Breck v. Roger Doyle et al, No. 3:2012cv00649 - Document 185 (D. Nev. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER granting ECF Nos. 130 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and 134 Motion to Dismiss; denying as moot ECF No. 174 Motion for Summary Judgment; Clerk directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and close this case. Signed by Judge Miranda M. Du on 1/25/2018. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - KW)
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Breck v. Roger Doyle et al Doc. 185 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 8 *** 9 WILLIAM BRECK, an Individual, pro se, Plaintiff, 10 11 Case No. 3:12-cv-00649-MMD-VPC v. ORDER ROGER DOYLE, et al., 12 Defendants. 13 14 I. SUMMARY 15 Before the Court are two Motions to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 130, 134.) The first was 16 filed on behalf of David Clark, Kimberly Farmer, Laura Peters, Patrick King, J. Thomas 17 Susich, Caren Cafferata-Jenkins, Kathleen Breckenridge (collectively, “Individual 18 Defendants”), and the State Bar of Nevada (“SBN”). (ECF No. 130.) Plaintiff responded 19 (ECF No. 141), and Individual Defendants and SBN replied (ECF No. 148). 20 The second motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of Defendants State of Nevada 21 and the Nevada Supreme Court (“NSC”). (ECF No. 134.) Plaintiff responded (ECF No. 22 141), and Defendants State of Nevada and NSC replied (ECF No. 153). For the following reasons, the Court grants both motions to dismiss. 23 24 II. BACKGROUND 25 The Northern Nevada Disciplinary Panel (“Panel”) found that Plaintiff violated 26 Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct and recommended that he be barred from the 27 practice of law in Nevada. (See ECF No. 124-3 at 1.) Plaintiff appealed the decision to 28 the NSC and asserted a number of constitutional due process and equal protection Dockets.Justia.com 1 violations. (See ECF No. 130-3 at 41-75.) Meanwhile, Plaintiff initiated this action, and 2 the Court abstained under Younger, staying the case. (See ECF No. 111 at 11.) The 3 Court also dismissed Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and granted leave to file a 4 Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (Id.) Before Plaintiff filed his SAC, the NSC 5 affirmed the Panel’s sanctions, concluding that Plaintiff did not demonstrate “that his 6 constitutional rights were violated during or by the proceedings.” (ECF No. 130-2 at 4.) 7 Plaintiff appealed to the United States Supreme Court, but the Court denied Plaintiff’s 8 petition for writ of certiorari. (ECF No. 124-3 at 1.) Plaintiff then filed his SAC, which 9 contains claims for violations of the due process and equal protection clauses of the 10 Fourteenth Amendment as well as claims for violation of the Privileges and Immunities 11 Clause, Commerce Clause, and unconstitutional conditions doctrine, all stemming from 12 his disciplinary proceeding. (ECF No. 124-1 at 6-8.) 13 III. LEGAL STANDARD 14 A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) Legal Standard 15 Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows defendants to seek 16 dismissal of a claim or action for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Dismissal under 17 Rule 12(b)(1) “is appropriate if the complaint, considered in its entirety, on its face fails to 18 allege facts sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction.” In re Dynamic Random 19 Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 984–85 (9th Cir. 2008). Although 20 the defendant is the moving party in a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(1), the 21 plaintiff is the party invoking the court’s jurisdiction. As a result, the plaintiff bears the 22 burden of proving that the case is properly in federal court. In re Ford Motor Co./Citibank 23 (S.D.), N.A., Cardholder Rebate Program Litig., 264 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 24 McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)). 25 B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Legal Standard 26 A court may dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which 27 relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A properly pleaded complaint must 28 provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 2 1 relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 2 While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than “labels 3 and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft 4 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations 5 must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 6 at 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 7 matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 8 In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to 9 apply when considering motions to dismiss. First, a district court must accept as true all 10 well-pleaded factual allegations—but not legal conclusions—in the complaint. Id. at 678. 11 Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory 12 statements, do not suffice. Id. Second, a district court must consider whether the factual 13 allegations in the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679. A claim is 14 facially plausible when the plaintiff’s complaint alleges facts that allow a court to draw a 15 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 678. 