed to a plenary trial to resolve the contested jurisdictional issues. Id. III. An alys is For the reasons that follow, Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dism iss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) is granted. The Court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claim s pursuant to the Rooker-Feldm an doctrine. “Under the Rooker– Feldm an doctrine, a district court is precluded from entertaining an action, that is, the federal court lacks subject m atter jurisdiction, if the relief requested effectively would reverse a state court decision or void its ruling.” Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 20 0 6) (citations om itted). There are four requirem ents that m ust be m et for the Rooker– Feldm an doctrine to apply: “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff com plain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court judgm ents; (3) those judgm ents were 6 rendered before the federal suit was filed; an d (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgm ents.” B.S. v. Som erset Cnty., 70 4 F.3d 250 , 259– 60 (3d Cir. 20 13) (quoting Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 20 10 )). As such, application of the Rooker– Feldm an doctrine is necessarily lim ited to “cases brought by state-court losers com plaining of injuries caused by state-court judgm ents rendered before the district court proceedings com m enced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgm ents.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 , 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (20 0 5). The Third Circuit explains the Rooker– Feldm an doctrine as barring federal district courts from hearing cases under two circum stances: “‘first, if the federal claim was actually litigated in state-court prior to the filing of the federal action or, second, if the federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state adjudication, m eaning that federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state-court was wrong.’” In re Knapper, 40 7 F.3d at 580 (em phasis added) (quoting Walker v. Horn, 385 F.3d 321, 329 (3d Cir. 20 0 4); Parkview Assoc. P'ship v. City of Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 20 0 0 ). In this case, both proscriptions apply. “[A] federal action is inextricably intertwined with a state adjudication, and thus barred in federal court under Feldm an, ‘[w]here federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong.’ ” Id. (quoting Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1430 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25, 10 7 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (Marshall, J ., concurring)). See also Exxon Mobil, 544 7 U.S. at 293, 125 S.Ct. 1517 (“In parallel litigation, a federal court m ay be bound to recognize the claim - and issue-preclusive effects of a state-court judgm ent,” but the federal court is divested of jurisdiction under Rooker– Feldm an only where it is asked to redress injuries caused by an unfavorable state-court judgm ent.). Im portantly, if a plaintiff's claim in federal court is inextricably intertwined with a previous state court adjudication, the district court lacks jurisdiction over the claim even if it was not raised in the state court. Id. at 327, 125 S.Ct. 1517. Here, the Court is invited to review and reject the Settlem ent Agreem ent that is the subject of the New J ersey Superior Court’s J uly 14, 20 14 J udgment. Plaintiff had the opportunity to challenge the Settlem ent Agreem ent in State Court prior to and during the pendency of the present action. Plaintiff’s Am ended Com plaint acknowledges that his claim s were actually litigated as he seeks action on the Settlem ent Agreem ent before the New J ersey Superior Court: Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgm ent pending the resolution of this case, which is based on events that transpired shortly after settlem ent agreem ent in the m atter of Harte v. Sea Village Marina, LLC, et al., Superior Court of New J ersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. L-2616-12 (the “Lawsuit”) and potentially newly discovered evidence. Plaintiff prays for judgm ent and hereby dem ands a jury trial against Defendants[.] See Am end. Com pl. Moreover, Counts I and III as they relate to Wells Fargo seek relief identical to that requested in the State Court. The Court finds that plaintiff’s claim s were actually litigated in state court prior and/ or are inextricably intertwined with the J udgm ent of the New J ersey Superior Court. As such, 8 Plaintiff is a state court loser, com plaining of an injury caused by New J ersey Superior Court’s enforcem ent of the Settlem ent Agreem ent that is at the heart of his federal case. In other words, the Court finds that the ultim ate relief sought by Plaintiff in this m atter is the sam e relief he sought and lost in the Superior Court of New J ersey. Such review is proscribed by Rooker-Feldman. Walker, 385 F.3d at 330 . Moreover, the Court finds that the present Am ended Com plaint is “inextricably intertwined” with issues resolved by the New J ersey Superior Court and this Court is without jurisdiction to resolve Plaintiff’s claim s under the Rooker– Feldm an doctrine. As a result, this Court lacks subject m atter jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's claim s and dism isses them as to Defendant Wells Fargo pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). In addition, Plaintiff’s request to am end the Am ended Com plaint is both deficient and denied as futile. In his Opposition Brief, Plaintiff requests perm ission to am end the com plaint without setting forth the relevant criteria for the m otion or appending the proposed Second Am ended Com plaint. “[A]bsent undue or substantial prejudice, an am endm ent should be allowed under Rule 15(a) unless denial [can] be grounded in bad faith or dilatory m otive, truly undue or unexplained delay, repeated failure to cure deficiency by am endm ents previously allowed or futility of am endm ent.’” Long v. Wilson, 393 F.3d 390 , 40 0 (3d Cir. 20 0 4) (quoting Lundy v. Adam ar of New J ersey, Inc., 34 F.3d 1173, 1196 (3d Cir. 1994)). Here, Plaintiff fails to address any of the considerations. In addition, the Court finds that the am endm ent would be futile as the claim s 9 relate to or are inextricably intertwined with the New J ersey Superior Court’s J uly 14, 20 14 J udgm ent in Daniel T. Harte v. Sea Village Marina, LLC, Docket No. ATL-L-261612. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 10 3, 10 8 (3d Cir. 20 0 2) (an am endm ent sought pursuant to Rule 15(a) shall be perm itted unless it would be inequitable or futile.). Because the Court is divested of subject m atter jurisdiction under the RookerFeldm an Doctrine, it will not address Wells Fargo’s rem aining argum ents related to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and the Entire Controversy Doctrine, res judicata, Collateral Estoppel and the Statute of Lim itations. IV. Co n clu s io n For the reasons stated above, Wells Fargo’s m otion to dism iss is granted. The claim s against Barbara Lieberm an and the Estate of J ohn Best are dism issed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (m ). Plaintiff’s request to am end the com plaint is deficient and futile and, therefore, denied. An appropriate Order shall issue. Dated: February 4, 20 16 s/ J oseph H. Rodriguez Hon. J oseph H. Rodriguez, UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 10
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