GUERS v. JONES LANG LASALLE AMERICAS, INC., No. 1:2013cv07734 - Document 8 (D.N.J. 2014)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez on 9/25/2014. (drw, )

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GUERS v. JONES LANG LASALLE AMERICAS, INC. Doc. 8 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT FOR TH E D ISTRICT OF N EW JERSEY MATTHEW A. GUERS, : : : : : : : : : Plaintiff, v. J ONES LANG LASALLE AMERICAS, INC., Defendant. Hon. J oseph H. Rodriguez Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-7734 MEMORANDUM OPINION This m atter is before the Court on Defendant s Motion to Dism iss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, the m otion will be granted. As such, Plaintiff s claim s will be dism issed without prejudice. I. Backgro u n d Plaintiff Matthew A. Guers ( Plaintiff ) was em ployed by Defen dant J ones Lang LaSalle Am ericas, Inc. ( Defendant ) as a real estate agent/ broker. (Com pl. ¶ 2.) As an em ployee of Defendant, Plaintiff was paid by com m ission. (Com pl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff claim s to have m et or exceeded goals for paym ent of com m issions. (Com pl. ¶ 3.) In February 20 13, Defendant fired Plaintiff, claim ing that Plaintiff breached Defendant s ethical code by obtaining inform ation in possession of another agent/ broker. (Com pl. ¶ 7.) As a result, Plaintiff was term inated and accordingly denied the com m issions he claim s to have earned throughout the course of his em ploym ent. (Com pl. ¶ 10 .) The total value of the com m issions Plain tiff claim s he is entitled to is $ 65,546.45. (Com pl. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff claim s that the allegation that Plaintiff breached Defendant s ethical code is false. He further claim s that the allegation was m ade by Defendant either knowingly and/ or negligently with the intent to deprive Plaintiff of his com m issions and 1 Dockets.Justia.com to libel/ slander Plaintiff. (Com pl. ¶¶ 8, 9.) Plaintiff thus seeks a favorable judgm ent and requests dam ages in the am ount of $ 65,546.45; attorneys fees, interest, and suit costs; punitive, consequential, treble, special and/ or exem plary dam ages; and any other relief deem ed appropriate by this Court. (Com pl. ¶ 13.) Accordingly, Plaintiff brings claim s for breach of contract, libel and/ or slander, intentional infliction of em otional distress, fraud/ conversion, violation of the New J ersey Consum er Fraud Act, im proper term ination, and under the theory of quantum m eruit. The Court will address each of these claim s in turn. II. Stan d ard A com plaint should be dism issed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if the alleged facts, taken as true, fail to state a claim . Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When deciding a m otion to dism iss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), ordinarily only the allegations in the com plaint, m atters of public record, orders, and exhibits attached to the com plaint, are taken into consideration. 1 See Chester County Interm ediate Unit v. Pa. Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 8 0 8, 8 12 (3d Cir. 1990 ). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead evidence. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977). The question before the Court is not whether the plaintiff will ultim ately prevail. Watson v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 150 (20 0 7). Instead, the Court sim ply asks whether the plaintiff has articulated enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twom bly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (20 0 7). 1 Although a district court m ay not consider m atters extraneous to the pleadings, a docum ent integral to or explicitly relied upon in the com plaint m ay be considered without converting the m otion to dism iss into one for summ ary judgm ent. U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 20 0 2) (internal quotation m arks and citations om itted) (em phasis deleted). 2 A claim has facial plausibility 2 when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the m isconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (20 0 9) (citing Twom bly, 550 U.S. at 556). When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assum e their veracity and then determ ine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlem ent to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 . The Court need not accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 20 0 7) (citation om itted), however, and [l]egal conclusions m ade in the guise of factual allegations . . . are given no presum ption of truthfulness. Wyeth v. Ranbaxy Labs., Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 2d 60 7, 60 9 (D.N.J . 