GONZALEZ v. CAPE MAY COUNTY et al, No. 1:2012cv00517 - Document 54 (D.N.J. 2015)
Court Description: OPINION. Signed by Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez on 3/31/2015. (dmr)
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GONZALEZ v. CAPE MAY COUNTY et al Doc. 54 U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT D ISTRICT OF N EW JERSEY _________________ ________ Luis A. Gonzalez, : : Plaintiff, : H o n . Jo s e p h H . Ro d rigu e z : v. : Civil Action No. 12-0 517 : Cape May County, et. al. : : OPIN ION Defendants. : _______________________ __ : These m atters com e before the Court on Motions for Sum m ary J udgm ent, filed on behalf of Defendants County of Ocean, “County of Ocean Probation Departm ent,” “County of Ocean Departm ent of Corrections,” “County of Ocean Sheriff’s Departm ent,” William Polhem us, Theodore J . Hutler, S. Metta and Paul Hoffm an (“Ocean County Defendants”) and on behalf of Defendants Cape May County, “Cape May County Sheriff’s Office,” Sheriff Gary G. Shaffer, Officer Perednas, and Officer Atkinson. The Court has considered the written subm issions of the parties and the argum ents advanced at the hearing on these m atters on February 18, 20 15. For the reasons expressed on the record that day and those set forth below, Defendants’ m otions are granted in part and denied in part. I. Factu al Backgro u n d This case stem s from the alleged false arrest and im prisonm ent of Plaintiff Luis Albert Gonzalez, which was carried out by Sherriff’s Officers of Cape May and Ocean Counties pursuant to bench warrants identifying an individual nam ed “Luis R. Gonzalez” who is not Plaintiff Luis Albert Gonzalez. With a few exceptions, the facts are not in dispute. 1 Dockets.Justia.com On J uly 12, 20 10 , the Superior Court of New J ersey, Chancery Division, Ocean County issued two bench warrants for the arrest of a “Louis R Gonzalez” residing at 370 0 New J ersey Aven ue Unit D5, Wildwood, NJ . Plaintiff alleges that the County of Ocean Sheriff’s Departm ent sent the two warrants to the Cape May County Sheriff’s Departm ent and ordered the arrest of “Louis R Gonzalez.” Am . Com pl. ¶ 26. On or about August 6, 20 10 , Defendants Perednas and Atkinson, both Officers em ployed by the Cape May County Sheriff’s Departm ent, arrested Plaintiff Louis Albert Gonzalez at his residence at 370 0 New J ersey Avenue Un it D5, Wildwood, NJ . Id. at ¶ 19. Plaintiff Louis Albert Gonzalez alleges and it was eventually confirm ed that he was not the individual specified in the warrants. Specifically, though Mr. Gonzalez’s address and physical description m atch the individual identified in the warrants, his m iddle n am e, date of birth, and Social Security num ber differ from that of the individual identified in the warrants. Id. at ¶ 28. Both warrants provide that “Louis R Gonzalez” was born on April 1, 1965, and his Social Security num ber is XXX-XX-7396. Id. at ¶ 26. Plaintiff Louis Albert Gonzalez’s m iddle initial is “A,” he was born on April 16, 1965, and his Social Security num ber is XXX-XX-4734. Id. ¶¶ 29-33. Plaintiff Louis Albert Gonzalez is not the father of the child that is subject of the warrants and that he has never fathered a child with the m other of the child that is the subject of the warrants. Id. at ¶¶ 34, 35. Following Mr. Gonzalez’s arrest, Defendants Perednas and Atkinson of the Cape May County Sheriff’s Departm ent transferred custody and control of Mr. Gonzalez to Defendant S. Metta, an Officer em ployed by the Ocean County Sheriff’s Departm ent. Id. at ¶¶ 13, 38 . When Mr. Gonzalez arrived at the Ocean County Departm ent of 2 Corrections, Officer Paul Hoffm an “booked” and “thorough[ly] searched” Mr. Gonzalez. Id. at ¶¶ 43-44. Mr. Gonzalez alleges that he was subjected to a “strip search” while in Defendants’ custody. Id. at ¶ 37. When Mr. Gonzalez was “booked” at the Ocean County Departm ent of Corrections, he had in his possession his Social Security card and his New J ersey driver’s license, which states that his m iddle initial is “A” and his date of birth is April 16, 1965. Id. at ¶ 42. Mr. Gonzalez alleges that while he was incarcerated in the Ocean County Correctional Facility, his fam ily m em bers drove to the facility to “attem pt to have Plaintiff released from jail.” Id. at ¶ 50 . His fam ily was told that he was arrested for failing to pay child support; in response, his fam ily explained that Mr. Gonzalez did not owe child support an d that “they” arrested and incarcerated the wrong person. Id. at ¶ 52. According to his Am ended Com plaint, Mr. Gonzalez was “disabled” and “under consistent m edical treatm ent for his m edical conditions,” which in clude “four herniated disc and nerve dam age.” Id. at ¶ 47. Mr. Gonzalez claim s he suffered from these m edical conditions at the tim e of his arrest and incarceration, takes several m edications on a daily basis to treat the aforem entioned conditions, an d was denied his “necessary” m edication an d m edical treatm ent while under arrest an d incarceration. Id. at ¶¶ 47-49. Following his release, he “im m ediately went to the hospital to receive the care an d treatm ent he was denied” while in custody. Id. at ¶ 54. Mr. Gonzalez’s Am ended Com plaint alleges the following causes of action against all of the Defendants. Plaintiff first alleges that the individual defendants violated his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when, acting under color of state law, they deprived him of 3 his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and right to be free from punishm ent without due process of law in violation of the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Am endm ents as plead in Count I. Count II alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 198 3 asserting that the Counties, County Departm ents, individual Sheriffs, and Warden Theodore J . Hutler failed to properly hire, train, and/ or supervise which led to the depravation of Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights. In Count III, Plaintiff alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious m edical needs. Counts IV and V respectively allege a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 against all defen dants and a claim of false arrest and/ or detention against the individual defendants. Counts VI and VII allege claim s under the New J ersey State Constitution and New J ersey Civil Rights Act, N.J .S.A. 10 :6-1 et. seq. and a negligence claim against all defendants, respectively. Count VIII pleads a claim s for negligent hiring and supervision against the Counties, County Departm ents, Sheriffs, and Warden. Fin ally, Count IX pleads a claim against any J ohn Doe (1-99) individual or state/ governm ent agency that m ay have injured and/ or dam aged Plaintiff in one of the aforem entioned m anners. II. Su m m ary Ju d gm e n t Stan d ard A court will grant a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent if there is no gen uine issue of m aterial fact and if, viewing the facts in the light m ost favorable to the non-m oving party, the m oving party is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law. Pearson v. Com ponent Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 482 n.1 (3d Cir. 20 0 1) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 10 6 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). Thus, this Court will enter sum m ary judgm ent only when “the pleadings, 4 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and adm issions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any m aterial fact and that the m oving party is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). An issue is “genuine” if supported by evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonm oving party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 10 6 S. Ct. 250 5, 91 L.Ed.2d 20 2 (1986). A fact is “m aterial” if, under the governing substantive law, a dispute about the fact m ight affect the outcom e of the suit. Id. In determ ining whether a genuin e issue of m aterial fact exists, the court m ust view the facts and all reasonable inferen ces drawn from those facts in the light m ost favorable to the nonm oving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 10 6 S. Ct. 1348, 8 9 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Initially, the m oving party has the burden of dem onstrating the absence of a genuine issue of m aterial fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 10 6 S. Ct. 2548 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the m oving party has m et this burden, the nonm oving party m ust identify, by affidavits or otherwise, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.; Maidenbaum v. Bally’s Park Place, Inc., 8 70 F. Supp. 1254, 1258 (D.N.J . 1994). Thus, to withstand a properly supported m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, the nonm oving party m ust identify specific facts and affirm ative eviden ce that contradict those offered by the m oving party. Andersen, 477 U.S. at 25657. Indeed, the plain language of Rule 56(c) m andates the entry of sum m ary judgm ent, after adequate tim e for discovery an d upon m otion, against a party who fails to m ake a showing sufficient to establish the existen ce of an elem ent essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 5 In deciding the m erits of a party’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, the court’s role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the m atter, but to determ ine whether there is a gen uine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Credibility determ inations are the province of the finder of fact. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am ., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). III. An alys is As a prelim inary m atter, Officers J ohn Does (1-99) are dism issed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 21, which provides in pertin ent part: “parties m ay be dropped or added by order of the court on m otion of any party or of its own initiative at an y stage of the action an d on such term s as are just.” This rule perm its the Court to exclude J ohn Doe parties from an action when appropriate. Adam s v. City of Cam den, 461 F. Supp. 2d 263, 271 (D.N.J . 20 0 6) (citing Hightower v. Rom an, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 740 , 754 (D.N.J . 20 0 2); Atlantic Used Auto Parts v. City of Philadelphia, 957 F. Supp. 622, 625 (E.D.Pa. 1997) (holding “fictitious party nam es m ay be used ‘at least until reasonable discovery perm its the actual defendants to assum e their places. . . ,’ however, . . . ‘[f]ictitious nam es m ust eventually be dism issed, if discovery yields no identities.’”)). Plaintiff filed this action on J anuary 27, 20 12. On Decem ber 3, 20 13, the Magistrate J udge ordered com pletion of discovery by J anuary 16, 20 14. Given that the identity of the unnam ed Defendants has not been found in the intervening three years since this suit was filed and/ or in the year sin ce com pletion of discovery, the interests of justice perm it droppin g those parties from the suit. Therefore, Officers J ohn Doe (1-99) are dism issed from this action. 6 In addition, sum m ary judgm ent is granted as to Defendants Ocean County Sheriff’s Departm ent, Ocean County Departm ent of Corrections, and Cape May County Sheriff’s Departm ent. These entities are divisions of the Counties of Ocean and Cape May and the claim s against these entities m erge with the claim s against each separate County. Generally, public entities that are not separate legal entities, but rather subunits of a local governm ent or m unicipality, cannot be sued under § 1983. See, e.g., Peppers v. Booker, Civ. No. 11-320 7, 20 12 WL 180 6170 (D.N.J . May 17, 20 12) (noting that “[i]n a Section 1983 claim , police departm ents m ay not be nam ed defendants in conjunction with m unicipalities because police departm ents are m erely instrum ents of m unicipalities); Open Inns, Ltd. v. Chester County Sheriff’s Dept., 24 F.Supp.2d 410 , 417 n.13 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (noting that “the Chester County Sheriff's Departm ent is a subunit of Chester County which cannot be sued [under § 1983] because it is m erely an arm of the local m unicipality, and thus is not a separate judicial entity). Thus, insofar as Cape May’s and Ocean’s Sheriff’s Departm ents and Ocean County’s Departm ent of Corrections are not separate legal entities, but division s of the county, Plaintiff cannot sustain a separate §198 3 claim against these Defendants and sum m ary judgm ent is granted as to these claim s entities. Moreover, insofar as the “County of Ocean Probation Departm ent” is not part of the County of Ocean but is a division of the Superior Court of New J ersey, it is a state agency. States and their agen cies are im m une from suit under § 1983, as they are not “persons” under the statute. See Will v. Michigan State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 10 9 (198 9). The “County of Ocean Probation Departm ent” is not a separate legal entity, but rather a 7 state agency, Mr. Gonzalez cannot sustain his § 1983 claim s against this Defendant an d, as a result, sum m ary judgm ent is granted. A. Claim s U n d e r 4 2 U .S.C. § 19 8 3 an d Qu alifie d Im m u n ity Plaintiff’s constitutional claim s are governed by Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil rem edy against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the United States Constitution. