MERCADO v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY et al, No. 1:2009cv05973 - Document 2 (D.N.J. 2009)
Court Description: OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 12/1/09. (drw, )
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY JOHN MERCADO, Plaintiff, v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al., Defendants. : : : : : : : : : : : Civil Action No. 09-5973 (NLH) O P I N I O N APPEARANCES: John Mercado, Pro Se 225596 Camden County Correctional Facility 330 Federal Street Camden, NJ 08102 HILLMAN, District Judge Plaintiff, John Mercado, currently confined at the Camden County Correctional Facility in Camden, New Jersey, has submitted this civil complaint which alleges violations of his constitutional rights, and seeks damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not paid the filing fee, and seeks permission to proceed in forma pauperis. Based on Plaintiff s affidavit of indigence, this Court will grant his request. At this time, the Court must review the complaint to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). BACKGROUND Plaintiff states that on October 3, 2009, while housed at the Camden County Correctional Facility, he slipped and fell on some water on the floor. Plaintiff requested to go to medical, and defendant Ishner, a corrections officer, refused permission. Plaintiff continued to request medical attention and was permitted to go to medical. When he arrived at medical, the nurse took his vitals, and told him to go to bed. not check out his injuries. Plaintiff states the nurse did Plaintiff requested to go to the hospital, but was refused permission to do so. Plaintiff was in pain in his lower back, neck, and had a headache. He was told that he would see a doctor the next day. The next day, Plaintiff woke in excruciating pain and could not get out of his bunk. His cell-mate called the corrections officer, who called medical. Plaintiff waited two hours and was told that he would not be seen by a doctor that day because there was no doctor available. The following day, October 5, 2009, Plaintiff was seen by a doctor, who examined him, ordered x-rays, and prescribed medication. Plaintiff requested and was denied a CAT scan. 2 Plaintiff asserts that he has not been provided proper medical care, and that he continues to experience pain. He asks for medical care and compensation for pain and suffering. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review The Prison Litigation Reform Act ( PLRA ), Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity. The Court is required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. See 28 U.S.C. §§ This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, because plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding as an indigent. In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). See also United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). The Court must accept as 3 true all of the allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). The Court need not, however, credit a pro se plaintiff's bald assertions or legal conclusions. Id. A pro se complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines, 404 U.S. at 521 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). See also Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93-94 (in considering a pro se prisoner civil rights complaint, the Court reviewed whether the complaint complied with the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)). However, recently, the Supreme Court refined this standard for summary dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Iqbal s civil rights complaint adequately alleged defendants personal involvement in discriminatory decisions regarding Iqbal s treatment during detention at the Metropolitan Detention Center which, if true, violated his constitutional rights. See id. The Court examined Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 4 relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).1 Citing its recent opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), for the proposition that [a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions' or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court identified two working principles underlying the failure to state a claim standard: First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice ... . Rule 8 ... does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-1950 (citations omitted). The Court further explained that a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court 1 Rule 8(d)(1) provides that [e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct. No technical form is required. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d). 5 should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausible give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at 1950. Thus, to prevent a summary dismissal, a civil complaint must now allege sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially plausible. This then allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See id. at 1948. The Supreme Court s ruling in Iqbal emphasizes that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the allegations of his complaint is plausible. See id. at 1949-50; see also Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, & n.3; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 2009 WL 2501662, *4 (3d Cir., Aug. 18, 2009). Consequently, the Third Circuit observed that Iqbal provides the final nail-in-the-coffin for the no set of facts standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), 2 that applied to federal complaints before Twombly. 2501662 at *5. See Fowler, 2009 WL Now, after Iqbal, the Third Circuit requires that a district court must conduct the two-part analysis set forth in Iqbal when presented with a motion to dismiss: 2 In Conley, as stated above, a district court was permitted to summarily dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim only if it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. Under this no set of facts standard, a complaint could effectively survive a motion to dismiss so long as it contained a bare recitation of the claim s legal elements. 6 First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. [Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50]. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief. [Id.] In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to show such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 23435. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, [w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not show [n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Iqbal, [129 S. Ct. at 1949-50]. This plausibility determination will be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. Fowler, 2009 WL 2501662, *5. This Court is mindful, however, that the sufficiency of this pro se pleading must be construed liberally in favor of Plaintiff, even after Iqbal. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). Moreover, a court should not dismiss a complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim without granting leave to amend, unless it finds bad faith, undue delay, prejudice or futility. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 110-111 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 117 (3d Cir. 2000). B. Section 1983 Actions A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of his or her constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 7 the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ... . Thus, to establish a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged conduct was committed by (1) a person acting under color of state law and (2) that the conduct deprived him of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994). C. Medical Care Claim In this case, Plaintiff alleges that he has not received proper medical care, in violation of his constitutional rights. It is not clear from the complaint whether the plaintiff is a pretrial detainee or a convicted but unsentenced inmate, or a convicted and sentenced inmate. Pretrial detainees are protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and convicted prisoners are protected by the Eighth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, n.16, 545 (1979). See However, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has analyzed pretrial detainees medical care claims utilizing the Eighth Amendment standard. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166 n.22 (3d Cir. 8 2005); Natale v. Camden County Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581-82 (3d Cir. 2003); Sylvester v. City of Newark, 120 Fed. Appx. 419 (3d Cir. 2005). The Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment also requires that prison officials provide inmates with adequate medical care. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976); Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1999). In order to set forth a cognizable claim for a violation of his right to adequate medical care, an inmate must allege: (1) a serious medical need; and (2) behavior on the part of prison officials that constitutes deliberate indifference to that need. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Natale v. Camden County Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). To satisfy the first prong of the Estelle inquiry, the inmate must demonstrate that his medical needs are serious. "Because society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if those needs are serious. " Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). The Third Circuit has defined a serious medical need as: (1) "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment;" (2) "one that is so obvious that a lay person would recognize the necessity for a doctor s attention;" or (3) one for which "the denial of treatment would result in the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" or "a life-long handicap or permanent loss." Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2003)(internal quotations 9 and citations omitted); see also Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988). The second element of the Estelle test requires an inmate to show that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical need. See Natale, 318 F.3d at 582 (finding deliberate indifference requires proof that the official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety). "Deliberate indifference" is more than mere malpractice or negligence; it is a state of mind equivalent to reckless disregard of a known risk of harm. 837-38 (1994). See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, Furthermore, a prisoner s subjective dissatisfaction with his medical care does not in itself indicate deliberate indifference. See Andrews v. Camden County, 95 F. Supp.2d 217, 228 (D.N.J. 2000); Peterson v. Davis, 551 F. Supp. 137, 145 (D. Md. 1982), aff d , 729 F.2d 1453 (4th Cir. 1984). Similarly, "mere disagreements over medical judgment do not state Eighth Amendment claims." (3d Cir. 1990). White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 "Courts will disavow any attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment ... [which] remains a question of sound professional judgment." Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Even if a doctor s judgment concerning the proper course of a prisoner s treatment ultimately is shown to be mistaken, at most what would 10 be proved is medical malpractice and not an Eighth Amendment violation. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06; White, 897 F.3d at 110. The Third Circuit has found deliberate indifference where a prison official: (1) knows of a prisoner s need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment for non-medical reasons; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended treatment. See Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197. In this case, Plaintiff has not alleged facts indicating deliberate indifference on the part of the defendants. Plaintiff notes that he was examined and treated for his injuries, seeing a doctor within two days. While he may have been misdiagnosed, not given the diagnostic tests he would hope for, and/or treatment may not have been to his liking, at most, Plaintiff has alleged facts indicating medical malpractice, which does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, this claim will be dismissed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. However, the dismissal will be without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a motion to reopen and submitting an amended complaint, in accordance with the attached order, that addresses the deficiencies as outlined above. 11 D. Proper Defendants Plaintiff names as defendants the Camden County Correctional Facility, and Officer Ishner. However, the CCCF is not a proper defendant in this civil rights action, and will be dismissed. See Mitchell v. Chester County Farms Prison, 426 F. Supp. 271, 274 (D.C. Pa. 1976); see also Marsden v. Federal BOP, 856 F. Supp. 832, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (county jail not an entity amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Powell v. Cook County Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (Cook County Jail not a "person" under § 1983); McCoy v. Chesapeake Correctional Center, 788 F. Supp. 890, 893-94 (E.D. Va. 1992) (local jail not a "person" under § 1983). CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff s medical care claim will be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Defendant CCCF will be dismissed from this action, with prejudice. An appropriate order accompanies this opinion. /s/ NOEL L. HILLMAN NOEL L. HILLMAN United States District Judge Dated: December 1, 2009 At Camden, New Jersey 12
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