20 0 6) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see also Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170 , 177 (3d Cir. 20 0 7) (quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 20 0 5) ( [A] court need not credit either bald assertions or legal conclusions in a com plaint when deciding a m otion to dism iss. )). Accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (finding that pleadings that are n o m ore than conclusions are not entitled to the assum ption of truth). Further, although detailed factual allegations are not necessary, a plaintiff s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlem ent to relief requires m ore than labels and con clusions, an d a form ulaic recitation of a cause of action s elem ents will not do. Twom bly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations om itted). See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 2 This plausibility standard requires more than a m ere possibility that unlawful conduct has occurred. When a com plaint pleads facts that are m erely consistent with a defendant s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlem ent to relief. Id. 3 ( Threadbare recitals of the elem ents of a cause of action, supported by m ere conclusory statem ents, do not suffice. ). Thus, a m otion to dism iss should be granted unless the plaintiff s factual allegations are enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assum ption that all of the com plaint s allegations are true (even if doubtful in fact). Twom bly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal citations om itted). [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not perm it the court to infer m ore than the m ere possibility of m isconduct, the com plaint has alleged-but it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Further, Rule 9(b) provides that [i]n alleging fraud or m istake, a party m ust state with particularity the circum stances constituting fraud or m istake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person s m ind m ay be alleged generally. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Pursuant to Rule 9(b), a plaintiff m ust plead with particularity the circum stances of the alleged fraud in order to place the defendants on notice of the precise m isconduct with which they are charged, an d to safeguard defendants against spurious charges of im m oral and fraudulent behavior. Lum v. Bank of Am ., 361 F.3d 217, 223-24 (3d Cir. 20 0 4) (quoting Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southm ost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 791 (3d Cir. 1984)). There are two ways to satisfy the particularity requirem ent. See Lum , 361 F.3d at 224. First, a plaintiff m ay plead the date, place or tim e of the fraudulent act. Id. (quoting Seville, 742 F.2d at 791) (internal quotations om itted). Second, a plaintiff m ay use alternative m eans [to] inject[ ] som e m easure of substantiation into their allegations of fraud. Id. (internal quotations om itted). Still, the plaintiff m ust plead enough to substantiate the allegations of fraud being m ade and m ay not rely on 4 conclusory statem ents. NN&R, Inc. v. One Beacon Ins. Group, 362 F. Supp. 2d 514, 518 (D.N.J . 20 0 5) (quoting Mordini v. Viking Freight, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 378, 385 (D.N.J . 1999)). At a m inim um , a plaintiff m ust allege who m ade a m isrepresentation to whom and the general content of the m isrepresentation. Lum , 361 F.3d at 224. Significantly, the heightened pleading standard required by Rule 9(b) applies to claim s of fraud brought under New J ersey law. Frederico v. Hom e Depot, 50 7 F.3d 188, 20 0 (3d Cir. 20 0 7). III. D is cu s s io n A. Bre a ch o f Co n tract Claim Count II 3 of Plaintiff s Com plaint asserts a claim for breach of contract. 4 To state a breach of contract claim , a plaintiff m ust allege: (1) the existence of a contract between the parties, (2) a breach of that contract, (3) dam ages flowing from that contract, and (4) that the party bringing the breach of contract claim perform ed its own obligations under the contract. Frederico, 50 7 F.3d at 20 3 (citing Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Hom e Entm t, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 552, 561 (D.N.J . 20 0 2)). As Plaintiff was an em ployee of Defendant, there m ust have been either an explicit or im plied contract, be it written or oral, between the parties, satisfying the first elem ent. However, Plaintiff has not pled sufficiently the second elem ent that the 3 Count I of Plaintiff s Com plaint will not be addressed by this Court. Count I does not provide a legal basis for recovery, but consists of factual allegations and an unsupported request for favorable judgm ent and dam ages. As such, this Court begins its analysis with Count II and will m ake no determ ination as to Count I. 4 In Plaintiff s Brief, he also argues that there has been a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Plaintiff s Brief in Opp. to Mot. to Dism iss.) However, as this was not addressed in the Com plaint as a cause of action, this Court will not consider the argum ent. [I]t is axiom atic that the complaint m ay not be am ended by the briefs in opposition to a m otion to dism iss. Com m onwealth of Pa. ex rel. Zim m erman v. Pepsico, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 10 0 7 (7th Cir. 1984)). 