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 50 3 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). Any analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should begin with the language of the statute: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom , or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im m unities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As the above language m akes clear, Section 1983 is a rem edial statute design ed to redress deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and its subordinate federal laws. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n.3 (1979). By its own words, therefore, Section 1983 “does not . . . create substantive rights.” Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 20 0 6) (citing Baker, 443 U.S. at 145, n.3). To state a cognizable claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff m ust allege a “deprivation of a constitutional right and that the constitutional deprivation was caused by a person acting under the color of state law.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 20 0 8) (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 120 4 (3d Cir. 1996)). Thus, a plaintiff m ust dem onstrate two essential elem ents to m aintain a claim under § 1983: (1) that the plaintiff was deprived of a “right or privileges secured by the 8 Constitution or the laws of the United States” and (2) that the plaintiff was deprived of his rights by a person acting under the color of state law. William s v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 8 91 F.2d 458, 464 (3d Cir. 1989). A sim ilar analysis m ay be m ade regarding any claim under the New J ersey Civil Rights Act. See Arm strong v. Sherm an, No. 0 9 CV 716, 20 10 WL 2483911, *5 (D.N.J . J un. 4, 20 10 ) (“[T]he language of the New J ersey Civil Rights Act, like the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, appears to grant a cause of action only to those persons whose rights have been personally violated.”) 1 The doctrin e of qualified im m unity provides that “governm ent officials perform ing discretionary functions . . . are shielded from liability for civil dam ages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 8 0 0 , 8 18 (1982). Thus, governm ent officials are im m une from suit in their individual capacities unless, “taken in the light m ost favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right” and “the right was clearly established” at the tim e of the objectionable conduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 20 1 (20 0 1). Courts m ay exercise discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified im m unity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circum stances in the particular case at hand. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (20 0 9). 1 For this reason, the Court will not undertake separate analysis of Gonzalez’ claims under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act. “This district has repeatedly interpreted NJCRA analogously to § 1983.” Pettit v. New Jersey, 2011 WL 1325614, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2011). “[W]hen pled together, [the NJCRA and § 1983] are analyzed under the same standard[.]” Id., 2011 WL 1325614 at *4; see also Hottenstein v. Sea Isle City, 793 F.Supp.2d 688, 695 (D.N.J. 2011). 9 This doctrin e “balances two im portant interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassm ent, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably” and it “applies regardless of whether the governm ent official’s error is a m istake of law, a m istake of fact, or a m istake based on m ixed questions of law and fact.” Id. (internal quotation om itted). Properly applied, qualified im m unity “protects ‘all but the plainly incom petent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 20 74, 20 8 5 (20 11) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). For a right to be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right m ust be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 20 2 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). That is, “[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry in determ ining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 492 (20 0 6). “If the officer’s m istake as to what the law requires is reasonable,” the officer is entitled to qualified im m unity. Couden, 446 F.3d at 492 (internal citations om itted). Further, “[i]f officers of reasonable com petence could disagree on th[e] issue, im m unity should be recognized.” Malley, 475 U.S. at 341 (1986). See also Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (20 0 4) (The general touchstone is whether the conduct of the official was reasonable at the tim e it occurred.) Finally, because qualified im m unity is an affirm ative defense, the burden of proving its applicability rests with the defen dant. See Beers-Capital v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120 , 142, n.15 (3d Cir. 20 0 1). 10 Here, Plaintiff alleges a violation of his Fourth, Fourteenth, and Eighth Am endm ent rights and there is no dispute that the individual officers were acting under the color of state law. 1. Co n s titu tio n al Claim s 2 Plaintiff m akes claim s of false arrest and false im prisonm ent against the individual officers. The Fourth Am endm ent prohibits seizures in the absence of probable cause. Orsatti v. New J ersey State Police, 71 F.3d. 48 0 , 482 (3d Cir. 1995). Under the Fourth Am endm ent, a person is seized “only if, in view of all the circum stances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980 )). Seizure occurs only when a person is detained by “m eans intentionally applied” to term inate his freedom of m ovem ent by m eans of physical force or by show of authority. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1989). No seizure occurs when a reasonable person would feel free to “disregard the police and go about his business” or where “a reasonable person would feel free to declin e the officers’ requests or otherwise term inate the encounter.” United States v. Kim , 27 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 50 1 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)). 