16 Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of 17 misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but has not shown—that the pleader is entitled 18 to relief. Id. at 679. When the claims in a complaint have not crossed the line from 19 conceivable to plausible, the complaint must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 20 IV. DISCUSSION 21 A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 22 Defendants first argue that the SAC should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) 23 because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 24 (ECF No. 130 at 6; ECF No. 134 at 4.) “Rooker-Feldman prohibits a federal district court 25 from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a 26 state court judgment.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004). 27 The Ninth Circuit has provided guidance to determine whether a suit amounts to a de 28 facto appeal: “If a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous 3 1 decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that 2 decision, Rooker–Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction in federal district court.” Noel 3 v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003). “If, on the other hand, a federal plaintiff 4 asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party, 5 Rooker–Feldman does not bar jurisdiction.” Id. Thus, Rooker-Feldman deprives federal 6 district courts of jurisdiction when plaintiffs allege legal errors by state courts but not 7 when plaintiffs allege wrongful acts by defendants. Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1142. 8 Here, Plaintiff alleges wrongful acts by Individual Defendants and SBN in support 9 of his claims. (See, e.g., ECF No. 124-1 at 6 (alleging that Individual Defendants and 10 SBN never notified Plaintiff of any preliminary hearing and never gave him the 11 opportunity to review the evidence lodged against him).) While Plaintiff’s SAC contains 12 allegations that the NSC erred in determining his constitutional rights were not violated 13 (see, e.g., ECF No. 124-1 at 6; ECF No. 124-3 at 2), these allegations do not form the 14 basis of his claims. Rather, his claims stem from the allegedly wrongful acts of Individual 15 Defendants and SBN in connection with his disciplinary proceeding. Accordingly, this 16 Court is not deprived of jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman. 17 B. Sovereign Immunity 18 Defendants next argue that the SAC should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) 19 because sovereign immunity bars claims against the State of Nevada, SBN, and NSC 20 (ECF No. 130 at 8-9; ECF No. 134 at 5.) “[U]nder the eleventh amendment a state or its 21 agencies cannot be sued in federal court without its consent.” O’Connor v. State of Nev., 22 686 F.2d 749, 750 (9th Cir. 1982). “Nevada has explicitly refused to waive its immunity to 23 suit under the eleventh amendment.” Id. (citing NRS § 41.031(3)). In addition, Defendant 24 SBN enjoys eleventh amendment immunity as the investigative arm of Defendant NSC. 25 Id. Naturally, the NSC enjoys eleventh amendment immunity as well. See Simmons v. 26 Sacramento Cty. Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003); Louis v. Supreme 27 Court of Nev., 490 F. Supp. 1174, 1180 (D. Nev. 1980). Accordingly, Defendants State 28 /// 4 1 of Nevada, SBN, and NSC are not proper parties to this action, and Plaintiff’s SAC will 2 be dismissed as to them. 3 C. Immunity of Individual Defendants 4 Individual Defendants argue that the SAC should be dismissed under Rule 5 12(b)(6) because they are immune from civil liability in this action based on NSC Rule 6 106. (ECF No. 130 at 7.) The rule states: All participants in the discipline process, including grievants, bar counsel staff, members of disciplinary panels, diversion and mentoring participants, and witnesses, shall be absolutely immune from civil liability. No action may be predicated upon the filing of a disciplinary complaint or grievance or any action taken in connection with such a filing by any of the participants. 7 8 9 10 11 NSC Rule 106. The rule contains one exception: “[A]ny disclosures made pursuant to 12 Rule 121(16) shall not be immune under this rule.” Id. 13 The Individual Defendant were participants in Plaintiff’s discipline process. (See 14 ECF No. 141 at 11-15; ECF No. 174 at 3.) As such, NSC Rule 106 presumptively 15 applies. Plaintiff has not alleged that Individual Defendants’ conduct falls within the 16 exception to NSC Rule 106 but instead alleges that his claims arise from Individual 17 Defendants’ conduct outside the discipline process. (ECF No. 141 at 11-15.) However, 18 Individual Defendants’ conduct as alleged by Plaintiff relates entirely to the discipline 19 process. (See id.; ECF No. 174 at 3.) Moreover, any conduct that Plaintiff alleges 20 occurred outside the scope of the discipline process would exceed the scope of the 21 SAC. Plaintiff’s SAC contains only constitutional claims related to the discipline process. 22 (See ECF No. 124-1 at 6-8.) Accordingly, Individual Defendants are immune from civil 23 liability and are not proper parties to this action. Plaintiff’s SAC will be dismissed as to 24 them. 25 V. CONCLUSION 26 The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several 27 cases not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and 28 5 1 determines that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the 2 motions. It is hereby ordered that Individual Defendants and SBN’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF 3 4 No. 130) is granted. It is further ordered that Defendants State of Nevada and NSC’s Motion to 5 6 Dismiss (ECF No. 134) is granted. Plaintiff’s pending Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 174) is denied 7 8 as moot. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and close this 9 10 11 case. ENTERED THIS 25th day of January 2018. 12 13 MIRANDA M. DU UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6
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