5 contract between the parties was in fact breached by Defendant. A copy of the contract between the parties is not attached to the Com plaint, nor does the Com plaint detail the term s of the contract. As such, this Court is unable to determ in e whether it is plausible that the contract was breached by Defendant. Although the Com plaint provides that Defendant s refusal to rem it the m onies due and owing to Plaintiff constitutes a breach of contract, (Com pl. ¶ 15), this statem ent is conclusory and lacks factual allegations to substantiate the claim . See Chem tech Int l, Inc. v. Chem . Injection Technologies, Inc., 170 F. App x 80 5, 8 0 8 (3d Cir. 20 0 6) ( Stating that a contract was breached is stating a legal conclusion. Stating that a docum ent was signed, that the docum ent called for certain perform ance, and that perform ance did not occur are all factual allegations that would underpin this legal conclusion. ). As such, Plaintiff s breach of contract claim is dism issed without prejudice. B. Libe l a n d / o r Slan d e r Claim Count III of Plaintiff s Com plaint brings a claim for libel and/ or slander. To establish defam ation under New J ersey law, a plaintiff m ust show the defendant (1) m ade a false and defam atory statem ent concerning the plaintiff, (2) com m unicated the statem ent to a third party, and (3) had a sufficient degree of fault. Mangan v. Corporate Synergies Group, Inc., 8 34 F. Supp. 2d 199, 20 4 (D.N.J . 20 11) (citing Singer v. Beach Trading Co., 379 N.J . Super. 63, 79 (App. Div. 20 0 5)). The Com plaint does not allege that Defendant com m unicated a defam atory statem ent to a third party. The Com plaint m erely provides that Defendant fired Plaintiff claim ing that Plaintiff com m itted a breach of the Defendant s ethical code by obtaining inform ation in the possession of another agent/ broker and that [s]uch allegation was false and m ade to libel/ slander the Plaintiff. (Com plaint ¶¶ 7-9.) This 6 is not sufficient to establish a claim for libel and/ or slander. In Plaintiff s Brief, he provides that Defendant m ade false and disparaging statem ents about Plaintiff and his conduct in connection with his em ploym ent and the ethics code and did so to other em ployees and individuals in Plaintiff s industry. (Plaintiff s Brief in Opp. to Mot. to Dism iss.) However, Plaintiff does not introduce this allegation in the Com plaint; it is addressed for the first tim e in Plaintiff s Brief. Again, it is axiom atic that the com plaint m ay not be am ended by the briefs in opposition to a m otion to dism iss. Pepsico, 836 F.2d at 18 1 (quoting Car Carriers, 745 F.2d at 10 0 7). As the Com plaint does not provide factual allegations showing that a defam atory statem ent was com m unicated to a third party, the libel/ slander claim is dism issed without prejudice. C. In te n tio n a l In flictio n o f Em o tio n al D is tre s s Claim Count IV of Plaintiff s Com plaint brings a claim for intentional infliction of em otional distress. To state a claim for intentional infliction of em otional distress, a plaintiff m ust allege: (1) that the defendant was either deliberate or reckless in his actions, disregarding the high probability that em otional distress will follow ; (2) that the defendant s conduct was outrageous or extrem e beyond all possible bounds of decency ; (3) that the defendant s conduct was the proxim ate cause of the plaintiff s em otional distress; and (4) that the plaintiff s em otional distress was so severe that no reasonable m an could be expected to endure it. Lascurain v. City of Newark, 349 N.J . Super. 251, 277 (App. Div. 20 0 2) (citing Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc y, 111 N.J . 355, 366 (1988) (internal quotations om itted)). The conduct m ust be so outrageous in character, an d so extrem e in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized com m unity. Buckley, 111 N.J . at 366. 