2 Where an am endm ent provides explicit protection against a particular kind of governm ent action, that am endm ent is the source of the Court=s evaluation of a §1983 claim rather than the gen eral rights granted by the Fourteenth Am endm ent. County of Sacram ento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 (1998) (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994)). Thus, allegations of false arrest or false im prison m ent are evaluated under the Fourth Am endm ent rather than the Fourteenth Am endm ent. See, e.g., Un ited States v. Lan ier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 (1997); Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 268-69 (3d Cir. 20 0 0 ). To the extent Plaintiff m akes a due process claim the Suprem e Court has stated that the Constitution does not require “a sheriff executin g an arrest warrant . . . to in vestigate independently every claim of in nocence, whether the claim is based on m istaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite intent. Nor is the official charged with m aintainin g custody of the accused nam ed in the warrant required by the Constitution to perform an error-free in vestigation of such a claim .” Baker v. McCollan , 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979). 11 Under New J ersey com m on law, the tort of false im prisonm ent is defined as when an actor im properly constrains a person’s freedom of m ovem ent by force or by threats of force com m unicated through conduct or words. Maietta v. USPS, 749 F. Supp. 1344, 1366 (D.N.J . 1990). New J ersey requires two elem ents for false im prisonm ent: (1) detention of the person again st his or her will, and (2) a lack of proper legal authority or “legal justification.” Mesgleski v. Oraboni, 748 A.2d 1130 , 1138 (N.J . Super. Ct. App. Div. 20 0 0 ). Taking the facts in a light m ost favorable to the Plaintiff, Luis A. Gonzalez was seized an d im prisoned under either of the above standards. The issue before the Court is whether that seizure and subsequent im prisonm ent violates the Fourth Am endm ent. Plaintiff argues, relying on Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 272 (3d Cir. 20 0 0 ), that because an erroneously issued warrant cannot satisfy the probable cause elem ent of the Fourth Am endm ent, Defendants’ m istaken belief that an arrest warrant had been issued for Plaintiff is im m aterial and the arrest and subsequent im prisonm ent violate the Fourth Am endm ent. This argum ent m isconstrues the facts in Berg. In Berg, the Third Circuit considered whether a hired constable was im m une from suit because of an objectively reason able belief in the validity of a warrant that identified a person for whom no probable cause existed for arrest. Id. at 270 -71. Unlike here, no probable cause existed to arrest the intended subject of the warrant. The fact that the wrong person was arrested did not m atter because a warrant should have never issued for the intended subject. “Because the governm ent officials who issued the warrant [in Berg] did not have probable cause to arrest Berg, the arrest violated the Fourth Am endm ent.” Id. at 271. However, the Court never reached the issue of qualified 12 im m unity, instead rem anding that issue for consideration by the district court. Id. In so doing, the Third Circuit instructed that reliance on the warrant m ust be considered in light of other relevant circum stances, including “other inform ation that the officer possesses or to which he has reasonable access, and whether failing to m ake an im m ediate arrest creates a public threat or danger of flight.” Id. (citations om itted). Here, the warrants were issued by the Ocean County Superior Court. Plaintiff offers no eviden ce to support that the warrants were facially invalid or erroneously issued, as in Berg. There is no evidence that the warrant was invalid as to the intended subject of the warrant, Luis R. Gonzalez. This is a case about m istaken identity, not an invalid warrant. However, there was no probable cause to arrest and/ or im prison as to Plaintiff Luis A. Gonzalez. As a result, the Court’s inquiry turns to the issue of qualified im m unity. a . Qu alifie d Im m u n ity- Cap e May Arre s tin g Office rs Pe re d n as an d Atkin s o n Sum m ary judgm ent is denied as to Officers Perednas an d Atkinson because there are questions of fact related to the reasonableness of their investigation as to whether Plaintiff was the subject of the warrant. Officers Perednas and Atkinson had no part in the issuance of the warrants; they were assigned to execute the warrants. On August 6, 20 10 , Officer Perednas and Officer Atkinson drove to the apartm ent of Luis A. Gonzalez to serve a warrant for Luis R. Gonzalez. The officers had a warrant packet in their possession, which contained a photograph printout from the Motor Vehicle Com m ission. As they approached the address, Officer Perednas m ade an initial identification of Plaintiff by com paring his facial features to those contained in the photograph of warrant packet. See Perednas Dep., Ex. B., 15:9-22; 29:2-4. The Officers 13 approached Mr. Gonzalez and asked him whether he was Luis Gonzalez; Plaintiff affirm ed with a nod of his head. Id. at 15:17-22. Officer Perednas showed Plaintiff the photograph in the warrant packet an d asked Plaintiff “Is this you?” Id. at 23:1-12. Again, Plaintiff nodded in agreem ent. Id. Plaintiff produced his driver’s licen se and gave it to Officer Perednas, who then com pared the inform ation on the licen se to the inform ation contain ed on the warrant and in the warrant packet. She noticed that while the driver’s licen se num ber m atched, the date of birth an d m iddle initial of the nam e did not m atch listed on Plaintiff’s license did not m atch the inform ation listed on the warrant. Id. at 24:11-14. The officers proceeded to take Plaintiff into custody and were im m ediately approached by Plaintiff’s daughter. Id. at 16:19- 17:2. The daughter explained that the arrest was a m istake because Plaintiff did n ot have any young children. Id. at 17:6-13. As a result, Officer Peredn as returned to her vehicle to double check the inform ation using the m obile data term inal to access NCIC. Id. at 38 :17-39. Her search lead her to believe that Plaintiff was the correct target of the warrant. Id. In addition, Officer Perednas called her supervisor to discuss the m ism atching inform ation contained on the warrant and in the warrant packet, noting that the birth date an d social security num bers listed did n ot m atch those identifiers for Plaintiff. Id. at 39:9-40 :19. The supervisor instructed her to proceed with the arrest of Plaintiff. Id. at 40 :20 -23. Plaintiff was arrested and taken to the Cape May County J ail. See Gonzalez Dep., Ex. E. 22:9-13. Ordin arily, an officer can presum e a warrant is supported by probable cause and thus valid if such a belief is objectively reasonable. Berg, 219 F.3d at 273. The question 14 on sum m ary judgm ent is whether the officers’ erroneous arrest of Luis A. Gonzalez was objectively reasonable under the circum stances. The Court finds that there are questions of fact as to the reasonableness of their actions which preclude cloaking Officers Perednas and Atkinson with qualified im m unity at this tim e. Qualified im m unity “gives am ple room for m istaken judgm ents” by protecting “all but the plainly incom petent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Hunter v. Bryant, 50 2 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 343); see also Orsatti v. NJ State Police, 71 F.3d 480 , 483 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding officers only lose qualified im m unity where clear indicia that probable cause unreasonable). Defendants rely on Ram irez v. United States of Am erica, 8 1 F. Supp. 2d 532 (D.N.J . 20 0 0 ) as instructive. Felix Ram on Ram irez was a lawful perm anen t alien of the United States, who arrived in the United States on a flight originating from the Dom inican Republic. Upon arrival, he was detained by INS agents on the basis of an outstanding warrant for an individual nam ed “Felix Ram os Ram irez.” Id. at 534. As it turned out, the INS agents had the wrong person and Ram irez was detained for five hours. Id. Ram irez brought suit against, inter alia, the INS agents responsible for apprehending him . The district court analyzed the claim s an d found that the INS officers were entitled to qualified im m unity because they relied on a valid com puter generated warrant and because the officers’ m istaken belief as to the identity of Ram irez was objectively reasonable under the circum stances. Id. at 538. The detaining officer in Ram irez also took additional steps to confirm that Ram irez was the individual listed in the warrant by calling Hudson County to confirm that the warrant was still active and by asking for additional inform ation. Id. In response to the inquiry, Hudson County sent a facsim ile to the INS officer that included a copy of a fingerprint record and a photograph 15 of the 198 8 arrestee “Felix R. Ram irez.” Id. Ram irez, who spoke som e English, exam ined the photograph sent by Hudson County and agreed that he was the individual depicted therein. Although the additional inform ation sent by Hudson County was not connected to the intended subject of the warrant, the district court concluded that the officer “acted reasonably in her reliance upon the additional inform ation sent by Hudson County to determ ine that plaintiff was the subject of the warrant.” Id. The district court further concluded that the INS officer’s reliance on the com puter record of the warrant, standing alone, was enough to cloak her in qualified im m unity. For these reasons, and relying heavily on the fact that the officer took additional steps to confirm that detention was appropriate, the district court concluded that the INS agents were entitled to qualified im m unity. Id. The record dem onstrates that Perednas relied on the inform ation on the warrant in concluding that Plaintiff was the subject of the warrant. In addition, although ultim ately erroneous, the inform ation from the MVC further indicated that Plaintiff was the subject listed on the warrant. However, the inform ation on the warrant was in conflict with the inform ation contained on the MVC record. In addition, Plaintiff’s fam ily told the officers that Plaintiff’s children were all em ancipated and that he was not in arrears. To her credit, Perednas was troubled by the conflicting inform ation and the consternation from Plaintiff’s fam ily. She then reached out to her supervisor to try and determ ine that arrest of Plaintiff was appropriate. Plaintiff argues that the officers’ actions were not objectively reasonable because, unlike Ram irez, the inform ation listed on the warrant was in conflict with the additional inform ation contained in the warrant packet. The Court agrees. Although Plaintiff lived at the address listed for the intended subject, had the sam e first and last nam e as 16 the intended subject, neither his date of birth nor social security num ber m atched and his m iddle initial was wrong. Moreover, the physical description was not a m atch an d Plaintiff’s fam ily disputed that he was the subject of the warrant and, given the language barrier, Plaintiff was n ever able to explain the m istakes. Officer Perednas’ concern over the conflicting inform ation caused her to question the identity of Plaintiff as the subject of the warrant. Whether the nature of the steps she took to assure herself of the appropriaten ess of the arrest are objectively reasonable under these circum stances present a genuine issue of m aterial fact. Plaintiff’s expert opined that Officer Perednas’ addition al inquiries into Plaintiff’s true identity were inconsistent with established policy an d procedure. William s’ Report, Ex. I, 6(A). In this regard, Perednas’ actions and the type of inform ation she had available to her are ripe for consideration by a jury. See Berg, 219 F.2d 217 (qualified im m unity analysis m ust consider “other inform ation that the officer possesses or to which he has reasonable access, and whether failing to m ake an im m ediate arrest creates a public threat or danger of flight.” Id. (citations om itted)). In addition, there is no reason why Officer Perednas could not take additional tim e to investigate Plaintiff’s claim s of m istaken identity; this was a failure to pay child support arrest with no exigent circum stances. See Reddy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 224 n.37 (3d Cir. 20 10 ) (qualified im m unity inappropriate where no split second decisions needed to be m ade.) While m istakes will invariably happen, the Fourth Am endm ent guarantees that m istakes will only be m ade after proper diligence and regard for our notions of liberty and justice is accorded. “Under qualified im m unity, police officers are entitled to a certain am ount of deference for decisions they m ake in the field [because they] m ust 17 m ake split-second judgm ents—in circum stances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 20 7 (3d Cir. 20 0 5) (internal quotations om itted)). Here, there are questions of fact related to the reasonableness of the officers’ reliance on in consisten t inform ation contained in the warrant, the actions they took to assure them selves of the identity of Plaintiff, and whether those actions are consistent with established policy and procedure. “[S]ufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of the Fourth Am endm ent[.]” Hill v. California, 40 1 U.S. 797, 8 0 3-0 4 (1971). Under this standard an d viewing the facts in a light m ost favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court finds that Officers Perednas’ and Atkinson’s m istake as to the presen ce of probable cause m ay not have been objectively reasonable under the circum stances an d they are not entitled to qualified im m unity. Sum m ary judgm ent is denied. b. Qu alifie d Im m u n ity- Oce an Co u n ty Office rs Me tta an d H o ffm an The Ocean County Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s arrest and im prisonm ent did not violate the Fourth Am endm ent because Cape May Officers Perednas an d Atkinson had a reasonable belief on the existence of probable cause. As explained, there are questions of fact surrounding the reasonableness of that belief that are tied to whether Perednas an d Atkinson followed identification protocol in arriving at their conclusion that Plaintiff was the intended subject of the warrant. Even if Perednas and Atkinson are entitled to qualified im m unity, on this record, such im m unity cannot extend to Ocean County Officer Metta at this tim e. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that Metta was ever aware of the circum stances confronting the Cape May Officers and/ or the existen ce of probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Metta agrees that he did n ot show the warrant to anyone at the Cape 18 May County J ail and Metta cannot confirm that his partner produced the warrant to the jail. Metta Dep., Ex. F. 16:5-15. In addition, Metta never questioned Plaintiff nor endeavored to confirm that Plaintiff was indeed the target of the warrant, or even the correct transportee. Id. at 18:5-11. Metta does not know if his partner spoke to Plaintiff. Id. at 18:12-19:13. Metta agrees that he did n ot attem pt to positively identify Plaintiff as the person listed on the warrant and that he relied on Cape May’s assurance that Plaintiff was the “guy.” Id. at 26:14-25; 27:11-14. Even though Officer Metta never checked Plaintiff’s nam e, birth date, and Social Security num ber again st inform ation specified in the warrant, Ocean County argues that Mr. Gonzalez’s arrest and subsequent incarceration were valid because the Cape May Officers had probable cause in light of the objectively reasonable m istake as to Plaintiff’s identity. For the sam e reasons stated as the Cape May Officers Perednas an d Atkinson, there are questions of fact related to whether probable cause existed. In addition, because Officer Metta never spoke to anyone at the Cape May County J ail and/ or Plaintiff, there are questions of fact related to whether that Officer Metta acted reasonably and whether he had good faith belief that they were justified in transporting and detaining Mr. Gonzalez. Likewise, sum m ary judgm ent is denied as to Officer Hoffm an. The intake procedures in effect at the tim e that Plaintiff was “booked” or processed into the Ocean County J ail required Hoffm an to ask Plaintiff for certain inform ation. See Ocean Co. Dep. of Corrections Policies and Procedures, Ex. K. Hoffm an does n ot recall his interaction with Plaintiff because he processes nearly two thousand persons a year. See Hoffm an Dep., Ex. H., 13:11-25. As a result, Hoffm an cannot recall if he had difficulty 19 com m unicating with Plaintiff and adm its that he did not use the “language hotline”3 for assistan ce. Id. at 17:13-25. Hoffm an’s lack of recall is understandable given the am ount of tim e that has passed and the num ber of people Hoffm an processes. Also com plicating m atters is Plaintiff’s adm itted silence during the booking process. Plaintiff never indicated to Hoffm an that he was not the m an identified in the warrant. Viewing the facts in a light favorable to Plaintiff, there are questions of fact related to whether Hoffm an ever properly processed Plaintiff. Hoffm an agrees that he rarely used a person’s driver’s licen se to attem pt to identify a detainee. “We don’t really use it [. . . ] because there are so m any different I.D.’s out there[.]” Hoffm an Dep., Ex. H. 29:23-25. In addition, Hoffm an agreed that he routinely ran a detainees’ social security num ber, date of birth and nam e during processing. Id. at 34:14-18 . Because Plaintiff cannot speak English, because Hoffm an did not use the language hotline for assistan ce, and because running Plaintiff’s identifiers through the database m ay likely have alerted Hoffm an to a discrepancy during processing, a reasonable juror could conclude that Hoffm an never asked Plaintiff about his iden tification. This is problem atic for several reasons. First, to the extent Hoffm an sim ply relied on the chain of custody to furnish probable cause, he never confirm ed Plaintiff’s identity as being consistent with the processing papers. Second, by failing to follow Ocean County’s Procedures for intake, a reasonable jury could conclude that Hoffm an’s actions were not reasonable and in bad faith. As a result, Hoffm an is not entitled to qualified im m unity and sum m ary judgm ent is den ied. 3 The language hotline provides assistance, in the form of a translator, to the booking officer when the officer is attempting to communicate with a person who does not speak English. Hoffman has only used the language hotline once in his entire career. Hoffman Dep., Ex. H. 17:21-24. 20 c. Claim s again s t th e Co u n tie s an d Su p e rvis o rs Plaintiff alleges claim s of negligent hiring, failure to train, and unconstitutional policy an d/ or custom pursuant to Monell v. Dept. Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978 ) against Cape May County, Cape May County Sheriff Gary G. Shaffer, Ocean County Sheriff William L. Polhem us and Ocean County Warden Theodore J . Hutler. Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants' argum ents regarding negligent hiring. As a result, the Court will grant sum m ary judgm ent as unopposed as to that claim . For the reasons that follow, sum m ary judgm ent is denied in part. 1. Mo n e ll Cla im s A m unicipality is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Monell v. Dept. Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). However, a governm ent entity m ay be liable for its agent’s actions upon a dem onstration that a policy or custom of the m unicipality caused, or was a “m oving force” behind, the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s rights. Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)); Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 8 9 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996). Policy or custom m ay be established in two ways. “Policy is m ade when a ‘decisionm aker possess[ing] final authority to establish m unicipal policy with respect to the action’ issues an official proclam ation, policy, or edict.” An drews v. City of Philadelphia, 8 95 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990 ) (citations om itted). “A course of conduct is considered to be a ‘custom ’ when, though not authorized by law, ‘such practices of state officials [are] so perm anent and well settled’ as to virtually constitute law.” Id. (citations om itted). Custom requires proof of knowledge and acquiescence by the decisionm aker. McTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 636, 657 -658 (3d Cir. 21 20 0 9). Moreover, supervisors can be liable if they “established and m aintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm ,” or if they “participated in violating plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them , or, as the person[s] in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in [their] subordinates' violations.” Santiago v. Warm inster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 (3d Cir. 20 10 ) (citations om itted). Thus, in order to prevail against the governm ent entity, “[a] plaintiff m ust identify the challenged policy, attribute it to the city itself, and show a causal link between execution of the policy and the injury suffered.” Losch v. Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 90 3, 910 (3d Cir. 1984). Further, a plaintiff m ust show that the m unicipality acted with “deliberate indifference” to the known policy or custom . Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 38 8 (198 9). “A showing of sim ple or even heightened negligence will not suffice.” Board of County Com m ’rs of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. at 397, 40 7 (1997). Finally, to prevail on a failure to train, discipline or control claim , a plaintiff m ust “show both contem poraneous knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern of sim ilar incidents and circum stances under which the supervisor’s actions or inaction could be found to have com m unicated a m essage of approval to the offending subordinate.” Montgom ery v. De Sim on e, 159 F.3d 120 , 127 (3d Cir. 1998) (citations om itted). The Suprem e Court notes that in “lim ited circum stances, a local governm ent's decision not to train certain em ployees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens' rights m ay rise to the level of an official governm ent policy for purposes of § 1983.” Connick v. Thom pson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 , 1359 (20 11). To sustain a failure-to-train claim under § 1983, a plaintiff “m ust (1) identify the deficiency; (2) prove that the deficiency 22 caused the alleged constitutional violation; and (3) prove that the failure to rem edy the deficiency reflected deliberate in difference on the part of the m unicipality.” Lapella v. City of Atlantic City, 10 -2454, 20 12 WL 2952411, at *6 (D.N.J . J uly 18, 20 12) (citing Malignaggi v. County of Gloucester, 8 55 F.Supp. 74, 77 (D.N.J . 1994)). Only when a plaintiff dem onstrates deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the untrained em ployees com e into contact “can such a shortcom ing be properly thought of as a city ‘policy or custom ’ that is actionable under § 1983.” Connick, 131 S.Ct at 135960 (internal citation om itted). Deliberate indifference is “a stringent standard of fault” that requires proof that a m unicipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence. Id. (citing Board of Cty Com m ’rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)). Thus, for purposes of a failure to train claim , it is “ordinarily necessary” for a plaintiff to show “[a] pattern of sim ilar constitutional violations by untrained em ployees.” Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1360 (internal citation om itted). The Third Circuit has noted that: [A] m unicipality's deliberately indifferent failure to train is not established by (1) presenting evidence of the shortcom ings of an individual; (2) proving that an otherwise sound training program occasionally was negligently adm inistered; or (3) showing, without m ore, that better training would have enabled an officer to avoid the injury-causing conduct. Sim m ons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 10 42, 10 60 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing City of Canton v. Ohio, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989) (emphasis in original)). A “single-in cident” theory of liability can proceed only upon dem onstration that the constitutional violation was the “obvious” consequence of inadequate training. Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1360 – 61 (citations om itted); see also, City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 , n. 10 . However, such a 23 “single incident” theory of liability only arises “in a n arrow range of circum stances.” Id. at 1361. a. Claim s Again s t Oce an Co u n ty D e fe n d an ts Sum m ary judgm ent is denied under both a failure to train theory an d policy/ custom theory. There are genuine issues of m aterial fact related to whether Ocean County acquiesced to an official custom of discouraging the use of a person’s driver’s license and social security cards as a m eans to verify identity for non-English speaking people. Ocean County Lieutenant Haberbush’s testified that “a lot of Spanish-speaking people have fake driver’s licenses” and that m akes it less reliable for “certain classes of people.” Haberbush Dep., Ex. I, 36:19-37:23, 38:4-20 . Officer Metta also testified that fake driver’s licen ses are a concern, renderin g that form of identification unreliable. Metta Dep., Ex. F, 29:20 -30 :1. In addition, Plaintiff’s export report details the practice and its im pact. As a result, reasonable jurors could differ as to the existence of a practice that is so widespread an d well-settled that it constitutes a standard operating procedure of Ocean County, through its Corrections and Sheriff’s Departm ents. Such a custom could be the cause of and the m oving force behind Plaintiff’s constitutional claim s. If anyone at Ocean County had reviewed Plaintiff’s identification and/ or questioned him about his identity, the violation m ay not have occurred. Likewise, sum m ary judgm ent is denied a to Plaintiff’s failure to train claim . Plaintiff’s expert notes, and the Ocean County Defendants agree, that Ocean County did not have a policy for the identification, arrest, and/ or transportation of non-English speaking persons during the relevant period of tim e. See William s Report, Ex. L; Metta Dep., Ex. F. 33:14-25; Hoffm an Dep., Ex. H. 19:14-24, Haberbush Dep., Ex. I. 53:1-3. 