7 Plaintiff fails to plead facts sufficient to establish a claim for intentional infliction of em otional distress. A plaintiff m ust show that the defendant was deliberate or reckless in his actions and that the defendant s conduct went beyond all possible bounds of decency. Lascurain, 349 N.J . Super. at 277 (citing Buckley, 111 N.J . at 366). The Com plaint does not satisfy this burden. The Com plaint provides that Defendant knowingly and/ or negligently [m ade wrongful allegations again st Plaintiff] with the intent to deprive plaintiff of com m issions he earned. (Com pl. ¶ 9.) This allegation is not sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion. As previously stated, this Court need not accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, Baraka, 481 F.3d at 195 (citation om itted), and [l]egal conclusions m ade in the guise of factual allegations . . . are given no presum ption of truthfulness. Wyeth, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 60 9 (citing Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286). The Com plaint provides no m ore than threadbare, unsupported conclusions that Defendant acted deliberately or recklessly; Plaintiff provides no underlying facts that show that this conclusion should be accepted by the Court. Further, there is no evidence that supports the conclusion that Defendant s conduct was beyond all possible bounds of decency. The term ination of an em ployee, whatever the secret m otive underlying it, is the kind of event that happens every day; such an act is not even a breach of m odern-day business etiquette, m uch less an uncivilized barbarism . Quite a bit m ore . . . m ust accom pany a firing if it is to be deem ed outrageous. Borecki v. E. Int l Mgmt. Corp., 694 F. Supp. 47, 61 (D.N.J . 1988) (quotation om itted). Without providing m ore to substantiate a claim that Defendant engaged in outrageous conduct that is intolerable in a civilized com m unity, either 8 deliberately or recklessly, Plaintiff s claim can not stand. 5 Accordingly, the intentional infliction of em otional distress claim is dism issed without prejudice. D . Fra u d / Co n ve rs io n Claim Count V of Plaintiff s Com plaint brings a claim for fraud. To establish a claim for com m on law fraud, there m ust be (1) a m aterial m isrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the defendant of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable reliance thereon by the other person; and (5) resulting dam ages. Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 N.J . 582, 610 (1997) (citing J ewish Ctr. of Sussex County v. Whale, 86 N.J . 619, 624-25 (1981)). As previously stated, there is also a heightened pleading standard when alleging fraud: a party m ust state w ith particularity the circum stances constituting fraud or m istake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person s m ind m ay be alleged generally. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (em phasis added). Taking the allegations in the Com plaint as true, as this Court m ust under a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion, the first elem ent of com m on law fraud a m aterial m isrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact is satisfied. The Com plaint provides that Defendant fired Plaintiff for breach of Defendant s ethical code and further claim s that such allegation was false; these allegations establish that Defendant m ade a m aterial m isrepresentation of fact. (Com pl. ¶¶ 7, 8.) However, the Com plaint fails to assert with 5 In his Brief, Plaintiff argues that he was term inated in retaliation for [] requesting leave under the [Fam ily Medical Leave Act] due to his wife s traum atic and complicated pregnancy. (Plaintiff s Brief in Opp. to Mot. to Dism iss.) As this was not addressed in the Complaint as a reason for the term ination, the Court will not consider the claim . Once again, it is axiom atic that the com plaint m ay not be am ended by the briefs in opposition to a m otion to dism iss. Pepsico, 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Car Carriers, 745 F.2d 110 1, 10 0 7 (7th Cir. 1984)). 9 particularity, or even generally, that Defendant knew or believed the allegation was false or that Plaintiff relied on the allegation. Although the second elem ent the defendant s knowledge or belief of the fact s falsity is not always required when equitable fraud is being claim ed, the other four elem ents of com m on law fraud rem ain s essential and m ust be satisfied. See Whale, 8 6 N.J . at 625. Therefore, regardless of whether legal or equitable fraud is being claim ed, Plaintiff m ust show with particularity that there was reasonable reliance on the m isrepresented fact. This reliance was not alleged in the Com plaint with particularity, nor was it alleged generally. As the Com plaint has not provided sufficient factual allegations to show that Plaintiff reasonably relied on the m isrepresentation, Defendant s Motion to Dism iss is granted as to the com m on law fraud claim . Significantly, the claim s asserted in Count V of Plaintiff s Com plaint are tied to the breach of contract claim . The New J ersey District Courts still hold that fraud claim s not extrinsic to underlying contract claim s are not m aintainable as separate causes of action. Gleason v. Norwest Mortg., Inc., 243 F.3d 130 , 144 (3d Cir. 20 0 1). Even if the Com plaint were to sufficiently allege the elem ents of com m on law fraud, Plaintiff would be unable to m aintain his com m on law fraud claim because it is intrinsic to his breach of contract claim . Count V of Plaintiff s Com plaint also brings a claim for conversion. To state a claim for com m on law conversion, the following elem ents m ust be alleged: (1) the existen ce of property, (2) the right of im m ediate possession thereof belonging to plaintiff, and (3) the wrongful interference with that right by defendant. Torsiello v. Strobeck, 955 F. Supp. 2d 30 0 , 312 (D.N.J . 20 13) (quoting Corestar Int l PTE. Ltd. v. Com m c ns, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 10 7, 127 (D.N.J . 20 0 7)). Plaintiff fails to show that his 10 property, if in fact taken, was taken wrongfully or that Plaintiff had a right to im m ediate possession of the com m issions. As previously stated in reference to the breach of contract claim , a copy of the contract between the parties was not attached to the Com plaint, nor does the Com plaint detail the term s of the contract. As such, this Court cannot find that Defendant was not authorized to withhold com m ission paym ents from Plaintiff. Accordingly, both the com m on law fraud and conversion claim s are dism issed by this Court without prejudice. E. Vio la tio n o f th e N e w J e rs e y Co n s u m e r Frau d Act Claim Count VI of Plaintiff s Com plaint purports to bring a claim for a violation of the New J ersey Consum er Fraud Act ( NJ CFA ). To state a claim for a violation of the NJ CFA, a plaintiff m ust allege each of three elem ents: (1) unlawful conduct by the defendants; (2) an ascertainable loss on the part of the plaintiff; and (3) a causal relationship between the defendants unlawful conduct and the plaintiff s ascertainable loss. N.J . Citizen Action v. Schering-Plough Corp., 367 N.J . Super. 8, 12-13 (App. Div. 20 0 3). As to the unlawful conduct requirem ent, the NJ CFA provides that: The act . . . of any unconscionable com m ercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false prom ise, m isrepresentation, or the knowing concealm ent, suppression, or om ission of any m aterial fact with intent that others rely upon such concealm ent, suppression or om ission, in connection with the sale or advertisem ent of any m erchandise or real estate, or with the subsequent perform ance of such person as aforesaid . . . is declared to be an unlawful practice . . . . N.J .S.A. § 56:8 -2 (1976). As previously stated, there is also a heightened pleading standard when alleging fraud: a party m ust state w ith particularity the circum stan ces constituting fraud or m istake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person s m in d m ay be alleged generally. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (em phasis added). This 11 pleading standard does not require that a plaintiff claim ing fraud plead the date, place or tim e of the fraud. NN&R, Inc. v. One Beacon Ins. Group, 362 F. Supp. 2d 514, 518 (D.N.J . 20 0 5). However, the plaintiff m ust indicate at the very least who m ade the m aterial representation giving rise to the claim and what specific representations were m ade. One Beacon, 362 F. Supp. at 518 (quoting Mardini v. Viking Freight, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 378, 385 (D.N.J . 1999)). Plaintiff does not satisfy this burden. Plaintiff claim s that Defendant em ployed/ used an unconscionable com m ercial practice to defraud Plaintiff out of m oney due and owing to him . (Com pl. ¶ 24.) This statem ent, as well as the other pertinent statem ents in the Com plaint, do not state w ith particularity that Defendant engaged in fraudulent conduct. Assum ing that the allegations m ade again st Plaintiff were false, as this Court m ust on a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion, Plaintiff does not provide sufficient facts to substantiate that the allegations were fraudulent. Plaintiff provides no details concerning the allegations m ade against him except that they were the alleged reason for his term in ation. Besides the conclusion drawn by the Plaintiff that the allegations were false, this Court has no facts from which it can possibly conclude that fraud was actually involved in Plaintiff s term ination. Plaintiff m ust provide m ore to satisfy the heightened pleading stan dard set by Rule 9(b) and as interpreted by this Court. Accordingly, the NJ CFA claim is dism issed without prejudice. F. Im p ro p e r Te rm in atio n Claim Count VII of Plaintiff s Com plaint attem pts to bring a claim for im proper term ination. Under New J ersey law, em ploym ent is con sidered at-will in the absence of explicit, contractual term s providing otherwise. Robles v. United States Envtl. Universal Servs., Inc., 469 Fed. Appx. 10 4, 10 8 (3d Cir. 20 12) (quoting Bernard v. IMI 12 Sys., Inc., 131 N.J . 