24 Failure to adopt a policy can result in liability. Natale v. Cam den County Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 585 (3d Cir. 20 0 3). Given Hoffm an’s testim ony that he only used the language hotline once and that he did not use licenses or social security cards for identification purposes, and because Hoffm an was not reprim anded for the m istaken detention of Plaintiff, a jury could reasonably conclude that Defendant Hutler ratified Hoffm an’s custom s or inactions. Finally, there are questions of fact related to whether Ocean County was deliberately indifferent to the consequences of its actions/ in actions. Although Plaintiff does not identify a pattern, there are questions of fact related to the obviousness of the conseqeunces under a “single-in cident” theory of liability. Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1360 – 61 (citations om itted); see also, City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 , n. 10 . For these reasons, sum m ary judgm ent is denied. b. Claim s Again s t Cape May Co u n ty D e fe n d an ts For substantially the sam e reasons identified with respect to Ocean County, sum m ary judgm ent is denied as to Defendants Cape May County and Gary Schaffer. Mr. Gonzalez argues that Cape May County and Sheriff Shaffer are liable under § 1983 on a failure-to-train theory, as they have dem onstrated deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights. Gonzalez points to the deposition of Sheriff Schaffer in which he states that Perednas and Atkinson followed the correct procedures in arresting Plaintiff. Because Perednas an d Atkinson did not conduct a background check before they arrested Plaintiff, Gonzalez alleges a claim of failure to train. In addition, there is no policy, or there is an in adequate policy with respect to the arrest of non-English speaking in dividuals. Plaintiff’s expert opines that Cape May’s policy does not m eet 25 nationally accepted standards. See Ex. I, at 16:3. In addition, Cape May lacks operational policies that m andate appropriate due diligence procedures of officer m aking arrests. Id. Lieutenant Scott Knoedler, of the Cape May County Sheriff’s Departm ent, testified that, at the tim e of Plaintiff’s arrest, there was no policy in place that required verification of a subject’s identity prior to m aking an arrest based upon a warrant. Exhibit L, 34:3-9. Officer Perednas agreed that no policy existed on the procedures for confirm ing the identification of a subject of a warrant. Perednas Dep., Ex. G., 37:12-18 . Officer Atkinson was n ot aware whether such a policy existed. Atkinson Dep., Ex. M., 26:3-6. Likewise, Cape May lacked policies and procedures for the arrest of non-English speaking individuals. William s’ Report, Ex. I, 11:3; Shaffer Dep., Ex. J ., 14-15, Perednas Dep., Ex. G. 35:14-18, Atkinson Dep., Ex. M., 24:19-23. Given the eviden ce in the record, a reason able jury could find that Cape May County failed to train its officers to investigate and arrest non-English speaking individuals and that the failure to train caused Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional violations. Although evidence of deliberate indifference is thin, the failure to identify the need for the policy and Plaintiff’s expert report which claim s Cape May failed to im plem ent State m andated in-service train in g on the use of force and the identification of non-English speakin g persons, deliberate indifference m ay be inferred. Sum m ary judgm ent is denied on the failure to train claim . 2 . In ad e qu ate Me d ical Care Claim Again s t Oce an Co u n ty Sum m ary judgm ent is granted as to Plaintiff’s claim of failure to provide m edical treatm ent. To succeed under the “deliberate indifference” standard, the plaintiff m ust 26 prove: (1) that his m edical needs were “objectively serious” and (2) that the defen dants exhibited “deliberate indifference” to Plaintiff’s m edical n eeds. Monm outh County Correctional Inst. Inm ates v. Lan zaro, 8 34 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Estelle v. Gam ble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976)). A “serious m edical need” is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatm ent or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention” or “where the denial of treatm ent would result in the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or a life-long handicap or perm anent loss.” Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 27273 (3d Cir. 20 0 3) (internal citations om itted). The Am ended Com plaint alleges that the Ocean County Defendants “deliberately, intentionally, wantonly and/ or recklessly” failed to provide him with necessary m edical care while he was in custody. Am Com pl. at ¶ 63. According to his Am ended Com plaint, Mr. Gonzalez suffers from four herniated disc, “am ong other con ditions,” for which he receives “consistent m edical treatm ent” and regularly takes Losibra, Atenolol, Norvasc, Prozec, Oxycondone, Zolpidem Tartrate, Cycloprine, an d Fentanyl Transderm al. Id. at ¶¶ 47-48 . Mr. Gonzalez was denied this m edical treatm ent while he was arrested and incarcerated. Id. at 49. In his brief in opposition to the m otions for sum m ary judgm ent, Plaintiff fails to cite to any records or testim ony to support his claim . Instead, he generally references Com plaint and the First Am ended Com plaint. Such general references are insufficient to survive sum m ary judgm ent. “A nonm oving party m ay not ‘rest upon m ere allegations, general denials or . . . vague statem ents . . . .’” Trap Rock Indus., Inc. v. Local 8 25, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 982 F.2d 8 84, 8 90 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Quiroga 27 v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 50 0 (3d Cir. 1991)). Rather, to establish the presence of a genuine issue of m aterial fact, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c)(1)(A) requires that the non-m oving party “cit[e] to particular parts of m aterials in the record, including depositions, docum ents, electronically stored inform ation, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . adm issions, interrogatory answers, or other m aterials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c)(1)(A). Because Plaintiff fails to m eet his burden in this regard, sum m ary judgm ent is granted as to this claim . IV. Co n clu s io n For the reasons stated herein, sum m ary judgm ent is granted as to J ohn Does (199), County of Ocean Probation Departm ent, Ocean County Sheriff’s Departm ent, Ocean County Departm ent of Corrections, and Cape May County Sheriff’s Departm ent. Sum m ary judgm ent is also granted as to Plaintiff’s claim of negligent hiring and claim for inadequate m edical care. Sum m ary judgm ent is denied as to the rem aining claim s. An appropriate Order shall issue. Dated: March 31, 20 15 s/ J oseph H. Rodriguez Hon. J oseph H. Rodriguez UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 28
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