91, 10 6 (1993)). As the Com plaint does not detail the term s of the contract between the parties and a copy of the contract was not attached to the Com plaint, this Court considers the em ploym ent relationship between the parties to be at-will. An at-will em ployee m ay be term in ated for any reason, be it good cause, no cause, or even m orally-wrong cause . . . . Robles, 469 F. App x at 10 8 (quoting D Agostino v. J ohnson & J ohnson, Inc., 133 N.J . 516, 527 (1993)). As such, the wrongful term ination claim can not stand because Defendant was at liberty to term inate Plaintiff for any cause or for no cause at all. Plaintiff argues in his Brief that his wrongful term ination claim is based on the understanding that an at-will em ployee cannot be term inated when the term ination violates to a clear m andate of public policy. (Plaintiff s Brief in Opp. to Mot. to Dism iss.) However, even if Defendant s allegations that Plaintiff breached the ethical code were false, term ination as a result of this allegation does not violate a clear m andate of public policy. Plaintiff claim s that it was a violation of public policy for Defendant to term inate Plaintiff based on Plaintiff s request for leave under the Fam ily Medical Leave Act. However, as previously stated, the Com plaint does not allege facts showing that this was Defendant s m otivation for term inating Plain tiff, and the allegations and argum ents m ade in Plaintiff s Brief will not be considered by this Court. Accordingly, this allegation cannot be the basis for the wrongful term ination claim . Therefore, Plaintiff s wrongful term ination claim is dism issed by this Court. G. Qu a n tu m Me ru it Claim Count VIII of Plaintiff s Com plaint asserts Plaintiff s claim under the theory of quantum m eruit. Quantum m eruit is a quasi-contractual rem edy in which a contract is im plied-in-law under a theory of unjust enrichm ent; the contract is one that is im plied 13 in law, and not an actual contract at all. Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Phillip Morris, 228 F.3d 429, 447 (3d Cir. 20 0 0 ) (internal quotations om itted). To state a claim for recovery based on quantum m eruit, a plaintiff m ust establish four elem ents: (1) the perform ance of services in good faith; (2) the acceptance of the services by the person to whom they are rendered; (3) an expectation of com pensation therefore; and (4) the reasonable value of the services. TBI Unlim ited, LLC v. Clearcut Lawn Decisions, LLC, 20 13 WL 1223643, *5 (D.N.J . Mar. 25, 20 13) (citing Starkey, Kelly, Blaney, & White v. Estate of Nicolaysen, 172 N.J . 60 , 68 (20 0 2)). Plaintiff fails to satisfy the first elem ent of a quantum m eruit claim the perform ance of services in good faith. In the Com plaint, Plaintiff claim s that he was em ployed by Defendant as a real estate agent/ broker, which this Court takes as true under a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion. (Com pl. ¶ 1.) Further, the Com plaint states that Plaintiff m et or exceeded goals for paym ent of com m issions as agreed. (Com pl. ¶ 2.) However, the Com plaint does not provide what services Plaintiff perform ed for Defendant, when he perform ed such services, how often he perform ed them , et cetera. In fact, the Com plaint never explicitly states that Plaintiff perform ed services for Defendant. Instead, this Court m ust m ake the inference that because Plaintiff was em ployed as a real estate agent/ broker by Defendant and m et the goals expected of him to receive paym ent, he m ust have perform ed services for Defen dant, and also that he m ust have done so in good faith. This Court n eed not accept this inference. Accordingly, Plaintiff s claim based on the theory of quantum m eruit is dism issed without prejudice. 14 IV. Co n clu s io n For the reasons stated above, Defendant s Motion to Dism iss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is granted on the entirety of the Com plaint. As such, Plaintiff s breach of contract, libel/ slander, in tentional infliction of em otional distress, fraud/ conversion, NJ CFA, im proper term ination, and quantum m eruit claim s are all dism issed without prejudice. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to am end the Com plaint to fix the deficiencies stated above, if possible, within ten days. An appropriate order shall follow. Dated: Septem ber 25, 20 14 / s/ J oseph H. Rodriguez_ _ J OSEPH H. RODRIGUEZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 15

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